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ABSTRACT 
This study analyses the nature of Germany's role in the EU after 
unification. The thesis posits a two tier approach, first examining Germany's 
relationship in the EU at a 'high' politics, and then utilising a sectoral 
approach to Germany's role in the EU, focusing on two key policy areas: 
migration and agriculture. 
The thesis reviews theories of European integration assessing their 
applicability to Germany's specific case. It is argued that it is an 
oversimplification to characterise Germany as either an 'assertive' or 
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concludes that Germany has acquired a stronger role. Unification has 
presented Germany with a number of challenges in the domestic arena. 
Borrowing from the ideas of Lowi, the thesis argues that Germany's role 
in the EU is policy specific and differs in contrasting policy sectors. The 
thesis also specifies the characteristics within the policy sector that shape 
Germany's actions in the EU. Furthermore, it is argued that the EU serves 
as an important arena for solving important domestic concerns. The thesis 
attempts to develop a taxonomic model comprising three characteristics: 
dynamics of the policy sector, policy circumstance and policy-making 
structures to test these hypotheses. 
The two policy sectors analysed illustrate how Germany's role can vary 
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policy in an t;ssue which represented a major domestic challenge after 
unification. Conversely, agriculture continued to be dominated by the 
Germans seeking wholly 'German' outcomes in the EU institutions. The 
thesis highlights the utility of European frameworks in particular policy 
sectors. In the case of migration, domestic and European policy making 
structures acted as a formidable constraint for policy solutions. On the 
contrary, in agriculture the nature of policy making at the domestic and 
European level enhanced the position of farmers and the agricultural sector 
in general. 
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION 
INTRODUCTION 
Since German unification there has been a great deal of debate both 
in academic literature and in the political sphere in Germany and in 
Europe about Germany's future role in the European Union (EU) 1 and its 
.-
continuing commitment to European integration. Contrasting views, both 
positive and negative, have emerged in the literature on post-unification 
Germany. The German Chancellor, Helmut Kohl, has declared his 
continued support for integration and a leading role for Germany in that 
process. In September 1994 he stated, "My government has always 
been the motor of unity. That will remain the case." (The Independent, 
30.09.94) 
One view that is put forward is that Germany will ultimately become 
economically and politically stronger, and that this development will aid 
the European unification process. The European Commission's 
statement on German unification on October 3rd 1990 clearly stated, 
German unification provided new impetus for a stronger and more 
united Community moving towards economic and monetary union 
and political union. The solution of the German problem in the 
Community framework will speed up the Community's own progress 
towards unity. (Commission of the European Communities, 1990: 
7)2 
In contrast, there is a negative view of Germany's stronger position. It 
has been argued that the unified Germany will become some kind of 
hegemon and come to dominate the European Union. Advocates of this 
pessimistic view include the late Nicholas Ridley. He commented in an 
article in the Spectator in July 1990 that Economic and Monetary Union 
1 The term European Community (EC) is used throughout the thesis to describe the Community 
prior to November 1993. The term European Union (EU) is adopted to refer to the situation 
thereafter, with the enforcement of the Treaty on European Union (TEU). 
2 At the time of unification the seventeen Commissioners confidently declared that, " ... German 
unification gives a new elan to a stronger and more united Community, leading to the economic 
and monetary and political union .... (Financial Times, 03.10.90: 1) 
was a "German racket designed to take over the whole of Europe." (The 
Spectator, 14.07.90: 8) Ridley's comments are particularly significant 
because it is generally assumed that his views mirrored those of the 
former British Prime Minister, Mrs Thatcher, who was originally opposed 
to German unification. 
Those who contradict this pessimistic view point to the functional 
and institutional explanations for the benign effect of German unification 
on European development. Hodge argues, 
The nature of the Federal Republic's domestic politics, as well as 
the relationship with the European Community, apply substantial 
constraints on the ability, or desire, to bring about radical 
reorientation. (Hodge, 1992: 223) 
The optimists suggest that the self-serving German power has been 
tamed by involvement in international institutions. 
Some integrationists fear that Germany will become less committed 
to European integration. There are those who believe that Germany has 
become economically and politically weaker as a result of unification. It 
is argued that as a consequence, Germany has become more inward 
looking and may well turn its back on the European Union. Advocates of 
this view suggest that a weaker Germany will lead to a weaker Europe. 
Marsh argues, 
without a strong Germany at its centre, able to play a constructive 
role in the integration of the entire continent. Europe will become a 
strife-ridden economic and political backwater unable to master its 
own destiny in a world where economic growth will have migrated to 
,the United States. (Marsh. 1994: front cover) 
Conversely. anti-integrationists take a positive view of a weaker Germany 
within the EU. 
1.1 PERSPECTIVES IN THE LITERATURE 
Studies examining the behaviour of a member state in the EC came 
to the fore in the 1980s. Germany proved to be a prime candidate for 
3. 
analysis. (Kohl & Basevi, 1980; Bulmer, 1986; Bulmer & Paterson, 1987; 
Hrbek & Wessels, 1984a; Wessels & Regelsberger, 1988; LOtzler, 1986; 
Feld, 1981). A number of these studies came in the form of edited 
collections concentrating on various aspects of Germany's relations with 
the EC. The volume of studies also generated a variety of approaches. 
Some studies concentrated ci'n the analysis of policy-making structures 
and how they have an impact on Germany's role in the EU. (Bulmer, 
1983; Bulmer & Paterson, 1987) Others concentrated on Germany's 
interests in the EC. (Hrbek & Wessels, 1984a) The economic dimension 
of Germany's relations with the EC was incorporated into most studies 
seeking to analyse this relationship. (Wessels & Regelsberger, 1988) 
Studies took a sectoral approach focusing on particular policy areas 
and the institutional dimension. (Kohl & Basevi, 1980) 
The reunification of Germany and its integration into the EU was an 
interesting yet unprecedented event. The possible implications of 
reunification for Germany's role in the EU were bound to arouse the 
interest of academics and journalists alike. In the immediate aftermath 
of unification a number of descriptive and chronological accounts 
( 
outlining the collapse of the communist regime in the former German 
Democratic Republic (GDR) and Germany's path to unification were 
generated. These were accounts in both English and German. 
(Dohnanyi, 1990; Golombek & Ratze, 1990; Grunberg, 1990; Heinrich, 
1990; Knopp, 1990; Lau & Lau, 1990; Senghaas, 1990; Glaessner, 
1992; Glaessner & Wallace, 1992: Grosser, 1990) Some accounts 
detailed the negotiation process and went on to speculate about the 
possible consequences of Germany's reunification on the European 
Community. (Spence, 1991; Grosser, 1992) Others examined the 
international aspects of Germany reunification outlining the views of the 
four occupying powers. (Kaiser, 1991) Others attempted to detail the 
4 
international reactions to German unification. (James & Stone, 1992) 
Some authors focused on the economic aspects of unification, taking a 
sectoral case study approach. (Ghaussy & Schafer, 1993) Some 
examined the international aspects of unification looking at the 
economic implications of unification for national and international 
environment. (Heitger & WaVf3'rman, 1993; Welfens, 1992) 
Several accounts attempted to analyse the "new" Germany's 
relationship with the EU and Europe. (Lankowski, 1993; Baring, 1994) 
Most accounts came in the form of edited collections focusing on the 
internal and external implications of unification. These accounts 
concentrated on areas such as security policy, foreign policy, economic 
policy and implications of unification for both eastern and western 
Europe. (Stares, 1992; Merkl, 1993) Others sought to examine the 
political, economic and social consequences of unification. (Kurz, 1993) 
Some authors chose to take a sectoral approach examining key policy 
areas. (Lippert, et ai, 1993; Heisenberg, 1991) 
1.2 OBJECTIVES OF THE THESIS 
The overall objective of the thesis is to investigate what Germany's , 
future role in the European Union will be. A further objective is to 
ascertain what impact unification has had on Germany's role in the EU. 
Has the "power" of Germany increased since unification? Will Germany 
discontinue working through multilateral frameworks and turn away from 
integrated actions towards the pursuit of 'national interest'? Is Germany 
as. committed to European unification as before or is its commitment 
going to waver under the pressure of domestic unification? An essential 
part of looking at Germany's role in the EU is the part that Germany will 
play in the process of European integration. These represent some of 
the core issues addressed in the thesis. 
5 
1.3 MAIN ARGUMENT 
Since unification a whole body of literature has emerged which 
attempts to deal with Germany's "new" role in the EU. Some views 
broadly reflect the Realist or Intergovernmentalist interpretations of 
European integration. In other words that Germany will become 
-, 
"assertive", some kind of hegemon in the pursuit of national interests. 
(Reich & Markovits, 1991; Garton-Ash, 1993 & 1994; Sperling, 1994) 
Others, however, reject these arguments by pointing to the benign effect 
of unification on Germany's role in the EU. These writers point out the 
benefits Germany has derived from the EU membership and joint action. 
The functional and institutional constraints in the domestic arena are 
cited as evidence negating a "hegemonic" resurgence on the part of the 
Germans. Others point to the policy-making structure, mitigating against 
the argument that the state can act as a coherent actor and on the 
existence of a national interest. These arguments loosely correspond to 
the "integrationist" (or interdependence) approach and the Domestic 
Politics Approach. (Hodge, 1992; Goldberger, 1993; Paterson, 1993) 
My contribution to the debate about Germany's future role in the EU 
• 
differs somewhat from the above contributions. The argument presented 
here can be placed at a midpoint in this continuum of extremes; of 
assertive and hegemonic interpretations on the one hand, and 
completely compliant explanations which argue that there has been no 
change after unification on the other hand. In the broad context, it is 
argued that Germany will remain committed to the EU in the post-
unification period. < The completion of the internal market and the 
implementation of Maastricht Treaty bear witness to this fact. 
Furthermore, Kohl continues to espouse the virtues of joint action 
through integration. 
6 
It would, however, be wrong to argue that unification has had no 
effect at all. Indeed, Germany's role has become "stronger" but by no 
means hegemonic. It is contended that unification has brought some 
challenges in the domestic sphere. Despite Germany's continued 
commitment to the EU and the process of European integration, 
.-
domestic concerns have become more important for Germany since 
unification. The two case studies, on migration and agriculture, are two 
of these areas of concern and offer good tests of this hypothesis. 
(Unification has affected these domestic concerns more directly in the 
case of agriculture and indirectly in migration). In this thesis it is 
contended therefore, that Germany has unavoidably in the short-term 
become more inward looking in order to deal with the mammoth task of 
unification and its consequences. 
Even though domestic problems have been high on the German 
agenda and the Germans have been more inward looking, this does not 
correspond to less commitment to Europe or vice versa to assertive 
behaviour. The Germans are unlikely to turn their backs on Europe. The 
EU retains it~ importance for Germany. It is maintained that the 
Germans are unlikely to move away from integrated actions in the 
pursuit of some "national interest". Integration has borne dividends for 
the Germans in the past, and can continue to do so in the future. 
It is argued that the EU serves as an important arena for solving 
domestic problems. It is perhaps more politically viable in certain policy 
areas to work within the European context. As William Paterson asserts, 
." 
"The Community ... provides a more acceptable framework for a number 
of pressing German concerns .... than any other conceivable 
arrangement." (Paterson, 1993: 172) Migration is one of these pressing 
problems where the Germans are seeking transnational solutions. 
Certain domestic concerns can be advanced in international 
7 
frameworks. (Milward, 1993: 4) Some German problems are best solved 
in the European arena. It is maintained that unification has not slowed 
down the pace of integration. The recent enlargement of the EU bears 
witness to this fact. 
However, an overall assessment of Germany's role in the EU is 
-
. beyond the scope of this thesis. A useful tool for analysing Germany's 
role in the EU is by looking at specific policy areas. Thus, a case study 
approach is utilised. The two policy areas chosen are Migration and 
Agriculture. These two areas also happen to constitute domestic 
concerns which were given a new dimension by unification. 
1.4 CASE STUDY ARGUMENT 
Another hypothesis tested in the thesis is that Germany's role in the 
EU differs in contrasting policy sectors. It is the contention of the thesis 
that the policy sector itself shapes whether Germany takes a pro-
European, Euro-compliant, less assertive position or vice versa. Thus, I 
borrow from Lowi, who has argued that policy determines politics. Lowi 
contends that different policy arenas produce different policy patterns, 
processes an? actors. It is argued that agriculture and immigration 
provide a contrast of Germany's approach to, and role in, the EU. In the 
case of migration the Germans may lean towards the "Euro-compliant, 
less assertive" end of the spectrum. This contrasts with agriculture, 
where the Germans may seek more "German" oriented solutions. 
Another contention in the thesis is that the EU serves as an optimal 
environment for pursuing or solving certain domestic concerns. Where 
" 
the Germans are able to utilise this resource for solving a domestic 
problem, they are likely to be more European-oriented i.e. less assertive. 
This begs the question of how the EU framework can be useful to 
Germany. 
8" 
One then has to ask what it is about these policy sectors that makes 
them important enough for detailed examination. The thesis tries to 
develop a typology of characteristics which "affect Germany's role in the 
EU in each of the policy areas. Thus, the argument put forward rests on 
three characteristics to be found, in different forms, in each policy sector: 
the dynamics of the policy sector, policy circumstance, and policy-
making structures. The dynamics of the policy sector refers to the nature 
of the policy issue itself, incorporating the factors within the policy area 
which bring about change. Policy circumstance deals with issues which 
at first glance may appear peripheral to the policy in question, but which 
nevertheless have an impact on policy decisions. The policy-making 
structures are vital in the role that a member state plays within the EU. It 
has been argued that the structure of the policy-making process in 
Germany has a direct effect on decisions taken at the European level. " 
Thus, an examination of a particular policy area includes an analysis of 
the main domestic political actors and processes. 
1.4.1 MIGRA liON 
The migration case study examines three characteristics: the 
, 
dynamics of the policy sector, policy circumstance and policy-making 
, 
structures. In the case of migration, the dynamics of the policy sector 
includes an analysis of characteristics intrinsic to the issue of migration. 
The section examines the political sensitivities surrounding the 
migration issue, the inconsistencies in policy and the inability of policy-
making structures to deal with the issue. The definition of migration as a 
transnational issue, which needs transnational solutions, is also 
examined. 
The unification of Germany had an indirect effect on policy, but 
associated events in the international arena were important to the whole 
migration debate. Policy circumstance analyses the significance of, and 
9· 
the effect of unification, the collapse of communism and the dissolution 
of the Soviet Union as a contributory factor towards policy reform. The 
mass migration from the east intensified the pressure for change. 
The section on policy-making structures investigates the impact of 
the constitutional and political deadlock in Germany's attempts to 
Europeanise policy. The Germans perceived the European framework 
as a legitimate arena in which to solve their migration problem. Germany 
readily and willingly attempted to seek European solutions. The section 
analyses the Germany's failure in the European arena and in turn its 
eventual agreement on the asylum compromise. The section on policy-
making structures also involves an analysis of Germany's future actions 
in this policy sector. 
1.4.2 AGRICULTURE 
The dynamics of the policy sector, policy circumstance and policy-
making structures are analysed in depth in each of the policy areas. With 
reference to agriculture, the dynamics of policy sector includes an 
analysis of the agricultural sector in the East and the inherent 
differences in the sectors in East and West which are inevitably going to , 
influence policy. The section entails an examination of the problems in 
the transition process and the degree to which this has changed 
Germany's position on agriculture. Dynamics of the policy sector 
incorporates an investigation of the traditional importance of, and role of, 
agriculture in German politics as well as the German attitude towards 
agriculture. 
Agriculture is inherently a complex issue both at the domestic and 
European level. The problems in agriculture have existed for a while and 
have not completely arisen as a direct result of unification. Policy 
circumstance endeavours to examine the serious challenges facing 
agriculture which have an affect on the German position at the European 
to· 
level. The incorporation of the new Lander into the Common Agricultural 
Policy (CAP), the whole debate on CAP reform and the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) negotiations are considered in 
this section. 
Institutional and constitutional factors have a direct affect on 
agricultural policy decisions. The integration of domestic and European 
policy making at national level ensures that domestic political actors 
have a fundamental role in the policy process and they are thereby able 
to control both the national and European agricultural agenda. Therefore, 
the section on policy-making structures includes an analysis of the main 
actors involved in agricultural policy-making, namely the German 
Farmers Union or Deutsche Bauernverband (DBV), the Minister for 
Agriculture, the Ministry for Agriculture or Bundesministerium fOr 
Ernahrung, Landwirtschaft und Forsten (BML), the political parties, 
particularly the Christian Social Union (CSU) and the Lander. The 
sections also examines the co-operation and close relationship 
between DBV and BML and the role of the CSU in the governing coalition 
and its attitudes on agriculture . 
. 
1.5 RESEARCH METHODS 
The methodological approach relies considerably on semi-
structured interviews conducted with high level civil servants in the 
Auswartiges Amt (AA) (Foreign Office), the BML, Bundesministerium des 
Innern (BMI) (Ministry of the Interior) and the Bundeskanzleramt (the 
Chancellery). For the agriculture case study, semi-structured interviews 
were also conducted with high ranking officials in the Deutsche Bauern 
Verband, both in Bonn at the DBV's headquarters and at the regional 
office in Berlin. The agriculture case study also encompassed interviews 
with officials responsible for agriculture in the party headquarters of the 
Christliche Demokratische Union (CDU) Christian Democratic Union. 
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Interviews were also carried out with leading academics working in the 
field of agriculture in Germany. 
Similarly, the migration' case study entailed conducting semi-
structured interviews with the Bundesbeauftragte far die Belange der 
Auslander (the Federal Representative for the Foreigners Affairs), with 
officials responsible for internal affairs at the CDU party headquarters, 
with officials at the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, with the Sozialdemokratische 
Partei Deutschlands (SPD) (Social Democratic Party) "think tank", with 
officials from the office of an SPD Member of Parliament, and with 
academics working in the field of migration. Semi-structured interviews 
were also conducted with officials at the German Permanent 
Representation in Brussels. 
Interviews were carried out with civil servants in the Foreign Office, 
the Ministry for Agriculture, and the Department of Trade and Industry in 
London. The interviews conducted in London proved useful in providing 
a perception of Germany's role in the EU as seen by one of Germany's 
partners in the EU. 
A total of 21 interviews were carried out over a period of two and half , 
years. Initial respondents were identified through existing literature in the 
various case study areas. Civil servants responsible for agriculture, 
migration and European affairs were identified through my personal 
. contacts; others were recommended to me either by my supervisor 
Professor Wyn Grant or by another leading academic in the field of 
German Politics, Professor William Paterson. Other interviews were 
arranged through re6ommendations of previous interviewees. Initial 
contact was always made in writing. 
The majority of interviews were conducted in German. The interviews 
were semi-structured in that questions were prepared in advance, but a 
rigid agenda was not adhered to in the interview, giving respondents an 
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opportunity to identify issues they considered important. The average 
length of the interviews was around one hour. The questions ranged 
from particular problems in the case study areas to Germany's changing 
role in the EU. Making contact with officials in German ministries and 
other bodies proved unproblematic. Officials were co-operative, 
answering my questions fully. The interviews proved to be a good source 
for identifying other key officials and for obtaining documentary material. 
The interviews were in the main recorded and transcribed afterwards. 
The interviews provided a major source of primary material for the case 
studies. The sessions on elite interviewing as part of the PhD research 
training programme proved to be a useful resource in structuring and 
conducting these interviews. 
The methodological approach also relied considerably on 
documentary. sources. Reports and documents from the German 
Bundestag were consulted. Reports, documents and official statements 
from the BML, BMI and AA proved invaluable in outlining the official 
position of the ministries to the areas being studied. Documents and 
official publications of the DBV, CDU and the SPD party headquarters 
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were also utilised. Publications of the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung provided 
essential background material and policy positions in the field of 
migration. The study entailed the use of various reports and documents 
from the European Commission and the European Parliament. The 
documentary sources provided a major source of primary research 
material for the thesis, particularly in the case studies. Conferences and 
seminars related to the'· research area, attended in Germany and Britain, 
again provided useful material as well as fora to discuss ideas for and 
the main arguments of, the thesis. 
The preliminary survey of the literature was conducted at the Library 
of the German Bundestag in Bonn and the library of the University of 
Konstanz. The Deutsche Gesellschaft fOr Auswartige Politik provided 
essential secondary resources on various field trips to Germany. 
Libraries of the European ··Commission in London, the BML, the 
Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, the AA archive, the BMI and resources from the 
former Ministry for Inner German Relations were also used. Informal 
discussions with individuals at the Institut fOr Europaische Politik proved 
beneficial. 
The secondary sources consulted included books on post 
unification Germany, Germany's role in the EU and specialist 
background literature on the case studies. A whole variety of periodicals 
and newspapers in both German and English were utilised. 
The research was made possible by a three year postgraduate 
scholarship from the Economic and Social Research Council. A detailed 
two month research trip was funded by the German Academic Exchange 
Service. The Department of Politics and International Studies provided 
funds for residual research in the closing stages of my PhD. 
1.6 PLAN OF THE THESIS 
The thesis comprises seven chapters. Chapter One provides an , 
introduction into the subject matter. It includes a survey of the major 
works on Germany's role in the European Union. The chapter goes on to 
outline the prinCipal objectives of the thesis and the main arguments. 
The chapter also contains a section. on research methods, outlining how 
the study was carried out and methods and sources utilised in the study. 
Chapter Two provides a theoretical review for the thesis. The 
Chapter begins with an analysis of Intergovernmentalism, proceeding 
on to a review of the Domestic Politics Approach and the ideas of Alan 
Milward. It then sets out the ideas of Lowi, considering the general 
literature on 'policy style'. Chapter Two advances to an analysis of the 
relevant theoretical literature on German 'policy style' and German policy-
14 
making in general. The chapter moves on to consider approaches which 
look at the linkage of domestic and international factors such as Putnam 
and his so-called Two-LeveLGames Approach, the Interdependence 
theorists and finally Moravcsik's Liberal Intergovernmentalism. In 
conclusion the chapter considers the applicability of the various theories 
surveyed for the policy case studies. Thus, the final section provides the 
theoretical framework for the thesis. 
Chapter Three provides a historical overview of Germany's 
relationship with, and role in, the EU. The chapter considers the aims 
and objectives of the Germans at the time of the establishment of the 
European Communities. Chapter Three considers the economic and 
political importance of European integration for Germany from the time of 
Adenauer up until unification. 
Chapter Four considers the debate after unification. The chapter 
contains an overview of the immediate reaction to German unification 
and the fears and expectations of Germany's partners in the EU. The 
chapter goes on to consider the main contentions of the thesis as 
regards Germany's role in the EU . 
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Chapters Five, Six and Seven contain an analysis of the case 
studies, migration and agriculture, presented in the light of the 
theoretical concerns and policy issues highlighted in earlier chapters. 
CHAPTER TWO: THEORETICAL REVIEW 
INTRODUCTION 
The aim of the thesis is to analyse the nature of Germany's role in the 
EU after unification. The study posits a two tier approach, first examining 
Germany's broader relationship with the EU, and then using a sectoral 
approach to analyse Germany's role in the EU, concentrating on two key 
policy areas: migration and agriculture. The research is informed by a 
number of relevant theoretical frameworks. The aim of this chapter is to 
provide the theoretical background for the thesis. 
The thesis surveys a plethora of diverse theoretical literature. However, 
the starting point of any theoretical analysis of the role of a member state 
within the EU and the process of European integration has. to be the 
theories of European integration. Scholars have viewed European 
integration and the role of member states in the EU in a variety of ways. 
Broadly speaking, the theoretical approaches to European integration can 
be categorised into those that concentrate on either the 'supranational' 
dimension of integration 1 or those that highlight the primacy of the nation-
. ' 
state. 
1 This category includes Functionalism, Neofunctionalism, Federalism and Transactionalism. 
Functionalism found its roots in the writings of David Mitrany, whose sole purpose was the 
development of a 'working peace system'. For the functionalists, "the dynamic of integration .... was the 
learning process of citizens who were gradually drawn into the co-operative ethos created by 
functionally specific international institutions". (Taylor, 1983: 4) For a comprehensive explanation of 
David Mitrany's ideas see: (Mitrany, 1966 & 1975) and (Pentland, 1973: 64-99). The two scholars 
particularly associated with neofunctionalism, an adaptation of David Mitrany's functionalist ideas, are 
Ernst B. Haas and Leon Lindberg. Ernst Haas defined integration as, "the process whereby political 
actors in several distinct settings are persuaded to shift their loyalties, expectations and political 
activities toward a new centre, whose institutions possess or demand jurisdiction over the pre-existing 
national states. The end result of a process of political integration is a new political community, 
superimposed over the pre-existing ones". (Haas, 1958: 16) For an in-depth explanation of 
neofunctionalism see: (Haas, 1958), (Lindberg, 1963) and (Pentland, 1973: 100-146). 
Neofunctionalism has been the subject of much critical appraisal, not least from some of its own 
proponents. For a critique ofneofunctionalism see: (George, 1991), (Laffan, 1992) and (Mitrany, 
1975). The Single Market experiment rekindled interest in neofunctionalism. For a revised model of 
neofunctionalism see: (George, 1991 & 1993). The main proponents of the federalist approach include 
Jean Monnet, Walter Hallstein and Alberto Spinelli. For a summary of federalist theory see: (Pentland, 
1973: 147-186). The main proponent oftransactionalism is Karl Deutsch. See: (Deutsch, 1972) and 
(Hodges, 1972: 108-123). For an overview of theoretical approaches to European integration refer to: 
(De Bussy, 1975: 84-123). 
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Ernst Haas once commented that, "Theories of regional integration 
retain a good deal of relevance wherever and whenever the setting they 
were designed to describe and explain continues to exist." (Haas, 1975: 15) 
However, the theoretical approaches to integration which solely concentrate 
on the 'supranational' dimension of integration; namely functionalism, 
neofunctionalism, federalism and transactionalism2, are not relevant for the 
purposes of this study, in that these approaches cannot provide adequate 
explanations or a comprehensive framework for understanding Germany's 
changing role in the EU. 
The theoretical review begins with an analysis of intergovernmentalism, 
the theory of European integration which attempts to conceptualise the role 
that member states play in the integration process. Intergovernmentalism 
starts from the assumption that nation states are important actors in the 
process of European integration. The theory is pertinent for the purposes of 
this study in that it places emphasis on the domestic dimension of EU, 
focusing on the role, and the impact that nation states can have on EU. 3 
The review progresses onto a discussion of the Domestic Politics 
Approach, which provides a potential framework for investigating the role of 
a member state in the EU. Furthermore, the Domestic Politics Approach 
proves to be a useful structuring aid, in that it propounds a framework for 
analysing case studies. The chapter proceeds with a consideration of the 
relevance of the ideas of Alan Milward for the purposes of the thesis. Briefly, 
the analysis assesses the utility of the EU framework for solving domestic 
concerns, as the thesis advances the hypothesis that domestic concerns 
have always been important for Germany and that it has always attempted 
2 The different schools of integration theory have attempted to explain the integration process in 
Western Europe; but no one approach or theory has ever achieved complete dominance. Rather, 
different approaches or theories have tended to predominate during various stages of the development 
of the EU. For example, intergovernmentalism the starting point of the analysis for the purposes of 
this thesis dominated the theoretical literature on European integration in the 1970s. 
3 The utility of the intergovemmentalist approach for this thesis is developed further on in this 
chapter. 
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to further them in the European arena. Any member state will, of course, do 
this, but in Germany's case, it is particularly important to attempt to 
distinguish between European rhetoric and the imperatives of national 
interest. 
Another hypothesis investigated in this thesis is that Germany's role in 
the EU differs in different policy sectors. Hence, the assertion that 
Germany's role in the EU is sector specific. 4 The nature of the policy sector 
itself determines whether Germany takes a 'German' or 'European' role in 
the EU in certain policy areas. Any analysis therefore has to be sensitive to 
sectoral variations. The ideas of Theodore Lowi, who argues that different 
policy arenas produce different policy patterns, processes and actors, are 
utilised to some extent. 5 The theoretical framework uses Lowi's ideas in 
the broadest sense, elucidating the sector specific characteristic of his 
approach and setting these attributes in the context of countervailing 
arguments about national policy style. 6 The thesis attempts to develop a 
taxonomic model of characteristics which affect Germany's role in the EU in 
each of the policy area. The theoretical discussion sets these arguments in 
the context of t~9 theoretical literature on German policy-making in general, 
and on German policy style more specifically. 7 
The theoretical analysis moves on to review the approaches which 
attempt to combine the domestic and international factors as possible 
theoretical explanations for European integration, namely interdependence 
theory and Liberal Intergovernmentalism. Finally, the chapter outlines the 
applicability of the various theoretical approaches for the purposes of this 
4 Case studies of contrasting policy sectors, namely migration and agriculture, are used to illustrate 
these arguments. Refer to Chapters 5 & 7. 
5 A more detailed analysis is included further on in this chapter. See: (Lowi, 1964) 
6 Refer to: (Freeman, 1985) and (Richardson, 1982) 
7 Refer to: (Dyson, 1982), (Katzenstein, 1982) and (Bulmer, 1989b) 
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thesis in general and more specifically, for the policy case studies. 
2.1 INTERGOVERNMENTALISM 
Intergovernmentalism came to the fore in the conditions of the 1970s 
when progress towards integration was frustrated by oil and community 
price shocks, the breakdown of the Bretton Woods Monetary System, 
'stagflation' and the consequent emergence of 'Eurosclerosis'. However, 
before proceeding on to a discussion of intergovernmentalism, it would be 
useful at this stage to define the term 'intergovernmental'. According to 
Webb, the term 'intergovernmentalism' describes and categorises an 
international organisation by its decision-making capacity. An international 
organisation is intergovernmental when it rejects any restrictions on its 
sovereignty. (Webb, 1983: 22) As regards the European Community the 
term 'intergovernmental', according to Webb, describes the political 
processes that have emerged despite the institutional arrangements laid 
down in the Treaties. It is also used as an explanation for the relationship 
which has developed between the Council of Ministers and the 
Commission, a relationship which has definitely been advantageous for the 
, 
Council of Ministers. 
Stanley Hoffmann's name is mostly identified with 
intergovernmentalism. Hoffmann highlighted the role of governments as 
major factors influencing the speed of integration.8 However, it is important 
to note that this is not a new phenomenon. Voices have continuously been 
raised about the capacity of national governments to block efforts towards 
integration.9 According to intergovernmentalism the state is a major player 
in the international system and therefore holds the key to decision-making. 
Hoffmann depicted the role of national governments as, " ... gatekeepers 
8 For a detailed account of Hoffmann's arguments see: (Hoffmann, 1966: 862-915). 
9 The Realist or traditional school of international relations theory has always highlighted the role of 
national governments in integration. 
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between the Community and the national level". Intergovernmentalists 
emphasise the importance of the EC in the revival of Western European 
states after the war. (Laffan, 1992: 11)10 In addition, Hoffmann argued that 
national governments, " .. can stop or slow down the building of a central 
political system and ..... resist the transfer of power to a new central one." 
(Hoffmann, 1982: 30) Hoffmann particularly stressed the strong ability of the 
national governments to constrict the expansion of EC's central institutions 
and its policy scope. (Webb, 1983: 22) He questioned the willingness of 
national governments to give up a part of their sovereignty to an international 
organisation. Hoffmann distinguished between 'high' and 'low' politics, 
emphasising that national governments could not be expected to renounce 
responsibility in areas of 'high' politics since this would mean a direct 
challenge to their authority and status. He contended that governments 
would, however, be prepared to collaborate and cooperate in the areas of 
'low' politics; since lithe bastion of the state would not undermined by such 
co-operation." (Webb, 1983: 24) From this perspective, European 
integration is perceived as zero sum bargaining game in which national 
interest is the predominant interest. 
• 
Intergovernmentalism does provide one picture of EU decision-making. 
The importance of national governments certainly manifests itself in the 
Council of Ministers, the Committee of Permanent Representatives 
(COREPER), and in the European Council. The emergence of summitry 
gives credence to the intergovernmental character of the EU institutions. 
However, intergovernmentalism has not remained without criticism. 
Intergovernmentalism has mainly come under scrutiny due to " .. its 
insistence on the stubbornness of national governments in the face of 
pressure to engage in international co-operation." (Webb, 1983: 21) 
10 Paul Taylor reiterates the importance of national in EC policy making. Arguing from an 
intergovernmentalist perspective, Taylor considers, "national governments as the central actors in EC 
policy-making in a confederalist phase of integration." (Bulmer, 1983: 349) 
20 
Intergovernmentalism does not consider the far-reaching co-operation 
which occurs between states in the international system and the 
consequent constraints that can be placed on national governments in an 
interdependent world. More specifically, Webb argues that 
intergovernmentalists tend to misrepresent and omit the "consensus-
building mechanisms" and the occasional (and increasing) use of qualified 
majority voting. 
Hoffmann's differentiation of 'high' politics and 'low' politics has also 
been criticised as being "artificial and inappropriate" when considering the 
manner in which governments react to certain issues. (Webb, 1983: 24) The 
effectiveness of national governments as 'gatekeepers' has been 
challenged. Webb asserts that, 
Far from being efficient and effective gatekeepers straddling between 
their national boundaries and the Community, national governments 
more closely resemble the juggler who must apply himself 
simultaneously to the tasks of keeping several balls in the air and not 
lOSing his balance on a rotating platform.(Webb, 1983: 31) 
Webb argues that Hoffmann underrated the problems which confront 
national governments when co-ordinating policies at the national level. The 
fact that governments have to bargain and make trade-offs, and satisfy a 
variety of interests at the domestic level, was not taken into account. (Webb, 
1983: 24) Huelshoff contends that intergovernmentalism cannot analyse the 
domestic sources of the motivations of a member states behaviour in the 
EU. (Huelshoff, 1993: 304) 
Intergovernmentalism in its entirety does not explain the role that 
G~rmany can play in the EU. Despite the valid criticisms that can be made 
of it, intergovernmentalism forms an important basis for the theoretical 
framework of the thesis in that it highlights the national or domestic 
dimension of European integration. If one is to examine the implications 
which unification may have for Germany's role in the EU essentially, whilst 
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not ignoring the European tier, one has to concentrate on the domestic 
dimension of European politics. In order to examine whether German power 
has grown after unification, one has to look at the domestic sphere. If one is 
to investigate whether Germany is being more "assertive" in the EU, one 
has to ask does this imply a change in domestic circumstances? Has 
unification acted as a constraint on Germany's role in the EU? Essentially 
this is a domestic argument in that unification has been primarily handled 
domestically. Has Germany's attitude towards the EU fundamentally 
changed since unification? Is Germany still pursuing, or pursuing to a 
greater extent, domestic objectives within the EU? This thesis attempts to 
provide a contribution to answering these questions. 
Webb notes that, "the constraints - and occasionally the opportunities 
generated within the domestic political systems - can impinge directly and 
emphatically on Community policy-making." (Webb, 1983: 27) Has this 
been the case in Germany after unification? Intergovernmentalism focuses 
on the ways in which the national governments and politicians can use the 
EU context for national gains. Intergovernmentalism certainly highlights the 
way in which governments are able to use the EU to solve domestic 
problems, for example by blaming unpopular but necessary decisions on 
the EU. The Germans have certainly done this. The German government 
has been ready and willing to export issues which are politically sensitive 
out of the domestic political arena. As Webb asserts, "Various governments 
have, indeed, anxiously looked to the EC to find solutions to problems which 
have persistently eluded them." (Webb, 1983: 31) Wallace argued that, 
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the EC could be used as a resource in domestic politics by hard 
pressed governments. The governments may wish to refer to their 
Community commitments il1 .. order to further, or even to clarify, their own 
domestic policy objectives on a similar or related issue. Back home, by 
contrast, a government may be able to avoid too close and too 
comfortable an association with an unpopular or contentious policy by 
making use of the EC as a political or economic alibi. (Webb, 1983: 
29)11 
National governments undoubtedly have an important role to play in EU 
decision-making. The German government in particular has an important 
role being perceived as a driving force behind integration and as the EU's 
'paymaster'. But, as the case studies will show, other actors in the domestic 
arena are of considerable importance in the stance that a government or 
member state takes to the EU level. As Webb notes, "governments can be 
.. sensitive to the political clout of some groups." (Webb, 1983: 29) This is 
certainly the case in agriculture, where the Deutsche Bauern Verband holds 
a lot of political weight. Webb argues that the dealings that governments 
have with other domestic actors can improve national participation in the 
EU, as well as complicate it. As the case studies will show, public opinion 
is also of great irTlportance. This is particularly the case with migration. 
Bulmer and Paterson reject the intergovernmentalist approach as 
applicable to Germany. They contend that national governments in Germany 
cannot be regarded as a cohesive actor. (Bulmer & Paterson, 1987: 17) 
They assert that the premises of intergovernmentalism that, "sovereignty 
will be defended, that policy will be defined by national interest and that a 
single, coherent Europea':l policy will prevail, cannot adequately explain the 
German case." (Bulmer & Paterson, 1987: 15) 
2.2 THE DOMESTIC POLITICS ApPROACH 
Intergovernmentalism notwithstanding these criticisms, helps to provide 
II For original argument see: (Wallace, 1977). 
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part of the conceptual context for the thesis, highlighting the national 
dimension in EU politics and EU policy-making. Intergovernmentalism 
concurs with the Domestic Politics Approach in emphasising the centrality 
of national governments, and consequently the domestic policy-making 
environment. 12 However, Bulmer, the main advocate of the Domestic Politics 
Approach, rejects the assumptions about the monolithic character of 
national governments in the intergovernmentalist approach. 13 Bulmer 
argues that intergovernmentalism does little more than stress the 
importance of national governments. Intergovernmentalist interpretations of 
the EU do not advance a framework for examining member states' attitudes 
towards the EU. (Bulmer, 1983: 356) Intergovernmentalism is therefore not 
enough. The Domestic Politics Approach provides an alternative framework 
to the various European integration theories for analysing the behaviour of 
member states within the European Union. 
The Domestic Politics Approach is particularly pertinent to this thesis 
because it provides a framework to examine a member state's role in the 
European Union. Hence, the Domestic Politics Approach can partially 
provide the theoretical framework for analysing Germany's role in the 
• 
European Union. The Domestic Politics Approach is also a useful tool for 
this thesis in so far as it provides a framework for analysing case studies. 14 
One particular element of the Domestic Politics Approach is relevant for the 
thesis; namely the argument that domestic political factors can be utilised to 
12 Bulmer distinguishes the importance of national governments in intergovernmentalism and the 
Domestic Politics Approach. Bulmer cites the Luxembourg Compromise of 1966, which ensured that 
all important decisions were taken by unanimity. Governments were able to have recourse to a veto in 
matters affecting "vital national interests". These factors enhanced the role of national governments. 
The introduction of this idea of "vital national interests" ensued from De Gaulle's boycott of the 
Community in 1965. According to the Domestic Politics Approach, this concept, "served notice on all 
sectional interests that they could aspire to be vital." (Bulmer, 1983: 358) Bulmer alluded to the 
development of summitry and the economic recession as reasons for the importance of national 
Bovernments. (Bulmer, 1983: 358-360). . 
The federal structure of Germany precludes the natlOnal government behavrng as a monolithic actor. 
The federal system allows for other actors in the policy making process to have a say in the making of 
European Policy. For instance, the DBV is fundamental in the formulation of agricultural policy. 
14 The analysis of Community policy-making, especially via case studies, came to the fore in the 
1970s and early 1980s when the development of integration theories slowed down. 
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explain actions in the EU. 1S (Butmer, 1986: 26) The Domestic Politics 
Approach also explains the way in which governments can use the EU. This 
is visible in the case of immigration, where government's support for 
harmonisation of immigration and asylum policy can be explained in terms 
of the domestic political context whereby, "governments may have 
considerable powers to impose a policy on affected domestic interests so. 
that they can derive power from their formally authoritative position in 
domestic politics and from their important position in the Council of 
Ministers." (Bulmer, 1983: 354) 
The Domestic Politics Approach was formulated as a response to 
neofunctionalism and provided a contemporary alternative to the Neorealist 
model. Bulmer examines the linkage between domestic politics and the 
European Union. The Domestic Politics Approach seeks to explain how EC 
policy-making is affected by behaviour within the nation-state, thereby 
examining member states' attitudes and interests in the EU. Firstly, Bulmer, 
considers the domestic policy-making structures and secondly, he 
examines the attitudes held within the member state concerning the EU. 
(Bulmer, 1983: 350) Bulmer asserts that the purpose of investigating the 
linkage between domestic politics and EU policy-making is, "to synthesise 
these two dimensions with a view to illuminating the behaviour of individual 
member states in the Community." (Bulmer, 1983: 350) Bulmer believes 
that the Domestic Politics Approach provides a useful tool for analysing 
case studies. It provides a method for explaining the reasons why national 
governments hold certain policy positions in the Council of Ministers. 
(Bulmer, 1983: 350) More broadly, the Domestic Politics Approach 
15 This point is reiterated by Bulmer and Paterson who argue that, "domestic political factors will 
remain key determinants of political developments at the European level in the foreseeable future." 
(Bulmer & Paterson, 1987: 14) This is certainly the case in migration policy, where the Germans have 
identified a problem in the domestic sphere and have attempted to find solutions in the European 
arena. Domestic issues are shaping European policy. The European arena is proving beneficial to the 
Germans. The EU policy arena is increasingly used by national governments seeking transnational 
policy solutions to intractable domestic policy issues. 
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contributes to the, "putting togetl)er of a composite picture of a member 
state's behaviour in the EC, to examining the continuing sensitivities of 
individual member states towards Community activity." (Bulmer, 1983: 351) 
The Domestic Politics Approach assumes that EC policy-making 
comprises two tiers: "the upper tier - the formal institutional framework of 
the Communities and the lower tier - domestic sources of national 
negotiating position." (Bulmer, 1983: 353) The 'lower tier' is particularly 
important in explaining Germany's role within the Community and why it has 
adopted certain positions in the Council of Ministers. The Domestic Politics 
Approach stresses one of the main arguments of the thesis, that the policy 
sector itself influences whether Germany takes a 'European' line or a 
'German' line. In other words, the policy sector itself shapes whether 
Germany will seek a transnational solution. The policy sector itself 
influences whether Germany argues for a solution in a particular policy area 
which is more akin to its domestic interests. Studies conducted by 
Rosenthal and Wallace 16 in the 1970s concluded that, "policy-making 
patterns differ according to the area concerned." (Bulmer, 1983: 349) This 
argument is reinforced by the Domestic Politics Approach, which 
emphasises the fact that the domestic policy-making arena or the lower 
decisional tier "is rooted in policy environments which differ between 
member states and the policy area concerned". (Bulmer, 1983: 353) 
Bulmer utilises the concept of "policy style" 17 to examine how national 
negotiating positions are arrived at and to characterise the different policy-
making environments. Another element of Bulmer's argument that is 
pertinent to this thesis IS the contention that the social and economic 
. conditions in the domestic arena help to form the national interests and the 
16 See: (Rosenthal, 1975) and (Wallace, Wallace & Webb, 1977). 
17 Richardson, Gustafsson and Jordan derme "policy style" as "the interaction between (a) the 
government's approach to policy-making and (b) the relationship between government and other actors 
in the policy process." (Richardson, 1982: 13). 
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composition of policy. Thus, the golitical importance of the migration issue 
in the years after unification shaped the domestic policy position on that 
issue. Bulmer argues that, 
Each national polity has a different set of social and economic 
conditions that shapes its national interests and policy content. Each 
state has differing ideological cleavages which determine the extent of 
consensus. (Bulmer, 1983: 353 ). 
Bulmer poses an important question when he asks why member states 
perceive the EU as the most suitable arena to solve certain policy issues, 
rather than the nation-state or other international organisations. (Bulmer, 
1983: 356) The answer to this question with reference to this thesis is that 
particular domestic objectives are better achieved at the European level 
within the European structures. The domestic context or domestic policy-
making structures determine the policy position individual ministers will 
take at the European level. 
Thus, using the upper tier as a medium, the patterns of negotiation on 
EC issues at the domestic level of the member states will determine the 
progress on individual policy issues and integration in general. (Bulmer, 
1983: 357) 
The Domestic Politics Approach concentrates on the policy-making 
structures in the domestic arena. This is a useful tool for structuring the 
case studies. The thesis moves beyond the institutional aspects of the 
domestic environment. The thesis examines other 'domestic variables' 
which are specific to the policy sectors analysed. For instance, in the case 
of migration one considers the special nature of the issue and the nature of 
the policy process associated with it. The fact that migration is a politically 
sensitive issue meant that the Germans, seeing the European policy-
. making level as a legitimate extension of domestic policy-making in 
Germany, constructively used the EU to further particular national interests. 
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2.3 ALAN MILWARD 
In his book, "The European Rescue of the Nation-State" Milward 
critiques the major theoretical explanations for the integration process in 
Europe. He argues that theories of European integration have had "little 
predictive value and historical research." (Milward, 1993: 1) Milward 
challenges the fundamental tenets of the theories which assume that the 
process of integration would lead to the disappearance of the nation-state. 
(Milward, 1992: 2) He contests the assumptions of both the Realists and 
the Neofunctionalists that there is a basic antagonism between European 
integration and the nation-state. Milward argues that this contention has not 
been borne out by historical research. Milward maintains that the 
development of the European Union does not mean the demise of the 
nation-state. Moreover, he asserts that the expansion of the European 
Union since 1945, "has been an integral part of the reassertion of the 
nation-state as an organisational concept." (Milward, 1992: 2-3) He 
contends that without the evolution of the European Union the reassertion of 
the nation-state may have been unachievable. He goes further to maintain 
that, 
The development of the European Community, the process of European 
integration, was, ... a part of the post-war rescue of the European nation-
state, because the new political consensus on which this rescue was 
built required the process of integration, the surrender of limited areas 
of national sovereignty to the supranation. (Milward, 1992: 4) 
Thus, it is argued that the nation-state was able to reassert itself within 
the process of European integration. Milward points out, from historical 
evidence, that nation-states had a substantial part in the formation of the 
European Communities and that the nation-state kept command of the 
process of their development. Milward claims that nation-states remain the 
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locus of power with only limited slJrrender of national sovereignty. He further 
claims that integration was a process undertaken by the nation-states "for 
their own purposes". (Milward, 1992: 18) Thus, the European Union was a 
construct of the nation-state for the satisfaction or achievement of its own 
domestic policy objectives. He asserts that, "states were able to assert the 
priority of a national interest within the integrationist framework." (Milward, 
1993: 4) He hypothesises that certain policy objectives could be advanced 
more successfully via international institutions. Thus, in order to achieve 
these domestic policy objectives, nation-states would be willing to cede 
sovereignty in particular policies to common institutions. They would then 
be able to restrict the transfer of sovereignty and retain the balance of 
power in their favour. (Milward, 1993: 19) 
Alan Milward's arguments mirror one of the central contentions of this 
thesis: member states will use the international framework at hand to 
pursue domestic policy objectives. Milward's argument in summary is that, 
Nation-states have a certain portfolio of policy objectives which they will 
try to realise in the face of economic and political internationalisation. 
These policy objectives are almost entirely shaped by domestic political 
pressures and economic resources and will therefore vary from country 
to country and over time. In order to advance these objectives, nation-
states will attempt to use what international framework there is at 
hand.{Milward, 1993: 21) 
Milward maintains that the western Europe's recent history, in terms of 
support for the integration process, can be explained through the pursuit of 
domestic objectives. The whole integration process becomes acceptable to 
most domestic constituencies if it is tied to the attainment of specific aims . 
. (Milward, 1993: 185-186) These arguments may be an overstatement, but 
they are an interesting overstatement which contribute to the debate. 
Thus, Milward explains integration as, 
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a new form of agreed international framework created by nation-states 
to advance particular sets of national domestic policies which could not 
be pursued, or not be pursued so successfully, through the already 
eXisting international framework of co-operation between 
interdependent states, nor by renouncing international 
interdependence. (Milward, 1993: 182) 
Alan Milward's arguments, to a certain extent, mirror those of Werner J. 
Feld, who also dismisses the integration theories. (Feld, 1981: 17-22) Feld 
puts forward a theoretical approach defining integration in terms of the 
domestic and foreign policy objectives of the member states. (Feld, 1981: 
22) Feld argues that integration is based on "national interests" of the 
nation-state. He contends the member states determine whether 
integration progresses forward or stagnates. I8 Thus, Feld's view of the 
purpose of integration echoes that of Alan Milward. Feld argues that 
member states can utilise the EU to maximise national interests. He 
asserts, 
integration is a vehicle through which member states maximise or 
attempt to maximise their national interests on a long-range basis 
through the creation of regional institutions and the evolution of regional 
policies. (Feld, 1981: 23) 
Feld's claim relates to one of the arguments of the thesis particularly in 
the case of migration. 
2.4 LOWI AND THE CONCEPT OF POLICY STYLE 
The thesis utilises a case study approach to analyse specific policy 
areas in relation to Germany's changing role in the EU. It is contended that 
- Germany's role in the EU differs in contrasting policy sectors. Hence, the 
18 Feld states, " .. regional integration from its lowest form (a free trade area) to its highest form 
(political union) is seen from the perspective of the nation state's economic, political and strategic 
interests and foreign_policy goals. These goals largely set the scope and level of integration and defme 
the parameters of the regional institutions to be created." (Feld, 1981: 22) 
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assertion that Germany's role in the EU is sector specific, with the case 
studies of migration and agriculture providing a contrast of that role. The 
thesis further contends that characteristics within the policy sector itself 
shape Germany's course of action in that policy area. 
The argument propounded in the thesis rests on a typology of 
characteristics which affect Germany's role in the EU in each of the policy 
areas. The thesis identifies the dynamics of the policy sector, policy 
circumstance and policy-making structures, as characteristics which can be 
found, in different forms, in each of the policy sectors. 19 The underlying 
assumption is that the nature of the policy issue (in other words 
characteristics within the policy area itself), together with the institutional 
dynamics of the policy process (policy-making structures) combine to affect 
Germany's role in the EU. The thesis suggests that sectoral variations exist, 
not only in the dynamics of the policy issue, but also in the institutional 
make up, culminating in the conclusion that Germany's role in, and 
approach to, the EU is sector specific. It is proposed that these sectoral 
variations in policy areas have implications for the nature of Germany's role 
in the EU.20 
Gary Freeman attempted to explain structured variation in the policies of 
states, by reviewing two important analytical perspectives, the national 
styles approach and the policy sector approach. He proposes the 
integration of the concepts of style and sector, each complementing the 
other. (Freeman, 1985: 469) 
The policy sector approach departs from the premise propounded by 
the national styles approach that 'politics determines policy'. Many scholars, 
including Lowi, the best known proponent of the policy sector approach, 
19 See chapter one for a general explanation of these terms. For a detailed analysis of these 
characteristics in relation to the policy areas studied refer to Chapter Five for migration and Chapter 
Seven in the case of agriculture. 
20 These arguments are developed in greater depth in Chapters Five, Seven and Eight. 
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suggested "reversing the direction of causality" by asserting that "the nature 
of political issues themselves causes the politics associated with them". 21 
(Freeman, 1985: 467) 
What relevance is Lowi for the purposes of this study? Lowi's basic 
premise is that 'policy determines politics'. Lowi's conception of the policy 
process, which forms the linchpin of the policy sector approach, is rooted in 
the assumption that particular kinds of policies produce certain types of 
politics and shape policy outcomes. 22 Lowi illustrates the sector specific 
characteristics of the policy process. He makes a causal link between the 
nature of policy issues and the pattern of politics associated with them. 
(Lowi, 1964) Therefore, the assertion that the policy issue itself maybe a 
determinant of the manner in which a problem is processed. Lowi states 
that, "a political relationship is determined by the type of policy at stake, so 
that for every type of policy there is likely to be a distinctive political 
relationship". (Lowi, 1964: 688) In maintaining that different types of policy 
promote different types of political activity Lowi's argument is by nature 
sector specific. (Lowi, 1964) Lowi asserts that, "areas of policy or 
government activity constitute real arenas of power. Each arena tends to 
develop its own characteristic political structure, political process, elites and 
group relations". (Lowi, 1964: 689-690) 23 
Various aspects of Lowi's argument are directly relevant to the central 
hypothesis of the thesis. The thesis suggests that the dynamics of the 
policy sector, defined as the nature of the policy issue has a direct impact 
on policy outcomes. For instance, as illustrated by the case study on 
migration, characteristics intrinsic to the migration issue, such as the 
21 In other words, the policy sector approach focuses on categories of issues and outputs of the 
political system. 
22 This supposition is grounded in various theoretical perspectives, apart from Lowi. For a summary 
see: (Freeman, 1985: 482-484) 
23In other words, he argues that different policy arenas produce different policy patterns, actors and 
processes. 
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political sensitivity surrounding the issue in the domestic arena and the 
. 
definition of migration as a transnational issue, were directly related to the 
German government's attempt to Europeanise policy in this sector. 
Conversely, characteristics specific to the agricultural issue produced a 
. protectionist and essentially 'German' oriented approach to agricultural 
matters in the EU. Not only did policy dynamics demonstrate sectoral 
variation, but the varying role of the actors involved in the policy process 
indicated sectoral nuances. This undoubtedly had an effect on policy 
outcomes. The structured and the consensual approach towards 
agricultural policy making has not only enabled agricultural issues to 
dominate the political agenda but also result in favourable policy outcomes. 
In contrast, the case of migration demonstrated a much less formalised 
institutional framework. 
Lowi relates policy to politics by typifying policy. In doing so it is 
automatically assumed that policies differ in their political connotation. Lowi 
outlines the sectoral variation in policies by defining areas of policy into 
functional categories in terms of their impact or expected impact on society. 
(Lowi, 1964: 689) Lowi develops a typology of policy types: distributive, 
regulatory and redistributive. 24 Lowi's categorisation of policy types is of 
limited relevance for the thesis, since the thesis does not adopt Lowi's 
typology nor does it attempt to formulate one. For the purposes of this 
thesis, Lowi's ideas are considered in the broadest context. However, the 
thesis does outline a typology of characteristics which affect Germany's role 
in the EU. 
Lowi's ideas have both admirers and opponents. Freeman observes 
. ,-' 
that, "while the claim that policy problems significantly shape politics goes 
against the grain of many common presumptions about political systems, 
24 For a definition of Lowi's policy types and an illustration of his scheme in a diagrammatic form 
see: (Lowi, 1964: 690-715). 
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there is much to be said for the idea". (Freeman, 1985: 482) Greenberg 
~ 
praises Lowi, commenting that, "no single theoretical construct has been 
more important to the development of public policy case studies than Lowi's 
categorisation". (Greenberg, 1995: 203) Freeman goes further to suggest 
. that the policy sector approach could be utilised in testing the premises of 
the national styles approach. "By starting with policies and working 
backward we may be in a better position to assess the relative impact policy 
styles might be expected to play". (Freeman, 1985: 482) He maintains that 
sectoral tendencies evident in policy making undermine the predictive value 
of the concept of style. (Freeman, 1985: 482) 
Richardson points out that Lowi's scheme of policy types has had "more 
admirers than followers". (Richardson, 1982: 4) Nevertheless, many 
attempts have been made to improve and modify Lowi's approach. 25 
However, the main critique pitched at Lowi is the criticism inherent in the 
study of policy typologies in general and the problem of classifying policies 
correctly into specific categories. 26 Lowi, by contrast, does not perceive the 
classification of policies as presenting a problem. (Greenberg, 1995: 206) 
Richardson advocates the concept of a national policy style, which he 
defines as 'policy making and implementation' style. (Richardson, 1982: 2) 
Richardson assumes that Lowi would oppose the idea of a national policy 
style, arguing that policy content would have to be stipulated first. 
(Richardson, 1982: 4) The concept of 'policy style', according to Richardson, 
comprises two primary features; firstly a government's approach to 
problem-solving which he characterises as either anticipatory or reactive; 
and secondly, the nature of a government's relationship with other actors in 
the policy making process. Richardson maintains that this relationship can 
25See: (Steinberger, 1995: 220-233) and (Spitzer, 1995: 233-244) 
26 Since the thesis does not adopt a policy typology for Germany's role in the EU, the argument is not 
given fuller consideration. However, for a general critique of Lowi and policy typologies see: 
(Greenberg, 1995: 201-220) 
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be one of imposing decisions or reaching consensus. 27 (Richardson, 
1982: 12-13) 
Richardson does, however, concede that all policies are not dealt with 
in exactly the same way and that there are difficulties in identifying policy 
style. To an extent Richardson's comments justify the policy sector 
. approach. He alludes to the phenomenon of sectorisation as one of the 
main problems in attempting to identify a dominant policy style. 
(Richardson, 1982: 3) He remarks that, 
if policies are formulated independently in each policy sector. ... then this 
may invalidate a search for one policy style. If each policy area develops 
into a semi-watertight compartment, ruled by its own 'policy elite', then 
quite different policy styles may develop within the same political 
system. (Richardson, 1982: 3) 
The sectorisation of policy making in the German case, certainly allows for 
sectoral variation of a dominant policy style. (Dyson, 1982) 
Freeman questions the existence of a dominant policy style, by pointing 
to 'conceptual and methodological' problems. He argues that, "policy styles 
are susceptible to a variety of cultural shocks and cyclical developments". 
(Freeman, 1985: 479) Freeman identifies five short-term and long-term 
conjunctural factors which put in doubt the presence of a predominant style. 
Firstly, Freeman implies that policy style might oscillate with alterations in 
the complexion of a government. Secondly, he notes that standard policy 
making procedures may change with shifts in government. Thirdly, Freeman 
alludes to the possibility of less severe types of regime transformation 
instigating modifications in the predominant policy making style. Fourthly, 
he states that 'situational factors' may bring about temporary changes in the 
'normal' policy· making style. Finally, Freeman points to unusual prosperity 
as a cause for changes in policy making behaviour. (Freeman, 1985: 477-
27 For a fuller analysis of the concept of national policy style see Richardson's edited collection on 
dominant policy styles in West European states. (Richardson, 1982: 1-14) For a contrast of this 
approach with the policy sector approach, propounded by Lowi refer to: (Freeman, 1985). 
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479) 
So far the discussion has revolved around the concepts of policy style 
and the policy sector approach in general. The analysis has focused on the 
relevance of the policy sector approach and more specifically, the ideas of 
Lowi for the purposes of the thesis. However, the task relating of these 
theoretical ideas to the German policy making arena remains. 
2.5 A GERMAN POLICY STYLE? 
Various scholars have employed the case study approach to categorise, 
characterise and study policy making on a national level. Among them, 
Dyson's study on German Policy Style, Katzenstein's seminal analysis of 
the Federal Republic's internal policy-making structures and Bulmer's 
examination of 'institutional pluralism' in the German policy process are 
worthy of detailed examination. 
2.5.1 DYSON: THE SEARCH FOR A RATIONALIST CONSENSUS 
Dyson identifies the predominant policy style in Germany as that of a 
'rationalist consensus'. (Dyson, 1982: 17) Dyson's model diverges from 
Richardson's exclusive advancement of a national policy style, by allowing 
for the sectoral variation of policy style within a state. Dyson points out the 
distinctive, yet diverse and complex, nature of the German policy process, 
which he attributes to Germany's specific 'historical experience and the 
cultural attitudes' that have emanated from that experience. (Dyson, 1982: 
17) Dyson asserts that, "policy is made in different ways not only between 
sectors, but also in the same sector". (Dyson, 1982: 17) Dyson devises a 
model· to categorise policy making style in different policy sectors in 
Germany. 
FIGURE 2.1: DYSON'S MODEL OF POLICY STYLE IN WEST GERMANY 
\ 
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Source: Dyson, Kenneth. (1982), "West Germany: The Search for a 
Rationalist Consensus", in Richardson, J. (Ed), Policy Styles in Western 
Europe, London: Allen & Unwin, p. 20 
Dyson charts the concept of policy style on a two-dimensional axis, with 
the horizontal axis mapping Germany's approach to problem solving and 
the vertical the government's relationship with other actors in the policy 
process. Dyson characterises Germany's approach to problem solving as 
either 'reactive' or 'anticipatory'. Reactive policy style, according to Dyson, 
stresses the 'passive and responsive' character of, and the unbiased role 
of the government as a referee. Dyson classifies reactive policy style as 
'deductivist', and aspiring to a 'language of principles'. (Dyson, 1982: 17) 
On the opposite end of th-e spectrum, the anticipatory style denotes a 'pre-
emptive' style which assumes an innovative and committed role for the 
government on the basis of obtaining knowledge and information. By 
contrast to the reactive style, the anticipatory style is grounded in "the 
language of goals, options, appraisal and effectiveness". (Dyson, 1982: 17-
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18) 
The vertical axis characterises the relationship between the government 
and other policy actors in the policy process as one of 'negotiation' or 
'imposition'. The style of negotiation highlights the interdependence within 
the policy process and the search for consensus in policy. This style is 
characterised by power sharing between actors in the policy process, with 
the balance of power being embodied in the "co-operative norms of the 
'state-society' ideology, of German federal arrangements and of coalition 
politics". (Dyson, 1982: 18) The negotiation relationship is distinguished by 
the sanctioning of group power, with interest groups in a position to gain 
favourable access and higher institutionalised status. (Dyson, 1982: 18) 
Conversely, interest groups are deemed as executing a potentially 
'disruptive and irresponsible' role in the imposition relationship. Imposition 
involves enforcing the 'technically correct solution' in order ensure the 
'overriding common good'. (Dyson, 1982: 18) German suspicion and 
apprehension of party political imposition guarantees that this authoritative 
style is used as the last possible course of action. 
Dyson's classification results in four kinds of models of policy style in 
Germany. Both 'concertation' and 'status preservation' emphasise the role 
of 'co-operative and trustworthy' interest groups, which gain a favoured 
institutionalised position. These two models are distinguished by the 
salience of the policy area concerned. Hence, status preservation alludes to 
those policy sectors which involve routine relationships and co-operation 
between interest groups and the government. Concertation is, by 
comparison, denoted by the "pursuit of enlightenment and innovation via a 
politics of summit diplomacy". (Dyson, 1982: 19) 'Activism' and 'regulation' 
constitute authoritative styles of imposition. Activism is essentially, an 
innovative style of imposition, which is a short-term and rare attribute of 
German pO.licy making. Whilst regulation "is the traditional style of 
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bureaucratic legalism, which embodies the highly formalised character of 
" 
the Rechtstaat conception and a neo-liberal political outlook". (Dyson. 1982: 
20) 
Dyson discerns a general 'rationalistic style' of politics, expressed in the 
notion of Sachlichkeit, which emanates from a normative aversion to 
politicking. The tradition of rationality is realised by the predominance of 
senior civil servants in both the political and administrative spheres of policy 
making process. Dyson identifies the concept of power sharing as a trait of 
the German policy process, which is borne out in the interdependent 
relationship between the federal and state governments in the making and 
implementation of policy. He asserts that the institutional structure of the 
FRG acts as mediator between these overriding norms and the behaviour of 
governments. More specifically, "coalition politics and federal politics are 
institutional guarantors of power sharing and respond to deep cultural fears 
of a concentration of political power". (Dyson, 1982: 22) 
Having delineated the general character of policy style in Germany, 
Dyson analysed three different policy sectors; nuclear policy, health policy 
and economic pol!cy, to illustrate the variety of style that could be found in 
the German policy process. 28 The crux of Dyson's model rests on the 
notion that, "a given policy sector or a particular case may display various 
policy styles as well as shifts in the dominant policy over time". 29 (Dyson, 
1982: 21) The sectoral variation in policy style is enhanced by the existence 
of the phenomenon of sectorisation. The constitutionally guaranteed 
principal of departmental autonomy facilitates this process by creating 
powerful centrifugal tendencies which become unmanageable at the centre. 
The institutional sectorisation of German policy-making is particularly 
28 For a detailed discussion of the policy sectors analysed by Dyson refer to: (Dyson, 1982: 25-41) 
29 Dyson discerned a change in the predominant policy style of the 1960s from one of regulation and 
status preservation to one of concertation and status preservation. (Dyson, 1982: 21) 
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relevant to the case studies examined in this thesis. 30 
2.5.2 KATZENSTEIN: SEMISOVEREIGNTY AND THE INSTITUTIONAL DYNAMICS OF 
THE POLICY PROCESS 
In his seminal analysis of the Federal Republic, Peter Katzenstein 
characterised the state as semisovereign. The concept of semisovereignty 
was used to explain the dispersal of German power on both an external and 
internal level. Although Katzenstein refers to external constraints of 
semisovereignty, his analysis explored the internal constraints more fully. 
Institutional constraints, according to Katzenstein, limited the scope of 
radical policy making and the capacity of the German state. Thus, 
Katzenstein asserted that power of the German state has been "tamed 
rather than broken". (Katzenstein, 1987: 10) 
According to Katzenstein, "the interaction between policy and politics is 
shaped by specific West German institutions". (Katzenstein, 1987: 35) The 
institutional structure in Germany comprises a decentralised state31 , where 
power is dispersed among competing institutions and a centralised 
society32, which allows the concentration of power in large social groups. 
The institutions in the policy process perform the function of linking state 
and society, and different levels of governments into a tight policy network. 
(Katzenstein, 1987: 35) Interdependence between these actors reduces the 
possibility of departing from established policy positions. Hence 
Katzenstein's assertion that, "institutional interpenetration has moderated 
political power and encouraged cautious policies and incremental change". 
(Katzenstein, 1987: 10) 
30 The sectorisation of policy-making forms an important component of the section on policy-making 
structures in each of the case studies. The differing impact of this process is illustrated in Chapter five 
and Chapter seven. 
31 Germany's federal structure, the jurisdiction of the Federal Constitutional Court, the inflexible 
bureaucracy and the fmite co-ordinating capacity of the Chancellor all constitute important components 
of this decentralised state. (Katzenstein, 1987: 15-23) 
32 According to Katzenstein, a centralised society is denoted by the strong employers groups, trade 
unions and professional organisations of the private sector. (Katzenstein, 1987: 23-30) 
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Katzenstein formulates a distinctive configuration of institutions, which 
" 
act as internal constraints to the accumulation of power, and upon which 
policy is determined. Political parties, co-operative federalism and 
parapublic institutions constitute the three institutional nodes of all policy 
networks. The structure of political parties , government by coalition and the 
institutional rules of the Bundestag all foster centrist, consensual political 
outcomes and a culture of incremental policy change. (Katzenstein, 1987: 
35-45) Many scholars have cited the system of co-operative federalism, 
which rests on a harmonious relationship between Bonn and the' Lander, 
as a constraining factor on the purposive exercise of German power. 
Indeed, the federal structure which is divided by functions and not policy 
areas33 , performs the task of bringing together divergent interests to 
formulate consensual policies, and acts as a barrier against attempts to 
force radical policy developments. (Katzenstein, 1987: 45) The federal 
structure is, however, amply flexible to accommodate change. Katzenstein 
attributes the flexibility of the federal structure to the close links between 
'conflict and consensus' and 'centralisation and decentralisation' which 
guard against blockages. The third node of the policy network comprises a 
composite set of parapublic institutions, most notably the Bundesbank, 
which connect public and private actors. According to Katzenstein 
parapublic institutions, 
act like political shock-absorbers. They induce political stability both 
directly and indirectly. They tend to limit political controversies in the 
process of policy implementation. And they limit the scope of policy 
. initiatives. (Katzenstein, 1987: 58) 
Katzenstein's model is instructive for the thesis on two levels. Firstly, 
Katzeinstein's approach demonstrates the important role that institutions 
33 Katzenstein notes that the role of the relevant actors varies considerably between the policy sectors 
which are under the sole competence of the federal government and those which are exclusively under 
the domain of the Ulnder. Katzenstein points out the policy sectors where the both the federal and state 
governments share competence would be most instructive for an investigation of intergovernmental 
relations. (Katzenstein, 1987: 45) 
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play within the German policy making process. Although, Katzenstein's 
" 
model comprises a comprehensive configuration of institutions which 
influence policy making in general, his model engenders a degree of 
sectoral diversity. The sectoral variation is borne out in the different mix of 
actors; and the varying importance, and influence of , particular institutions 
in different policy sectors. Katzenstein contends that, "the institutional 
structure creates particular capacities and incapacities in different policy 
sectors". (Katzenstein, 1987: 361) In his analysis of six policy sectors, 
Katzenstein illustrates the differing role that institutional structures play in 
different policy sectors. 34 In particular, Katzenstein notes the instance of 
parapublic institutions, which have a varying degree of influence according 
to the policy sector in question. He delineates the sector specific 
institutional role of actors in the policy process. Secondly, Katzenstein's 
model highlights the institutional sectorisation of policy making in Germany. 
The policy case studies contained in this thesis illustrate the institutional 
sectorisation of policy, and the impact that it has for Germany's role in the 
EU in those policy areas. 
Secondly, Katzenstein's model is useful for the broader questions 
posed in the thesis about Germany's future role in the EU. Katzenstein links 
the institutional make up of the state with the debate about the exercise of 
German power. He argues that institutions foster an interdependent 
approach to policy making, where actors are tied together in a policy 
network. This interdependent approach mitigates against an accumulation 
of power and radical policy changes, cultivating a propensity towards 
incremental policy change. Hence, Katzenstein argues that the sectorised 
nature of policy making places institutional constraints on the capacity of the 
34 Katzenstein analysed economic management, industrial relations, social welfare, migrant labour, 
administrative reform and university reform. His book, Policy and Politics in West Germany: The 
Growth of a Semi Sovereign State, includes detailed chapters on each of these policy sectors. For a 
comparative analysis and summary of his findings refer to: (Katzenstein, 1987: 361-367) 
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German state, thereby reducing the scope for the exercise of power. 
Katzenstein concludes that German power has been 'tamed' by the 
institutional structures. He notes, "because it incorporates many of the 
institutions that weaken it, West Germany's state is best described as 
semisovereign'. (Katzenstein, 1987: 82) It could be argued that 
Katzenstein's characterisation of Germany as a semisovereign state is 
outdated, as it refers to pre-unification Germany. However, in a more recent 
analysis on semisovereignty, Paterson notes that the concept still retains 
relevance for the new Germany. He argues that unity has not disturbed the 
semisovereign state in the internal domain. Paterson, thus, concludes that, 
"semisovereignty persists as an internal condition of the new German 
state". (Paterson, 1996: 167) 
2.5.3 BULMER: INSTITUTIONAL PLURALISM 
Bulmer examines the "unity, diversity and stability" of the German public 
policy agenda. He observes the wide variety of "policy communities" in the 
German policy process, and the varying degrees of influence the same 
institutions enjoy in different policy sectors. 35Bulmer argues that, 
politics are conducted in a highly institutionalised manner ... However, 
the exact balance between institutional 'players' varies according to the 
policy area in which the 'game' is being played. (Bulmer, 1989b: 14) 
Bulmer utilises an institutional approach to illustrate the role of institutions 
in shaping the arena in which policy is formulated. Bulmer notes Peter 
Hall's argument that institutions develop their own dynamics which are 
capable of affecting policy content in their own right. (Bulmer, 1989b: 17) 
Institutional pluralism is. a concept used by Bulmer to characterise the 
public policy making process in Germany. Firstly, the term describes the 
'plurality' in the policy process. Secondly, it correlates to the institutional 
35 Bulmer demonstrates the diversity of the policy process by illustrating the different roles that 
institutions can play in varying policy sectors. He argues that policy outcomes in different sectors are 
dependent on the 'balance of authority' between the state and federal governments, the role of the 'lead' 
ministry and sector-specific semi governmental bodies. (Bulmer, 1989b: 13) 
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perspective of the policy process proposed by Bulmer. (Bulmer, 1989b: 15) 
.. 
Bulmer utilises the concept of institutional pluralism to demonstrate the 
issues of unity, diversity and stability. 
Bulmer points out that institutional pluralism is most readily identifiable 
in the organisation of government structures in Germany. It is here, that 
Bulmer's approach proves most fruitful for the theoretical analysis of the 
thesis. Bulmer identifies a vast array of institutions, and the varying degree 
of their influence, in different policy sectors in the policy process. The 
component on policy-making structures in the taxonomic model suggested 
in the thesis, is essentially, modelled on Bulmer's approach in terms of its 
organisation. 
Bulmer outlines ten dimensions of institutional pluralism. Bulmer 
stresses the significance of the federal system, particularly co-operative 
federalism, which generates manifold variations on the way in which 
responsibility for policy is allotted. Responsibility for policy formation and 
implementation is shared between the federal and state governments 
according to the area concerned. The Bund and the Lander enjoy exclusive 
powers in some sectors, and competence is shared in matters falling 
under 'framework conditions' and 'concurrent legislation'. 36 
Bulmer also cites the importance of ministerial autonomy and coalition 
politics, 37 where both ministers and political parties protect their lot. Bulmer 
notes the process of sectorisation which is particularly prevalent in the 
German policy making process, a tendency which is reinforced by coalition 
governments. These two features of institutional pluralism act as a barrier 
to policy innovation. (Bulmer, 1989b: 25) The remaining eight characteristics 
36 The impact of the federal structure for policy making is discussed in greater detail in relation to the 
case studies in Chapter five and Chapter seven. Bulmer provides a diagrammatic scheme of the 
distribution of policy competence between Bund and Lander. Refer to: (Bulmer, 1989b: 20) 
37 Bulmer cites the constitutionally guaranteed principles of ministerial autonomy, the Chancellor 
principle and the principle of collegiality. Refer to Chapter five and Chapter seven for an analysis of 
these principles-in relation to the case studies. 
44 
include: bureaucratic politics and administrative culture, which focuses on 
~ 
the search for a 'rationalist' consensus as identified by Dyson, the role of the 
law and the Federal Constitutional Court, parapublic institutions, the 
institutionalisation of industry and finance, the institutionalisation of labour, 
powerful interest groups such as the DBV, international institutions 
including the EU and NATO and political parties, which Bulmer argues are 
institutions in their own right. 
2.6 THE MARRYING OF NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL 
Several writers have attempted to look at the linkage between national 
and international factors. Earlier in this chapter, whilst concentrating on the 
influence of domestic political structures, Bulmer was seen to examine the 
linkage between domestic politics and EU policy-making. More recently, 
Andrew Moravcsik has attempted to integrate theories of domestic and 
international politics in his "liberal intergovernmentalist" approach.38 Gilpin, 
espouses the increasing importance of interdependence, but maintains 
that the state preserves most of its capacity for national choice. Katzenstein 
has looked at the interaction of international and domestic forces in the 
, 
shaping of the international political economy. When referring to the 
international political economy, Katzenstein argues, 
International and domestic forces have been closely intertwined in the 
historical evolution of the international political economy since the 
middle of the 19th century. Shifts in domestic structures have led to 
basic changes in the British, German .... strategies of foreign economic 
policy. The international context in which these countries found 
themselves in turn influenced their domestic structures and thus, the 
strategies they adopted in the international political economy . 
. (Katzenstein, 1984: 11) 
Putnam also examines the linkage between the domestic and 
international system in his Two-Level Games Approach.39 Putnam argues 
38 See: (Moravcsik, 1993a: 473-524) and (Moravcsik, 1993b: 1-42) 
39 For a detailed analysis see: (Putnam, 1988: 427-460) 
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that decision-makers are simultaneously involved in interlinked 
negotiations. One takes place at the international level among nation-states 
via intergovernmental bargaining. The other occurs at the domestic level. 
Evans explains the connection between the domestic and international 
level. He asserts, 
Deals at the international level change the character of domestic 
constraints, while the movement of domestic politics opens up new 
possibilities for international accords. Domestic goals are pursued via 
international moves, and domestic politicking is central to international 
negotiation. The role of international and domestic factors in the 
determination of outcomes is simultaneous and mutual. (Evans, 1993: 
397) 
Several writers have drawn on the Two-Level Games Approach to 
explain Germany's relationship with the EU. Huelshoff (1993) argues for a 
model of European integration which categorically links domestic politics to 
intergovernmental bargaining. Huelshoff links a member state's domestic 
interests, ideology and institutions to their bargaining positions in the EU. 
John Woolley examined the reasons behind the linkage of Economic 
and Monetary Union (EMU) and European Political Union (EPU) at 
Maastricht. His analysis also draws on the work of Putnam. Woolley argues 
that domestic politics can shape the behaviour of international negotiators. 
He asserts that international negotiators have to take domestic institutions, 
obligations to coalition partners and electoral challenges into consideration. 
(Woolley, 1994: 69) 
, The Interdependence Approach sees integration in a completely 
different light. The interdependence theorists begin to take into account the 
interdependent relationship between the national governments and 
international organisations. 
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2.6.1 INTERDEPENDENCE 
The concept of interdependence came to the fore in the 1970s when the 
study of integration became unfashionable due to the failure of the EU to 
move towards some kind of political union. For some, the term 
interdependence described the network of relations and collaboration in the 
EC better than integration. The scholars associated with this approach 
include Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye.40 
According to the relevant body of literature in international relations, 
interdependence refers to 
the close and persistent relationship between two or more states or 
international actors, based on mutual reliance and therefore carrying a 
cost to one side or the other, or both, if the relationship were to be 
ended. (Webb, 1983: 33) 
When applied to the European Community, Webb argues that 
interdependence has been employed to describe, " .... the conjuncture of 
economic conditions in Western Europe which give rise to the EC initiatives; 
to the economic and political consequences of policy collaboration; to 
indicate the limits of regional co-operation; and as a justification for 
maintaining the EC inspite of disagreements amongst its member states 
about its ultimate political purpose." (Webb, 1983: 33) 
As mentioned above, some interdependence theorists regarded 
interdependence as a better term for the process that was occurring in the 
EC. Interdependence theorists argued that 'interdependence' referred to a 
state (of intensive economic exchange) when political relationships may be 
influenced, but an integrative response may not necessarily be invoked from 
those affected. Interdependence theorists are also less concerned about 
institutionalised forms of co-operation. Thus, unlike the neo-functionalists 
40 For a detailed discussion of the Interdependence approach see: (Keohane & Nye, 1977). 
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who postulate a central role for the Commission or the 
intergovernmentalists who stress the role of the national governments, the 
interdependence theorists do not put forward an equivalent institutional 
model. 
However, as Webb argues, the interdependence theorists do 
emphasise the diffusion of power in the EC. They see this as a 
consequence of the erosion of national governmental authority and the 
inability of the Commission to become a counter force in key policy areas. 
The interdependence theorists explain the erosion of national authority in 
terms of the rise of transnational and transgovernmental activity. An 
increase in international trade, the flow of international capital, the location 
policies of multinational companies and economic specialisation, have 
reduced the exercise of national sovereignty. Interdependence theorists 
suggest that an 'international regime' may be a more appropriate label for 
the EC. Keohane and Nye argue that, " ... under conditions of 'complex 
interdependence', international regimes will emerge to regulate inter-state 
relations. In the absence of a central authority in the international system, 
regimes are based on coalitions between governments and involve 
procedures, rules, norms, and institutions for the conduct of inter-state 
relations." (Laffan, 1992: 12-13) 
The interdependence approach has been criticised as a framework for 
examining EC politics. Firstly, the interdependence approach lacks 
appropriate empirical evidence to back up its general propositions. 
Secondly, some interdependence theorists have tended to play down the 
distinctiveness of the Community framework. Nonetheless, 
interdependence theory provides a view on the European Union which 
centres on " ... its incompleteness as an integrated regional system, and its 
incipient tensions as a policy-making forum, stemming from the 
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combination of external pressures and internal divisions." (Webb, 1983: 36) 
" 
2.6.2 LIBERAL INTERGOVERNMENTALISM 
In putting forward the liberal intergovernmentalist approach Moravcsik 
modifies traditional intergovernmentalist theory by marrying liberal theories 
of state - society relations and intergovernmentalist theories, which are 
often seen as contradictory, to conceptualise the EU as, "a successful 
international regime designed to manage economic interdependence 
through negotiated policy co-ordination." (Moravcsik, 1993a: 474) Moravcsik 
responds to the weaknesses of earlier intergovernmentalist interpretations 
which view the state as a "black box". He develops his earlier approach of 
"intergovernmental institutionalism" by, 
refining its theory of interstate bargaining and institutional compliance, 
and by adding an explicit theory of national preference formation 
grounded in liberal theories of international interdependence. 
(Moravcsik, ·1993a: 480) 
Liberal intergovernmentalism proposes a two-step process. The first 
step is national preference formation, which Moravcsik believes is 
determined by "constraints and opportunities imposed by economic 
interdependence." (Moravcsik, 1993a: 517) He also details how national 
preferences are formed by state-society interaction. The second step is 
interstate negotiation or bargaining among EU Member States. The 
outcomes of these negotiations are, according to Moravcsik, "determined by 
the relative bargaining power of governments and the functional incentives 
for institutionalisation created by high transaction costs and the desire to 
co.ntrol domestic agend~s." (Moravcsik, 1993a: 517) Moravcsik contends 
that EU negotiations can be regarded as a "co-operative game". The level of 
co-operation indicates the pattern of preferences of national governments. 
He comments, 
The more intensely governments desire agreement, the more 
concessions and the greater the effort they will expend to achieve it. The 
greater- the potential gains for a government from co-operation, as 
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compared to its policy alternative, the less risk of non-agreement it is 
willing to assume and, therefore, the weaker its bargaining power over 
the specific terms of agreement. (Moravcsik, 1993a: 499) 
Hence, Moravcsik concludes that the EU can be explained in terms of 
interstate bargaining through the use of "bargaining game" analysis. Thus, 
He believes that major EU decisions can be explained by a sequential 
examination of national preference formation and intergovernmental 
strategic interaction. (Moravcsik, 1993a: 480) Moravcsik asserts that 
national preference formation defines the demand for international co-
operation and interstate bargaining determines the capacity of the 
international system to supply co-operation. He argues that explanations of 
European integration which concentrate on either demand or supply are, "at 
best incomplete and at worst misleading." (Moravcsik, 1993a: 482) 
In his final section Moravcsik goes on to argue that it is a mistake to 
view supranational institutions as the antithesis of intergovernmentalism. 
Traditional intergovernmentalist theory purports that, 
the unique institutional structure of the EC is acceptable to national 
governments only insofar as it strengthens, rather than weakens, their 
control over domestic affairs, permitting them to attain goals otherwise 
unachievable. (Moravcsik, 1993a: 507) 
Moravcsik goes on to demonstrate how EU institutions strengthen 
rather than limit the power of governments in their pursuit domestic goals. 
He argues that this is possible through the increasing efficiency of interstate 
bargaining and the strengthening of the autonomy of national leaders vis-a-
vis particularistic groups within their polity. (Moravcsik, 1993a: 507) 
Moravcsik describes this 'two-level' process, which allows national 
governments to surmount domestic opposition via EU institutions in detail. 
He argues, 
The mantle of the European Community adds legitimacy and credibility 
to Member State initiatives. Domestic coalitions can be mobilised more 
easily in favour of policy co-ordination. This adds weight in domestic 
debate to both major reforms and everyday decisions emanating from 
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the EC ... The institutional structure of the EC strengthens the initiative 
and influence of national g'overnments by insulating the policy process 
and generating domestic agenda-setting power for national politicians. 
National governments are able to take initiatives and reach bargains in 
Council negotiations with relatively little constraint. (Moravcsik, 1993a: 
515) 
Moravcsik puts forward a comprehensive and detailed analysis of a 
liberal intergovernmentalist interpretation of the EU. Moravcsik has not 
remained without criticism. He places great importance on the role of 
domestic groups who inform state preferences. Moravcsik also 
emphasises the importance of states. Perhaps, liberal 
intergovernmentalism places too much emphasis on the role of domestic 
groups. Indeed, they do have a part to play in determining the policies that 
member states take to the European arena. But other factors in the 
domestic arena also influence the way a member state decides its 
priorities. 
For instance, in the case of migration the very nature of the issue 
necessitated a policy solution in the European arena. The mass movement 
of asylum seekers into Germany since 1989 and the growing concern 
among the general public about this movement have acted as key catalysts 
for policy reappraisal. The accompanying rise in right wing extremism and 
the fact that Germany was facing a General Election in October 1994 also 
intensified pressures for policy reform. Thus, other factors in the domestic 
arena can shape the priorities of member states in the European arena. 
That is not to argue that domestic groups are irrelevant, indeed they can be 
of fundamental importance; particularly if one considers the role of the 
German Farmers Union in influencing domestic policy priorities in 
agriculture. Nevertheless, the Ministry of Agriculture, and the junior partner in 
the governing coalition, the Christian Social Union, also have an influence in 
shaping policy. 
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The criticisms levelled at Moravcsik are both theoretical and empirical in 
.. 
nature. Wincott argues that liberal intergovernmentalism can be described 
as, "an approach rather than a theory." (Wincott, 1994: 5) If Moravcsik's 
arguments can be considered to be an approach, then Wincott argues that 
it, "leaves the analysis open to empirical criticism." (Wincott, 1994: 5) 
Wincott cites Moravcsik's bias against supranationalism. 
Some of Moravcsik's points are interesting for this thesis. Firstly, he 
acknowledges the importance of domestic politics and focuses on national 
actors. Liberal intergovernmentalism espouses that, "governments are 
assumed to act purposively in the international arena, but on the basis of 
goals that are set domestically." (Moravcsik, 1993a: 481) Foreign policy 
goals of governments are affected by pressure from domestic social 
groups. These groups aggregate their preferences through political 
institutions. National interests emanate from political conflict as these 
groups compete for political influence. Moravcsik gives great importance to 
societal groups and the nature of their influences and to the amount of 
influence these groups have domestically. He argues that the factors that 
determine the above criteria are both domestic and transnational. Moravcsik 
highlights the importance of national politicians who determine state 
priorities and policies but are constrained by domestic and transnational 
civil society. 
Secondly, the assumption that EU institutions augment the power of 
national governments to achieve domestic objectives, and the way in which 
they do this, is relevant for the case studies. According to the theory, national 
government leaders can playa two level strategy that undermines, "potential 
opposition by reaching bargains in Brussels first and presenting domestic 
groups with an 'up or down' choice." (Moravcsik, 1993a: 515) This was 
certainly the case in migration where the German government attempted to 
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surmount the policy deadlock in the domestic arena and overcome 
domestic opposition by attempting to export the migration problem to the 
European arena. 
2.7 THEORETICAL ApPROACH: ApPLICABILITY OF THE THEORIES TO POLICY 
CASE STUDIES 
The overall aim of the thesis is to analyse Germany's future role in the 
EU. A number of studies during the 1980s have endeavoured to examine 
the relationship between Germany and the EU, utilising a variety of 
approaches. This thesis posits a two tier approach, firstly analysing 
Germany's broader relationship with the EU, and then employing a case 
study approach to examine Germany's role in the EU, focusing on two key 
policy areas; migration and agriculture. 
The thesis contends that, on the whole, a pro-integration stance prevails 
in Germany. Germany will, without a doubt, remain committed to the EU in 
the post-unification period. Nevertheless, unification has brought some 
challenges in the domestic sphere. It is argued, therefore, that in the short-
term Germany has unavoidably become inward looking. It is asserted that 
Germany is unlikely to move away from integrated actions in the pursuit of 
some "national interest", Integration has proved beneficial for the Germans. 
However, it is contended that the EU serves as an important arena for 
solving certain domestic problems. 
The thesis notes a sectoral variation in Germany's role in the EU, 
despite this predominant pro-integration approach. The thesis tries to 
develop a taxonomic model of characteristics to demonstrate the sectoral 
nature of Germany's role in the EU. Briefly, the model identifies dynamics of 
the policy sector, policy circumstance and policy-making structures as 
important variables. It is contended that Germany's role in the EU differs 
significantly in different policy sectors. Hence, the thesis suggests that 
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Germany's approach to the "EU is sector specific. Furthermore, it is 
proposed that, it is the nature of the policy sector which determines the role 
that Germany plays in the EU. In other words, the policy sector itself shapes 
Germany's approach in the EU, be it pro-European or anti-European. The 
two case studies provide a contrast of Germany's approach to, and role in 
the EU. The thesis asserts that certain policy sectors are able to bypass this 
overall European approach, utilising the EU as an optimal arena to solve 
domestic problems. In this sense the EU policy making arena serves as a 
policy resource. Where the EU serves as a framework for solving certain 
specific policy problems, and where the Germans are willing to utilise that 
resource, they are likely to be more European-oriented. The institutional 
sectorisation of policy making in Germany sanctions this practice due to the 
integration of domestic and European policy making at the national level. 
Therefore, the institutional structures within the policy process allow actors 
to pursue their own agendas at the European level. 
A whole host of theoretical approaches have been surveyed in this 
chapter, yielding varying degrees of relevance for the theoretical analysis of 
the thesis. The $tudy used theoretical approaches to European integration 
as its point of departure. It was concluded that intergovernmentalism in its 
entirety does not account for Germany's role in the EU. Germany is unlikely 
to become some hegemonic actor wishing to dominate Europe. However, 
intergovernmentalism does emphasise the importance of the 
national/domestic dimension and the impact that nation states can have on 
the EU. Intergovernm~ntalism elucidates the way in which national 
-
governments and politicians can utilise the European frameworks to solve 
domestic problems. The thesis propounds the argument that the EU can 
serve as an arena for solving domestic problems. Governments under 
siege from domestic problems can use the EU as a "resource". 
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The ideas of Lowi, Dyson's work on 'policy style', the Domestic Politics 
" 
Approach, Institutional Pluralism and Katzenstein's approach all help to 
frame the theoretical approach for the thesis. They all inform the central 
hypothesises of the thesis and in particular the taxonomic model of 
characteristics proposed in the thesis. 
The Domestic Politics Approach has proved to be a structuring aid for 
the case studies. Bulmer'S approach is instructive for the taxonomic model, 
firstly by looking at policy-making structures to examine the behaviour of 
member states in the EU. Bulmer uses the concept of policy style to 
characterise the policy making environment and patterns, which he argues 
differ in different policy areas. (Bulmer, 1983: 353) In so doing, Bulmer 
illustrates the diversity of the policy process. The case studies undertaken 
in the thesis analyse the role of actors in the policy sectors, to illustrate the 
varying nature of Germany's role in the EU. The thesis suggests that the 
nature of the policy sector shapes the role which Germany's plays in the EU. 
Bulmer highlights the fact that different social and economic conditions 
shape the position a member state takes at the EU level. (Bulmer, 1983: 
353) 
The Domestic Politics Approach remedies the deficiency of 
intergovernmentalism which places too much emphasis on the role of 
national governments. The case studies follow the lead of the Domestic 
Politics Approach, by analysing the role of a whole range of actors in the 
policy process to explicate their contribution to the decisions Germany takes 
and the role it plays in the EU. The thesis, however, moves beyond a purely 
institutional analysis of the domestic environment, to include the role of 
other 'domestic variables' such as the dynamics of the policy sector and 
policy circumstance. 
The Domestic Politics Approach and the ideas of Alan Milward are an 
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important point of reference f?r the hypothesis that the EU serves as an 
optimal arena for solving domestic problems. Milward sets the broader 
framework by arguing that certain policy objectives are better advanced 
through international institutions and that member states will use these 
frameworks to pursue these objectives. (Milward, 1993; 21) He notes that 
the EU framework can be a useful resource for solving domestic problems. 
Similarly, the Domestic Politics Approach highlights the fact that domestic 
political factors can explain actions in the EU and demonstrates how the EU 
can prove to be an aid for national governments. (Bulmer, 1983: 354) The 
case studies analyse the way in which certain institutional characteristics 
can explain how some domestic concerns are extracted out of the domestic 
envir~nment onto the European agenda. 
Taken in its broadest context, the work of Lowi has proved relevant for 
this thesis. The thesis argues that Germany's role in the EU differs in 
different policy areas and that the policy sectors themselves influence the 
course of action in that policy sector. It is suggested that sectoral variations 
exist, not only in the dynamics of the policy issue, but also in the institutional 
set up, culminating in the conclusion that Germany's role in the EU is sector 
specific. Lowi illustrates the sector specific characteristics of the policy 
process. Firstly, Lowi argues that the nature of the policy issue affects policy 
outcomes and the politics associated with that. This aspect of his argument 
is particularly pertinent for the component on dynamics of the policy sector. 
Lowi illustrates the sectoral variation in the policy process and the sectoral 
nature of policy-making .by suggesting that each policy arena develops its 
,-
own characteristic political structure, process, patterns and actors. By 
alluding to different political structures and actors, Lowi emphasises the 
varying role of actors in the policy process. 
The work of Dyson, Katzenstein and Bulmer is particularly useful in that 
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it focuses on various elements of the German policy-making arena. All three 
" 
scholars utilise the case study approach to examine policy sectors, in order 
to demonstrate the diversity in the policy making process. Dyson draws on 
the cultural norms which underpin the German public policy making 
process to outline the distinctive, yet general character of policy style. 
Dyson's analysis provides an insight into the general approach to policy-
making and the relationship between actors in the policy process. Dyson 
model allows for the sectoral nuances of the policy process, by illustrating 
the variety of policy styles. He observes that policy is made differently 
between sectors. The case studies illuminate these sectoral tendencies, by 
providing a contrast of policy making. Although, there is a general approach 
to policy making, the case studies noted differences in the areas of 
migration and agriculture. 
Katzenstein and Bulmer enlighten important aspects of the section on 
policy making structures. Both Katzenstein and Bulmer emphasise the role 
of institutions in shaping policy. Katzenstein presents a comprehensive 
configuration of institutions which influence policy making in general. 
However, Katzenstein's model exhibits a degree of sectoral diversity. The 
diversity manifests itself in the different mix of actors and their varying 
influence in different policy sectors. Katzenstein highlights the institutional 
sectorisation of the policy process and the way in which it places 
constraints on the German state. The case studies examine the role of the 
policy actors, and the implications of the sectorisation of policy making in 
each of the policy sectors. 
Katzenstein's model is of relevance for the wider questions posed in the 
thesis about Germany's role in the EU. Katzenstein argues that Germany's 
institutional structure has implications for Germany's wider role in the EU. 
He relates the concept of semisovereignty to the internal dynamics of 
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German policy making, arguing that it has a constraining effect on the 
exercise of German power. 
Bulmer's model formulates the basis for the organisation of the section 
on policy making structures. He reveals the diversity of the policy process by 
again emphasising the differing role of various institutions in different policy 
sectors. More importantly, Bulmer highlights the importanc~ of the concept 
of institutional pluralism and the sectorisation of policy making. Both these 
concepts are analysed in depth in each of the case studies. Like 
Katzenstein, Bulmer examines the impact of these processes for 
Germany's wider role in the EU. The thesis make a connection between the 
institutional sectorisation of policy and the broader questions about 
Germany's role in the EU in the conclusion . 
. ' 
CHAPTER THREE: GERMANY AND THE EC: A HISTORICAL 
OVERVIEW " 
INTRODUCTION 
Before one can embark on an assessment of the impact that German 
reunification will have on its role in the European Union and consequently 
on Germany's future attitude towards European integration, it is important to 
delve into the past. The study requires a historical analysis of Germany's! 
role in the European Community/Union, examining Germany's motivations 
behind joining the EC and assessing the position that the European 
Community/Union holds for Germany. Therefore, the aim of this chapter is 
to provide a historical overview of Germany's relationship with the European 
Community from its foundation up to reunification. 
The thesis contends that Germany will remain committed to the EU. 
Germany is unlikely to move away from integrated actions, as co-operation 
in EU has proved beneficial for the Germans. The EU has been an 
important arena for solving certain domestic problems. This chapter seeks 
to demonstrate how important the integration process has been for the 
Germans and how the Germans have utilised European frameworks to 
solve problems or achieve objectives since the establishment of the FRG. 
Thus, the chapter examines Germany's principal objectives in the 
integration process dating back to the post war years and how the Germans 
have been able to solve domestic problems in the European framework. 
However, it is important to mention that the existence of domestic priorities 
does not necessarily cor~flict with a pro-integration stance. 2 The thesis also 
1 The term refers to the former Federal Republic of Germany. This chapter concentrates on an analysis 
of the Federal Republic's role in the Ee up until unification. The chapter does not consider the fate of 
the German Democratic Republic in the years of the division. 
2 The whole debate about the existence of German "national interests" has been discussed extensively 
in the literature. There are those who posit that Germany does not have "national interests" and others 
who argue the opposite. Hrbek and Wessels argue that it would be wrong to start from the premise that 
"national interests" do not play any role in the integration process. They state, " ... die Analyse von 
europaischer Einigung und Europapolitik - dem sicherlich fortgeschrittensten Fall eines 
Integrationspr6zesses - bedeutete stets auch die Beschaftigung mit nationalen (und verschiedenen 
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maintains that domestic political factors can explain actions in the EU. 3 In 
" 
other words, if one seeks to investigate Germany's past relationship with 
and role in the European Community/Union, one has to consider the 
domestic political arena. One has to look at the way in which domestic 
concerns have altered Germany's attitude towards the European 
Community/Union. Have domestic objectives of German policy been seryed 
through the integration process? 
With these questions in mind, an attempt will now be made to provide a 
historical account of West Germany's policies towards European integration 
and to examine the diversity and potency of West German integrative input.' 
This will be carried out chronologically, since the Federal Republic's (FRG) 
role in the Community/Union and its attitude towards European integration 
has gone through different phases and concomitantly changed over time. 
Therefore, this chapter assesses Bonn's approach to the Community in the 
1950s and 1960s, when the FRG's commitment to European Integration 
might have been conditioned by its desire to be on an equal footing with its 
partners in the Communities, both in the economic and political fields. It 
then analyses West German European policies in the 1970s and 1980s, 
when developments in the international economy and changed political 
circumstances had put the FRG in the forefront of international politics. The 
motivations behind the FRG's attitude towards European integration and 
domestic constraints on the process of integration will also be examined. 
Gruppen-) Interessen." (Hrbek and Wessels, 1984: 31) Author's translation, " .. the analysis of European 
unification and European policy -: which certainly the most advanced case of the integration process -
always meant occupation with national (and various group) interests". Hrbek and Wessels argue that 
analysis of European unification and European policy always means looking at national interest. 
Chapter Four includes an in-depth analysis of the role of domestic priorities or national interests in 
Germany's approach to the EU after unification. 
3 The Domestic Politics Approach, the ideas of Alan Milward and elements of Andrew Moracvsik's 
"liberal intergovemmentalism" demonstrate how important the domestic arena is for actions taken at 
the European level. The views of Donald Puchala demonstrate the importance of the nation state. He 
argues, " ... not only have nation-states not become less important as the Communities have evolved, 
but they have actually become a great deal more important, and, analytically speaking, they have 
become the key to understanding the EC." (Hrbek, 1986: 26) Chapter Two contains an analysis of 
these ideas and how they apply to the thesis. 
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3.1 THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY AND THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY: A 
HISTORICAL OVERVIEW 
3.1.1 THE FOUNDING OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC AND EUROPEAN INTEGRATION 
Developments both in Germany and in Europe in the immediate post 
war period acted as a catalyst for the establishment of an international 
organisation into which Germany could be anchored. The continent was 
expeditiously carved up into two opposing blocs; with the two superpowers, 
the United States of America and the Soviet Union, at the helm. The 
increased antagonism between the two superpowers with their two 
ideologically opposed political systems guaranteed the institution of the 
Cold War, which was to last forty years. The increased conflict between the 
two powers had a direct effect on the fate of Germany and the policies being 
pursued there, as they were the holders of supreme authority in Germany 
along with France and the United Kingdom. The Occupying Powers were 
unable to reach a consensus regarding Germany's future. East and West 
appeared determined to consolidate their respective Occupational Zones 
into blocs. Thus, Germany was divided into the Federal Republic and the 
German Democratic Republic. 
With the establishment of the Federal Republic, the Western Allies, 
along with the Benelux countries, came to the decision that, " .. .for the 
political and economic well-being of the countries of Western Europe and of 
a. democratic Germany, there must be close association of their economic 
life." (Hrbek, 1986: 19) The decision to establish the Federal Republic was 
a decision in favour of West European integration. Hence, European 
integration has been important for the FRG since its creation in 1949; it was 
considered 'so central that European unification found constitutional 
grounding in the Basic Law through Article 24 which provides for the transfer 
of sovereignty to international organisations such as the European 
Community. Thus, the fate of the Federal Republic of Germany is 
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inextricably linked with West European integration. Integration was a priority 
.. 
for the Western allies in order to tie the FRG to the West and to control it. 
The FRG was increasingly tied into western alliances to prevent the 
atrocities of the Second World War from being repeated. The integration of 
the FRG into a European constellation was also seen as a means for 
solving its economic and political problems. It was reiterated at the Hague 
Congress of the European Movement in 1948 that, "the integration of 
Germany in a united or federated Europe alone provides a solution to both 
the economic and political aspects of the German problem." (Feld, 1981: 
29) It is, however, important to point out that the Germans did not have a 
choice between independence and integration. 
3.2 THE ADENAUER ERA: NATIONAL INTERESTS OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC AND 
EUROPEAN INTEGRATION 
Konrad Adenauer, the first Chancellor of the Federal Republic, had very 
clear objectives in mind. Not only was Adenauer decisively in favour of 
integration, but the nature of integration to be pursued was immensely 
significant. The Occupying Powers had been granted considerable rights, 
particularly in military and foreign policy. Adenauer was skilful in countering 
this by utilising every favourable opportunity to extend the realm of authority 
and freedom of action of the Bonn government. (Saeter, 1980: 16) The role 
of Adenauer is crucial to understand the FRG's actions towards integration 
in the post-war period. Adenauer was never an ardent nationalist. He 
believed that the nation-state belonged to the past. He firmly believed that 
the whole project of European integration offered new opportunities. 
Adenauer was of the opinion that the European Coal and Steel Community 
(ECSC) would, "change not only economic conditions on our continent but 
all of the thinking and political feeling of European man as welL" (Feld, 
1981: 32) The ECSC would extend the boundaries of peoples' lives into 
Europe an~ enrich their lives. 
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Hrbek outlines five objectives in the Adenauer era which could constitute 
" 
national interests. Firstly, the Federal Republic wanted to re-establish 
sovereignty, both in domestic and international affairs. Secondly, Adenauer 
was concerned with the economic reconstruction in Germany. He wanted to 
bring about economic transformation and recovery. Thirdly, after two world 
wars the Federal Republic wanted to secure peace and security. Fourthly, 
Adenauer was eager to strengthen the Federal Republic.as a democracy. 
Finally, Adenauer's ultimate aim was the reunification of the two parts of 
Germany. (Hrbek, 1986: 27) Hendriks adds that Adenauer aimed to take the 
FRG back to the "cultural and political forces of Western Europe"; to redeem 
the FRG after the crimes of the Nazi regime; to regain foundations of 
national power; to reconcile differences with the Allies, particularly with 
France. (Hendriks, 1991:10) 
In the immediate post-war years European integration represented a 
lifeline for the FRG. The Germans had specific interests in the project of 
European integration, which were economic and political in nature. Feld 
adds that Germany's attitude towards European integration in this period 
was conditioned by foreign as well as domestic policy considerations. He 
argues that Germany's foreign policy emanated from strategic and security 
concerns connected to the Cold War. As mentioned previously, the attitude 
of the political leaders of the time, particularly of Adenauer, was of utmost 
importance. (Feld, 1981: 28) It is, however, important to note that there was 
opposition to membership of the Communities4 within Germany. 5 The SPD 
4 "The Communities" essentially' refers to the European Coal and Steel Community, the European 
Economic Communities (EEC), and European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM). Reference is 
also made to the failed European Defence Community. The ECSC was the supranational organisation 
to be established. The EDC failed in 1954 together with an attempt at European Political Co-operation 
(EPC). The Treaty of Rome established the EEC and EURATOM in 1957. The ECSC, EEC and 
EURATOM were amalgamated into the European Communities. 
5 Werner Feld has examined the attitudes of various sectors to the German political spectrum to the 
establishment of the Communities. Feld argues that opposition was raised against the establishment of 
the European Coal and Steel Community from industry. The Federation of German Industry 
(Bundesverband der Deutschen Industrie) (BDI) pledged support for the ECSC in theory, but they 
also had doubts. The Federation was concerned that the ECSC might act as an instrument for French 
control of Geiman industry. Alternatively, support was stronger amongst the Federation of German 
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specifically raised concerns about membership of the Communities and 
" 
the diminishing importance of the objective of reunification. 
It is important to examine these objectives individually; to ascertain 
whether Adenauer's principal objectives were realised in the European 
frameworks; and to demonstrate the importance of European integration for 
the Germans. As mentioned previously, the FRG's objectives in Europe 
were political, economic and foreign policy related. 
3.2.1 THE POLITICAL SIGNIFICANCE OF EUROPEAN INTEGRATION 
Germany's defeat in World War Two had led to a change in Germany's 
standing in the international system. Not only had Germany been divided 
but it had also been completely discredited. The war resulted in a loss of 
Germany's traditional power base in Central Europe. Having been divided 
and then de facto occupied, Germany had also lost its freedom of 
independent action. In the period immediately after division, the FRG had 
restricted and revocable measures of sovereignty; being controlled 
essentially by the Allied High Commission. Hence, the FRG had to explore 
alternative solutions, which would enable the FRG to gain some of 
trappings of a sovereign state. The FRG had to be reintegrated into the 
international system and accepted as a credible partner. In other words, the 
Germans had to build up credibility and reliability in international politics. 
(Bulmer & Paterson, 1987: 7) . Thus, European integration enabled the FRG 
to achieve national sovereignty and international respectability. The FRG 
was gradually able to restore sovereignty by being admitted to the ECSC. 
European integration was of mutual benefit. The Germans obtained 
Trade Unions (Deutscher Gewerkschaftsbund) (DGB), but this was by no means unanimous. Fears 
about unemployment were amongst the main concerns of the Trade Unions. As far as the political 
parties were concerned, the CDU, who were in government during the negotiations, were most in 
favour of the ECSC. The FDP took the middle ground, concerning themselves with the worries of 
industry but at the same time sanctioning ratification. The SPD vehemently voiced its opposition to 
the ECSC. The SPD's opposition was largely based on emotional and nationalistic grounds. The SPD 
were worried about the impact that the ECSC would have on the objective of German reunification and 
how the ECSC would institutionalise French hegemony. (Feld, 1981: 29-32) For a detailed analysis 
of the Germariy attitude towards the establishment of all three Communities see: (Feld, 1981: 29-42) 
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sovereignty and their partners were able to secure assurances of good 
" 
behaviour from them in return. (Bulmer, 1989a: 211) European integration 
worked in favour of the FRG. The Germans, devoid of sovereignty due to the 
atrocities of the Third Reich, were able to work within multilateral 
frameworks and to achieve objectives. European integration was the vehicle 
through which Germany was able to achieve equality with its partners in 
Europe. As Bulmer notes, European integration aided the Germans in, 
"obtaining international acceptance as an equal of France, while gaining 
some, if not complete, control over the coal and steel industries which had 
been under allied controL" (Bulmer, 1989a: 212). Bulmer also argues that 
the Germans were mainly in favour of European integration because it 
facilitated the progression of the FRG, "from a position of dependence to 
interdependence." (Bulmer, 1989a: 211) The European frameworks acted 
as "an arena of co-operation" 6 which allowed the FRG greater freedom of 
manoeuvre in international affairs. Grosser argues that, "For Germany it 
was easier to give up rights that she had not yet regained than for her 
neighbours to abandon those they still possessed." (Hendriks, 1991: 11). 
Hrbek suggests that European integration assisted the development of 
the Federal Republic as a democracy. He argues that integration helped to 
ground basic human rights, democracy, social justice and the rule of law as 
the foundation of the Federal Republic. (Hrbek, 1986: 27-28) 
Hrbek also contends that European integration ensured peace and 
security in Europe. This was a major priority for the Federal Republic; having 
been through two world wars. The project of European integration excluded 
a defence component, particularly after the failure to ratify the EDC in 1954. 
Bulmer and 'Paterson suggest that in the early stages of the Communities 
the security aspect was not salient. Hrbek contends that in the early years 
6 Term coined by Bulmer and Paterson. See: (Bulmer & Paterson, 1987: 7) 
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European integration led to the formation of a "security community" 7, as Karl 
" 
Deutsch saw it. Thus, membership of the Communities had resulted in a 
degree of "mutual dependence" which ruled out the prospect of military 
conflict between the six member states. (Hrbek, 1986: 27) 
Thus, Adenauer's conscious emphasis on European integration bore 
ample dividends. Hendriks argues that for the Germans integration w~s a 
means to an end. She suggests that this was a calculated move on the part 
of the Germans. "In accepting the supervision and control of foreign powers, 
the FRG made a virtue out of necessity by using the channels thus opened 
to further its economic, social military and growing political influence." 
(Hendriks, 1991: 15) Hendriks is not alone, Hrbek 8 and Kirchner 9 also 
emphasise this point. 
It can therefore be deduced that Adenauer's emphasis on integration 
served his political national interest. Adenauer achieved the solution of the 
Ruhr and Saar problems, the sensitive issue of German rearmament; he 
recovered partial sovereignty, and above all he eased Franco-German 
relations. Adenauer also achieved "recognition in Europe and the world, 
protection from Soviet aggression ( whether real or imagined),· and 
economic recovery in a climate of freedom and reasonable security." 
(Hendriks, 1991: 15). 
3.2.2 ECONOMIC SIGNIFICANCE OF EUROPEAN INTEGRATION 
After the war Germany was devastated economically. One of Adenauer's 
primary objectives was economic reconstruction. The division of Germany 
had· resulted in a loss of agricultural territory in the East and East - West 
trade had practically halted. Hence, the FRG required a new trading system. 
Hendriks. argues that the Marshall Plan, the foundation of the Organisation 
7 For a definition of "security community" see Chapter Two. For a further discussion of Karl 
Deutsch's idea see: (Deutsch, 1957) 
8 See: (Hrbek, 1986: 27) 
9 See: (Kirchner, 1989: 425) 
for European Economic Co-operation (OEEC), and the separation of 
" 
Germany had already prepared the FRG to integrate into the economic 
system of the West. (Hendriks, 1991: 16) 
Bulmer and Paterson argue that the economic and political functions of 
European integration are interlinked for the FRG. They note that th"e FRG's 
economic achievements would have been seen as a threat without the 
Communities as a forum for political co-operation. (Bulmer & Paterson, 
1987: 7) Thus, political co-operation aided economic competition. The 
European Communities undoubtedly facilitated Germany's economic 
success. Bulmer and Paterson maintain that the ECSC played a vital role in 
the rebuilding of trade and industry in the FRG. According to Bulmer and 
Paterson, membership of the ECSC was crucial increasing the FRG's 
international economic standing. (Bulmer & Paterson, 1987: 8) They also 
highlight the contribution of the currency reform, the OEEC and the 
European Payments Union (EPU) in the FRG's economic reconstruction. 
(Bulmer & Paterson, 1987: 7) Gisela Hendriks points out that, "the creation 
of the Community with a tariff-free Custom Union and a market of 322 
million people was a crucial factor in Germany's spectacular rise to one of 
the world's most powerful economic actors." (Hendriks, 1991: 21) 
The German economy is undoubtedly the strongest in the EU. 
Germany's economy is highly dependent on exports. Bulmer and Paterson 
see the EC as fulfilling two purposes for the FRG: an external and an 
internal role. Firstly, "the FRG sees the EC as a multilateral force working 
for global trade liberalisation in its foreign economic policy. Secondly, the 
FRG seeks to ensure that economic liberalisation is pursued inside the 
EC's internal market." (Bulmer & Paterson, 1987: 12) The former, according 
to Bulmer and Paterson, emanates from the FRG's export dependence. The 
FRG has to take the fluctuations in the international economic system into 
consider~tion. The latter can be explained in terms of the EC being the 
FRG's dominant trading partner. (Bulmer & Paterson, 1987: 12) 
~ 
Hendriks adds a purposive dimension to the FRG's economic 
objectives in the Communities. According to Gisela Hendriks, the FRG used 
the "Community as a vehicle" to achieve its economic aims. She states, 
using the Community as a vehicle, the FRG was able to extend the 
geographical framework of its economic activities, find new markets, 
participate in the solution of world-wide problems, secure raw materials 
and increase its influence in the North-South dialogue. (Hendriks, 1991: 
21) 
It cannot be denied that European integration facilitated the economic 
success of Germany and was largely responsible for elevating it to the 
heights that it has now achieved. Thus, Adenauer was able to achieve his 
economic aims in the European Communities. 
3.2.3 THE ACHIEVEMENT OF GERMAN REUNIFICATION 
The aim of reunifying the two divided parts of Germany deserves 
separate attention. German reunification had an important place in the 
whole debate about European integration. It remained an important 
objective for Adenauer and his successors. However, German reunification 
was also the source of discord between the major political parties. The SPD 
in particular raised concerns about the membership of the Communities. 
and the diminishing significance of the objective of reunification. 10 German 
reunification could not be accomplished in the early stages of European 
integration. Nevertheless, German reunification would definitely not have 
been a possibility, had the Germans abstained from the project of European 
integration. Gradually, as the Germans became meshed into the European 
constellations, conditions were brought about where Germany's partners 
understood the special nature of the FRG's relationship with the GDR. 
Furthermore, it was with the support of its partners that the FRG was later 
able to pursue Ostpolitik (Policy towards the East). German reunification 
10 This question has been discussed earlier in this chapter. 
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remained an objective throughout the existence of the FRG, all be it in the 
" 
background in later years. However, it cannot be denied that this ultimate 
objective could not have been achieved without European integration. 
German reunification was achieved forty years after the establishment of the 
FRG and very much under the "European banner". 
Germany's approach to European integration reflects Germany's 
complex post-war history. European integration was of vital importance for 
the FRG from the very beginning, notwithstanding discord over the objective 
of German reunification in the earlier years. Despite the fact that European 
integration was the only acceptable path for the Germans, the Germans 
were able to make use of the opportunities that integration presented. By 
emphasising supranationalism, Adenauer was able to achieve certain 
political and economic objectives. As Hrbek notes, 
As far as· West German politicians were concerned their decision in 
favour of integrating the Federal Republic into Western Europe had 
been founded on their conviction that integration was not only 
compatible with the principal objectives of the new West German state 
but would promote their realisation." (Hrbek, 1986: 27) 
Hrbek argues that Adenauer's objectives can be considered national 
interests and that the Communities helped to realise these national. 
interests. (Hrbek, 1986: 28) Kolinsky adds that, "West Germans tend to 
support European goals, but their orientation towards Europe has been 
instrumental. Europe is accepted but not liked." (Kolinsky, 1992: 174) 
Through European integration, the FRG was able to retrieve sovereignty, 
gaining equal status among its partners; the Federal Republic was able to 
effect an economic recovery, elevating it to its present economic heights; 
finally the FRG attained internal and external stability. The Germans' 
approach towards negotiations in the Communities was "integration 
oriented." The Germans would back down in negotiations if there was a 
danger o( impeding integration. Morgan argues that, " in the early years of 
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the Communities German delegations were under instructions to back 
down in the event of conflict." (Bulmer, 1986: 16). 
3.3 THE FRG's RELATIONSHIP WITH THE EC: THE SIXTIES AND BEYOND 
3.3.1 THE END OF AN ERA AND EUROPEAN INTEGRATION 
Adenauer had been committed to Westpolitik. Adenauer had essentially 
perceived Germany's interests as being identical to those of Germany's 
western partners. The foundation of Adenauer's approach to European 
integration was a solid partnership with France. This would later prove to 
be detrimental to Adenauer. The actions of De Gaulle in the 1960s 
embarrassed Adenauer and the German government. De Gaulle went on 
the offensive against the United States and NATO. He also made clear his 
intense dislike of the supranational elements of the Communities. His 
actions in essence almost jeopardised the very foundations of Adenauer's 
foreign policy; namely Germany's security arrangement with the USA, the 
friendly understanding with France, reconciliation with France and 
Germany's commitment to European integration. However, it was De 
Gaulle's veto over British membership to the EC in 1963 which was the final 
blow for Adenauer. Despite opposition from other members of the cabinet, 
namely Erhard and Foreign Minister Schroeder, Adenauer, pursuing a pro- . 
French policy, went ahead and signed the German French Friendship Treaty 
shortly after De Gaulle'S veto of British entry in January 1963. Adenauer's 
actions were not only a blow for his popularity at home but also for the 
Community ideal. Feld notes that, "Adenauer's acquiescence to the veto 
casts some doubt upon his declared high priority of European unification." 
(Feld, 1981,48) DIE-ZEIT even commented that Adenauer was, "destroying 
the foundations of European unification." (Feld, 1981: 48) 
Thus, as Germany was emerging out of the Adenauer era, there was a 
diversion from a commitment to supranationalism. Supranationalism was 
at the heart of the debate when Adenauer conceded to General de Gaulle'S 
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veto on British membership of the EC in 1963. West German elites 
questioned the supranational dimension of the ECSC, claiming it to be too 
supranational. The Germans were of the opinion that Germany should be 
entitled to a more dominant economic position due to its growing economic 
strength. 
3.3.2 ERHARD AND THE MOVE AWAY FROM INTEGRATION 
Ludwig Erhard took over as Chancellor after Adenauer's resignation in 
1963. Erhard's approach towards European integration differed 
considerably from his predecessor. Firstly, Erhard had a different style of 
leadership to Adenauer. Adenauer's term in office is characterised by the 
term "Chancellor democracy". 11 The Chancellor's position has 
constitutional backing by virtue of the Chancellor Principle (Kanzlerprinzip). 
The Chancellor principle, guaranteed by Article 65 of the Basic Law, sets out 
the Chancellor's Richtlinienkompetenz (competence to set guidelines of 
policy). This principle identifies the Chancellor'S formal authority to set the 
guidelines of government policy. Thus, Adenauer had constitutional 
grounding to pursue an active European policy. Adenauer used his 
Richtlinienkompetenz to the maxim as regards European integration 
particularly political matters. Conversely, Erhard was a "consensus oriented 
politician", which meant an increase in ministerial autonomy 
(Ressortprinzip). 12 The prinCiple of ministerial autonomy empowers 
individual ministers to formulate their policies and run their own 
departments. Chancellor Erhard was uninterested in external policy, leaving 
Foreign Minister Gerhard Schroeder to deal with European policy. 
Secondly, whilst Adenauer had a firm grasp of all political matters 
relating to European integration, Erhard being an economist, was the first to 
emphasise the economic aspects of European integration. Erhard 
11 The tenn "Chancellor democracy" was used to denote Adenauer's dominant almost authoritarian 
style of government. Adenauer's domina,lce manifested itself by the control he exerted over the CDU, 
his domineering style as head of government. 
12 The Ressoitprinzip is also constitutionally guaranteed by virtue of Article 65 of the Basic Law. 
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remarked, "For anyone with any insight integration means free and 
" 
comprehensive competition; it means economic collaboration on a 
functionally higher leveL" (Erhard, 1958: 213) Erhard was concerned not 
with the establishment of institutions but with freedom of movement of 
goods, services and capital, and with the convertibility of currency. He 
argued that European integration was seen too much in terms of the 
creation of institutions; the functional was ignored whilst the institutional 
was overemphasised. (Erhard, 1958: 217) Erhard felt that political 
integration may be achieved without the corresponding economic 
developments. Erhard commented, 
I must express my concern that the proper priorities may be lost sight of, 
and that the political forms of Europe may be settled before equivalent 
economic integration has been achieved. The great danger still exists 
today that we all want a free Europe, but that, if politics move forward 
without corresponding economic developments, a centralism might 
arise - a centralism which might stifle all that is colourful and different in 
this old European culture. (Erhard, 1958: 218) 
Thirdly, Adenauer had put an emphasis on the Franco-German alliance. 
Erhard's term in office was characterised by a debate between the Gaullists 
and the Atlanticists. The former emphasised a policy gravitating towards 
Europe. The latter were primarily concerned with avoiding any conflict with 
the United States with respect to foreign policy. Erhard stressed the Atlantic 
alliance, considering the FRG's dependence on the USA for security. The 
Gaullists were undermined during this period, given Germany's support for 
France and supranationalism and De Gaulle's animosity towards the 
Communities. The "e"!lPty chair crisis" and De Gaulle's withdrawal from 
-
Community meetings in 1965 meant the integration process had began to 
stagnate. 
3.4 BRANDT AND OSTPOLITIK 
However, it was during his time as Foreign Minister under Kiesinger's 
Chancellorship in the Grand Coalition, that Brandt began the process of 
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easing relations with the GDR. When he became Chancellor in November 
" 
1972, he focused almost exclusively on one area of foreign policy: 
Ostpolitik. 
His achievements in Ostpolitik almost definitely aided his election 
victory in 1972. Prior to Brandt's Chancellorship relations with the GDR had 
been constrained by the existence of the Hallstein Doctrine. 13 Brandt h.oped 
that Ostpolitik would normalise relations with Eastern Europe and 
particularly achieve some progress on German-German relations. Brandt 
als.o wished to reduce the FRG's dependence on the western allies. Thus, 
the main aim of Ostpolitik was the bettering of relations with the GDR. 
Brandt was able to realise his main aims of Ostpolitik. The international 
environment had changed in the 1970s. The process of European 
integration had certainly aided that change. European integration had 
encouraged co-operation between the Germans and the western allies. 
Hence, the achievement of Ostpolitik had signified a reduction of the 
dependence of the FRG on the western allies. By the 1970s the 
Communities had also developed other instruments for an integrated 
foreign policy. {This came in the shape of European Political Co-operation. 
Collective means of achieving foreign policy goals were particularly. 
important for the FRG. EPC represented a particularly important forum for 
the FRG to present its own foreign policy goals especially since the ability to 
pursue goals independently had been destroyed by the Second World War. 
The European label legitimised German foreign policy initiatives, so that by 
the early 1970s the Federal Republic of Germany was able to achieve its 
foreign policy goals: Hendriks argues that, "The European label helped the 
FRG to be emancipated from .... historical burden." (Hendriks, 1991: 23) The 
European framework had certainly aided Brandt in his pursuit of Ostpolitik. It 
13 The Hallstein Doctrine stated that the Federal Republic of Germany regarded the recognition of the 
GDR by another state as an unfriendly act. 
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is commented in Hendriks, "The attempts of my government for better 
" 
relations with Eastern Europe would have been impossible without the 
trusting support in the West - the EC and the Atlantic Alliance." (Hendriks, 
1991: 23) 
Kirchner argues that the approach to political integration became more 
realistic with Willy Brandt's Chancellorship. "For him [Brandt], there was no 
automatic development from economic integration to political integration. 
Rather, European unification was a dynamic development process which 
must be a continuing object of political discussion among the participants." 
(Kirchner, 1989: 427) 
3.5 HELMUT SCHMIDT 
Following the change of the Chancellor the FRG's position on European 
integration and role in the EC changed. Schmidt's approach towards 
European integration was largely a result of changed international 
circumstances. The oil embargo and the oil price shocks of 1973 and the 
international recession complicated matters for Schmidt. Bulmer argues 
that international developments had the effect of increasing, "German 
preparedness to be assertive in bargaining between member governments 
in the EC." (Bulmer, 1989a: 218) Paterson points out that Schmidt's 
approach to European integration was incongruous. Paterson notes that 
Schmidt's Chancellorship was characterised by interdependence, 
particularly economic interdependence. 
Bulmer argued that the FRG became more assertive. Paterson notes 
that the Schmidt wavered from this position of interdependence. (Paterson, 
1994: 148-149) This was no more significant than in the "paymaster" 
question where the FRG questioned its budgetary contributions to the 
European Regional Development Fund (ERDF). The FRG emphasised its 
"paymaster" role in the EC budget. According to Bulmer, the "paymaster" 
episode .indicated that, "the defence of national interests was being 
pursued explicitly." (Bulmer, 1989a: 218) Schmidt, however, also attacked 
" 
the Commission as inefficient. He accused the Commission of "financial 
irresponsibility and administrative incompetence". (Paterson, 1994: 149) 
The solution, therefore, according to Paterson, was to increase the role of 
the Council. 
Conversely, economic interdependence was of primary importance to 
Schmidt. Schmidt increased economic integration by setting up the 
European Monetary System (EMS) with Giscard d' Estaing. According to 
Schmidt, the EMS served two purposes. Firstly, it established an area of 
monetary stability in Europe. Secondly, the EMS precluded the danger of 
Germany being perceived as pursuing its domestic objectives too clearly. 
(Paterson, 1994: 149) Clearly, the Schmidt Chancellorship can be 
associated with a prevalence of economic integration and an elevation of 
the importance of the Council. As Bulmer notes, " ... the political necessity of 
integration lost precedence to the need to defend economic and social 
interests in the diverse activities of the EC." (Bulmer, 1989a: 218) 
3.6 CHANCELLOR KOHL: THE 19805 
Kohl's approach to European integration has been mixed. When he 
came to power in 1982 Kohl adopted Adenauer's European policy as a . 
model, stating that his aim was to advance the union of Europe. In a 
government declaration in May 1983 Kohl commented, "It is our historical 
task to take the lead energetically on the road to a united Europe." (Leick, 
1987: 55) In a foreign policy speech at the Adenauer Memorial lecture in 
Oxford in 1984, Kohl stated that he considered national interests as 
secondary to those of the Community. He asserted, 
Since Adenauer, German Chancellors have time and time again 
refused to place their own national interests, as justified as they might 
be, ahead of those of the Community. I expressly confess myself to 
holding this same attitude. (Leick, 1987: 55) 
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However, Kohl's "European rhetoric" does not seem to correspond to 
" 
his actions, particularly in the early years of his Chancellorship. In fact, Kohl 
made little progress in his aim of achieving European unification. On the 
contrary, Kohl made use of the infamous national veto for the first time in 
1985 over cereal prices. Furthermore, Kohl stressed German reunification 
as an important aim at the 1987 election campaign. "It is the historical task 
of our generation to strive for a united Germany." (Leick, 1987: 56) Leick 
argues that alongside the usual 'European rhetoric' has emerged a new 
'national rhetoric'. Leick comments, 
He [Kohl] no longer defined the location of the Federal Republic in the 
historical dimensions of European unity, but in the process of German 
unity. Terms and ideas like patriotism and fatherland and national 
symbols are being used of course to define one's own location. (Leick, 
1987: 56) 
Kohl perceived German unification and European unification as part of 
the same process. German unity could not be achieved without European 
unity. Indeed, this is what transpired in 1990. 
Leick suggests that Kohl has been pursuing national interests over 
Community interests. Leick suggests that if there was a conflict of interests 
between Community and national concerns, Kohl would choose the. 
national option. This argument is reinforced by Bulmer who contends that, 
"the German government's defence of its national interests has become 
more vociferous, with the result that the Federal Republic is catching up with 
the masters of the art - the French and the British." (Bulmer, 1986: 16) Leick 
comes to the conclusion that German European policies lack the 
enthusiasm of the earlier years. In this sense, the Germans have according 
to Leick, become a "completely normal nation." (Leick, 1987: 59) 
Although, Leick's statements may appear exaggerated; it cannot be 
denied that Germany's approach towards European integration in the 
1980s underwent some change. Kirchner has argued that the earlier parts 
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of Kohl's Chancellorship were characterised by a degree of ambiguity. He 
" 
points out that Kohl's stance on Europe lacked "clarity or drive." (Kirchner, 
1989: 428) The ambiguous nature of Germany's role in the EC during the 
1970s and 1980s caused academics and Germany's partners in the 
European Community to question the reasons for this decline in support. 
Kirchner puts forward a number of possible explanations for this change. 
Kirchner argues that there was "benign neglect of or disillusionment 
with" the EC. He further subdivided the Germans' attitude towards the EC 
into three categories: the Germans were either complacent about the EC, 
• 
disillusioned with it, or arrogant. (Kirchner, 1989: 429-430) Firstly, Kirchner 
suggests that the degree of economic success in Germany correlated to its 
decline in support for European unification. Kirchner argues that economic 
prosperity in Germany produced a complacent attitude amongst the 
. Germans and led to EuropamOdigkeit. Kirchner also argues that Germany's 
history had the effect of making the Germans too cautious; i.e. less willing 
to take risks and concentrating more on the present. Kirchner tends to 
suggest that it was for this reason that the Germans concentrated on 
economic matters rather than on political ones. Secondly, Kirchner 
maintains that the Germans were simply disillusioned with the EC. The. 
Germans were far too concerned with budgetary and financial contributions, 
especially to the poorer members of the Community. The Germans, 
according to Kirchner, perceived this as a liability whilst still deriving 
economic benefits from the EC. Thirdly, Kirchner contends that the change 
in attitude could be accounted for by mere arrogance. Kirchner suggests 
that the concept of "Model Deutschland" reduced policy attempts for further 
integration. The FRG became more critical of the economic performance of 
the other member states, and the Commission was deemed inefficient. 
(Kirchner, 1989: 429-430) Furthermore, Kirchner suggests that a growing 
national ~onfidence altered the European Community's importance to the 
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Federal Republic. (Kirchner, 1989: 425-442) 
Hrbek argues that the discussions within the FRG at this time produced 
diverse opinions. There were, of course, those who followed the argument 
that there was no other feasible option to the EC. Alternatively, others 
complained about central policy areas, such as the Common Agricultural 
Policy, as being wasteful. As argued previously, politicians were critical of 
the bureaucracy as well as highlighting the "paymaster role" of the 
Germans. (Hrbek, 1986: 30-32) 
Germa~y's role in the EC became the subject of discussion in many of 
the member states of the EC. This primarily derived from the economic and 
social challenges the other member states were confronting. Germany's 
partners in the EC were critical of Germany's self-proclamation as the 
"paymaster" of the EC. The other member states argued that the German 
economy should function as a "locomotive". Rather than decreasing its 
budgetary contributions, Germany's partners were pushing for a further 
increase. 
The French in particular were concerned about Germany's future. The 
French fears revolved around a possible reorientation of German loyalties 
to the East. The French were mainly disturbed by, "tendencies in the Federal. 
Republic to loosen her pro western alignment or even renounce it." (Hrbek, 
1986: 29) This is not a new fear on the part of the French; they have 
previously questioned the "reliability and trustworthiness of Germany as a 
partner." (Hrbek, 1986: 30) 
There were those who emphasised economic arguments. Lankowski 
put forward the argument that the FRG utilised the economy as a means of 
economic hegemony. There are those that counter this argument, 
particularly Bulmer and Paterson who point to domestic and external 
constraints on the FRG's ability to take an assertive stance in Europe. They 
utilise oth.er arguments for the German decline in support for the EC. 
.. 78 
Bulmer and Paterson su.~gest that the FRG, "formerly the mainstay of 
European integration and co-operation, has become a less reliable partner 
in Community." (Bulmer & Paterson, 1988: 231) They contend that 
Germany's change in attitude can be attributed to, "the loosely co-ordinated 
nature of European policy." (Bulmer and Paterson, 1988: 231) Bulmer and 
Paterson put forward the argument that internal policy-making factors and 
external factors apply constraints Oll Germany's capacity to playa principal 
role in the EC. They argue that the FRG has become a "Sorgenkind" 
because of its incoherent European policy. 
Bulmer and Paterson cite limited Chancellorial authority; sectorisation 
of policy; Bund-Lander dynamics; and the party politicisation of agriculture 
as the internal factors which apply constraints on Germany's role in the EU. 
These internal factors are essentially connected with the policy making 
machinery. (Bulmer & Paterson, 1988: 231) 
Bulmer and Paterson particularly highlight limited Chancellorial 
authority as an internal factor mitigating against a strong leadership role in 
the EC. Chancellorial authority is a constitutionally guaranteed right of the 
Chancellor to set the guidelines for government policy. Thus, the Chancellor 
has the authority to set guidelines for European policy and pursue an active. 
policy. However, the extent to which this resource is utilised and how much 
attention is given to European policy is dependent on the Chancellor. 
Konrad Adenauer, the first Chancellor of the FRG, utilised these powers to 
the maximum. Since Adenauer however, German Chancellors have not 
used these powers to the same extent because politicians have tended to 
be more consensus' orientated. Bulmer and Paterson also argue that it is 
harder to assert Chancellorial authority because of the vast increase in the 
activities of the EC. (Bulmer & Paterson, 1988: 244) 
Furthermore, Bulmer and Paterson maintain that the sectorisation of 
policy ha~ affected Germany's ability to playa leading role in the EC. The 
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sectorisation of policy is closely connected with the constitutionally 
" 
guaranteed right of ministerial autonomy or (Ressortprinzip). The principle 
of ministerial autonomy empowers individual ministers to formulate their 
own policies. Thus, when there is a lack of Chancellorial authority, 
ministerial autonomy becomes more important. 
Bulmer and Paterson argue that the existence of the Ressortprinzip and 
the sectorisation . of policy can have positive and negative effects on 
European policy. On the positive side, "it is easy for policies with a low 
overall governmental priority to be conducted autonomously from ministerial 
level altogether." (Bulmer & Paterson, 1988: 246) On the negative side, the 
existence of ministerial autonomy promotes the development of so-called 
'house policies'. This operation of 'house policies', according to Bulmer and 
Paterson, can affect the coherence of European policy. Ministers begin to 
formulate policy subjectively and individual policies may conflict with overall 
European policy aims. Bulmer and Paterson point out that, "In their totality, 
... sectorized policy areas may bear, an inadequate relationship to the 
government's stated European Policy."(Bulmer & Paterson, 1987: 25) They 
note that sectcrisation has increased in European policy in the 1970s and 
1980s. Bulmer highlights the effect of sectorisation on European policy,. 
particularly in relation to the CAP. The operation of 'house policies' certainly 
had an impact on the efforts of Helmut Schmidt to reform the CAP and the 
desire of the BML to increase CAP expenditure, so that the German farmer 
. may exploit all the possible advantages. Thus, the policies of the BML 
obstructed the attempts of Schmidt to reform the CAP. 
Bulmer and Paterson also examine the effect of the relationship 
between the federal level and the state level: Bund-Lander dynamics. Due to 
the Federal structure of Germany, the Lander governments play a 
fundamental role in the policy-making process in Germany. Competence for 
policy ar~as is divided between the Federal government and the Lander. 
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Hence, the Federal government does not have exclusive competence for all 
" 
the policy areas addressed by the EC. The Lander governments have to be 
consulted on certain issues. The federal structure of the state leads to 
further incoherence in policy. Bulmer and Paterson argue that complications 
in the Bund-Lander relations on European policy constitute, "a serious 
additional impediment to a German leadership role in the EC". (Bulmer and 
Paterson, 1988: 250) 
The ratification of the Single European Act (SEA) was a clear example of 
how complications in the Bund-Lander relationship can affect Germany's 
role in the EC. The Lander saw the SEA as a "threat to their constitutional 
status". (Bulmer & Paterson, 1988: 249) The SEA allotted responsibility for 
policy areas under Lander jurisdiction to the EC, without the corresponding 
involvement of the Lander in the policy-making process. (Bulmer & 
Paterson, 1988: 249) The federal government was forced to make some 
concessions before the Lander ratified the SEA. A formal consultation 
procedure on all issues concerning the EC was set up. As Bulmer and 
Paterson argue, " ... this formal consultation procedure will inevitably slow 
down the process of European policy-making in the FRG." (Bulmer and 
Paterson, 1988: 250) 
There has tended to be a consensus regarding European policy across 
the political spectrum in Germany. This consensus has been reinforced by 
the dominance of coalition governments. However, it has been suggested 
by some that this was not the case as regards agricultural policy. 14 
Bulmer argues that European policy is formulated in a consensual 
manner. The "institutional pluralism" in the FRG means that the Federal 
government has to consider the opinions of the Lander, and the Basic Law 
provides for ministerial autonomy and an independent Bundesbank. The 
individual ministries and corresponding interest groups tend to work closely 
14 The relationship between the various parties with agriculture is examined in Chapter Seven. 
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together. However, these constitutional and institutional factors also act as 
" 
a barrier to Germany taking a leading role in the EC. Bulmer and Paterson 
also cited Franco-German relations and inner-German relations as limiting 
the extent of German leadership in the EC. 
Having considered the various arguments regarding Germany's role in 
the EC during the 1980s it cannot be denied that Germany's role changed. 
The Germans were perhaps not 'as assertive in the hegemonic sense, as 
Lankowski and Leick would appear to suggest. It can be accepted that the 
policy-making structures have an impact on Germany's stance in the EC. 
However, by the 1980s the FRG "had become as assertive a member state 
as the others." (Bulmer & Paterson, 1988: 239) 
Moving on from the 1980s, the Germans remained committed to the EU, 
but they also continue to derive benefits from it. Kohl's record as far as 
European integration was concerned improved from the earlier period of 
this Chancellorship. Kohl was instrumental in the formulation of the Single 
European Act in 1986. Since German unification was achieved under the 
European framework, Kohl has maintained his objective of European 
unification. The EU has seen the implementation of the internal market in 
1992. Kohl has consistently stressed the importance of political union as. 
well as economic and monetary union. 
3.7 CONCLUSION 
This chapter has endeavoured to examine Germany's relationship with 
the EC from its inception. It has shown how the relationship has changed 
over the years with different Chancellors. The chapter has examined the 
Germans' initial motivations behind joining the Communities. The chapter 
concludes that the FRG has been committed to European integration; 
concomitantly it has been able to achieve domestic objectives within the 
European frameworks. The extent to which this has been done has 
essentially depended upon the Chancellor of the time and the way in which 
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Germany's relationship has shaped up with the Community. In the years 
" 
following the establishment of the Federal Republic and throughout the 
Adenauer era the European Community and the objective of European 
integration remained at the top of the political agenda. European integration 
was of economic and political significance. However, once these objectives 
had been achieved, Germany's relationship with the EC changed. It is 
argued that as Germany grew more integrated and more confident it 
became more assertive. This can be seen to varying degrees right from 
Erhard to Kohl. As time went on doubts were raised about Germany's 
commitment to the EC and its role within it, both from Germans and 
Germany's partners. Some agree that there is no alternative to the EC, other 
criticise some of its policies and institutions. There is no doubt that the FRG 
has benefited internally and externally from the EC. The Germans remain 
committed to the EC because it provides a mechanism for solving domestic 
problems. As the case studies will show, the way in which such solutions 
are pursued and worked through depends on the policy area concerned. 
CHAPTER FOUR: GERIVIANY'S ROLE IN THE EU IN THE POST 
UNIFICATION PERIOD 
INTRODUCTION 
Chapter Three comprised an analysis of Germany's relationship with, 
and role in, the EC prior to unification. The previous chapter traced the 
varying contours of Germany's polices in the EC and demonstrated how 
Germany's objectives in Europe had changed over the last four decades. 
The chapter concurred with the central contentions of this thesis that 
Germany remains committed to the EU. However, Germany has 
simultaneously been able to utilise the EU for solving domestic problems. 
This chapter aims to investigate Germany's role in the EU in the post 
unification period. The chapter traces the changing nature of Germany's role 
in the EU and the impact of unification on that role. The chapter addresses 
fundamental issues such as, Has German commitment to European 
integration oscillated since unification? Are the Germans still willing to work 
through multilateral frameworks or are they going to turn away from 
integrated actions towards the pursuit of 'national interests'? 
r, 
The thesis asserts that Germany will not waver from its commitment to 
the EU after unification. The Germans are unlikely to turn away from co-' 
operative methods of operation, as these have proved invaluable for the 
Germans. The EU has been a vital arena for solving domestic problems 
and this practice continues after unification. In fact, unification has 
presented the Germans with a whole host of challenges in the domestic 
~phere. The Germans have, thus, had to look to the domestic arena. 
Equally, it is not plausible to argue that unification has not had any impact 
on Germany's standing in the EU. Indeed, Germany's role has become 
stronger, but certainly not in the hegemonic sense. 
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This chapter briefly considers the process of unification and the 
" 
accession of the former GDR to the EU, examining the immediate reactions 
to that process. The chapter then moves on to survey the available literature 
on Germany's role in the EU in the post unification period before 
considering the some of the core contentions of this thesis. 
4.1 GERMAN UNIFICATION AND THE ACCESSION OF THE FORMER GDR TO THE EU 
The former GDR automatically became part of the European Union by 
uniting with an existing member state, the Federal Republic, via Article 23 of 
the Basic Law. Eastern Germany's accession to the European Union 
undoubtedly represented a unique case. The European Union faced the 
unprecedented task of integrating a country which for forty years had a 
completely different social, economic, political and even military system. 
Nevertheless, the European Union accepted unification, declaring that it 
should take place under the "European roof' and furthermore, that it would 
help to advance the unification of Europe. The Commission President, 
Jacques Delors, expressed his support for the unification process as early 
as January 1990. The European Commission's statement on German 
unification on 3rd October 1990 stated that, "it has .. been the objective of the 
European Community to bring about German unification as part of the 
process of European integration." (Commission of the European 
Communities, 1990: 7) 
Despite the member states' acceptance of German unification, there 
remained an underlying fear about the potential power of a new unified 
Germany and the role it would play in the EU. These fears emanated partly 
from historical as well as economic reasons. Shocks waves were felt 
through the capitals of the member states trying to guess what Germany's 
future role would be: one of greater dominance or less commitment. 
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4.2 IMMEDIATE REACTIONS 
Virtually since the creation of the two German states, its West European 
partners have been committed to reunification. However, at the same time, 
it is completely plausible to argue that Germany's West European partners 
did not consider, nor expect unification as a realistic and immediate 
prospect. The post-war order in Europe seemed to be firmly in place, and 
there were no visible signs of it changing. It is therefore not surprising that 
the Europeans, along with the Germans of course, were slightly taken 
aback at the turn of events in 1989/90, which set the wheels of unification in 
motion. 
The initial joy at the fall of the Berlin Wall gave way to consternation and 
growing concern about a possible change in direction by an enlarged 
Community.· The British and the French were able to express their fears 
most clearly. 
German unification and Germany's future role in the EU received a more 
straightforward response from Germany's smaller western allies. Denmark, 
the Netherlands and Belgium had no choice but to consent to German 
unification, since their economies were inextricably linked to the German 
economy. Furthermore, these states realised that they had no power to 
change the situation. Consequently, they gave their blessing to German 
unification, being pursued as part of European unification. A survey 
conducted by Eurobarometer in December 1989 showed that 76% of the 
Dutch, 70% of the Belgians and 60% of the Danes were in favour of 
unification. (Commission of the European Communities, 1989) 
., 
The less advanced members of the EU such as Spain, Portugal and 
Greece feared that the GDR's amalgamation with the Federal Republic 
would result in a diversion of attention and resources away from their own 
econom!c development. This remains a concern to the present day. 
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Furthermore, the Mediterr~nean members of the EU were increasingly 
concerned about Germany strengthening its eastern orientation. 
The British and the French reactions to the prospect of imminent 
unification were ambivalent. The British and French shared concerns about 
unification. The French and the British had committed themselves to the 
principle of German unity in the Deutschlandvertrag of 1952. Britain and 
France retained formal rights in Germany as occupying powers and risked 
losing them in the event of unification. Moreover, for Britain and France, the 
problem of adjustment was not just accepting a united Germany, but 
coming to terms with a Europe without the Cold War confrontation and the 
semi-sovereign Germany which gave both Britain and France an 
international standing which their economic position no longer supported. 
The then French President, Fran90is Mitterand, publicly voiced his 
concerns about Chancellor Kohl's Ten Point Plan for unification and did not 
clearly indicate absolute support for the rapidity of German unification after 
the falling of the Berlin Wall. 
The speed at which developments in 1989 and 1990 proceeded and the 
way in which the Germans handled reunification aroused anxiety from 
Germany's partners. An advisor to the then Prime Minister Jacques Chirac 
is cited in a Newsweek article as saying, 
The Germans these days resent any restraint from outside. 
Understandably they feel that the German unification process is their 
business, as Chancellor Kohl's 10-point plan made clear. They feel that 
they do not have to consult anybody, nor give any additional 'conditions' 
or 'guarantees' to anyone ... 1 am also disturbed by mounting evidence of 
new German assertiveness - some say outright arrogance - which 
translates attil1'1es into neglect of others' legitimate concerns. 
(Lellouche, 1990: 4) 
French fears of German domination centred on economic domination. 
A MORI poll conducted in January 1990 showed that 55% of those French 
questioned were worried about economic domination. The French were 
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concerned about the Ger,!'nans' lack of enthusiasm for the European 
integration process, and more specifically German reluctance to accelerate 
the process to economic and monetary union. The French approach was to 
tie German unification with an acceleration of the European integration 
process. 
Fears about Germany's possible domination of Europe in the. future 
were raised in Nicholas Ridley's Spectator article, where he asserted that 
the Germans were planning to take over Europe or to create a 
'Deutschmark zone'. He believed that Economic and Monetary Union was, 
"a German racket designed to take over the whole of Europe." (Spectator, 
14. 7. 1990: 8) He was of the opinion that relinquishing sovereignty would 
contribute to German hegemony. Ridley's comments are particularly 
significant because it is generally assumed that his views mirrored those of 
the former British Prime Minister, Mrs Thatcher, who originally opposed 
German reunification. 
The British government was caused further embarrassment by the 
leaking of a Chequers memorandum of 25 March 1990 from Mrs Thatcher's 
foreign policy advisor, Charles Powell. Powell had listed the following 
characteristics as describing the Germans, "angst, aggressiveness, 
assertiveness, bullying, egotism, (and) inferiority complex." (Spence, 1991: 
2) Powell believed that the Germans were in favour of European integration 
just to mislead other member states. (Spence, 1991: 2) Powell was of the 
opinion that the German's belief in European federalism as an alternative 
option to nationalism was, "not wholly convincing, given that the structure of 
the EC tended to favour German dominance". (Spence, 1991: 3) 
Mrs Thatcher's views on the containment of Germany necessitated a 
wider and looser EU and a slowing down of the integration process. 
German dominance "would be diluted by these restrictions on the scope of 
Community policies and the effects of further Community enlargement." 
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(Paterson, 1993: 169) Despite the initial resistance to unification, displayed 
" 
by Mrs Thatcher, and private remarks made by Euro-sceptics, these 
reactions did not constitute British policy. A good proportion of the 
establishment in Britain believed that unification was both an inevitable and 
positive development. 1 
These fears were further heightened by proclamations of the coming of 
the 'Fourth Reich'. The Irish historian Conor Cruise O'Brien warned that, "In 
the new proud, united Germany, the nationalists will proclaim the Fourth 
Reich". (O'Brien, 1989: 18) These arguments were mirrored by Heleno 
Sana, who believed that the fall of the Berlin Wall had removed the restraints 
upon Germany. (Sana, 1990: 22) 
The reactions to German unification and Germany's role after unification 
covered a broad spectrum of views. The broad range of reactions by 
Germany's partners are reflected in the literature on Germany's future role 
in the EU. 
4.3 GERMANY'S ROLE IN THE EU: THE LITERATURE 
Since German unification, five years ago, a considerable amount of 
literature has been amassed on the subject of Germany's future role in the 
European Union. A continuum has developed ranging from those that argue 
that Germany will rise up again and become more "assertive" devoid of the 
constraints of the post-war order. (Markovits & Reich, 1991; Garton-Ash, 
1993 & 1994) Others reject these "hegemonic" arguments, pointing to 
Germany's commitment to work within multilateral frameworks. (Hodge, 
1992; Goldberger, 1993; Paterson, 1993) Those in favour of integration fear 
that Germany will become less committed to European integration. 
Advocates of this view suggest that a weaker Germany will lead to a weaker 
Europe. (Marsh, 1994) Marsh argues that until Germany is united, Europe 
cannot be united. Some argue that due to the complexities in the domestic 
1 Interview-with unnamed 'top official' in the Foreign Office, London, 16 March 1995 
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policy process Germany wi!,1 perhaps become a more "awkward partner" in 
Europe. (Jeffery, 1995a) Thus, the reactions to German unification and 
Germany's role in the EU have been marked by ambivalence and 
inconsistency. Some fear a more powerful Germany; others criticise the 
supposed hesitancy of the unified Germany to take on more international 
responsibility. The aim of this section is to survey the contemporary view on 
Germany's role in the EU in the post unification period. 
Concern about the unification of Germany and its possible impact on 
Germany's future role in Europe lead some academics to raise the 
question: "Should Europe fear the Germans?" (Markovits & Reich, 1991) 
Markovits and Reich provide a survey of the differing attitudes to Germany's 
future role in the EU. Markovits and Reich divide attitudes regarding 
Germany into two categories: the optimists and the pessimists. 
Markovits and Reich coincide with the optimists to suggest that the 
experience of the Second World War is unlikely to be repeated in Germany 
again. It is argued that the factors which produced atrocities such as 
Auschwitz have been successfully eradicated. Markovits and Reich depart 
from the optimists view that Germany has virtually no exercise of power. On 
the contrary, they argue that amongst the factors making Germany powerful 
in a "hegemonic" sense is its commercialised and democratic nature. 
Markovits and Reich assert that Germany derives its power from the 
consensual nature of its politics, which confers a certain amount of 
legitimacy in the eyes of its partners, and from its markets. (Markovits & 
Reich, 1991: 2) 
Markovits and Reich examine Germany's influence in Western and 
Eastern Europe to assert that Germany already has a "hegemonic" role in 
Europe. They argue that Germany's power has increased in the EU over the 
last ten years, benefiting from the EU's trading relations. Markovits and 
Reich argue that Germany's economic success in the EU has provided it 
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with the means for heg~mony in Eastern Europe. They assert that 
Germany's power will grow with increasing rapidity in Eastern Europe, 
where fewer institutional constraints exist. In the pursuit of this hegemony in 
Eastern Europe the Germans will be also be assisted by the cultural 
legacies there and by the fact that the East Europeans see the Germans as 
a model for economic and political transformation. Furthermore, Markovits 
and Reich argue that, once this hegemony has been established in the 
East, it will "reciproca"y help to cement hegemony in Western Europe." 
(Markovits & Reich, 1991: 2) Markovits and Reich, however, do point out that, 
this emerging hegemony will not be the product of purposive, coercive 
behaviour by the Germans themselves but of the voluntary behaviour of 
Germany's partners who associate the idea of trade with economic 
growth. (Markovits & Reich, 1991: 2-3) 
Markovits and Reich maintain that Germany's economic influence in the 
EU is dominant and growing. They base this assumption on the 
measurement of intrastate trade flows and share of export. Markovits and 
Reich assert that the Germans clearly benefit from the EU system and that 
this is likely to carryon in the 1990s. (Markovits and Reich, 1991: 10) 
I' 
Markovits and Reich contend that along with its increasing economic 
influence, Germany has acquired a potential to set the policy agenda. 
Markovits and Reich do not refer to political leadership in the conventional 
sense. The Germans have not traditionally provided political leadership in 
the EU. Rather Markovits and Reich contend that, 
Germany's quiet influence in the EC has grown - largely by virtue of its 
ideological leade,rship ... the stabilisation of democratic values within 
Germany and the country's sustained economic successes have 
enhanced Germany's influence as a political and economic leader in 
the Community over time. (Markovits & Reich, 1991: 11) 
Markovits and Reich argue that the hegemony of democratic values in 
the West, with the characterisation of Germany as democratic, has served 
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German national interests because they produced a view of Germany as 
" 
fragmented, pluralist and hence benign. Markovits and Reich assert that 
this view of Germany as democratic and benign has complemented 
German economic interests because it has made sure that German 
economic penetration has not been regarded with unease. (Markovits & 
Reich, 1991: 13) 
Markovits and Reich also suggest that the ground is ripe for Germany to 
repeat the experience of the West in the East. In other words that the 
Germans are set to achieve economic hegemony in Eastern Europe. 
Markovits and Reich suggest Europe should not fear the Germans in 
"the way it once did." In other words that Germany should not be feared 
militarily. Markovits and Reich argue that the Germans are not 'intent' on 
achieving economic hegemony, but that this might be the result. Markovits 
and Reich assert that this belief that German involvement equals prosperity 
for its neighbours gives Germany a lot of influence whether it wants or not. 
(Markovits & Reich, 1991: 20) Thus, Markovits and Reich disagree with the 
pessimistic viewpoint. Rather they argue, 
(, 
German power will expand inadvertently rather than wilfully, 
economically rather than militarily. National aggrandisement is not part 
of the German agenda but will be a necessary by-product of Germany's 
hegemonic position in Europe. (Markovits & Reich, 1991: 20) 
Bruce Goldberger rebukes the central tenets of the Markovits and Reich 
article by arguing that the Europeans need not fear an economically and 
politically strong Germany, but quite the opposite that an economically and 
.-
politically strong Germany is something from which the European partners 
can benefit. (Goldberger, 1993: 288) Goldberger suggests that Markovits 
and Reich's perception of Germany's future role in the EU has its grounding 
in the realist conception of international relations. Goldberger's article 'Why 
Europe should not Fear the Germans' is an attempt to show how a unified 
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Germany deviates from the assumptions of realism. He systematically 
" 
negates the three assumptions of realism2 as applying to Germany. 
Goldberger characterises Germany's relationship with Europe as one of 
interdependence in which power is shared with multilateral organisations. 
He argues that the EU's fate would be worse without strong German 
participation. (Goldberger, 1993: 289) 
Goldberger points to Germany's strong Federal tradition and the power 
of the Lander in the policy-making process3 as evidence of Germany's 
divergence from the state centric model of realism. (Goldberger, 1993: 291) 
Goldberger argues that the task of integrating two different countries has 
eroded German sovereignty from below; new Lander and interest groups 
compete for a share of the government's power and resources. Conversely 
to Markovits and Reich, Goldberger maintains that Europe should not fear a 
strong Germany, but an ineffective central government which will not be able 
to meet the demands of all its constituencies. 
Goldberger argues Germany does not desire to become a military 
power. Markovits and Reich acknowledge that Germany is unlikely to 
become a mllitary power, but rather point to Germany's economic power. 
Goldberger makes the point that Germany's economic might emanates 
from independent corporations, not from the central government. 
Goldberger contends that Germany is a power in economic terms but that 
2 See Chapter Two. ' 
3 The ratification of ratification of the SEA and the Maastricht Treaty presented the Lander with 
the opportunity to increase their leverage in European policy decisions, as both the aforementioned 
treaties could not be ratified without the consent of the Lander representatives. The most visible 
, gains of the Lander include the constitutional changes of December 1992, particularly to the 
insertion of Article 23, otherwise known as the 'Article on European Union', and the adoption of 
the 'Law on the Co-operation Between the Federation and the Lander on Matters relating to the 
European Union'. Article 50 of the Basic Law was also amended. Goetz argues that the changes to 
articles 50 and 20 are most important. In doing so, Goetz states, ".for the first time the Basic Law 
acknowledges the right of the Under to participate in legislation and administration concerning 
EU matters; this gives a clear constitutional foundation to long-held claims by the Under". 
(Goetz, 1995: 106) Article 23 increased the participation of the Under. Hence, the implementation 
of the Maastricht Treaty and the new measures agreed within Germany as part of the national 
ratification process gave the right to be consulted on important European policy decisions. For a 
fuller discussion of the role of the German Lander in the EU see: (Jeffery, 1996) and (Goetz, 
1995). ' , 
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this power has been conte~~ed by unification. He maintains that Germany is 
economically weaker due to unification. Goldberger quotes Fedorov, 
There are many indications that unification tends not only to destroy the 
added potential but to impair somehow the West German economy, 
which already lags behind its Japanese counterpart. (Fedorov, 1992: 
93) 
Goldberger criticises Markovits and Reich's notion of cultural 
hegemony. He argues that the widespread learning of German in Central 
and Eastern Europe does not constitute cultural hegemony but a pragmatic 
approach to business with Germany and Europe. (Goldberger, 1993: 299) 
Goldberger criticises the implication in Markovits and Reich's article that 
Germany is an economic hegemon which is set to conquer Eastern Europe. 
Once this domination has been cemented Germany will utilise this power 
against the other EU states. Goldberger argues that the East European 
states seek to, "emulate the values of democratic federalism and social 
welfare." (Goldberger, 1993: 300) Furthermore, the Germans show no sign 
of wanting to turn their backs on the EU. 
Goldberger puts forward the view that a strong Europe needs a strong 
Germany. Goldberger asserts that the more Germany works within the EU 
the more autonomy it looses. 
Markovits and Reich replied to Goldberger's critique of their article.4 
Markovits and Reich argue that Goldberger has wrongly characterised their 
view of Germany's relations with the EU as realist. Rather Markovits and 
Reich assert that their original article sought to criticise structural theories 
such as realism. (Markovits and Reich, 1994: 130-132) 
Karl Kaiser's view about post unification Germany concurs with that of 
Goldberg'er, characterising Germany's relationship with the EU as 
interdependent. Karl Kaiser argues that the unification of Germany has by 
no means produced a state, with its newly acquired sovereignty, which can 
4 For a critique of Goldberger see: (Markovits & Reich, 1994: 129-132) 
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pursue its national interests. Rather Kaiser advocates continuity in German 
" 
relations with the EU. He argues that the unified Germany will continue with 
the fundamental principles of foreign policy of the old Federal Republic. 
Furthermore, he contends that Germany is a state which in many ways is 
bound up in bilateral and multilateral relations. He characterises Germany's 
relations with the EU as interdependent. (Kaiser, 1992: 266) _ Kaiser 
contends that Germany will exercise more responsibility in Europe, but not 
on its own. (Kaiser, 1992: 267) 
Carl Cavanagh Hodge contends that fears about Germany playing a 
hegemonic role in Europe are erroneous. Hodge asserts that the analogy of 
Germany as an economic giant but political dwarf has meant that the way in 
which Germany has been able to utilise multilateral frameworks to further 
its political influe~ce in Europe has been overlooked. (Hodge, 1992: 223) 
He argues that a re-examination of Germany's relationship with Europe and 
the disposal of this giant-dwarf characterisation is long overdue. 
Hodge asserts that those who warn about a resurgent Germany ignore 
the constraints under which foreign policy is made. Hodge emphasises the 
benefits· Germany has achieved through multilateralism. Furthermore, He 
argues that Germany's long term commitment to integration has itself 
restrained Germany's freedom of action in political affairs. Hodge points to 
the nature of domestic politics in Germany as a constraining factor on any 
potential German dominance. Hodge cites the Federal structure of Germany 
as mitigating against the accumulation of power by central government. 
He also stresses the role of the Lander in the making of European 
policy. Despite the establishment of information offices in Brussels the 
relationship between the Federal authorities and Lander remain congenial. 
The strategy has been to avoid open conflict by maintaining joint 
competence. The incrementalism with which individual ministries in Bonn 
operate_ as regards European policy militates against anyone being able to 
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steer European policy in a earticular direction. The result is often an array of 
'house policies' which are different to the government's European policy. 
Policy decisions tend to be sectorised, an argument which ties in with a 
central theme of this thesis. There is also consensus on European policy 
across party lines. The domestic structures of policy-making in Germany act 
as a substantial constraint on any German dominance. Hodge maintains 
that the future direction of Germany's role in the EU will be determined, as 
before, by Germany's corporate sector. (Hodge, 1992: 226-234) 
In the post Cold War era Germany finds itself in an unaccustomed role 
as the "architect of foreign relations". (Hodge, 1992: 234) Hodge argues that 
the source of its strength has been the corporate conglomerates. Hodge 
makes the point that the interests of these corporations have been in the 
West and that a reorientation to the East is unlikely. (Hodge, 1992: 235) 
Hodge argues that Germany's adjustment to its new role in Europe is likely 
to be awkward. 
Paterson argues that there exists in Germany a "leadership avoidance 
reflex" by West German governments. This combined with the nature of 
policy making in Germany mitigates against the rise of German power. 
Paterson outlines the arguments which negate the expectation of German 
dominance. Chancellor Kohl's position on Europe remains consistent. Kohl 
continues to advocate deeper integration and further enlargement. The 
mechanics of policy making in Germany remain the same where individual 
ministries retain considerable autonomy over their respective policy areas. 
The new Germany remains a Federal state organised along the same lines 
as the old Federal Republic where power and competencies are shared 
with the Lander. This according to Paterson reduces the opportunity for 
Germany to exercise "purposive dominance." (Paterson, 1993: 167) The 
Lander remain active in European policy after unification. 
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Paterson argues that ~ermany will remain a leading economic power 
and that Germany will derive a certain amount of influence from this 
economic strength. At the same time Germany's economic strength has 
been limited as a result of unification and this will lead Germany to 
cooperate with its European neighbours. (Paterson, 1993: 170) 
Bulmer concurs with Paterson arguing that Germany's economic and 
political str~ngth will increase due to unification. However, Bulmer utilises 
the neo-institutional approach to argue that Germany will remain a 
"constrained and contained" power. Like Paterson, Bulmer cites the 
domestic structure of EC policy-making as constraints against the rise of 
German power. (Bulmer, 1993: 75-83) Bulmer argues that Germany has 
moved from a position of dependence to one of interdependence as 
regards relations with the EU. Bulmer maintains that these constraints have 
continued after unification. 
Reinhard Rode has also examined Germany's role in the EU through 
an economic lens. Like Hodge, Rode agrees that it is Germany's economic 
strength which provided it with a leading role in the EU. Rode believes that 
the unification of Germany and the collapse of the Soviet empire will provide 
Europe with the chance to become the world leading economic power 
again. (Rode, 1991: 230) Rode argues that Germany has not accepted its 
greater role in economic affairs as a triumph but rather with a feeling of 
dizziness. (Rode, 1991: 230) He argues that a solo attempt by Germany 
would not only prove to be costly for Europe, but that economically it would 
be a completely inane for Germany. As for Germany's economic power 
increasing after unification, Rode argues that unification has increased 
Germany's economic potential. Rode does, however, point out that West 
Germany was already the dominant economy in the Community of twelve. 
He believes that Germany will also remain a regional "economic hegemon" 
in an el"!larged EU. (Rode, 1991: 236) 
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Rittberger characterises Germany as, 
" 
nicht mehr, aber nicht weniger als eine inter- und transnational 
kooperierende, europaisch integrierte Demokratie und Marktwirtschaft, 
die selbst in Europa eher 'kollegial' denn 'direktorial' zu agieren 
gehalten ist. 5 (Rittberger, 1992: 215) 
Others have argued that the degree of economic integration envisaged 
at Maastricht would preclude any real possibility of German domi.nation. 
The result would be a "Europeanised Germany", and not an isolated power 
wanting domination. (Merkl, 1993: 394) 
Huelshoff highlights the domestic dimension of Germany's role in the 
EU. Huelshoff argues that in Germany there exists both mass and elite 
support for integration, which disposes domestic debate towards co-
operation in the EU. Huelshoff believes that in general the Germans are 
"good Europeans" partially because their values and interests are in that 
direction and also because the state encourages co-operative decision-
making. (Huelshoff, 1993: 309) 
It is an oversimplification to categorise Germany as either "assertive" or 
"benign". My contribution to the debate varies somewhat from the above 
contributions., The argument presented here can be placed at a midpoint in 
this continuum of extremes; of assertive and hegemonic interpretations on 
the one hand, and completely compliant with no change after unification on 
the other. 
The thesis concurs with the view of Markovits and Reich to argue that 
Germany no longer represents a military threat in the EU. Rather Markovits 
and Reich highlight the importance of Germany's economic strength and 
the power that Germany derives from its leading economic position in the 
EU. It.is clear that concern about German hegemony or dominance in the 
last years of the 20th century is not military but rather economic in nature. 
S Author's translation, "[being] neither more nor less than a democracy and a market economy, 
which is integrated into Europe and co-operates on inter- and transnational levels. Even within 
Europe Geimany is required to operate in a 'co-operative' rather than a 'directoral' manner." 
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Ludlow has noted that the ~,uropean Monetary System was the sector where 
the Germans most clearly pursued any kind of leadership in the EC. 
(Ludlow, 1982: 290) Bulmer further argues that, "the EMS affords clear 
sectoral evidence of German hegemony in the EC." (Bulmer, 1993: 86)6 
Germany was a powerful player in the EU prior to unification by virtue of 
being the 'economic powerhouse' in EU. Undoubtedly, Germany's 
economic strength is inevitably going to be a source for an enhanced role. 7 
This thesis rejects this hegemonic notion of Germany dominating the EU. 
The thesis, however, does not concentrate on the economic dimension of 
German power. Several studies have already attempted to analyse 
unification and the German economy and the ensuing implications for 
Germany's role in the EU. 8 
The thesis coincides with those writers who characterise Germany's 
relationship with the EU as interdependent. 9 Hence, the thesis rejects the 
realist conception of Germany as a dominating power. 10 The Germans are 
committed to the future progression of European integration. The Germans 
have worked within multilateral frameworks to derive influence over issues 
and will conVnue to do so after unification. Multilateral frameworks have 
born dividends for the Germans in the past. The thesis rejects the idea that 
Germany's role has not changed after unification. The Germans have 
6 Several writers challenge the view that Germany acts as a hegemon in the EMS. Smeets (1990) 
argues that German dominance in the EMS is not proven. McNamara (1994) questions the 
traditional conceptions of hegemony as defmed by Keohane as applying to German actions in the 
EMS. McNamara states that hegemonic stability theory does not encapsulate German power in the 
EMS. Kurzer and Allen (1992) argue that the capacity or inclination of Germany to exercise 
hegemony over its neighbours is misplaced. They cite three primary reasons for this conclusion: 
" (1) the government miscalculated the costs of unification and the institutions resources required to 
integrate eastern Germany; (2) the nature of German institutions means that it is difficult to 
impose on neighbours; (3) the institutions established by Germany's neighbours may be similar 
to the German model, nevertheless they are particular to each of these countries. However, Kurzer 
and Allen do argue that if a trend is visible it is restricted to the monetary-economic arena. 
7 See: (Bulmer & Paterson, 1996; Rode, 1991) 
8 See: (Kurz, 1993; Wallach & Franciso, 1992; Ghaussy & Schafer, 1993; Welfens, 1992) 
9 See: (Kaiser, 1992; Goldberger, 1993; Hodge, 1992; Bulmer, 1993) 
10 As the case studies will show the nature of policy-making in Germany means that the 
government cannot act as a unitary actor. The Federal structure of Germany, the role of the Lander 
in the policy-making process mitigate against realist conceptions. The case studies will 
demonstrate that other key actors in the policy process are of equal importance. 
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acquired a "new" role after unification; but the Germans have also inherited 
" 
a whole host of challenges in the domestic arena. 
Thus, in summary, the thesis argues that Germany will remain 
committed to the EU. The Germans will continue to co-operate and work 
within multilateral frameworks. The EU is an important arena for solving 
certain domestic objectives. In policy areas of interest, the Germans will 
indeed take a pro-active stance to pursue policy solutions which are 
beneficial to them. Thus, in certain policy areas the Germans may pursue 
an independent line. However, pursuing objectives in European frameworks 
is not seen as fundamentally contradictory to Germany's overall 'European' 
stance. The Germans have the capacity and potential to set the policy 
agenda in their favour. Unification has strengthened Germany's role in the 
EU, but Germany has acquired many problems domestically, which have 
forced the Germans to become inward looking, at least in the short-term. 
4.4 GERMANY AND THE EU: CONTINUED COMMITMENT TO INTEGRATED ACTIONS 
OR THE PURSUIT OF NATIONAL INTERESTS? 
The thesis contends that Germany will remain committed to the EU. II It 
is also maintained in the thesis that the Germans are unlikely to move away 
from integrated actions in the pursuit of some 'national interest' in the 
hegemonic sense. The Germans have worked within multilateral 
frameworks and will continue to do so. The integration process has born 
dividends for the Germans in the past, why should this process not 
continue? 
Germany's defeat in the Second World War not only led to the 
establishment of a whole host of multilateral frameworks in which the 
nation state was no longer the primary actor, but the outcome of the war 
also ensured that Germany was firmly anchored in these multilateral 
frameworks. Multilaterialism became the hallmark of Germany. It is 
11 This contention is examined in depth in the next section of this chapter. 
·, 100 
important to point out that t~e Germans did not have a choice after the War, 
independence was not an option for the Germans. Hence, they have 
become "committed Europeans". In any given area the Germans would 
simply opt for the European option rather than the national. Thus, the 
Germans were able to profit from a necessity. As Michael Sturmer notes, 
The only option left open to Germany [after 1945] was to play the 
western game, to be the most European nation, and to translate 
Germany's geostrategic position into political negotiation power. (The 
Spectator, 21.07.90: 14) 
The Germans were able to realise their major objectives by working 
within integrated frameworks. 12 Garton-Ash argues that there was an 
instrumental value to Germany's Europeanness. He asserts that, " ... in part 
this has been the pursuit of national interest in the European guise." (The 
Spectator, 21. 07. 90: 14) 
4.4.1 THE GERMANS AND THE DEBATE ABOUT 'NATIONAL INTERESTS'. 
The question of German 'national interests' is an important and 
interesting one. The term 'national interest' is highly contentious in the 
German context. The idea of Germany with any coherent national interests 
(-
invokes a negative vision of Germany as a hegemon dominating the EU. 
This underlies the question posed in many states of the EU, all be it in the 
press, of a European Germany or a German Europe. However, the 
existence of domestic objectives or 'national interests' does not imply 
hegemony or dominance. The pursuit of certain domestic objectives in the 
European frameworks does not imply turning away from multilateral 
. frameworks. The picture is not clear cut; member states are able to pursue 
domestic objectives within the EU framework. 
This whole question of German 'national interests' has been debated 
extensively in the literature. There are those that point to the existence of 
12 Chapter Three contains an analysis of Germany's principal objectives in the integration process 
in the post war years and a historical analysis of how Germany was able to solve domestic 
problems ill the EU. 
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national interests, but as be.!ng beneficial for the integration process. Others 
suggest that Germany has difficulty in defining its interests clearly and that it 
needs to define them more independently. It is argued that Germany needs 
to do this due to its elevated position in the international community. Others 
categorically refute the notion of a defined national interest within Germany. 
Hrbek and Wessels present an interesting argument pointing out that 
national interests can have a positive effect on the integration process. They 
contend that national interests do not necessarily have to be a source of 
friction which hinders the integration process; rather they can provide a 
boost to the integration process. Hrbek and Wessels state, 
.. nationale Interessen spielen bei Integrationsprozessen eine wichtige 
Rolle. Sie durfen nicht nur als Storfaktor, der Integrationserfolge 
behindert, sondern mussen als eine Grosse, die Integrationsimpulse 
gibt und das Ausmass moglichen Integrationsfortschritts absteckt, 
gesehen werden. 13 (Hrbek & Wessels, 1984: 36) 
Hrbek and Wessels also maintain that national interests have always 
been at the centre of Germany's European policy.14 (Hrbek, 1986: 27-28) 
Hrbek and Wessels claim that integration was possible because the 
process of integration promised to advance or promote specific aims and 
interests. (Hrbek & Wessels, 1984: 31) Hrbek and Wessels contend that 
Germany became the European "Musterknabe" (perfect model) because 
integration promised to advance and realise specific German concerns. 
(Hrbek & Wessels, 1984: 37) Garton-Ash adds that, "German diplomacy 
has excelled at the patient, discreet pursuit of national goals through 
multinational institutions and negotiations." (Garton-Ash, 1994: 71) 
Hendriks questions whether traditional aims of member states had been 
sacrificed for the overall aims of the Community. In her examination of the 
13 Author's translation, " .. national interests play an important role in the integration process. 
They must not only be regarded as a source of friction which can hinder the success of integration, 
but they need to be acknowledged as a significant factor which gives an impulse to and determines 
the extent of the integration process." 
14 The pursuit and achievement of 'national interests' in the EC since its establishment is 
examined m Chapter Three. 
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Common Agricultural Policy' and European integration Hendriks sought to 
determine whether the creation of supranational institutions had given 
German domestic interests a European rather than a German orientation. 
Hendriks comes to the conclusion that national interests continued to be 
pursued in the EU and that national interests had not changed a result of 
the creation of the EU. (Hendriks, 1991: 215-233) Garton-Ash further notes 
that there has been a fusion of German and European interests. It is not 
simply the case that the Germans are pursuing national interests in 
Europe's name. There has been a lot of real commitment to European 
integration and as a result, German policymakers have on occasions had 
problems in differentiating between German and European interests. 
(Garton-Ash, 1994: 71) 
Bertram argues that the loosening of western structures such as NATO 
and the EUafter the end of the Cold War will accentuate the position of the 
more powerful members of the international community. He points out that 
with this elevated position Germany will have to learn to define its interests 
more independently. (Bertram, 1994: 92-100) Hans Peter Schwarz echoes 
this point but further adds that, "A clearer and more precise definition of 
German interests does not mean giving up established confederations or 
paralysing them with intransigent demands." (Schwarz, 1994: 118) Marsh 
argues that the Germans have stood for their national interests more 
directly and openly. However, the Germans have great difficulty in deciding 
what constitutes their national interests and hence convey confusing 
messages to their partners. Marsh argues that the Germans will have to 
admit that German unification is a priority over European unification. (Marsh, 
1994: 169-176) 
Conversely, Bulmer and Paterson reject the notion that Germany has a 
defined national interest which it seeks to pursue in the European arena. 
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They argue that the compl~xities of the domestic policy process mitigate 
against the German state behaving as a coherent actor. 
4.4.2 Do THE GERMANS HAVE A CLEAR 'NATIONAL INTEREST'? 
In a speech in March 1995, the President of the Federal Republic, 
Roman Herzog, clarified the existence of a set of German interests. He 
stated that it made no sense to hide this. He believed that Germany's 
partners would not believe them anyway. "Es hat keinen Sinn, das 
verschweigen zu wollen. Unsere Partner wOrden uns ohnehin nicht 
glauben ... " 1S (Herzog, 1995: 9) However, an acknowledgement of the 
existence of German interests does not correlate with aggressive or 
assertive behaviour. Herzog also noted that the fundamental characteristics 
of German politics would not change. Herzog was referring to the Germans 
moderate manner, their ability for dialogue and their readiness to 
compromise. (Herzog, 1995: 10) It is important to point out that the 
presence of German interests does not conflict with Germany's overall 
'European' approach to the EU, neither does it equate to a desire to 
dominate the EU. The CSU Party Chairman and Finance Minister, Theo 
Waigel, announced in an interview in Focus that it was impossible to talk 
openly about German interests during the time of Genscher. However, 
according to Waigel, five years after unification the situation has changed. 
(Focus, 1995: 53) He asserts that the German government has to define 
German interests and their focal points for European policy. Accordingly, 
Germany has a set of national interests. 16 
What are Germany's interests in the international arena after 
unification? The Germans have an overriding set of broad objectives such 
as to contribute to the spread of democracy to all parts of the world; to assist 
15 Author's translation, "It is pointless to deny this. Our partners would not believe us anyway." 
16 The view was confIrmed in interviews conducted in Germany. A representative from the 
St1lndige Vetretung commented, "Natllrlich hat Deutschland 'nationale Interessen', die sind 
politisch ..... 5konomisch." Author's translation, "Of course Germany has 'national interests', those 
are politicaL. economic." An interview with an unnamed senior offIcial, St1lndige Vetretung der 
Bundesrepublik bei den Europl1ischen Gemeinschaften, Brussels, 18 November 1994 
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in the building up of the United Nations to a real political system; to help 
" 
provide a new basis for the Atlantic Alliance and, of course, to complete the 
process of European integration. (Herzog, 1995: 9) 
German interests lie within the realm of the EU. The Germans have a 
fundamental interest in the political integration of Europe. Connected to this 
point is the German demand to extend the EU eastwards. Political, 
economic and security protection in the countries neighbouring Germany is 
an important matter of concern for Germany. The Germans feel that any 
instability in this region could have negative consequences for themselves. 
Thus, it is argued by the Germans that the organ which has maintained 
stability in the West should be extended eastwards. Germany's set of 
foreign policy objectives extends to good relations with Russia which it 
perceives as a vital interest. The Germans posit the argument that these are 
objectives which cannot be achieved alone; hence they are more prepared 
to work within multilateral frameworks such as the EU to attain policy 
solutions. "Deswegen sind wir so bereit, im Aussen- und 
sicherheitspolitischen Bereich die Integration voranzutreiben." 17 In certain 
policy areas the Germans are more prepared to work within multilateral 
frameworks such as the EU. 
Obviously, the Germans have certain economic interests. Firstly, the 
Germans wish to maintain a dynamic economy, bringing about the same 
economic standards in the East. Secondly, the Germans want a stable 
currency market in Europe. Hence, the provisions pertaining to currency 
union in the Maastricht Treaty are essential for them. Thirdly, the Germans 
'" 
have to make sure that sufficient capital transfers take place to the East. 18 
As the largest exporting nation in Europe, Germany has a special interest in 
17 Interview with an unnamed senior official, Stlindige Vetretung der Bundesrepublik bei den 
Europtlischen Gemeinschaften, Brussels, 18 November 1994. Author's translation, "That is why 
we are willing to hurry along integration in the areas of foreign and security policy." 
18 Interview with an unnamed senior official, Stlindige Vertretung der Bundesrepublik bei den 
Europtlisch(om Gemeinschaften, Brussels, 18 November 1994 
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the trouble free functioning of the internal market and its expansion 
" 
eastwards. The efforts of Chancellor Kohl and the Federal government to 
stick to the timetable for economic and monetary union and the continuing 
advocacy for eastern enlargement display the priority of these issues for the 
Germans. Chancellor Kohl has highlighted the importance of monetary 
union in achieving an ever closer union and for the future progression of 
European integration. Kohl perceives monetary union as playing a 
fundamental role in the EU of the future; he sees the single currency as the 
linchpin for political integration. Kohl has even gone so far as to equate the 
lack of monetary union with the possibility of war in Europe in the future. 
Europe could see the re-emergence of old rivalries, leading to hostility, 
even war. This is not a threat that Germany will wage war on its 
neighbours, but a prediction that an un-unified Europe will be a divided, 
squabbling Europe. (Economist, 13.01.96) 
A particular area of concern is Justice and Home Affairs 19 , particularly 
in controlling migration and reducing numbers. Germany is directly 
confronted by the flow of migrants from the East. 20 Indeed, the Germans 
have a common immigration and asylum policy at the top of their agenda. 
(. 
There appears to be a consensus across the political spectrum on the 
need to control migration?1 The Germans take the view this problem canno't 
be solved alone. Solution of this problem requires considerable joint effort 
on the part of the EU. National and independent policies do not go hand in 
hand with the lifting of internal borders. The Germans want their partners in 
the EU to take their share of the burden of asylum seekers. It could be 
• 19 This issue is examined in greater depth with regard to the main contentions of the thesis as part 
of the case study on migration in Chapter Five. 
20 The intensity of the migratory flows from East to West has increased considerably since the 
unification of Germany. The easing of travel restrictions in central and East European states; the 
collapse of communism in the East and the difficult political, economic and social transitions 
occurring in these post-socialist states has contributed to the rise in the numbers of people 
entering Germany. In 1992 prior to the 'Asylum Compromise', 438 191 had entered Germany. 
(Die Beauftragte der Bundesregierung ft1r die Belange der Ausllinder, 1994: 34-37) 
21 The urgency of solving the migration dilemma is apparent in literature from both the major 
parties and speeches by MEPs. (Herzog, 1995; Vorstand der SPD, 1993; Hintze, 1995; CDU, 
1994a; CDtJ, 1994b; CDU, 1994c) 
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suggested that the fear of future migration is a key reason for the Germans' 
" 
eagerness on Eastern enlargement. 
The term 'national interests' is problematic in the German context. It is 
clear that the Germans have a set of domestic objectives which can be 
better achieved at the European level. However, it is important to point out 
that having a defined set of domestic priorities does not equate to 
hegemonic behaviour or a renunciation of multilateralism, primarily 
because multilateral frameworks have served German interests. 
The Germans admit that collective action in European frameworks has 
served German interests. "Gemeinsame europaische Politik im Geiste der 
Partnerschaft und Freundschaft dient auch deutschen Interessen." 22 (CDU, 
1994c: 2) This argument is reiterated by Langguth who argues that all 
fundamental German interests can only be solved by concerted action on 
the part of all European states.23 (Langguth, 1993: 19) 
The thesis contends that the EU provides an important arena which can 
be used to solve domestic problems. (Hrbek, 1986: 19-44) 
Intergovernmentalist interpretations of the role of member states in the EU 
concur with this contention. Intergovernmentalism highlights the way in 
. which national governments and politicians can utilise European 
frameworks to solve domestic problems. However, intergovernmentalism 
does fail in that it places too much emphasis on the role of national 
governments. This thesis argues that in certain policy areas it is more 
politically viable to work in the European context. Milward argues that certain 
policy objectives are better advanced through international institutions and 
that member states will use these frameworks to pursue these objectives. 
(Milward, 1993: 21) Paterson adds that, "the Community ... provides a more 
acceptable framework for a number of pressing German concerns, .. than· 
22 Author's translation, "Joint European policy in the spirit of partnership and friendship does serve 
German interests." 
23 Langguth states, "AIle wesentlichen deutschen Interessen k5nnen nur noch in einer konzertierten 
Aktion der europliischen Staaten gel5st werden." (Langguth, 1993: 19) 
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any other conceivable arrangement." (Paterson, 1993: 172) There are 
" 
certain problems which can no longer be solved nationally. "Wir haben auf 
der einen Seite Probleme, die national nicht mehr losbar sind." 24 As 
mentioned previously in this chapter migration is one of those pressing 
problems which can be better solved at the European level. 25 The 
Germans have continually attempted to seek transnational solutions to 
migration questions. It is argued by some that Germany's important 
domestic interests can only be solved transnationally. "Unser Devise ist, 
..... dass heutzutage wirklich wichtige National interessen nur transnational 
gelost werden konnen. Das heisst, der alte klassische Nationalstaat kann 
diese auch gar nicht mehr losen." 26 Hence, it is claimed by some that 
Germany can only solve its major problems in the European context. 
Thus, we have ascertained that Germany has a set of domestic 
priorities, but that does not mean that Germany will be turning away from 
integrated actions. International fora such as the EU have been beneficial 
for the Germans; they have been able to achieve these domestic priorities 
through joint action in the EU. Reference to this stance is continually made 
in German documents. In a document outlining the objectives and key 
issues of the German Presidency in the latter of 1994 it is clearly stated that, 
"the only way to secure major national and shared interests is through joint 
action or co-ordinated national action within the European framework." 
. (Standige Vertretung der Bundesregierung bei den Europaischen 
Gemeinschaften, 1994: 2) 
2~ Interview with unnamed senior official, Auswllrtiges Amt, Bonn, 15 September 1994. Author's 
translation, "One the one hand we have problems which can no longer be solved at the national 
level." 
25 The migration case study is examined in greater depth in Chapter Five. 
26 Interview with unnamed senior official, Auswllrtiges Amt, Bonn, 15 September 1994. Author's 
translation, "Our maxim is ..... that nowadays really important national interests can only be solved 
transnationally. That means that the old classical nation state cannot possibly solve them any 
more." -
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4.5 GERMAN COMMITMENT TO EU 
In the preceding section we have ascertained that Germany continues to 
emphasise multilateral frameworks. The thesis contends that Germany will 
remain committed to the EU. It is argued that Germany's general approach 
to the EU has not changed as a result of unification. A senior official. in the 
German Foreign Office stated, "Die Deutsche Europapolitik hat sich durch 
die Wiedervereinigung Oberhaupt nicht geandert." 27 Citing the words of 
Thomas Mann this official remarked that, "We want a European Germany, 
not a German Europe". He argued that the principle of a 'European 
Germany' had underpinned German policy towards the EU from the 
beginning. He added that this guiding principle had not changed since 
unification. These comments were mirrored by a representative from the 
German Permanent Representation in Brussels. He pointed out that, "Die 
Einbindung Deutschlands in die europaische Integration ist eine Konstante 
der Deutschlandpolitik geblieben." 28 The EU has acquired a special 
significance for Germany. This thesis argues that EU has not lost its 
significance for Germany. Emil Kirchner aptly states, 
in the age of German unification ... the special relationship with the 
European Community will lose nothing of its economic and political 
importance. (Kirchner, 1991: 149) 
The establishment of a united Europe remains enshrined in the 
constitution after unification.29 The Treaty establishing German unity alludes 
to. this commitment. Through German unity the Germans wish to, 
. 
"contribute to the unification of Europe and to the building of a peaceful 
27 Interview with unnamed senior official in the Ausw1irtiges Amt, Bonn, 15 September 1994. 
Author's translation, "German European Policy has not changed at all due to unification." 
28 Interview with unnamed senior official in the St1indige Vertretung der Bundesrepublik bei den 
Europ1iischen Gemeinschafien, Brussels, 18 November 1994. Author's translation, "Germany's 
integration into European Union has remained a constant of German policy." 
29 The German Constitution, the Basic Law, includes a clause requiring the state to pursue 
European mtegration. 
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European order". (Press and Information Office of the Federal Government, 
" 
1991a: 71) 
4.5.1 THE ROLE OF THE POLITICAL ELITE 
The political elite in Germany has continually emphasised Germany's 
commitment to the EU and the further progression of integration after 
unification. The role of Chancellor Helmut Kohl has been fundamental in 
demonstrating Germany's continued commitment towards the EU. At the 
. time of unification Chancellor Kohl made it clear that German unity would 
take place under the European framework, and furthermore help to advance 
the unification of Europe. In a policy statement in the German Bundestag on 
the Signing of the Treaty on German Economic, Monetary and Social Union, 
Chancellor Kohl remarked, 
The unity of Germany and the unity of Europe are mutually dependent: 
the advancing process of European unification creates the framework to 
achieve unity in freedom. The unification of our country will impart 
decisive momentum to the political unification of Europe. (Press and 
Information Office of the Federal Government, 1991 b: 50) 
Kohl repeated this message in a speech in Oxford in November 1992. 
He stated that the Germans realise how much they owe to European 
integration. He pointed out that even after the end of the Cold War and the 
unification of Germany, the Germans firmly believe in the continuation of the 
project of European unification. He further stated that Germany had a 
fundamental national interest in the creation of a European Union, to which 
one day all of Germany's neighbours could' belong. (Presse und 
Informationsamt der Bundesregierung, 1992b: 1141) 
Kohl continues'to espouse the virtues of joint action and actively works 
towards the fruition of objectives. Since German unification the EU has seen 
the completion of the internal market in 1992 and the implementation of the 
Maastricht Treaty in 1993. Furthermore, the re-election of Chancellor Kohl in 
the October election reinforces an "integrationist" standpoint. In fact, the 
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continued progression of European integration figured as a decisive factor 
,', 
in convincing Chancellor Kohl to stand for re-election. Chancellor Kohl 
intends to be "a driving force for another big step towards European 
integration at the 1996 EU intergovernmental conference." (Financial Times, 
21,11.94) Kohl's efforts to continue the process of European integration 
have been clearly demonstrated by his actions within the realm of Economic 
and Monetary Union. Kohl is insistent that the EMU and the single currency 
are fundamental to the future course of the whole process. John Woolley 
has examined the reasons behind the linkage of Economic and Monetary 
Union (EMU) and European Political Union (EPU). Woolley has argued that 
Kohl put EMU and EPU on the same agenda as part of a move to satisfy 
Germany's allies that Germany would remain anchored in Western 
institutions. However, Woolley also asserts the that the two objectives were 
linked in order to satisfy domestic political commitments and coalitions. 
There has been a strong consensus in favour of European unification on 
the part of practically all the major players in German politics. Woolley 
argues that, "as the moment of reunification suddenly presented itself, there 
was no possibility of retreating from the associated commitment to 
European unification." (Woolley, 1994: 78) Kohl has caused outrage 
amongst Germany's European partners in a speech in Louvain in Belgium 
by stating that unless the other member states take a similar line on the 
. issue of monetary integration, there was potential for war in Europe. 
Nobody doubts Mr Kohl's commitment to EMU. Whatever its economic 
purpose, he sees it as a stepping-stone to a federal Europe, one with 
strong institutions. and a powerful parliament - a true European Union. 
(Economist, 13.01.96) . 
Kohl has frequently put forward the argument that Europe needed to 
stay on course for further integration in order contain German power. This 
has been a recurrent theme in speeches made by Kohl since unification. 
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The Germans are calling on their allies to save Germany from itself by tying 
" 
it securely in an integrated Europe. Kohl's future vision of the EU is clear in 
his objectives for the Intergovernmental Conference (IGC) due to start in 
March 1996. 
Bulmer and Paterson note that the response of the political elite has 
been to "reiterate its European· identity and the Europeanization of 
Germany." (Bulmer & Paterson, 1996: 5) It is not only the German 
Chancellor who continues to commit German support to the integration 
process in Europe. The Federal President, Roman Herzog, made it clear 
that Germany would remain firmly anchored into the West in post Cold War 
period. He declared that Germany did not want less but more integration 
into the West and more partnership with the USA.3D (Herzog, 1995: 5) 
The General Secretary of the CDU, Peter Hintze, remarked in a speech 
in February 1995 that France and Germany had been the "motor" of 
European integration for decades. He added that the unification of Germany 
and the end of the Cold War had not changed that position. (Hintze, 1995: 6) 
There has traditionally been a cross-party consensus on the need for an 
ever closer union. This consensual attitude towards European affairs 
continues in the unified Germany. It was commented, "Die Europapolitik ist 
bei uns kein strittiges Thema." 31 The CDU have on many an occasion 
indicated their support of integration and a continuation of that process with 
Germany firmly anchored in it. (CDU-Bundesgeschaftstelle, 1994: 85) 
Similarly, the SPD argue that their aim remains a union of European people, 
with an economic and currency union and a common foreign and security 
policy. (Vorstand der SPD, 1993: 4) Furthermore, the fact that 95% of the 
German Bundestag ratified the entry of the four European Free Trade 
jo The Federal President Roman Herzog made these statements in a speech on the fortieth 
anniversary of the foundation of the Deutsche Gesellschaft fUr Ausw1lrtige Politik, 13.03.95 
31 Interview with unnamed senior official, Ausw1lrtiges Amt, Bonn, 15 September 1994. Author's 
translation,'''European policy is not a contentious issue amongst us." 
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Association (EFTA) countri~s, signifies the overall consensus towards the 
EU. There was also a consensus in the second chamber, the Bundesrat. 
In the party political arena there exists, at least in principle, commitment 
to the deepening of the EU. However, the Germans are simultaneously 
committed to the enlargement of the Union, particularly to the East. 
References to this commitment are apparent in a variety of government and 
party documents such as the CDU Grundsatzprogramm, the coalition 
agreement between the CDU, CSU and the FDP, the Resolutions of the 
SPD Parteitag in Wiesbaden in November 1993, and speeches by CDU 
MEPs. (CDU-Bundesgeschaftsstelle, 1994a & b; Abgeordnete., 1995; 
Vorstand der SPD, 1993; Poettering, 1995) 
A controversial paper, entitled "Reflections on European Policy", 
published by the CDU/CSU fraction in the Bundestag, in September 1994, 
outlines Germany's policy interests in Europe. The paper demonstrates 
Germany's commitment to both the deepening and widening of the EU. The 
policy document states that, 
Germany has a fundamental interest in both widening the Union to the 
East and in strengthening it through further deepening. (CDU/CSU 
Fraktion des Deutschen Bundestages, 1994: 13-14) 
The Germans believe that the European Union has a great 
responsibility for the new democracies in Europe. The EU should actively 
support the building up of these democracies with the ultimate aim of 
accession to the EU. The Germans do not perceive the dual aims of further 
enlargement and further integration as contradictory. In fact, "deepening is a 
pre-condition for widening." (CDU/CSU Fraktion der Deutschen 
Bundestag'es, 1994: 14) 
The Germans have a fundamental interest in the enlargement of the EU 
to the East. Owing to its geographical location, Germany is particularly 
susceptible to consequences of instability in the East. Indeed, instability in 
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the East could have more" direct consequences for Germany; the mass 
exodus of people is but one of these consequences. The Germans are of 
the opinion that the only way to prevent instability in the East is to aid these 
Central and East European countries and integrate them into the post-war 
West European system. The Germans are clear that the EU needs to be 
reformed and strengthened before eastern enlargement could occur. The 
policy document states, 
Without further internal strengthening, the EU would be unable to meet 
the enormous challenge of eastward expansion. It might fall apart and 
once again become no more than a loose grouping of states unable to 
guarantee stability. (CDU/CSU Fraktion des Deutschen Bundestages, 
1994: 14) 
The theme of dissolution of the EU is a constant in Germany's approach 
to integration. The policy document implies that independent German action 
can only be avoided and Germany's power limited in this region if these 
Central and East European countries are integrated into the EU. It is made 
clear in the document that, 
.. if (West) European integration were not to progress, Germany might be 
called upon, or tempted by its own security constraints, to try to effect 
stabilisation of Eastern Europe on its own and in the traditional way. 
(CDU/CSU Fraktion des Deutschen Bundestages, 1994: 13) 
The Germans do however point out that this would exceed their capabilities 
and erode the cohesion of the EU. As mentioned in the previous section the 
Germans continuously restate the argument that Germany needs the 
progression of European integration in order to prevent German 
dominance. 
A fundamental objective of this controversial paper was to demonstrate 
its commitment to European integration. Karl Lamers, the Foreign Policy 
Spokesman of the CDU/CSU Parliamentary Party in the Bundestag and co-
author of this paper pointed out that the document, "sought to give 
substance to our .... European commitment by presenting fundamental 
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German interests in a, to some extent, geopolitical context." (Lamers, 1994: 
" 
1) He also believed that with this paper the Germans have been able to, 
dispel recurrent suspicions in some quarters that deep down, and 
despite its protestations to the contrary, Germany does not really want a 
politically unified and firmly constituted Europe, and that its efforts to 
bring about a widening of the Community as merely designed to dilute 
it. (Lamers, 1994: 1-2) 
In one sense, the Schauble/Lamers paper demonstrated German 
commitment to the EU, but the paper also indicated the urgency of, and the 
Germans' desire to keep the EMU on track by suggesting the establishment 
of a 'hard core' of states which would go ahead with intensive economic 
and political integration. This hard core would have a "centripetal or 
magnetic effect" on other states. This hard core should comprise France, 
Germany, and the Benelux countries. Schauble and Lamers reject the 
notion that the idea of a hard core of states is divisive. They assert that in 
principle every member state could become a member of the hard core if it 
co-operates in all policy areas and exhibits a commitment to pursuing 
further integration. (Lamers, 1994: 3) The function of the hard core is to 
. compensate! for the centrifugal tendencies created by constant 
enlargement. These 'hard core' states should endeavour to cooperate in 
the fields of monetary policy, fiscal and budgetary policy and economic and 
social policy. The creation of a hard core is seen as a means of reconciling 
the conflicting objectives of widening and deepening. (CDU/CSU Fraktion 
des Deutschen Bundestag, 1994: 18) The Schauble/Lamers paper 
demonstrated Germany's continued commitment to European integration, 
but there was an underlying message that Germany would not accept zero 
progress at the Intergovernmental Conference in 1996. 
The Germans' commitment to the EU clearly manifested itself in their 
calls for further reform of the EU at the IGC in 1996. The Germans, already 
convinced of the fact the EU is the only arena which can deal with the 
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present and future cha"eng~s in Europe, continue to seek reform in the EU 
via the IGC in 1996. The Germans believe that the EU is of vital importance 
for the stability of the continent as a whole. They advocate joint action 
through the institutions of the EU, rather than the co-operation of 
governments, as the basis for European unification. (Poettering, 1995: 1) 
German priorities for the Intergovernmental Conference of 1996 can be 
characterised under these three headings: 
(1) The competence to act (Handlungsfahigkeit) 
(2) Democratic legitimacy 
(3) Transparency 
The Germans advocate the tightening of lengthy and laborious 
procedures, so that problems are not only discussed but also overcome. 
They believe that institutional reform is the answer. Hence, Germany 
advocates that the Commission must function more efficiently. The 
Germans also support the development of a better co-decision procedure 
between the Council of Ministers and the European Parliament and an 
effective system of democratic control. 
The Germans are particularly promoting 'transparency'. An attempt is 
being made to bring the EU closer to its citizens. The Germans are of the 
opinion that decisions should not be made behind closed doors and in 
secret. The decision-making procedures in all areas of the Union should be 
simplified and standardised. 
The European Union is committed to the principle of parliamentary 
democracy. Thus, the EU should seek to strengthen democratic legitimacy. 
The Germans also -advocate increased powers for the European Parliament 
" 
and extended use of qualified majority voting. 
The Germans also wish to extend community competence in the area of 
Justice and Home affairs, currently LInder the third pillar and governed by 
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intergovernmental co-opera!ion. 32 Germany is keen to make more progress 
towards a common foreign and security policy. The Germans also wish to 
further apply the principle of subsidiarity.33 
The actions of Chancellor Kohl, and other members of the political elite 
clearly demonstrate Germany's future commitment to the EU, and the need 
to move further down the road of both Economic and Monetary Union and 
political union. 
4.5.2 ANTI-EuROPEAN TENDENCIES? 
So far, it has been argued that Germany will remain committed to the 
EU. It is, however, important to point out that although the general 
commitment exists there appear to be some anti-European tendencies 
emerging in the domestic arena. Since unification, a "Euro-sceptical" mood 
has emerged amongst public opinion. Public support among the German 
electorate for deepening the EU has been decreasing over the last few 
years. A MORI poll conducted for the Financial Times in November 1994 
indicates that the amount of support for EU membership is waning. Key 
areas of contention seem to be a single currency and EU enlargement to 
the East. (MORI, 1994: 2-5) An Allensbach survey conducted in June 1994 
showed that 73% of Germans feel that membership of the EU is a good 
thing, but the survey also revealed that 74% are against a European state. 
The results of the Allensbach survey concurred with those of the MORI poll 
citing a single currency as a problem area. 74% of Germans are against a 
single currency. (Radice, 1995: 175) Jeffrey argues, however, that this Euro-
scepticism among the German public has not transposed itself into the 
German party political arena, where "no credible and committed Euro-
, . 
sceptical force has emerged." (Jeffery, 1995a: 1501) Chancellor Kohl may 
32 This issue is considered in greater depth in Chapter Five as part of the migration case study. 
33 The exact definition of the term 'subsidiarity' is a contested issue. Different meanings have been 
attributed to the principle of subsidiarity by different member states. Generally speaking the term 
is interpreted as the EU only regulating matters which cannot be dealt with either at the national 
or regional levels. 
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espouse the virtues of ~,uropean integration; but even Kohl cannot 
completely ignore public opinion which is increasingly reticent about any 
further transfer of powers to EU institutions. Kohl will have to be sensitive to 
changes in moods in the domestic arena. This could possibly explain 
Chancellor Kohl's change in tone about a 'United States of Europe'. Kohl 
had been an ardent supporter of the goal of a 'United States of Europe'; but 
he no longer uses the phrase in case it is misunderstood. 
Added to the Euro-sceptical mood amongst public opinion were the 
comments of Edmund Stoiber, the Prime Minister of Bavaria, who outlined 
the weaknesses of the EU and highlighted the importance of the nation 
state as playing the dominant role within the EU. In an interview with the 
SOddeutsche Zeitung in October 1993 Stoiber called for the integration 
process to be slowed down. He argued that Chancellor Kohl's commitment 
to the European Union was out of date. Stoiber asserted that Germany's 
stance on an integrated Europe was more akin to Germany's position after 
the war and argued that Germany should define its role in the EU in 
accordance with Germany's 'national interests.' He rejected the idea of a 
European Federal state. Stoiber's actions can be explained in terms of 
Bavarian politics. Stoiber was attempting to muster up support from the 
national populist vote in time for the European elections. Stoiber was, in 
effect, attempting to gain ground from the Republikaner. 
Members of the ruling coalition were quick to dismiss Stoiber's 
comments. Hintze, the General Secretary of the COU, expeditiously pointed 
out that the views expressed by Stoiber were in no shape or form party 
policy. Rather, Stoiber's comments were personal views and could only be 
explained in terms of provincial Bavarian politics. In a show of solidarity all 
the main political parties in Germany, the CSU, FOP and the SPO reiterated 
Germany's commitment to the European Union, arguing that there was no 
alternative to European unity and that the process was irreversible. 
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The parties are also e~periencing problems as regards the process of 
European integration. Although there is common ground on the process of 
European integration, there are divisions in Germany on how it should 
proceed. Even the CDU, which has traditionally been a pro-integration party, 
has changed its stance somewhat. The CDU adopted a new Basic 
Programme in early 1994 and the new programme dropped the aspiration 
towards a Federal state in support of the preservation of the nation state. 
The narrow majority of just ten seats may prove problematic for the 
Chancellor and his governing coalition. 
There also appear to be cracks emerging as regards Eastern 
enlargement. The cross-party consensus on enlarging the EU to the East 
remains, but differences between the parties on the speed of Eastern 
enlargement has become discernible. In an interview in Focus, the leader of 
the CSU and Finance Minister Theo Waigel raised questions about the 
financing of the Eastern enlargement. Waigel has calculated that the 
accession of the Central and East European States would cost the EU 70 
billion OM per year. (Focus, 1995: 53) Waigel commented that as the largest 
contributor to the EU budget the Germans would have to carry the burden of 
at least 21 billion OM. He argued that financially this was not possible for 
the Germans. 
Other domestic factors may also influence Germany's stance on 
Europe. David Marsh points to institutional factors in Germany. Marsh cites 
the narrowness of Kohl's majority in the 1994 election?4 He argues, 
The narrowness of the Bonn coalition's majority may add to the 
Chancellor'S domestic reasons for caution over further extending 
supranational European decision-making - particularly over the 
question of economic and monetary union. (Financial Times, 17.10.94) 
34 Chancellor Kohl's CDU/CSUIFDP governing coalition only had a ten seat majority. The 
CDU/CSU gained 294 seats and the FDP 47 out of a total 672 seats. In contrast, the SPD 
obtained 252; Bilndnis 90IDie Grilnen 49; and the PDS 30 seats respectively. 
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The Federal Constituti~nal Court's ruling on the Maastricht Treaty has 
had an important effect on the future course that integration will take. In 
particular, both houses of parliament, the Bundestag and the Bundesrat, 
will in future exercise stronger democratic control over EC decision-making. 
The implication being that European legislation will not simply be rubber 
stamped as it used to be. The judgement sets a limit on the expansion of 
the European Union's powers. In considerable strife with the Federal 
government the Bundestag and the Bundesrat have drawn out constitutional 
powers to oversee all future European legislation. Furthermore, the Federal 
Constitutional Court has carved out the right to watch developments in the 
EU. The Federal Constitutional Court retains the right to decide whether 
legal acts carried out by the European institutions are within the sovereignty 
rights accorded to them or whether they exceed their remit. The Federal 
Constitutional Court's judgement stresses that the citizens of the Member 
states legitimate the activities of the European bodies via their national 
parliaments, giving the national parliaments a greater say in the EU 
decision-making process. The judgement further states that as the 
European nations grow closer together, democratic legitimation will be 
supplied from within the institutional structure of the EU. In other words, the 
judgement called for increased powers for the European Parliament. 
Undoubtedly there is a certain amount of dissension about European 
affairs in Germany. The Germans will have to be sensitive to these changes 
in moods in the domestic arena. The levels of discord, however, have not 
reached the point where they seriously impede future developments. 
Indeed, the issues~ of EMU and a single currency will have to be skilfully 
managed at the domestic level so as not to pose a threat to overall 
objectives. Jeffery suggests that, "Germany's European policies will in the 
future require .... a longer and more difficult period of domestic consensus 
formatio~ before presentation in Brussels." (Jeffery, 1995a: 1512) This will 
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mean that Germany is a more difficult partner or, as Jeffery puts it, echoing 
" 
Stephen George, a more "awkward partner" in the EU. (Jeffery, 1995a: 1512) 
The preceding section has sought to illustrate Germany's continuing 
commitment to the EU. The Chancellor has been fundamental in the pursuit 
of this aim. Indeed, one can witness a degree of continuity in Germany's 
approach to the EU in the post unification period. Germany's partners 
recognise that in the short term Kohl has steered Germany's approach to 
the EU in the same direction. It has to be acknowledged that some anti-
European tendencies have manifested themselves in the domestic arena. 
These take the shape of constitutional or institutional changes and changes 
in public opinion. It also has to be conceded that the Germans may face 
problems in the domestic arena over certain policy issues, particularly 
Economic and Monetary Union and the loss of the DM. 35 Overall the "new" 
united Germany of the 1990s may be more powerful but no less European. 
(Kirchner, 1991: 162) There is little evidence to suggest a general German 
'Sonderweg'. 36 
4.6 GERMANY'S CHANGING ROLE 
Germany's commitment to the EU may not have changed, but has 
Germany's role in the EU changed? It would be a mistake to argue that, 
unification has no impact on Germany's role in the EU. The Germans and 
their partners in Europe alike are focused on this question. The recovery of 
sovereignty, achieved by the unification of Germany, demands that Germany 
take its full place among the nations of the world. There have been calls 
from those within Germany and outside it for Germany as Europe's most 
"powerful" state to undertake its full international responsibilities. The 
Germans are being asked by their partners in Europe whether they are 
prepared not just to talk about new rights and responsibilities, but to actually 
undertake new duties and obligations. 
35 Interview with unnamed 'top official' in the Foreign Office, London, 16 March 1995 
36 Interview with 'Referent fUr Europapolitik', CDU Bundesgesch!lftsstelle, Bonn, 18 April 1995 
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The Germans have aC9uired a "new" role in the EU. Chancellor Kohl 
made this clear in a policy statement in the Bundestag on the signing of the 
Treaty on Monetary, Economic and Social Union on 18 May 1990, "We 
realise that a united Germany will assume special importance within the 
political and economic structure of the Europe of tomorrow." (Press and 
Information Office of the Federal Government, 1991 b: 49) 
A representative from the German Permanent Representation noted that 
Germany had acquired "ein anderes Gewicht". 37 A colleague from the 
Auswartiges Amt in Bonn further remarked that, "Es ist jetzt nur so, dass wir 
faktisch etwas schwergewichtiger geworden sind." 38 Germany has the 
strongest economy in the EU. Germany also occupies an important geo-
strategic location in the heart of Europe. It's population has increased by 16 
million and it has obviously acquired more territory. But does greater territory 
and more population imply an enhanced role? The Germans have a central 
role in the EU. This was the case before unification.39 Germany's economy 
was by far the strongest in the EU prior to unification. Germany enjoyed an 
important geo-strategic position by virtue of the bipolar system which 
existed in Europe for forty years. 
Germany's economic strength has never been disputed. However, prior 
to unification Germany was characterised by some as an 'economic 
powerhouse but a political dwarf'. Does unification imply a stronger 
'political' role for Germany? Has Germany acquired more 'political' power? 
When asked this question, the representative from the German Permanent 
Representation in Brussels replied, "Noch nicht. Dieses kommt mit der 
37 Interview with unnamed senior official in the Standige Vertretung der Bundesrepublik bei den 
Europaischen Gemeinschaften, Brussels, 18 November 1994. Author's translation, "A different 
weight." 
38 Interview with unnamed senior official, Auswartiges Amt, Bonn, 15 September 1994. Author's 
translation, "The point is that now we have actually acquired slightly more weight." 
39 Interview with senior official, Standige Vertretung der Bundesrepublik bei den Europaischen 
GemeinscIlaften, Brussels, 18 November 1994 
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Zeit." 40 The perception is ,that Germany's role in the EU is still evolving. 
Germany's partners in Europe make a direct link with unification and 
Germany's enhanced role. It is recognised by the other member states that 
Germany has acquired a new role as a result of unification 41 and that 
Germany's weight has increased. Some member states have interpreted 
Germany's actions in Central and Eastern Europe and its unwavering 
advocacy of Eastern enlargement as a manifestation of this greater role. 
A clear manifestation of Germany's enhanced role has been a more pro-
active stance in the field of foreign policy. Germany's scope for action in 
foreign and security policy matters has expanded. At the same time the 
necessity for German action in foreign policy has increased drastically. The 
"low profile" in German foreign policy, which ensued from Germany's 
security situation in Central Europe and its history as a divided state without 
full sovereignty, was accepted by its partners. However, this is no longer the 
case since the Gulf War. The demand for a "higher profile" in foreign policy 
has also grown because the perceived probability of conflicts erupting in 
Central and Eastern Europe has increased. German interests are directly 
affected by this. One principle area of concern is the migration of hundreds 
of thousands of refugees from the former Yugoslavia to Germany. This is an 
extra burden which the Germans are increasingly finding, difficult to bear 
both economically and socially mainly due to the reconstruction of the five 
new Lander. The costs and benefits of integrating the states of Central and 
Eastern Europe into the essential institutions are unequally distributed 
between the member states. Out of all the member states, Germany is the 
one which is most dependent on stability in this region, so that Germany's 
eastern borders do not once again become the dividing line between two 
systems. (Hintze, 1995: 2) 
40 Interview with senior official, St1indige Vertretung der Bundesrepublik bei den Europaischen 
Gemeinschaften, Brussels, 18 November 1994. Author's translation, "Not yet. This will happen 
in time." 
41 Interview with unnamed 'top official' in the Foreign Office, London, 16 March 1995. 
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There is no doubt that "Germany's role in the EU has become stronger 
but certainly not hegemonic. The Germans certainly do not perceive 
themselves as having a dictatorial or dominating role in the EU. Moreover, 
the Germans see themselves as the "Triebfeder" (motivating force) of the 
EU. (Hintze, 1995: 6) 
The Germans de facto have a stronger role. The Germans may have 
acquired this role but it does not necessarily follow that they are willing to 
carry out this role. It is argued by some that there is a reluctance towards 
leadership which is born out of Germany's history. It is maintained that the 
Germans are hesitant to take up this leading role. "Die Deutschen nehmen 
an der Politik teil, ohne bis jetzt jedenfalls die Bereitschaft zu zeigen, eine 
wirklich substantielle FOhrungsrolle zu spielen." 42 The Germans do not 
perceive this "new" role in terms of more political power but rather in terms 
of greater responsibility. 
"Die staatliche Einheit und die volle Souveranitat haben fOr 
Deutschland eine gewachsene Verantwortung in Europa und der Welt mit 
sich gebracht.,,43 (CDU-Bundesgeschaftsstelle, 1994a: 85) Peter Hintze, the 
General Secretary of the CDU, recapitulated those statements in the CDU 
Grundsatzprogramm during a speech in February 1995 on German Foreign 
Policy five years after the upheaval in Europe. He acknowledged the fact that 
the unification of Germany and the acquisition of full sovereignty had 
changed Germany's role. The unification of Germany has brought 
increasing responsibility for Germany, not only in Europe but in the rest of 
the world. (Hintze, 1995: 1-2) 
42 Interview with unnamed senior official, SUtndige Vertretung der Bundesrepublik bei den 
Europliischen Gemeinschaften, Brussels, 18 November 1994. Author's translation, "The Germans 
are taking part in politics without - at least until now - showing the willingness to playa really 
substantial leading role." 
43 Author's translation, "The union of the state and full sovereignty have implied increased 
responsibility for Germany in Europe and in the world." 
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The Germans wish to take up their new responsibilities in the 
" 
international community. The Regierungsprogramm of the CDU and CSU 
highlighted this point, 
CDU und CSU treten dafOr ein, dass Deutschland grundsatzlich die 
gleichen Rechte und Pflichten wie aile anderen Mitglieder der 
internationalen Gemeinschaft wahrnimmt. 44 (CDU-
Bundesgeschaftsstelle, 1994b: 51) 
Hans-Dietrich Genscher commented on this new role in a speech in 
Davos in February 1990, 
Die Welt erwartet zu Recht, dass das vereinte Deutschland mehr 
Verantwortung Obernimmt. Wir wissen dies; wir akzeptieren es, weil wir 
es wollen. Wir werden die auf uns zugekommene grossere Rolle nicht 
in einem Oberholten nationalstaatlichen Interesse - geleitet von 
nationalem Machtstreben - wahrnehmen, sondern als gute Europaer 
und im Verbund der Europaischen Gemeinschaft. 4S (Spence, 1991: 45-
46) 
Hans-Dietrich Genscher pointed out that Germany does not want more 
power, but nevertheless has acquired more responsibility. Interviews 
conducted in Germany concurred with Genscher's view that Germany 
expected g~~ater responsibility. "Aber nicht im Sinne einer einseitigen 
MachtausObung, sondern im Sinne einer flexible'n MachtausObung." 46 This 
point was reiterated by a colleague from the Auswartiges Amt. 
Wir stehen unser Rolle zurOckhaltend gegenOber vor allen Dingen in 
der Europaischen Union und der NATO. Wir sind ein richtige Partner 
dort ... Wir wollen niemand dominieren.47 
44 Author's translation, "The CDU and CSU support the point of view that in principle Germany 
has to observe exactly the same rights and duties as all the other members of the international 
community." . 
45 'The world rightly expects that the united Germany will take on more responsibility; we know 
this, we accept this, because we want this. We shall avail ourselves of this wider role which falls 
upon us, not out of national, political interest - in pursuit of national power - but as good 
Europeans and in alliance with the European Community' (Spence's translation). 
46 Interview with unnamed senior official, Stmdige Vertretung der Bundesrepublik bei den 
Europltischen Gemeinschaften, Brussels, 18 November 1994. Author's translation, "But not in 
the sense of a unidirectional exertion of power, but rather in the sense of a flexible exercise of 
~ower." 
7 Interview with unnamed senior official, Auswartiges Amt, Bonn, 15 September 1994. Author's 
translation, "We have a cautious attitude towards our role, particularly in the European Union and 
NATO. vie are a properthere ... We do not want to dominate anyone." 
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Furthermore, politicians argue that after unification Germany is a 
"normal and European" state. "Wir sind ein ganz normales und souveranes 
Land." 48 
4.7 DOMESTIC CHALLENGES 
The argument has so far concentrated on unification and Germany's 
attitude towards the EU. A central contention of the thesis is that the 
changes in Central and Eastern Europe and unification have brought some 
serious challenges in the domestic sphere. Despite Germany's continued 
commitment to the EU and the process of European integration, domestic 
concerns have become more important for Germany since unification. Even 
Chancellor Kohl has pointed out that there are certain pressing problems 
in the domestic arena. In July 1992 the Chancellor declared that "We 
currently have a tendency of predominant domestic problems". (Presse und 
I nformationsamt, 1992: 811) 
Inevitably, Germany faces the domestic challenges of unification itself, 
in both political and economic terms. The Germans, also have to cope with 
challenges of the adaptation process in all sectors. It is contended, 
therefore, that in the short-term Germany has unavoidably become more 
inward looking in order to deal with the mammoth task of unification and its 
consequences. Several problems prevail in the domestic arena. Dealing 
with all challenges is beyond the scope of the thesis; hence the thesis 
concentrates on the challenges that Germany faces in the two case studies 
chosen; namely migration and agriculture. 
4.8 CONCLUSION -
The thesis concludes that Germany will remain committed to the EU. In 
that respect, unification has not had an impact on Germany's approach 
towards the EU. Chancellor Kohl's actions towards the achievement of 
48 Intervi~w with unnamed senior official, Ausw!irtiges Amt, Bonn, 15 September 1994. Author's 
translation, "We are a completely normal and sovereign country." 
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further integration bear witness to that fact. European integration has 
" 
become an important asset for the Germans. The view still prevails that the 
Germans cannot survive without integration. 
Die politische Klasse in Deutschland - die Politiker in den Parteien, in 
der Regierung, auf Bundes-und Landesebene, und die Journalisten -
die Oberwiegende Zahl dieser Menschen ist der Auffassung, dass wir 
ohne europaische Integration nicht leben konnen. 49 
The thesis also asserts that the Germans remain committed to 
multilateral forms of co-operation. Collective action has worked to the 
advantage of the Germans since they have been able to realise major 
objectives by working within integrated frameworks and this practice is likely 
to continue. These practices should not be viewed with trepidation by 
Germany's partners. Germany's partners in the EU have no reason to fear 
the Germans. A German Sonderweg is unlikely to result. The thesis also 
reaches the conclusion that the practice of realising major goals in 
multilateral frameworks does not conflict with Germany's overall 'European' 
stance. 
Unification has, however, affected Germany's standing in the EU and 
(. 
the role which its partners expect it to play. Germany has acquired an even 
stronger role in the EU. However, this stronger role does not ooze traits of 
hegemonic behaviour. Some commentators argue that the Germans are 
reluctant to take on this "leading" role. However, as the case studies will 
demonstra~e the Germans are willing to take a pro-active, leading role in 
certain policy areas. Unification also had the effect of increasing the 
challenges which ~ermany faced in the domestic arena with the inevitable 
consequence that the Germans have become inward looking. An official 
49 Interview with unnamed senior official, St1lndige Vertretung der Bundesrepublik bei den 
Europaischen Gemeinschaften, Brussels, 18 November 1994. Author's translation, "The political 
class in Germany - politicians of the parties, in government, both state and federal levels, as well 
as journalists - the majority of the people are of the opinion that we cannot live without European 
integration." 
127 
from the Auswartiges Amt "succinctly described Germany's attitude towards 
the EU after unification, 
Durch die Wiedervereinigung hat sich die Deutsche Europapolitik im 
Prinzip uberhaupt nicht verandert. Wir sind gewichtiger geworden, was 
derzeit einige zusatzliche Probleme gebracht hat ..... Das wird sich aber 
in einigen Jahren wahrscheinlich umkehren. 50 
--
The thesis now proceeds to analyse German priorities in the EU in 
relation to the case studies. It is the contention of this thesis that Germany's 
attitude or role in the EU has largely depended on the policy area. Thus, if 
Germany has been pro-active in a given policy area, it is the characteristics 
of the policy area which have shaped Germany's attitude. 
so Interview with unnamed senior official, Ausw1irtiges Amt, Bonn, 15 September 1994. Author's 
translation, "In principle, German European Policy has not changed at all due to unification. We 
have become a heavy weight, which has also brought us problems .... But it is likely that this 
going to change in the next few years." 
CHAPTER FIVE: MIG~ATION 
INTRODUCTION 
The thesis tests two principal hypothesis in relation to the case studies. 
Firstly, it is contended that the role that Germany plays in the EU depends 
greatly on the policy sector in question. Furthermore, the thesis asserts that 
characteristic~ within the policy sector itself shape Germany's course of 
action in that policy area. 1 Secondly, it is argued that the EU serves as an 
important arena for solving domestic concerns.2 It is perhaps, in certain 
policy areas, more politically viable to utilise European frameworks. Thus, in 
an attempt to solve intractable domestic policy problems, member states 
may seek to 'Europeanise' policy. In the case of migration the Germans 
have increasingly sought European solutions, which contrasts with 
agriculture., 
, 
This chapter endeavours to analyse the main hypothesis in relation to 
migration policy. The analysis focuses on the migration question in the 
former FRG and the unified Germany. 3 Before embarking on the central 
body. of analysis it is important to justify the choice of migration as a case 
study. 
In the domestic context the importance of the migration issue has 
manifestly grown, with the issue occupying centre stage on the German 
political agenda in the early 1990s. Migration has, however, always been a 
1 This line of argument corresponds to the ideas put forward by Lowi. For a detailed analysis refer 
to Chapter One and Two. 
2 Milward argues that certaiQobjectives are better served through international frameworks. He 
" demonstrates the degree to which member states have utilised the EU to solve domestic problems, 
which would otherwise remain deadlocked. See: (Milward, 1992) and (Milward, 1993) 
3 By West European standards migration to the former GDR was insignificant. Foreigners totalled 
a mere 191, 000 constituting 1.2% of the population in a country of 17 million. Foreigners in 
the GDR were recruited as guestworkers or contract workers, on the basis of specific inter-
governmental agreements. These contracts were simply not renewed or allowed to expire after 
unification. Hence, the main contingents of foreign workers in the GDR were returned to their 
countries of origin following unification. (Wilpert, 1991: 49) The largest contingent emanated 
from Vietnam with a total of 60, 000 workers. The rest originated from Mozambique 16, 000; 
Cuba 9, 000 and Poland 7, 000 respectively. Migration in the former GDR will therefore be 
excluded from the analysis. 
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highly contentious issue fOE the Germans. Issues relating to migration have 
been considered "politically sensitive" resulting in a contradictory approach 
to the whole debate. The measures of the European Union to establish an 
internal market and its provisions for free movement of individuals has 
raised the profile of the migration issue at the European level. The 
realisation that national measures are incapable of adequately regulating 
migration has intensified pressure to harmonise policy within the EU. Thus, 
the significance of the migration issue has simultaneously increased within 
the EU. Domestic attempts to achieve solutions have been embroiled in a 
quagmire of problems. The Germans have therefore been at the forefront of 
efforts to resolve issues at the European level. The Germans have been 
more than willing to export the migration issue out of the scrutiny of the 
domestic political environment, indicating their desire to embrace European 
solutions. The 'European' approach to the migration question was visible 
during the mid 1980s, the question to be addressed was if Germany's 
approach would alter after unification. 
The whole migration debate in Germany was, and continues to be, 
complex and riddled with contradictions. However, in the 1990s migration 
represents an even greater challenge for the Germans and their partners in 
the EU, both at the domestic and European level. The perceived "crisis" in 
migration in the post-unification period led analysts to refer to the problem 
as "Germany's most pressing domestic political and social challenge." 
(Parkes, 1992a: ix) Germany has represented the principal destination for 
current migratory movements in Europe. However, the sheer volume of 
migration to Germany increased substantially after the momentous events 
of 1989. The reunification of Germany and the collapse of communism in 
Central and Eastern Europe, coupled with the dissolution of the Soviet 
Union, increased the flow of asylum seekers and in general intensified the 
pressur~ for migration. The accompanied rise in support for extreme right-
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wing parties 4 and the incre:,ase in extreme right activity and violence against 
foreigners5 all contributed to the state of "national emergency". This had the 
effect of thrusting migration on to the domestic and European political 
agendas. 
The argument propounded in the thesis incorporates an analysis of 
three characteristics to be found, in different forms, in each policy sector: the 
dynamics of the policy sector, policy circumstance, and policy-making 
structures. This chapter examines these characteristics in relation to 
migration. 
In the case of migration, the dynamics of the policy sector 
encompasses an analysis of factors intrinsic to the issue of migration. The 
section examines the complex nature and the inconsistencies of the debate 
within Germany. The disparities include the antipathy between the refusal to 
admit the reality of permanent migration and a de jure non immigration 
policy, and the consequent confusion over citizenship issues and the 
gradual blurring of immigration and asylum issue. The dynamics of the 
policy sector specifically refers to political sensitivity surrounding the 
migration issue and the inability of the domestic structures to resolve 
issues. The dynamics of the policy sector incorporates an analysis of 
characteristics which define migration as a transnational issue, demanding 
transnational solutions. These include: attempts by the Germans to 
Europeanise policy, the implications of the internal market for the freedom 
of movement and the attempts to harmonise policy at the European level. 
Policy circumstance comprises issues which have had an impact on 
4 The Deutsche Volksunion (DVU) achieved results above the 5% threshold polling 6% in the 
Landtag election in Bremen in September 1991 and 6.3% in Schleswig-Holstein in April 1992. 
The Republikaner had similar successes in Baden-WUrttemburg achieving 10.9% in the Landtag 
election in April 1992. (Roth, 1993: 7) 
5 According to figures from the Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution the number 
of criminal acts committed by right-wing extremists rapidly rose in 1991 from 270 in 1990 to 
1483 in 1991. The figures for the first six months of 1992 were even more alarming 2084 acts of 
violence were reported. (Embassy of the Federal Republic of Germany, 1993b: 1) 
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the migration debate in f3ermany. Unification had an indirect effect on 
migration in Germany. However, the Soviet's denunciation of the Brezhnev 
doctrine and the consequent collapse of communism in East and Central 
Europe; and the dissolution of the Soviet Union itself resulted in a mass 
exodus to the unified Germany which was to intensify pressure for a change 
in approach to migration and substantive policy. The rise in the number of 
asylum applications as well as European pressure to align policy towards a 
more restrictive approach all contributed to change. 
The institutional and constitutional dynamics assume fundamental 
importance in this policy sector. The integration of domestic and European 
policy-making at the "domestic level are vital in Germany's attempts to 
'Europeanise' policy. The input of domestic political actors is less 
formalised in this policy area. The policy-making process excludes the input 
of a formalised set of organised of interest groups, unlike agriculture. Prior 
to 1992 a lack of consensus was highly visible at the party political level, 
with inter- and intra-party disputes over the whole migration issue. The 
Chancellor assumed a much greater role in this policy area by virtue of his 
Richtlinienkompetenz, curbing the power of the individual ministry. The 
constitutional dimension acquired even greater significance as the right to 
asylum is a constitutionally guaranteed right, which requires a two-thirds 
majority in both the Bundestag and the Bundesrat for a constitutional 
amendment. The section on policy-making structures involves an analysis 
of the European policy-making structures within the Community framework 
and the intergovernmental framework. 
5.1 DYNAMICS OF THE POLICY SECTOR 
Dynamics of the policy sector incorporates an examination of factors 
intrinsic to the migration issue in Germany. The political sensitivity 
surrounding the migration debate in Germany and the inability to deal with 
the issl:le sufficiently at the domestic level has resulted in an essentially 
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reactive and contradictory approach. 6 Germany's approach to migration 
renders domestic solutions virtually impossible, thereby automatically 
thrusting domestic problems on to the European agenda. Migration is 
inherently a transnational phenomenon, which up to now has been 
regulated by national policies. However, as national policies prove 
inadequate to deal with a transnational issue, demands for European 
regulations have intensified. 
5.1.1 POLITICAL SENSITIVITY OF MIGRATION: A CONTRADICTORY ApPROACH 
There can be no doubt that Germany's approach to migration is a 
conundrum of inconsistencies. Part of the blame can be laid at the door of 
Germany's historical legacy, which has determined policy in all aspects of 
the migration debate. Nazi persecution during the Third Reich ensured a 
liberal asylum law 7 and Germany's citizenship policy dates back to 
Wilhelmine Germany. The division of Germany guaranteed the inclusion of 
a clause in the Basic Law which enabled the migration of ethnic Germans. 8 
However, these inconsistencies continue to frustrate the debate in the 
6 The degree of political sensitivity clearly manifested itself in the attempts to reform the asylum 
law in the early 1990s. The inability of domestic structures to resolve the issue resulted in a 
temporary paralysis of the domestic policy process. These issues will be considered in greater 
depth in the section on policy-making structures. 
7 The asylum law was particularly difficult to amend due to its historical background. The 
provision of a liberal asylum law was directly related to Germany's National Socialist past. Many 
Germans had survived persecution because they had managed to get asylum in other countries. 
"That is why the right to asylum in the Federal Republic was worded generously and went beyond 
international law and the right of asylum granted by any other state." (Bundesministerium des 
Innern, 1993b: 51) 
8 Germany has experienced extensive migration of so-called (Aussiedler) or ethnic Germans. 
Ethnic Germans are not considered de jure migrants. Article 116 of the Basic Law provides for the 
admission of people who qualify as nationals on the basis of ancestry. Essentially, ethnic 
Germans are Germans or descendants of Germans, returning from areas in the former Soviet Union 
and Eastern Europe. Once their citizenship has been approved, ethnic Germans are entitled to all 
the same benefits as a native- German. Ethnic German migration constitutes a large part of overall 
migration to Germany. The rise in the number of asylum applications was accompanied by a 
concomitant increase in the numbers of ethnic Germans. In 1985 38,968 arrived in Germany. Less 
than three years later the figures had quadrupled to 202, 673 in 1988. Numbers peaked in 1990 
with 397,055. Germany experienced a downward trend in 1991 and 1992 with 221,995 and 
230,565 respectively. Restrictive measures were installed in the early 1990s to control the 
intensity and density of ethnic German migration. The approach towards ethnic German migration 
has subtly changed. The German government was actively discouraging further migration by 
providing direct fmancial assistance. Procedures have been tightened up. Ethnic Germans now 
have to make an application through the German consulates prior to leaving their home country. 
The proofrequired for demonstrating their connection with German culture has become more 
rigorous. (Embassy of the Federal Republic of Germany, 1993b) 
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1990s. 
A principal contradiction in contemporary migration debate continues to 
be the confusion and the fusion of the immigration and asylum issues. The 
two are distinct, yet interconnected, forms of migration. Jonas Widgren 
elucidates the difference between the two forms of migration, 
Asylum is a reflection of enlightened humanitarian action: providing 
protection to vulnerable human beings who are in grave and urgent 
need of safety. Immigration policies by contrast, are largely based on 
principles relating to state utilitarianism. Immigration policies are part of 
state sovereignty .... Humanitarian actions allows immigration 
irrespective of such utilitarian considerations. (Widgren, 1993: 89) 
However, in reality the two have become interlinked with European 
governments viewing "their asylum policy as part and parcel of their 
immigration policy." (Layton-Henry, 1992: 230) In Germany there has been a 
tendency to mix the immigration and asylum issues. The fusion of these 
two issues has resulted in an unsatisfactory approach, with the asylum 
problem becoming embroiled with wider immigration and integration 
questions, and the former dominating the political agenda. Furthermore, the 
contentious official assertion that Germany is not a country of immigration 
has obscured much of the discussion over migration. The absence of an 
immigration law has been complicated by the existence of the guest worker 
system, the constitutionally guaranteed right of asylum and the legitimate 
migration of ethnic Germans. 
The political sensitivity surrounding the migration issue and the 
unwillingness to accept the reality of permanent migration allows the 
perpetuation of the notion that Germany is not a country of immigration.9 
However,' the reality of migration in Germany fundamentally contests this 
9 The continued assertion of this notion was made clear during interviews conducted in Germany. 
An official in the Interior Ministry remarked, "Die politische Haltung ist ganz klar. Deutschland 
ist kein Einwanderungsland." Author's translation, "The political position is quite clear. Germany 
is not a country of immigration." Interview with official, Referat AI, Grundsatz Referat fUr Asyl 
und AusHlnderpolitik, Bundesministerium des Innem, Bonn, 15 September 1994. 
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notion of a de jure non immigration country. 
" 
The unwillingness of the Germans to accept the possibility of 
permanent settlement has become entangled with the concept of, and the 
conferral of, citizenship in Germany. The Reichs- und 
Staatsburgerschaftsgesetz of June 1913 stipulates that nationality is 
based on the prinCiple of 'ius sanguinis'. Thus, citizenship in Germany is a 
right which can only be transmitted by blood. The nationality law is based on 
ethnicity, the idea of 'Germanness' or belonging to the German Volk. The 
tradition of ius sanguinis precludes the notion that one cannot become 
German; this inherently renders anyone born in Germany of non-German 
origin as a 'foreigner'. 10 The absence of an immigration policy originates 
directly from the belief implicit in the Nationality Law that one cannot 
become German. The conferral of citizenship on the basis of the Reichs-
und StaatsbOrgerschaftsgesetz corroborates the official policy position that 
Germany is not a country of immigration. 
Despite the official rhetoric, in practical terms Germany has been a 
country of immigration since its inception in 1949 with the absorption of 12 
million refugees from the eastern territories. The importation of guest 
workers during the economic miracle in the 1950s and 1960s has ensured 
that Germany has a resident immigrant population totalling 6.5 million 
people. 11 (Die Beauftragte der Bundesregierung fOr die Belange der 
10 The bestowal of citizenship on the basis of 'ius sanguinis' and the obstacles to naturalisation 
guarantee that the status Germany's guestworkers and their descendants remains that of 'non-
German' . Concomitant with the lack of access to citizenship is the lack of civil and political 
rights, which accompany citizenship. The exclusion of the provision for dual nationality further 
hinders the possibility of acquiring German citizenship. The position of the guestworkers 
contrasts greatly with that of the ethnic Germans, who have an accelerated access to German 
citizenship via repatriation; and therefore access to all social and political rights. Wilpert argues 
that the inherently discriminatory policies lead to "a duality in rights and policies towards the one 
time guestworkers and their descendants on the one hand and the ethnic Germans on the other." 
(Wilpert, 1991: 50) The Act to Amend the Regulations Governing Legal Questions of the Asylum 
Procedure, Work Permits and Aliens Law took effect on 1 July 1993. The 1993 amendment has 
facilitated easier access to citizenship for younger generations, whereby third generation offspring, 
with one parent born in Germany, are allowed dual citizenship until the age of 18 at which time 
the must make a choice. This scheme has been adopted on a trial basis. See: (Bundesministerium 
des Innern, 1993b: 38-41) 
11 -The catalyst for the establishment of the guest worker system was the shortage of labour 
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Auslander, 1994: 9) Analx .. sts tend to endorse the existence of permanent 
migration by arguing that, " ... a large part of the foreign population living in 
Germany is to be considered an immigrant population despite the oft-
repeated claim that Germany is not a country of immigration." (Hailbronner, 
1989: 71) Officials unwilling to concede the government line do, in private, 
however, acknowledge the existence of a de facto resident immigrant 
population. 12 
Furthermore, with the absence of an active immigration policy and the 
effective ending of permanent immigration for employment purposes in the 
1970s, the right of asylum, as guaranteed by Article 16 (2) 2 of the Basic 
Law13, became the only legitimate means of immigration to Germany. Article 
16 (2) of the Basic Law put the onus on the German government to disprove 
the claim for asylum; and therefore seemed to encourage migrants to enter 
Germany via the asylum procedure. With the result that, "access to Germany 
for all kinds of would-be immigrants is possible only by making an 
application for asylum." (Marshall, 1992: 253) The system has naturally 
been open to abuse with a whole host of migrants utilising the asylum 
procedure. These range from genuine asylum seekers, to those escaping 
from deprivation, ethnic disturbances and civil wars, to 'economic migrants'. 
The pattern of asylum to Germany had been steady until the mid 1980s 
when the numbers exploded. 14 The changing pattern of asylum can be 
induced by the economic miracle of the 1950s and 1960s. Germany's traditional source of cheap 
foreign labour dried up with the construction of the Berlin Wall in 1960. As a result, a guest 
worker system was established via series of treaties with Italy (1955), Spain and Greece (1960), 
Turkey (1961), Portugal (1964), and Yugoslavia (1968). Unlike previous migrants, who had been 
. easily integrated into German society, these migrants were supposed to resident in Germany on a 
temporary basis, essentially to fill the economic needs of the country. This myth of return ensured 
the social an~ political marginalisation of the guestworkers until the policy reversal in 1973, 
which implemented a recruitment stop. The conception of guestworkers as a temporary phenomena 
is justified by Germany's absence of an immigration policy and the existence of a Foreigners 
Policy which governs all matters pertaining to guestworkers. 
12 Interview with official, Referat AI, Grundsatz Referat ftlr Asyl und Auslanderpolitik, 
Bundesministerium des Innern, Bonn, 15 September 1995. 
13 Article 16 (2) of the Basic Law deals with a human right which is universally applicable and 
stipulates that "Persons persecuted on political grounds shall enjoy the right to asylum." 
14 • 
Refer to Table 5.1. 
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directly attributed to dev~lopments in Central and Eastern Europe. The 
easing of travel restrictions in Central and Eastern Europe and the former 
Soviet Union in the late 1980s; the collapse of communism in the East and 
the consequent flood of asylum seekers to Germany; and the difficult 
economic and political transformation process in these post socialist states 
all precipitated the inflow of migrants to Germany. 15 The volume of asylum 
applications to Germany is illustrated in the table overleaf: 
The political sensitivity surrounding migration and Germany's distinctive 
approach towards the issue precluded a coherent policy until 1992. The 
fusion of immigration and asylum in Germany meant that the government 
focused on the asylum question, perceiving the system as being, " .. on the 
verge of collapse: .The right of asylum has more and more turned into an 
uncheckable vehicle of migration." (Bundesministerium des Innern, 1993: 
51) The government was still utilising the asylum law to regulate all forms of 
migration. The "crisis" had escalated to such a level that migration 
constituted one of the major challenges confronting Germany in the 
domestic arena. The urgency for a political solution, with both the political 
elite and the public demanding action, culminated in the so-called "asylum 
compromise" of December 1992. The political sensitivity surrounding the 
migration issue produced one of the most intense and controversial 
political debates. The prolonged political struggle, the gravity of the problem, 
and the political and constitutional deadlock aided the potential to export the 
issue out of the domestic arena and intensified attempts to Europeanise 
policy. 
15 These. events coincided with the rise in the number of asylum applications from Central and 
Eastern Europe. The Bundesamt fUr die Anerkennung ausHlndischer Flilchtlinge reported that in 
January 1993 there were a total of36, 279 applications for asylum, of those 7,820 arrived from 
Romania, 6,563 from the former Yugoslavia, 4,733 from Bulgaria and 1,758 from the former 
Soviet Union. Hence, by the early 1990s the majority of asylum applicants were of Central and 
East European origin. (Presse und Informationsamt, 1993e: 111) This pattern continued for the 
remainder of 1993. Out of the 322,599 asylum applications reported in that year, 73,717 
originated.from Romania, 72,476 from the former Yugoslavia, 22,547 from Bulgaria and 21,240 
from Bosnia. (Beauftragte der Bundesregierung rur die Belange der Auslander, 1994a: 37) 
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TABLE 5.1: ASYLUM SEEKERS IN GERMANY. 1981-1994 
" 
Year Total Applications Recognition Rates (%) 
1981 49,391 7.71 
1982 37,423 6.83 
1983 19,737 13.71 
1984 35,278 26.56 
1985 73,832 29.15 
1986 99,650 15.94 
1987 57,379 9.40 
1988 103,076 8.61 
1989 121,318 4.97 
1990 193,063 4.38 
1991 256,112 6.90 
1992 438,191 4.25 
1993 322,599 -
1994 81,864* 
-
* Figures up to August 1994. 
Source: Die Beauftragte der Bundesregierung fOr die Belange der 
Auslander, (1994), Daten und Fakten zur Auslandersituation. Bonn, p. 34-37 
5.1.2 MIGRATION: A TRANSNATIONAL PHENOMENON 
"Migration is now indisputably a global issue and enjoys a permanent 
place on the agenda of many international fora." (De Boer, 1992: 669) 
Migration is intrinsically a transnational phenomenon. The course of 
European integration in the 1980s has defined the contemporary nature of 
migration at the European level as a transnational issue. The 
implementation of the Article 8a 16 of the SEA, which provided for the 
freedom of movement of individuals, extended the regulation of migration 
beyond the realm of national boundaries. The achievement of the Single 
Market also called for the lifting of internal borders. In the past member 
states had the power to determine who to admit for purposes of 
16 Article 8a of the Single European Act of 1986 provided for the achievement of "an area without 
internal frQntiers in which the free movement of goods, persons, services and capital is ensured" 
by December 31 1992. 
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employment or humanitaEian reasons. With the establishment of the 
internal market nation states no longer had complete control over their 
borders; national policies of border controls had to be co-ordinated. The 
developments to lift borders between states limited the policy choices of 
national actors. Allowing free movement of persons throughout the 
European Union with the lifting of internal border controls by the year 1993 
called for a common policy because a person, once admitted into one 
country, could move freely into another. An official from the Auswartiges Amt 
remarked, "Wenn es keine Grenzen mehr gibt, wenn jeder, der einmal die 
Grenze der Europaischen Union Oberschritten hat, sozusagen sich 
aussuchen kann, wo er hinwill...Dann ist das in der Tat ein gemeinsames 
Problem." 17 Thus, policy decisions at the European level had rendered the 
national regulation of migration virtually impossible. 
All West European states had been experiencing increased levels of 
migration, 18 with the result that migration was increasingly being perceived 
as a common European problem. "Asylum matters and the admission of 
people from Eastern Europe and from the Third World ...... are increasingly 
becoming a common problem of all West European States". 
(Bundesministerium des Innern, 1993b: 67) The migration issue had 
begun to occupy a prominent place on the political agenda of the European 
17 Interview with unnamed senior official, Ausw1lrtiges Amt, Bonn, 15 September 1994. 
Author's translation, "When there are no more frontiers and when everyone who has entered the 
EU once can freely choose where to go, then we indeed have a common problem." 
18 Most West European states recruited large scale immigrant labour in the 1950s and 1960s in 
response to domestic labour shortages and economic reconstruction. The ending of migration for 
employment purposes in the 1970s consolidated the settlement of immigrant communities in 
. these countries. By 1993 Germany had an immigrant popUlation of 6.8 million, constituting 8.5 
% of the population. France's immigrant population totalled 3.6 million, making up 6.3 % of the 
total popUlation. Britain's 2.5 million foreigners, made up 4.3 % of the population. (Beauftragte 
der Bundesregierung fUr die Belange der Ausi!inder, 1994a: 60) By the time of the implementation 
of the SEA in 1993 most member states were concerned with issues relating to migration, settled 
immigrant communities and their rights. Problems relating to permanent settled communities 
were compounded by the increased levels of asylum applications throughout Europe. The number 
of asylum applications across the EU multiplied from 424,000 in 1991 to 559,000 in 1992. 
Germany accepted the vast majority of these applicants. By the early 1990s Germany was taking 
in approximately 70% of all applications to the EU. However, with lifting of internal borders 
Germany's. problem with increasing numbers had to be considered Europe's problem. (Beauftragte 
der Bundesregierung fUr die Belange der Ausl1inder, 1994a: 61) 
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Union and its Member sta!es. (Commission of the European Communities, 
1994b) The issue of illegal immigration and police co-operation featured 
most highly on the political agenda. 
During the course of the debate to implement the SEA it became clear 
that effective action would require joint analysis and even joint initiatives. As 
Niessen argues, it became apparent that, "national policies to regulate an 
international phenomena [such as migration] are doomed to fail. " 
(Niessen, 1992: 16-17) The transnational character of migration demanded 
a transnational solution, as national solutions were proving incapable of 
regulating migration. This characteristic added to the German assumption 
that certain national problems such as migration were better solved 
trans nationally at the European level. The Germans firmly believed that, 
"Wichtige nationale Interessen konnen nur transnational gelost werden." 19 
Hence, "Das beste ware ein europaisches Gesetz." 20 These notions were 
behind Germany's efforts to Europeanise policy in migration. 
National and European policy makers have gradually adopted a more 
transnational interpretation of the characteristics of contemporary 
immigration, and refugee flows, characteristics which defy nationally 
planned and implemented policies. Furthermore, domestic, European and 
international pressures produced by the asylum issue have proved 
compelling reasons for a transnational approach to policy-making in this 
sector. The European Parliament acknowledged the factors behind and the 
increased need for policy harmonisation. 
The recent large influx of refugees into the Community has dramatically 
put the spotlight on Member States' asylum laws and policies and has 
underlined the urgency of the need to harmonise them ....... The advent of 
the Single Market and the abolition of internal frontiers with the 
consequent importance of a common external frontier. ...... meant that 
19 Interview with unnamed senior official, Ausw1irtiges Amt, Bonn, 15 September 1994. Author's 
translation, "Important national interests can only be solved transnationally." 
20 Intervi~w with unnamed senior official, Auswlirtiges Amt, Bonn, 15 September 1994. 
Author's translation, "A European law would be the best solution." 
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... Iaws and procedure~. have to be harmonised. (European Parliament, 
1992: 2) 
The transnational character of migration and the progress of European 
integration have ensured a degree of convergence of policy within this 
sector, all be it reluctantly. Callovi argues that there has been a " .. gradual 
eclipse of an exclusively national policy-making process as regards 
immigration." (Callovi 1990b: 18) Europe has witnessed policy 
harmonisation both within the intergovernmental and Community 
frameworks. 21 
Attempts at harmonising policy in this sector have proved exceedingly 
difficult. The variety of post-war migration patterns in the various West 
European states has lead to wide diversity in national legislation and 
obligation towards the respective migrant communities and ethnic 
minorities. 'The variance in domestic policy has complicated policy 
harmonisation in this sector. 22 The link between migration issues and the 
concept of national sovereignty define migration as a national competence; 
thereby further frustrating attempts to achieve a common policy. Niessen 
contends that, "the manifestation of these phenomena on the national level 
and national reaction is so varied that European-wide policies seem 
virtually impossible to reach, let alone implement." (Niessen, 1992: 16-17). 
A central contention of this thesis is that Germany's role in the EU varies 
considerably, depending on the policy sector in question. In addition, the 
21 The degree of hannon is at ion within this policy sector is considered in depth in the section on 
~olicy-making structures. 
, 2 Martin Baldwin-Edwards identified four 'policy regimes' in migration across the EU. Policy 
regimes diverge, albeit with common threads and convergent tendencies. Firstly, Baldwin-
Edwards noted the semi-peripheral or Mediterranean regime which included states such as 
Portugal, Spain, Italy and Greece, which had traditionally been countries of emigration. These 
c:ountries had a poor immigration infrastructure and generally discriminated against non-nationals, 
in contrast to the Scandinavian model which operated liberal policies in immigration and asylum. 
The Schengen model initially comprised countries such as Germany, France and the Benelux 
countries. These countries operated strict immigration control, with both migrants and asylum 
seekers being controlled tightly. (Italy, Spain, Portugal and Greece have signed the Schengen 
Agreement) The UK constituted a separate category which had progressively shifted from a liberal 
policy in the 1950s and 1960s to a restrictive control of immigration in the 1980s. (Baldwin-
Edwards, 1991:.203-204) 
141 
thesis asserts that charact~ristics within the policy sector shape Germany's 
approach in that policy area. Dynamics of the policy sector affirm these two 
hypotheses. Germany's role in the EU in this policy sector has varied greatly 
from agriculture. Germany's approach to migration policy and its attempts to 
seek European solutions has been driven by its need to solve the domestic 
migration crisis. Characteristics intrinsic to this policy sector have been at 
the heart of Germany's attempts to Europeanise migration policy. 
The dynamics of the policy sector, both at the domestic and European 
level, have automatically thrust the issue on the European agenda. 
Migration is a politically sensitive and an emotionally charged issue which 
the domestic structures have found difficult to deal with in the domestic 
arena. A manifestation of this was the political deadlock which ensued over 
the constitutional amendment of the asylum law. Domestic idiosyncrasies 
towards various aspects of the migration debate have resulted in an 
incoherent policy. The nature of the migration issue, in the domestic context, 
has meant that immigration and asylum have become fused, with neither 
being dealt with adequately. The conflict between the reality of permanent 
settlement and a de jure non immigration policy has clouded much of the 
debate on migration in Germany. This contradictory stance has further 
paralysed the formulation of an adequate policy. Remnants of history 
continue to determine various aspects of policy relating to migration and 
settled immigrant communities; furthermore they frustrate any progress at 
the domestic level. 
The definition of the migration as a transnational issue has further 
elevated the policy sector to the European level. Concomitant developments 
at the European level, such as the SEA and the lifting of internal borders 
and increased levels of immigration have raised the profile of the issue on 
the European agenda. Migration is increasingly perceived as a common 
problerl'! with the recognition that immigration and asylum need to be 
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tackled on a co-operative basis. National provisions for the regulation of 
migration are proving inadequate, thereby increasing the urgency for policy 
harmonisation. Furthermore, the Germans firmly believe that migration 
issues are better solved at within European frameworks. All these factors 
have catapulted migration to the European level and have underlined 
German attempts to Europeanise policy. 
5.2 POLICY CIRCUMSTANCE 
The previous section considered the impact of characteristics intrinsic 
to the migration issue, both at the domestic and European level, to the 
Europeanisation of migration policy. Policy Circumstance analyses the 
effect of associated developments, on the migration debate and on 
substantive policy within Germany. This section considers the impact of 
unification on the changing nature of the migration discussion. 
5.2.1 UNIFICATION AND THE MIGRATION DEBATE . 
The unification of Germany is fundamentally linked with the 
phenomenon of migration. Germany unity was initiated and accomplished 
with such rapidity due to the mass exodus of East Germans from the former 
GDR to the FRG, first via Hungary and Austria, and later via Czechoslovakia 
and Poland. Helig suggests that, "while unification was born out of sheer 
economic necessity, a demographic phenomenon, migration, triggered it." 
(Heilig et ai, 1990: 30) East Germans had been travelling to Hungary with 
the sole intention of crossing to the West through the breached Iron Curtain, 
which the Hungarians had been dismantling. The build up of refugees from 
the GDR was so intense that the Hungarian government, applying the 
principle of free movement, opened its borders with Austria in order to stem 
the flow of East Germans. However, the opening of borders between 
Hungary and Austria did not manage to stop the flow. When exit visas for 
Hungary were no longer available, East Germans travelled to 
Czecho~lovakia and Poland where visas were not required. East German 
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refugees occupied the W~st German Embassy in Prague and Warsaw, 
demanding passage to the West. The breaching of the Berlin Wall was a 
desperate attempt by the East German government to gain some form of 
control over the chaotic situation and to stem the outward flow of young and 
well qualified East Germans. The actions of the East German government 
had the opposite effect, with the opening of the Berlin Wall acting as a 
catalyst for further migration to the West. The continuing influx of German 
refugees had become an increasing burden for the FRG, particularly on the 
economy and the welfare system. The number of GDR citizens in the FRG in 
the last quarter of 1989 had totalled 240,000. Reducing the number of East 
Germans entering the FRG had become a priority for the West German 
government. The West German government opted for a 'fast track' to 
unification in response to the unprecedented levels of migration to 
Germany. Hence, unification was concluded so expeditiously in order to 
staunch the influx of migrants. 
The unification of Germany solved the problem of inner German 
migration, but it could not halt other migratory movements from East to 
West. The potential for non-German migration went unnoticed prior to 
unification; however, it was not long before the prospective numbers 
became blatantly obvious. 23 The collapse of communism in Central and 
Eastern Europe and the diSintegration of the Soviet Union, events which 
accompanied the unification of Germany, unleashed great potential for 
migration. Prior to the removal of the Iron Curtain, Eastern Bloc countries 
had pursued extremely restrictive emigration policies, permitting virtually nil 
migration. Those that managed to cross from East to West were welcomed 
with open arms, being perceived as ideological and political endorsements 
of western liberal democracy. The process changed with the advent of 
23 An Ee survey conducted in the summer of 1992 revealed that a total of 13 million people 
were ready_ and willing to migrate to western Europe. Furthermore, that 9 out of 10 Russian 
. Germans wanted to migrate directly to Germany. (MUhlum, 1993: 7) 
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Gorbachev in the Soviet Union with his relaxation of travel procedures, 
facilitating migration. Gorbachev's denunciation of the Brezhnev Doctrine 
meant that the Soviet Union gradually loosened its grip on all the eastern 
satellite states, thereby allowing one communist country to founder after the 
other. The difficult social, political and economic transition process in these 
post-socialist states acted as a 'push factor' from these regions, 
exacerbating the inflow of migrants to Germany. Officials make a direct link 
between the rise in migratory movements from Central and Eastern Europe, 
the opening up of the East and the unification process. "Die 
Wanderbewegung von Osten hat an und fOr sich, von Ausnahme 
abgesehen, nach der Wiedervereinigung eingesetzt, wei! die Mauer gefallen 
ist." 24 Migrants from Eastern and Central Europe were aided by Germany's 
previously liberal asylum law and its generous welfare provisions, which 
'pulled' migrants to Germany. 
Developments in Central and Eastern Europe precipitated migration to 
Germany, and in so doing intensified the so-called migration "crisis". The 
sheer volume of migration resultant from unification was perceived by 
policy-makers as a threat to political stability, which had to be tackled. In 
February 1993 the former Interior Minister, Rudolf Seiters, commented, 
Wanderbewegungen der gegenwartigen Dimension sind eine Gefahr 
fUr die politische Stabilitat in Europa. Deshalb muss mit gemeinsamen 
Anstrengungen der Herkunfts-, der Transit- und der Ziellander einer 
moglichen Gefahr der Destabilisierung der politischen Lage in Europa 
energisch entgegengetreten werden. 25 (Presse und Informationsamt 
der Bundesregierung, 1993f: 113) 
. Mass migration from "the East contributed to the heightened concern about 
24 Interview with official, Referat AI, Grundsatz fur Asyl und AusHinderpolitik, 
Bundesminsiterium des Innem, Bonn, 15 September 1994. Author's translation, "The migratory 
movement from the East has actually, apart from some exceptions, started after unification because 
the wall came down." 
25 Author's translation, "Migratory movements of the present dimension are dangerous for 
political stability in Europe. Therefore, the countries of origin, transit and destination, have to 
jointly take finn steps against the potential danger of political destabilisation in Europe." 
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the migration issue and ml:lltiplied the necessity for policy reform. 
The migration problem was compounded by open and porous borders 
to the East, which Germany acquired as a result of unification and the . 
opening up of the East. An official from the Interior Ministry pointed out, "Die 
Grenzen sind verschoben. Die Ostgrenzen sind in der Tat nach der 
Wiedervereinigung offen und werden auch fOr iIIegale Beitritte genutzt." 26 
The Germans have borders with their eastern neighbours which are virtually 
impossible to police, thus being the source of illegal immigration. 
The impact of external events on the migration dilemma in Germany 
cannot be denied. However, the sheer volume of migration to Germany 
evoked negative reactions within Germany, which applied pressure for 
policy reappraisal. The magnitude of migrants arriving in Germany created 
an uneasiness amongst the public. The native population, already laden 
with the burdens and negative consequences of unification, perceived any 
kind of foreigner as a threat or as competition for jobs, housing and welfare 
benefits. People no longer differentiated between categories of migrants. 
Schmid argues, 
Die Deutsche Bevolkerung markt die gesamte Zuwanderung der letzten 
Jahre und kann zwischen Aussiedlern, Arbeitsimmigration und 
Asylmissbrauch nicht mehr unterscheiden. Sie sieht ein·e 
Massenwanderung zum eigenen Sozialbudget, die durch nichts am 
allerwenigsten durch die Regierenden, gebremst zu werden scheint.27 
(Schmid, 1992: 45) 
Some of this negative feeling was translated into increased support for 
anti-immigrant parties such as the Republikaner and the DVU. The DVU 
made significant gains in the Landtag election in Bremen in 1991, polling 
26 Interview with official, Referat AI, Grundsatz fUr Asyl und Auslanderpolitik, 
Bundesministerium des Innern, Bonn, 15 September 1994. Author's translation, "The frontiers 
have shifted. After unification the eastern borders are indeed open and also being used for illegal 
entry." 
27 Author's translation, "The German population has noticed all the immigration of the last few years 
and is not able to distinguish between ethnic Germans, work-related immigration and asylum abuse 
any longer~ They see a mass migration to their welfare budget, which seems virtually impossible to 
hinder, least of all by the government". 
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6%. This success was r~peated in Schleswig-Holstein where the DVU 
achieved 6.3%. The Republikaner made similar gains in Baden-
Wurttemberg. The success of the extreme right reflected the 
disenchantment with mainstream political parties, which seemed incapable 
of resolving the migration problem.28 
Concomitant with the increase in support for extreme right parties was 
the manifest rise in racially motivated violence and more visible racial 
intolerance. The riots in Rostock, the arson and the murders of Turkish 
families in Molin in November 1992 and in Solingen in May 1993 are the 
most noteworthy examples. Violent attacks perpetrated against all kinds of 
foreigners evoked condemnation from all quarters of the political spectrum; 
more importantly, they augmented the urgency for a political solution of the 
migration problem. 
Policy Circumstance has endeavoured to analyse the relevance of 
unification for the migration debate in Germany. Unification did not have a 
substantive effect on policy. It did, however, have an indirect effect by 
facilitating the conditions for mass migration. The substantial rise in 
migration levels, in turn, acted as a catalyst for policy reform. Unification 
also induced negative outcomes by changing the perception of the whole 
migration issue. Germany saw a rise in extreme right success electorally as 
well as an increase in racially motivated attacks. Policy reform, however, 
proved to be a controversial and painful process. 
5.3 POLIcy-MAKING STRUCTURES 
The institutional and constitutional dynamics of policy-making in 
migration, in the -domestic arena and at the European level, assume 
fundamental importance. An analysis of the actions of domestic political 
actors is vital in understanding Germany's attempts to reform policy. The 
28 The significance of the success ofthe Republikaner and the DVU in the whole migration debate 
and resolution of constitutional stalemate is considered in greater depth in the section on policy· 
making structures. 
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"institutional pluralism" in the policy process affords domestic actors a 
crucial input in the formulation of policy in this sector. The constitutional 
dimension to policy reform in migration acquired particular significance; 
being the source of one of the most intense and controversial political 
debates in Germany. 29 The policy process was characterised by inter- and 
intra- party disputes, thereby frustrating policy reform. The inability of the 
governing coalition and the opposition to resolve their differences directly 
benefited the extreme right parties which were able to dictate the political 
agenda. The discontentment amongst the public reached epidemic levels, . 
exacerbating pressure for a political solution. The political sensitivity of the 
issue manifested itself in the protracted debate surrounding policy reform. 
The inability of the political structures to deal with the issue resulted in a 
temporary paralysis of the policy process, aiding the government's attempts 
to reach a solution at the European level. The whole migration issue was 
catapulted on to the European agenda with the Germans actively seeking 
solutions in both the Community and the intergovernmental frameworks. If a 
policy solution could be reached at the European level, it would be easier to 
implement domestically. 
5.3.1 DOMESTIC DEADLOCK 
The migration issue moved from the realm of 'low politics' to 'high 
politics', becoming highly politicised in the late 1980s and early 1990s. The 
fusion of the immigration and asylum issues meant that conflicts over the 
constitutional right to political asylum occupied centre stage. More 
specifically, the CDU/CSU's proposed amendment of Article 16 became the 
focal point for heated debate. 
The constitutional dimension to the asylum issue was pivotal in the 
29 The General Secretary of the CDU, Peter Hintze, commented on the controversial nature of the 
asylum issue during the debate on asylum in the Bundestag. He pointed out that the decision to 
amend Article 16 of the Constitution was one of the most divisive in recent times. He declared, 
"Kaum eine Entscheidung hat sich die Politik so schwer gemacht wie diese". (CDU-
Bundesgesch!iftsstelle, 1993: 5) Author's translation. "A political decision has rarely been so 
difficult for the politicians." 
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entire dispute. The right to political asylum, as embodied in Article 16 (2), 
was a constitutionally guaranteed right. In order to amend the asylum 
clause in the Basic Law, the Federal government required a two-thirds 
majority in the Bundesrat and the Bundestag. The Federal structure and the 
nature of policy-making in Germany disperses power between different 
levels of government, and in turn between various political parties. The 
actions of the Federal government were impeded since it needed to achieve 
a consensus in institutions which were not wholly dominated by the 
governing parties. The consensus required to secure an amendment was 
not forthcoming, with both the governing coalition and the opposition split on 
reform. 
The dissension at the party-political level, with the major parties holding 
diametrically opposing policy positions, precluded the urgently needed 
resolution of the issue. The conflict frustrated the policy process and acted 
as a formidable impetus for the Federal government to reach solutions 
outside the domestic arena at the European level. 
The CDU, and its sister party the CSU, have long sought to make the 
asylum provi,sion more restrictive on the basis that Germany's liberal policy 
was subject to abuse. The CDU/CSU tabled an amendment of the 
Constitution in order to restrict the number of economic migrants claiming 
political asylum. The CDU/CSU argued in favour of a stricter asylum law 
from the policy position that, "Germany does not have a special moral and 
political responsibility to maintain a generous policy of entry since the 
national order itself is threatened by the influx of foreigners." (Lemke, 1993: 
61) Statements from' key CDU/CSU politicians reflected this policy stance. 
The former Minister of the Interior, Wolfgang Schauble, alluded to the 
amendment of the Constitution as a means for saving the state from 
internal turmoil. Schauble equated the controlling of numbers with ensuring 
harmony amongst the immigrant and native communities. He declared, 
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"Only if we control and limit immigration more effectively ..... can we ensure 
peaceful and amicable co-existence." (Genilliard & Barber, 1993: 24) The 
two conservative parties introduced key phrases into the political debate, 
such as 'over-foreignisation', 'flood of asylum seekers', 'limits of 
endurance' and particularly the 'the boat is full'. 30 The CDU/CSU advocated 
a ceiling of its borders to the East, unwilling and unable to bear the 
immense financial burden connected with the maintenance of asylum 
seekers. 31 The sentiment increasingly prevalent amongst the governing 
elite was that Germany could not solve the problems of the world with 
respect to migration. 
The CDU/CSU added a European dimension to their search for a more 
restrictive policy, arguing that an amendment of its asylum law was 
necessary in order to placate pressure from its partners. Germany's 
partners were increasingly critical of its asylum law, which they perceived as 
being too liberal, opening the floodgates for unwanted and unlimited 
asylum seekers. In addition, the conservative parties contended that 
agreements negotiated within intergovernmental frameworks, such as the 
Schengen Accord and the Dublin Convention, were ineffective without a 
". 
constitutional revision. Both the Schengen Accord and the Dublin 
Convention could not be ratified until the law was amended. A member from 
the German Permanent Representation commented, "Man mOsste das 
Grundgesetz andern, urn diese Obereinkommen ratifizieren zu konnen und 
urn daraus ein nationales Gesetz machen zu konnen." 32 
The acutely sensitive issue of asylum was so politically divisive that it 
30 The head of the CDU parliamentary group in the Bundestag, Alfred Dregger, had already 
introduced the idea of 'flooding' in parliamentary debates in the mid-1980s. Dregger made a direct 
correlation between flooding and the so-called Muslim threat in Europe. 
31 Interview with official, Referat AI, Grundsatz Referat rur Asyl und Ausllinderpolitik, 
Bundesministerium des Innem, Bonn, 15 September 1994. 
32 Interview with an unnamed senior official, Stlindige Vertretung der Bundesrepublik bei den 
Europliischen Gemeinschaften, Brussels, 18 November 1994. Author's translation, "It would be 
necessary to change the Basic Law in order to ratify these agreements and then enact a national 
law." -
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caused open splits in the ruling coalition. Chancellor Kohl's proposal for 
~ 
amending the asylum law was unpalatable to the junior partner in the 
coalition, the FOP, whose policy stance was more akin to that of the SPO. 
The FOP initially refused to revise the Constitution. Kohl's attempts to build 
an election platform on the issue of asylum seekers in February 1992 
resulted in an unprecedented split between the COU/CSU majority and the 
FOP liberal minority. The rift was so deep that the FOP took the step of 
publishing a separate and contradictory post-cabinet statement. 
The policy position of the opposition thwarted the government's 
attempts for reform. Initially the SPD flatly rejected any constitutional 
amendment which would amend, undermine or abolish the granting of 
asylum. The SPO were particularly reluctant against modifying Article 16, 
embracing historical and moral arguments for its preservation. SPO 
politicians defended the right of asylum as a humanitarian obligation of the 
Federal Republic to politically persecuted individuals. The standpoint of the 
SPD is, "rooted in post-war West German vision wedded to the ideals of a 
liberal, open society strongly committed to a constitution protecting human 
rights and th~ rule of law." (Lemke, 1993: 62) The SPD considered the right 
of asylum as inviolable and therefore blocked changes for months. The 
SPD argued where would the pressure for amendments and infringements 
on people's liberties stop if the government is allowed to change the 
country's Basic Law. 
Oskar Lafontaine asserted that the asylum compromise was 'extremely 
fragile' since it failed to deal with fundamental problems related to 
. migration, namely ethnic Germans. The SPO, the Greens and even liberal 
conservatives agreed that a more comprehensive overhaul of the 
immigration policy was required, which would start with the recognition that 
Germany is a de facto country of immigration. They objected to the 'German 
blood' policy of preference for ethnic Germans, arguing that it should cease 
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and an immigration law, including quotas for different countries, and 
automatic citizenship for those born in Germany, established. The SPD 
contended that asylum procedures could be speeded up without requiring a 
change in the Constitution. 
A homogeneous view did not prevail within the SPD. The party had 
experienced lengthy internal conflicts between the national leadership 
which would not contemplate any serious restrictions on asylum, and the 
Lander level leaders who were coping with the practical consequences of a 
liberal policy. The result was visible confusion which proved to be electorally 
damaging. 
The intra-party split within the SPD unveiled the complications in the 
Bund - Lander relationship with respect to this policy issue. The Lander 
governments had assumed growing importance in the formulation and 
implementation of migration policy. The Constitution guarantees that 
competencies are divided in this policy sector. The Federal government 
retains exclusive competence over the formulation of policy pertaining to 
immigration, citizenship and the issuing of passports. The Lander 
governments implement Federal policy and have concurrent powers in the 
residence and establishment of aliens. More specifically, the Lander 
governments are empowered to deal with the practical distribution and 
maintenance of aliens. There has been growing discontent at the Lander 
level, with the Lander governments experiencing increasing problems. The 
five new Lander encountered severe difficulties, particularly with regard to 
the financial burden of maintaining provisions for asylum seekers. 33 A 
. report from the BMI states, "The Federation, the Lander and the local 
communities are faced with problems they can hardly solve on account of 
33 Asylum seekers are distributed among the Under according to a 'distribution key'. 
Accordingly, since unification 20% of all asylum applicants were distributed to the five new 
Uinder. The placement of asylum seekers in the new Lander has coincided with a rise in the 
number of attacks perpetrated against foreigners. 
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the great influx of asylum seekers." (Bundesministerium des Innern, 1993b: 
51 ) 
Concomitantly, Lander governments had an important role through their 
representation in the Bundesrat. Constitutionally the Bundesrat had a veto 
power in the amendment of the asylum clause unless there was a two-
thirds majority. The extent of the problem meant that there was a consensus 
between Bund and Lander on the need to change policy. 
, 
The growing uneasiness amongst the public impelled the Chancellor to 
act. The principle of Richtlinienkompetenz affords the Chancellor the power 
to set policy guidelines. Kohl grasped the initiative by arranging all party 
talks, where an agreement about the asylum question might be achieved. 
The outcomes reached at the so-called 'asylum summit' at the 
Bundeskanzleramt on 10 October 1991 were, however, only meagre. The 
mountain laboured and only brought forth a mouse. Only a few days after 
the summit disillusionment set in, with the COU/CSU putting forward a 
proposal to amend the Constitution. (Wasserman, 1992: 16) 
The mainstream parties were unable to come to a satisfactory 
conclusion of the asylum problem with both the opposition, which is split 
between local and national leaders, and the government's coalition partner 
the FOP, flatly refusing to amend the Constitution. The failure to deal with 
. the issue failed to discourage the racist violence, and led to widespread 
popular cynicism and a loss of support for leaders of all mainstream parties 
and therefore a steady rise in support of extreme right-wing parties. The 
perceived competence of a political party to effectively address salient 
. issues definitely has an impact on its standing electorally. "The asylum 
issue is probably one question which has caused most chaos and 
confusion in the political establishment, and has certainly helped boost the 
fortunes of the far right." (Peel, 1992: 2) 
The success of the extreme right has affected the fortunes of both the 
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major parties. The CSU has been particularly stringent in its views on 
amending Article 16 because it was worried about the Republikaner 
eroding its political base. 34 After the results in the Bremen state elections in 
1991, the extreme right parties made significant gains in the Schleswig-
Holstein and the Baden-WOrttemberg elections. In the Schleswig-Holstein 
election in April 1992, 48% of the electorate turned out to vote as compared 
to 72% in 1988. Almost 20% of the vote was shared out between the DVU 
and the Republikaner. The SPD just held on to power in Kiel but saw their 
overall vote slashed from 56% to 46%. Meanwhile the CDU lost the 
absolute majority it had for twenty years in Baden-WOrttemberg. The DVU 
gained six seats in the Kiel Parliament and the Republikaner gained 15 
seats in Stuttgart. The DVU and Republikaner became the third largest 
political groups represented in both assemblies. (Parkes, 1992c: 18) The 
right wing was also able to make gains in local and city elections in the 
state of Hessen in March 1993. The SPD vote slumped by 7% and the CDU 
by 2%. In Frankfurt, Franz Schonhuber and the Republikaner took 10 % of 
the vote. State-wide the Republikaner collected an estimated 7.7 % 
compared with less than 1 % for the far-right parties in the last election. 
The victories of the extreme right parties, "reflected anger and 
disenchantment with mainstream politicians, the paralysis of the 
muddlesome conservative/liberal federal coalition and the loss of contact 
with the realities of life." (Parkes, 1992c: 18) The gains of the extreme right 
were a result of the manipulation of the asylum issue itself and of the 
impotence of the mainstream parties. The extreme right benefited greatly 
. from the widespread disenchantment or Politikverdrossenheit felt in society. 
The mainstream parties dismissed the results as protest votes, but also 
34 The CSU has taken a similar stance on other aspects of the migration debate. The CSU is 
vehemently opposed to any relaxation of the Citizenship law, which it feels would somehow lead 
to a dilution of the German identity. The views of the CSU are reflected by the Bavarian premier, 
Edmund Stoiber, who stated, "We are not an immigration country. That would result in a multi-
cultural society. A multi-cultural society would be a terrible thing". (Peel, 1993: 22) 
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called for reflection and a rectification of why so many had voted for the 
extreme right. 
The inability of the mainstream parties to deal with the sensitive 
immigration problem unleashed extremism on the left of the political 
spectrum. An anti-racist demonstration in Berlin in November 1992 ended 
with the protesters pelting the state president with eggs. The groups on the 
extreme left sought to reveal what they saw as the hypocrisy of the 
politicians. 
Policy-making in this sector had proved fruitless in the domestic arena. 
The differing policy positions of domestic actors, and the inability to reach a 
consensus on policy reform, resulted in a paralysis of the domestic policy 
process. The political sensitivity of the issue, coupled with Germany's 
contradictory approach towards migration, precluded a domestic solution. 
The growing importance of the migration issue, as exemplified by the 
government's references to a 'state of emergency' and increasing 
uneasiness amongst the public made a resolution fundamental. By the 
early 1990s the migration issue had come to completely dominate the 
political age~da. The perceived need for a constitutional amendment and 
the stalemate in the Bundestag and the Bundesrat forced the government to 
look to the European level. The deadlock in the domestic arena rendered an 
- expeditious solution highly unlikely. The government was aided in its 
attempts to reach a solution outside of the scrutiny of the domestic policy 
process by the knowledge that certain policy issues could be better solved 
at the European level. Webb argues that, "Various governments have 
, anxiously looked -to the EC to find solutions to problems which have 
persistently eluded them". (Webb, 1983: 31) Furthermore, the definition of 
--
migration as a transnational issue demanded European solutions. 
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5.3.2 THE SEARCH FOR EUROPEAN SOLUTIONS 
The inability to reach decisions in the domestic arena, characterised by 
the constitutional and political stalemate, and the political urgency of solving 
the migration crisis renewed the Federal government's efforts to seek 
solutions within European frameworks. 
A central contention of this thesis is that the EU serves as an arena for 
solving domestic problems. Wallace argues, "the EC can be used as a 
resource in domestic problems by hard pressed governments". (Webb, 
1983: 29) The Germans could legitimately export the migration issue out of 
the domestic arena, negotiating policies within the EU which would then be 
directly applicable at home since EU legislation has primacy over national 
law. The Germans were aided in their search by the genuine belief of many 
of the political elite that the migration problem was better solved at the 
European level. A senior official in the Auswartiges Amt remarked that 
migration was a problem, "das Deutschland besser in der Europaischen 
Union durchsetzen kann". 35 Aside from the domestic problems, the 
Germans believed that the transnational character of migration demanded 
European solutions. With the advent of the Single Market and the lifting of 
internal borders, national policy solutions are no longer appropriate nor 
. effective enough to deal with the issues of immigration and asylum and 
therefore require Community or joint action. The Germans have actively 
sought to resolve the issue at the European level in the various policy-
making frameworks. 
As one of the key actors in the EU, Germany has stood for an 
integrationist view of the new Europe, and the German government has 
repeatedly called for common policies on borders and asylum and the 
35 Interview with unnamed senior official, Auswfutiges Amt, Bonn, 15 September 1994. 
Author's translation, " .. which Germany would better solve in the European Union." 
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European-wide distribution of asylum seekers. Germany's demands for the 
harmonisation of policy is not a new phenomenon which has resulted from 
the unification of Germany and the ensuing migration problems. The 
German government indicated its preference for the harmonisation of 
migration policy as far back as 1986. The Federal government announced 
that, "it would speed up the harmonisation of asylum legislation and .asylum 
law in the European context" in its Cabinet decision of 26 August 1986. 
(Bundesministerium des Innern, 1993b: 68) 
An interest in harmonisation of immigration and asylum policy dates 
back to the mid 1980s, when policy converged simultaneously in two 
European consultative structures: firstly, the formal Community framework, 
which is based on the EC Treaty and involves the Community institutions 
such as the Commission, the European Parliament and the Council of 
Ministers; and secondly, the less informal intergovernmental framework, 
which is mainly concerned with migration, asylum and combating terrorism. 
Much to the disappointment of the Germans, policy harmonisation has been 
removed from the scrutiny of the Community framework, and taken place in 
the ad hoc i~tergovernmental framework. Intergovernmental frameworks are 
preferred by many European politicians because it is felt that, " .. immigration 
policy is too important to be left to the European Commission because of its 
implications for each country's security, national identity and culture." 
(Layton - Henry 1992: 231). Furthermore, the intergovernmental frameworks 
have prevailed due to the identification of migration as a national 
competence which is closely linked with national sovereignty. However, De 
. Boer argues, "lf European policy is to work, close co-operation between 
Community institutions and intergovernmental channels is essential." (De 
Boer 1992: 672) The mixture of 'international and supranational co-operation 
has led to conflicts erupting among the member states and between the 
member states and the Community institutions. Callovi maintains, 
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Within the European Community we are witnessing the shaping of a 
new political decision-making landscape which involves in some cases 
the sharing of sovereignty among member states. The redistribution of 
power among institutions, and between nation-states and the 
Community, is part of a subtle game where interests and aims do not 
always converge. (Callovi 1992: 354) 
Intergovernmental co-operation in the areas of immigration and -asylum 
involved three main bodies: the Trevi Group set up in 1975 36, the Ad Hoc 
Group on Immigration established in 1986 37, and the Schengen Agreement 
signed in 1986.38 The main achievement of intergovernmental co-operation 
in immigration and asylum has been the Schengen Agreement. 
Consultation within the Community framework on immigration and 
36 TREVI was an acronym for terrorisme, radicalisme, extremisme et violence internationale. 
Trevi was an intergovernmental body set up at the behest of the British government. Operating 
under international law, Trevi was a body consisting of Justice and Interior Ministers. These 
intergovernmental bodies as a whole, including Trevi, were criticised for their unaccountable, 
undemocratic and secretive nature. The MEP John Tomlinson declared, "I regard the Trevi Group 
as positively dangerous and undemocratic ... they are managing to equate immigration policy and 
the freedom of movement of people with the same level of imperative secrecy as they are saying is 
necessary to have for counter-terrorist activities and counter drug activities". (Bunyan, 1991: 22) 
An argument which the Germans favoured, but the British disagreed with. The British 
government took a positive view of Trevi due to, "the informal, spontaneous and practical 
character of its discussions". The group's competencies comprised: immigration, asylum, border 
controls, freedom of movement, terrorism, visas, international crime and drug trafficking. 
37 The Ad Hoc Group on Immigration was another intergovernmental body set up at the initiation 
of the British government with the aim of ending the abuse of the asylum process. The activities 
of the Group were excluded from the scrutiny of Community institutions, but the Commission 
was granted observer status. Two international conventions went through various drafts: the 
Convention on Determining the State Responsible for Asylum Applications and the Convention 
on the Crossing of External Borders. 
38 The Schengen Agreement was signed by France, Germany, Belgium, the Netherlands and 
Luxembourg in 1985 to facilitate the abolition of internal borders and full implementation of the 
freedom of movement principle. Italy, Spain, Greece and Portugal later joined the original five 
states. A Supplementary Agreement was signed in 1990 to fill the loopholes that would arise 
from the full abolition of border controls between the signatory states. The main provisions of the 
Supplementary Agreement include: the exchange of information on new asylum law, new arrivals 
and countries of origin of asy,lum seekers, a common list of countries whose national require 
, visas, a common list of 'undesirable' who will be refused entry, exchange of information via the 
Schengen Information System, provisions determining the state responsible for examining an 
asylum application and sanctions against airline carriers transporting individuals without adequate 
documentation. The Supplementary Agreement entered into force on the 26 March 1995. The aims 
expressed in the Schengen Agreements are clearly similar to those in Article 8a of the EC Treaty. 
The Schengen Agreement strengthens the community spirit by envisaging the supremacy of all 
present and future EU Treaties over its own. Furthermore, the Commission participates in the 
processes of Schengen with observer status. Title VI of the Maastricht Treaty on co-operation in 
the fields of justice and Home Affairs implicitly allows for the conclusion of intergovernmental 
agreements such as Schengen. Title VI also envisages that these intergovernmental agreements 
may become part of the Community. 
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asylum lay dormant until 1985. The Commission's publication 'Guidelines 
for a Community Policy on Migration' advocated the inclusion of immigration 
and asylum into Community competence. The Commission's actions 
provoked a contradictory statement from the Council of Ministers, which 
recognised the desirability of promoting co-operation and convergence in 
immigration policy. However, simultaneously the Council confirm~d that 
matters relating to the access, residence, and employment of non-
Community nationals fell under the competence of the member states, 
regardless of Community Agreements. (Callovi, 1990: 25) From this point 
onwards the member states appeared to restrict the Community's 
competence in immigration to consent and co-operation. The Commission 
continued to push for community competence. The Commission introduced 
a procedure for 'prior communication and consultation on migration policies 
in relation to non-member countries', based on Article 118 of the Treaty of 
Rome on July 8 1985. Following appeals from many member states the 
European Court of Justice annulled the Commission's decision.39 The. 
implications of the implementation of the Single Market, as contained in the 
SEA, renewed debate about immigration and asylum at the European 
level.4o The Germans were at the forefront of bringing the issue on to the 
European political agenda. European level negotiations culminated in the 
Dublin Convention of 1990 41 and the incorporation of immigration and 
39 Surprisingly, the ECJ's annulment of the Commission's decision provided the impetus for 
more Community involvement in the situation of third country workers, since the ECJ gave the 
fullest recognition to the main tasks of the consultation procedure, namely; to facilitate the 
adoption of a common position by member states; to achieve progress toward harmonisation of 
. national legislation on foreigners; to promote the inclusion of common provisions in bilateral 
agreements; and to improve the protection of Community nationals working and living in non-
member countries. 
40 The implications of the SEA for harmonisation of immigration and asylum policies are 
discussed in the section on Dynamics of the Policy Sector. 
41 The Dublin Convention of 15 June 1990 is concerned with the harmonisation of the 
fundamental rules of asylum law, namely; the criteria for determining when applications for 
asylum are 'manifestly iII-founded'; the definition of and common application of the term 
'country of first asylum'; common assessment of the situation in the country of origin or the 
'country offrrst asylum'; and harmonised interpretation ofthe term 'refugee' as referred to Article 
1 of the 1951 Geneva Convention. The Dublin Convention was designed to, "combat asylum-
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asylum into the Third Pillar of the Treaty on European Union. 
The thesis contends that the EU serves as an arena for solving 
domestic problems. Considering the domestic deadlock, the Germans 
recognised the benefits of reaching policy solutions in the European arena. 
The Federal government held the belief that, "National policies and 
regulations concerning the problem of refugee movements ... need to be 
supplemented and harmonised at the European level." 
(Bundesministerium des Innern, 1993b: 68) In fact, the Germans actively 
encouraged policy harmonisation in both the intergovernmental and 
Community frameworks. Germany was an original signatory state of the 
Schengen Agreement. 
The German government and particularly Chancellor Kohl rejected 
intergovernmental co-operation as inadequate for controlling immigration 
and clearly expressed a preference for the Community framework. Apart 
from the democratic deficit inherent in the intergovernmental process, 
whereby decisions are reached in ad hoc, secretive, separative and 
unaccountable bodies, the requirement of unanimity in decision-making 
hindered Germany's progress towards achieving common policy position. 
Therefore, the Federal government stated that it, "would like the European 
Community to be invested with responsibilities in the above areas, which 
. would go beyond the intergovernmental co-operation practised hitherto." 
(Bundesministerium des Innern, 1993b: 73) 
The role of Chancellor Kohl has been fundamental in Germany's 
attempts for policy solutions within European frameworks. Kohl made a 
. concerted attempt to bring migration into Community competence, as part of 
Article 8a 'of the SEA, which is governed by majority voting in the Council of 
Ministers. Utilising his powers of policy initiation, Chancellor Kohl took the 
lead, in attempting to facilitate a common solution. Kohl put forward a 
shopping and refugees in orbit". (De Boer, 1992: 672-673) 
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proposal for a Community-wide policy on immigration at the European 
Council meeting in Luxembourg in June 1991. Kohl argued that, "Member 
states should commit themselves under the Treaty on Political Union to 
harmonising, both formally and substantively, their policies on asylum, 
immigration and aliens". (Commission of European Communities, 1991 b: 
2) Furthermore, Kohl was able to persuade his partners in the EC to agree 
that Ministers responsible for immigration should prepare special asylum 
and immigration reports for the Maastricht summit. Kohl's actions proved 
fruitful, as the Luxembourg Council asked the Ministers responsible for 
immigration to present proposals for the harmonisation of policy at the 
Maastricht summit. As part of the debate leading up to the Maastricht 
summit in December 1991, at the request of the European Council, the 
European Commission issued two Communications, one on immigration 
policy 42 and the other on the right of asylum. 43 The Commission 
acknowledged that these Communications instigated at the request of the 
Germans had, "a crucial bearing on future work". (Commission of European 
Communities, 1991 c: 19) Kohl reiterated his demands for the 
harmonisation of policies and the transfer of competencies to the EC at the 
Maastricht summit, in the knowledge that if he was able to secure a 
Community-wide policy, it would automatically be valid in German law since 
EC law has primacy over national law. 
Kohl's efforts were not rewarded. The TEU awarded clear legal 
competence to the Community on visa policy as laid down in Article 1 ~Oc . 
. 42 The Communication on immigration put forward proposals based on the need to introduce 
measures to control the flow of immigration, to make migration an integral part of the 
Community's external policy, and the need to strengthen integration policies for migrants already 
legally resident in the EU. For further details see: (Commission of European Communities, 
1991c) 
43 The Commission's Communication on the right of asylum focuses on ways of preventing the 
abuse of asylum, whilst guaranteeing that genuine asylum seekers are still accepted into the EU. 
The Communication calls for a common approach by Member States to application for asylum 
based on the humanitarian principles laid down in the Geneva Convention. The Communication 
suggested that one of the main priorities in the area of asylum was the ratification of the Dublin 
Convention on Asylum. For further details see: (Commission of European Communities, 1991 b) 
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The competence on visa enables the Community level to determine which 
~ 
non-EU nationals should be subject to a visa requirement and of a common 
format for visas. Although, immigration and asylum have been identified as 
areas of common interest; intergovernmental co-operation has remained in 
the field Justice and Home Affairs. 44 
Germany's attempts to reach a solution outside the domestic 
framework failed. Despite the political expediency on the part of the German 
government, the contemporary nature of the migration in Europe as 
transnational, Germany was unable to achieve a consensus in the sensitive 
policy area of migration. The necessity to achieve decisions by means of 
unanimity, in a policy sector which is guarded by many Member States as 
exclusively lying within national competence and closely linked to national 
sovereignty, all hindered Germany's attempts to harmonise policy. German 
initiatives appear to be jeopardised by the question of Community power 
versus national sovereignty. Furthermore, the conflict between Community 
and intergovernmental structures proved to be a hindrance. 
5.3.3 BACK TO THE DOMESTIC ARENA 
The impotence of European structures, despite calls from within the 
German government for a European solution, thrust migration back onto the 
domestic agenda. The mounting crisis in migration, with over 450,000 
arriving in Germany in 1992, renewed the Federal government's efforts to 
remove the obstructions to a constitutional amendment. A number of factors 
facilitated the final agreement over the asylum compromise. 
Public concern over the asylum issue had rocketed to unprecedented 
levels by 1992. The prevailing view seemed to be that, "The acceptance of 
the German population has diminished." (Bundesministerium des Innern, 
44 Areas of common interest include conditions of entry, movement and residence, access to 
employment, combating unauthorised immigration, rules governing the crossing of external 
borders and asylum policy. The provisions for intergovernmental co-operation do allow for 
Members States to bring any of the above mentioned areas into Article 100c i.e. bring them 
within the Community's ambit. However, this may be achieved only by means of an unanimous 
decision arid would be subject to the ratification by each individual Member State. 
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1993b: 51) Opinion polls from 1992 recorded growing support for a 
constitution-al amendment. A survey carried out by Ipos-Institute, 
commissioned by the BMI in May 1992, indicated that the overwhelming 
majority of those surveyed (74% in the old Lander and 84% in the new 
Lander) believed that those persecuted on political grounds should have 
the right to asylum in Germany. At the same time 63% in the old Langer and 
65% in the new Lander thought that only a fixed number of those suffering 
from political persecution should be admitted each year. 
(Bundesministerium des Innern, 1993b: 59) Figures from a poll conducted 
earlier in 1992 mirrored these results with around 60% of all Germans 
backing changes to prevent 'abuse' of the asylum laws. (Parkes, 1992b: 2) 
The asylum issue had come to dominate the political agenda with 47% of 
West Germans considering asylum and immigration as the country's 
biggest problems. (Parkes, 1992b: 2) Increased public concern put 
pressure on the political elite to overcome their disagreements on the 
issue. The necessity to appease and to allay the fears of the public became 
a prime motivating factor in forcing change. The then Interior Minister, Rudolf 
Seiters, recognising the importance of public opinion on the asylum issue, 
commented that, "Ein Parlament kann auf Dauer keine Politik machen 
gegen den erkennbaren Willen der Bevolkerung." 45 (Presse und 
Informationsamt der Bundesregierung, 1992m: 5) 
The public had conveyed their fears and discontentment with 
mainstream parties through increased support for extreme right parties. 
Both the Republikaner and the DVU made significant electoral gains at the 
. height of the asylu~ crisis. 46 These parties managed to exploit the 
inadequaCies of the mainstream parties effectively. In an attempt to win 
45 Author'S translation, "In the long run a parliament cannot pursue policies against the 
recognisable will of the population." 
46 Both the CDU and the SPD lost votes to the Republikaner and the DVU. Refer to section 
5.3.1. -
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back disaffected CDU voters, the party quite intentionally shifted further to 
, 
the right of the political spectrum, and hijacked and adopted the harsh policy 
position of the extreme right. The justification provided by the Interior 
Minister, Rudolf Seiters, was that, "Wir wollen nicht, dass Radikale und 
Extremisten von einer Situation profitieren." 47 (Presse und Informationsamt 
der Bundesregierung, 1992m: 5) By demanding an amendment of Ar:ticle 16 
the CDU was able to tap into popular resentment, oust the extreme right 
parties and stem the decline in the party's popularity, particularly in the East. 
Exaggerated references to a state of emergency by leading CDU 
politicians and growing concern over the harmful effects of the migration 
crisis to stability in Germany served as further justifications for the CDU's 
demands. Rudolf Seiters argued, "Ohne eine solche Moglichkeit werden 
Angste und Unsicherheiten verstarkt, die fOr den inneren Frieden schadlich 
sind." 48 (Presse und Informationsamt der Bundesregierung, 1992m: 1) The 
growing levels of racial violence intensified the need to overcome the 
constitutional deadlock. The Federal government perceived the 
constitutional amendment as a remedy for countering the manifest rise in 
violence. 
The SPD could not resist the forces for change in the domestic political 
arena and within the party itself. The party had been split internally between 
the national leadership who were unwilling to concede to change and state 
level authorities. The CDU made tactical use of the delicate balance within 
the party during the Bremen state election campaign, by taking the local 
ruling party to task for the over-liberal attitude of the senior members in 
. Bonn towards the migration problem. The SPD paid a price for their 
confusing 'stance on the asylum issue. The SPD incurred significant losses 
47 Author's translation, "We do not want radicals and extremists to profit from such a situation." 
48 Author's translation, "Without such an option fear and insecurity would increase, which would be 
detrimentarto internal harmony." 
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in Bremen. 49 The political unpopularity of the migration issue, the malaise 
within the party and the political system defeated the SPD's moral 
conscience in eventually agreeing to concede to a constitutional 
amendment in August 1992. The removal of the main obstacles in the party-
political arena paved the way for the negotiations between the governing 
coalition and the opposition. The Germans overcame the political and 
constitutional deadlock to deal with the asylum crisis domestically, by 
agreeing to 'asylum compromise' in December 1992, for legislation to be 
enacted by July 1993. 
5.3.4 END OF THE EUROPEAN ROAD FOR MIGRATION? 
The amendment of the asylum clause had the desired effect, the 
perceived asylum 'crisis' had been resolved, in time for Chancellor Kohl to 
score another victory in the Federal election in 1994. The migration issue no 
longer represented a politically worthy subject having been firmly extracted 
from public debate and the political agenda. Indeed, after the constitutional 
amendment the numbers of asylum seekers reaching Germany's borders 
diminished, being panned off to Germany's eastern neighbours. The 
Federal government's actions had succeeded in placating the general 
public and recuperating support from the extreme right. But is that the end of 
the matter? 
The traditional German idiosyncratic approach towards the migration 
issue has prevailed yet again. The fusion of the immigration and asylum 
issues has meant that the asylum law has been used as a remedy for all of 
Germany's migration problems. The asylum question is one aspect of 
Germany's greater migration dilemma, which the legislation does not 
address. The revised asylum law represents a partial answer to a whole 
host of complex problems. There is a consensus emerging in certain 
49 The SPD not only lost its absolute majority which it had sustained for twenty years but also 
lost ground to the DVU giving them an estimated six seats. The SPD's share of the vote fell from 
50 per cenfto around 40 per cent, giving it 41 seats in the 100 seat chamber. (Parkes, 1991: 4) 
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sections of the political elite that the asylum law can only be regarded as a 
; 
temporary measure because the government and the opposition remain 
reluctant to address the fundamental issue: the absence of any immigration 
legislation. Cornelia Schmalz-Jacobsen, a FOP parliamentary deputy and 
head of the government-backed Department for Problems of Foreigners, 
has criticised the government's record on other aspects of the migration 
dilemma; namely the integration of guest workers, their access to 
citizenship, civil and political rights and violent attacks. Schmalz-Jacobsen 
suggested that the arguments over the Constitution were a distraction from 
these other very real problems. She pointed out that amending the 
Constitution is fruitless and ineffective unless it is followed by the 
introduction of an immigration policy. 50 However, government officials have 
so far ruled out the possibility of such a law being enacted. Traditional 
explanations of Germany not being an immigration country have been cited 
against the enactment of legislation. Schmalz-Jacobsen explained that an 
immigration law was not likely in the near future, since in general the 
migration issue remains a pOlitically sensitive and emotive subject. Dissent 
exists within the ruling coalition between the FOP, which argues in favour of 
legislation dealing with working migrants, and the CDU, which propounds 
the 'Das Boot ist voll' explanation. 51 
What is clear is that Germany's migration nightmare is not yet over. The 
. changing of the Constitution is inadequate and far from providing a 
comprehensive solution to Germany's complex problems. The amendment 
of Article 16 was a cosmetic and symbolic attempt to deal with a protracted 
- . 
. . problem. The reform of the asylum law has not rid Germany of all its evils in 
the immig'ration arena and the subject will rear its ugly head on to the 
political agenda. Kohl is still uncomfortable with Germany's unstable 
50 Interview with Bundesbeauftragte fUr die Belange der Ausliinder, Bonn, 27 January 1995. 
51 Interview with Bundesbeauftragte fUr die Belange der Auslander, Bonn, 27 January 1995. 
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eastern borders and would .. prefer to regulate migration under the 'political 
cover' of the EU. (Barber, 1995: 10) Having not tackled all aspects of the 
migration dilemma, "the government may fudge the issue by amending the 
Constitution and then later rely on Brussels to draw up plans to restrict the 
European-wide flow of refugees." (Dempsey, 1992a: 2) 
Despite the enactment of domestic legislation, the Germans remain 
committed to the belief that migration is an issue which is better regulated 
and solved at the European level. The Germans firmly believe that greater 
integration in judicial and interior affairs is a necessity given the 
contemporary nature of migration in the EU, which dictates European-wide 
solutions. What happened domestically cannot be the last word on the 
issue, 52 the Germans will continue to seek to Europeanise migration policy. 
At a summit in Baden-Baden in December 1995, the French President 
Chirac and Chancellor Kohl agreed that the EU should aim to combine the 
freedom of movement of travel with common asylum, immigration and anti-
terrorist policies, despite the differences over implementing the Schengen 
borderless travel. (Norman, Buchan & Barber, 1995: 2) 
The TEU offers a signal that the EU is set to become more involved in 
immigration policy. The EU is acquiring authority and competence in various 
aspects of immigration policy, even though institutional responsibility is 
shared and intergovernmental co-operation is the dominant form of 
. governance. The governments of the EU are not ceding competence in the 
policy area willingly, rather, "national governments .. find themselves 
agreeing to cede ground over immigration policy to the Community inch by 
inch out of strong practical necessity". (Philip, 1994: 188) The dynamics of 
the policy 'sector as a transnational issue will ultimately result in a European 
policy. 
The Germans will clearly be in the forefront in the pursuit of such a 
52 Interview with official, Referent fUr Einwanderungspolitik, CDU, 18 April 1995. 
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policy. Justice and Home Affairs remains a priority of Chancellor Kohl; he is 
certain to push for more powers for the Third Pillar at the IGC. The German 
representative in the Reflection Group for the IGC, Werner Hoyer, clearly 
indicated these intentions. He remarked in a speech at Chatham House in 
September 1995, 
We need to resolve to deal with central problems of interior and justice 
policies together ...... I am aware that these have been classical key 
areas of national sovereignty, where reluctance to apply Community is 
particularly great. At least for asylum and immigration 
Communitarization seems indispensable. (Hoyer, 1995: 6) 
Hoyer has advanced an idea which would grant the Commission a right to 
initiate policies in Justice and Home Affairs. Chancellor Kohl has made his 
disdain for the intergovernmental framework for co-operation in migration 
quite clear. As a key actor in the European policy process, Chancellor Kohl 
is likely to push for the Third Pillar to be governed by community 
competence at the IGC. Germany would like to overcome difficulties of the 
intergovernmental co-operation which requires unanimity in decision 
making. The, Germans want to streamline the process, increase the role of 
the Commission and introduce majority voting. 
5.4 CONCLUSION 
The thesis contends that the role Germany plays in the EU varies 
depending on the policy sector at issue. Moreover, the thesis asserts that 
the policy sector itself shapes Germany's actions at the European level. 
Germany's approach towards migration policy has been conditioned by the 
very nature of the issue and by the need to solve the domestic migration 
crisis. The migration issue has been characterised as a politically sensitive 
subject, which has resulted in a contradictory approach and a temporary 
paralysis of the domestic policy process. This thesis maintains that the EU 
serves as an important arena for solving domestic problems. Migration 
., 168 
. 
policy represents a policy sector in which the German government has 
increasingly looked to the European level. The constitutional and political 
deadlock within the domestic policy process and the urgency of a political 
solution forced the German government to propel the issue onto the 
European agenda. The thesis analysed three characteristics in relation to 
migration policy: dynamics of the policy sector, policy circumstance and 
policy making structures. 
The dynamics of the policy sector incorporated an analysis of factors 
intrinsic to the migration issue at the domestic and European level. The 
migration 'crisis' represented Germany's key domestic challenge in the 
immediate post-unification period. The dynamics of the migration issue 
defined the subject as politically sensitive and domestically unmanageable. 
Domestic idiosyncrasies resulted in fundamental contradictions and 
inconsistencies which frustrated policy reform; elevating the migration issue 
to the European agenda. 
The definition of migration as a transnational issue further rendered 
European solutions likely. Further integration within the EU, with the 
opening up ?f the Single Market and the lifting of internal borders, also 
intensified pressure for European-wide policies in this policy sector. The 
Germans perceived the migration issue as a common European problem; 
. one which was better solved within the institutions of the EU. Hence, the 
dynamics of the policy sector pushed the potential for the Europeanisation 
of migration policy. 
The fundamental issue of the impact of unification on the migration 
. debate and substantive policy was examined within policy circumstance. 
The unification of Germany and the subject of migration are in essence 
linked. Indeed, unity was triggered by migration and concluded so 
expeditiously in order to stem the flow of migration to Germany. Although, 
unification did not have a direct effect on policy; it did facilitate the conditions 
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for mass migration. The collapse of communism and the dissolution of the 
Soviet Union opened the tap for further migration westwards, which acted 
as a catalyst for policy reform. Unification also instigated negative reactions 
from the general public, which manifested themselves in increased votes 
for the extreme right and support for a change in the Constitution. 
The constitutional and institutional dimension to policy-making in this 
policy sector has been of greatest significance. The requirement to amend 
the Constitution aroused the greatest difficulty. The party political arena was 
deadlocked, with the governing coalition and the opposition split on the 
need for a revision of Article 16. The prolonged political struggle, the gravity 
of the problem, and the constitutional and political stalemate pushed the 
issue out of the domestic arena on to the European agenda. The German 
government saw an opportunity to resolve the problem within European 
frameworks, in the knowledge that a European solution could be applied 
domestically. 
The Germans had long believed in and demanded the harmonisation of 
policy. They actively sought to utilise this opportunity and push for 
harmonisatio,n. Despite the problems of formulating a common policy on 
this issue, Kohl put forward proposals in the Luxembourg Council in 1991 
for a European-wide policy. Kohl achieved limited success in being able to 
. persuade his partners to prepare special reports in time for the Maastricht 
summit. The TEU made some progress towards giving the EU competence 
over immigration and asylum. Although, these policy issues were defined 
as areas of common interest, intergovernmental co-operation remained . 
. Kohl was unable to extract policy out of intergovernmental frameworks such 
as Schengen, thereby renewing his efforts in the domestic arena. 
The governing coalition were able to overcome the obstructions in the 
domestic policy process to agree to the 'asylum compromise' in December 
1992. The government may have revised the asylum law, but Germany's 
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migration problems have not disappeared. Indeed, the number of asylum 
... 
applications have diminished. The classic German problem with regard to 
migration has been the negligence of other aspects of the migration 
dilemma which the legislation does not address. Despite the asylum 
compromise there remains the belief that the migration issue requires 
European regulation, given the contemporary nature of European 
integration. The indications are that the Germans will push for European-
wide regulation at the IGC. 
CHAPTER SIX: AGRICULTURE: A HISTORICAL OVERVIEW 
INTRODUCTION 
When looking at how Germany's role will change in the European Union 
the question arises why look at agriculture as a case study? Germany has 
strong national traditions in agriculture, which have been cultivated from the 
1850s. Firstly, from the European perspective agriculture repres~nts an 
important policy area of the EU; it is the most highly developed form of 
common action in the European Union and the Common Agricultural Policy 
is often referred to as "the cornerstone of the Community." The Germans 
continue to espouse their commitment to European integration and an 
examination of Germany's role in the most integrated area of policy would 
test its adherence to these claims. Do the Germans act primarily on 
domestic grounds in this particular policy area or are they driven by 
European issues? Secondly, a contention of the thesis is that Germany's 
role in the EU differs in different policy sectors and that the policy sector 
itself shapes whether Germany takes a pro-European stance or vice versa. 
Agriculture in the European context has developed a dynamic of its own. 
From a domestic perspective, Germany has traditionally taken a 
protectionist stance in agriculture. Germany has very strong national 
traditions in agriculture and defined policies which it has actively pursued. 
Sections of this chapter endeavour to examine how Germany has attempted 
to reconcile its own interests with European interests in this area in the 
past. However, as will be examined in Chapter Seven, the differences in the 
agricultural sectors of the former German Democratic Republic and the 
FRG are so immense that the Germans would to a degree have to change 
their approach to European agriculture. Questions of agriculture have 
become more complex in Germany, leading to different contours of interest 
for Germany. It would be important to see how this has impacted on 
Germany's approach towards the CAP in the post unification period. 
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Before one can embark on a discussion of agricultural policy in post 
unification Germany, one has to delve into the past, examining the roots of 
agricultural policy and the structure and organisation of agriculture in both 
the Federal Republic of Germany and the former German Democratic 
Republic. 1 The complexity of agricultural policy in Germany necessitates a 
historical analysis. Hence, this chapter aims to provide the historical 
background to present day agricultural policy in the unified Germany. 
6.1 A HISTORICAL OVERVIEW - THE BEGINNINGS 
Germany's achievements as an industrial power are well known; but 
less is known as regards Germany's agricultural accomplishments. 
Germany was still regarded as an agricultural nation as recently as the 
1850s. Agriculture has always enjoyed a prominent place on the political 
agenda in Germany; this has largely been due to the powerful position of 
the feudal landowners, the Junkers, in the late 19th century, and later due to 
the organisation of farmers in associations, such as the Deutsche Bauern 
Verband. Great diversity has existed in farm structure. Essentially, there 
were two types of farms and these farms were distinguishable by size. 
There were the large estates, owned by the Junkers, in the East; and the 
small peasant-owned holdings and family farms in the rest of Germany. 
Statistics from 1895 show that estates of more than 100 hectares 
accounted for 43% of the agricultural area in Prussia. (Tracy, 1989: 86) 
However, even though these estates covered a significant part of the area, 
they were fewer in number. The smaller farms tended to be between 2 and 
20 hectares. These farms were not farmed full-time and farmed cows, pigs 
. and poultry. The large estates, on the other hand, primarily produced grain. 2 
The shape that agricultural policy has taken in post-war Germany has 
its roots in decisions taken in earlier times. According to Hendriks, " .. the 
1 The structure and organisation of agriculture in the fonner GDR is dealt with in Chapter Seven, when 
considering the vital differences between agriculture in the GDR and the FRG. 
2 The diversity of fann structures has once again become an issue in the re-unified Gennany and the 
problems emanating from the difference will be examined in Chapter Seven. 
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economic structure of the old Reich, the characteristics of its society, the 
social significance of peasant virtues and the strategic importance of self-
sufficiency in food formulated agricultural policies." (Hendriks, 1991 :26) 
There has always been a tradition of protection in the agricultural sector 
in Germany, which has continued through to the present day. Wagner 
argued in the late 19th century, 
Adequate protection for agriculture, even if higher than the present level, 
is in the national interest: even if this means that the creation of an 
industrial nation is retarded, though not prevented, it should thereby 
benefit the workers and the German economy as a whole ...... The 
maintenance of a viable German agriculture signifies the preservation 
of the German people, both now and in the future. (Tracy, 1989: 93) 
The arguments presented by Wagner bear some resemblance to those 
which are put forward by advocates in favour of support for agriculture today. 
It is important to point out that between 1850 and 1870 protective tariffs were 
seen as detrimental to agriculture. The Junkers had an interest in free trade; 
protective tariffs were perceived as increasing production costs in 
agriculture and as possibly hampering agricultural exports. It was not until 
the late 1870s that protective tariffs were seen as a measure to counter the 
, 
cheap grain imports from North America and Russia, the general economic 
depression and the bad harvests. 
Gisela Hendriks reiterates this point. She comments that price support 
is seen as a crucial means of guaranteeing the income of producers. 
Hendriks argues that this signalled the beginning of an active agricultural 
policy. Hendriks points out that this trend has continued to the present day . 
. She comments, 
The protection of farmers against a sharp fall in prices has been a 
central element of Germany's national agricultural policy for a hundred 
years. Thus contemporary agricultural concepts of the FRG are deeply 
rooted and express a fundamental political conviction. (Hendriks, 1991: 
30) 
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Protectionism in agriculture is not the only tradition which has survived 
into the 1990s. From the 1870s the close working relationship between the 
government and organised agricultural interests have been crucial in the 
drafting of agricultural policy. Agricultural interest groups, from the Bund der 
Landwirte organised by the Junkers in 1893 3, to the Nazi Reichsnahrstand 
(State Food Corporation), to the post-war Deutsche Bauern Verban9, have 
had a strong influence on the shape of agricultural policy. 
Two features characterise this period: firstly, the high degree of 
protectionism prevalent in agriculture and secondly, the influential position 
of organised interests in policies regarding agriculture. 
6.2 THE WEIMAR REPUBLIC 
By 1914 Germany had become reliant on agricultural imports, both for 
foodstuffs and feedingstuffs. Therefore, Germany experienced great 
problems when imports were cut off during the war. Furthermore, 
insufficient back up stock intensified the food shortage. By mid 1916 
rationing was in place. The situation was compounded by a sharp decrease 
in yields of crops and livestock, mainly due to the lack of labour, 
feedingstuffs and fertilisers. Since tariffs on foodstuffs ceased at the 
beginning of the war and had not been implemented again, farmers faced 
serious difficulties in the face of international competition. 
However, in 1925 Germany regained the right to set its own tariff. The 
pre-war Bulow duties were instituted with a higher rate for livestock 
products. The export of agricultural produce, which had been prohibited 
since the war, was allowed once again. These measures helped to ease 
. the situation, but the farmers remained dissatisfied. The government of the 
day was primarily concerned with war reparations. Promoting exports of 
manufactured goods was seen as a way to alleviate the burden. This 
sowed the seeds for discontent among the agricultural community when the 
3 For further details see: (Tracy, 1989) 
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situation came to crisis point in 1929 with a sharp decrease in prices; 
protection in agriculture at this moment in time was only moderate. 
Hendriks points out that the discontent and distress prevalent in the rural 
areas predisposed the farmers towards the Nazi movement. The Nazis had 
realised the farmers could be a significant source for voting. (Hendriks, 
1991: 32) 
6.3 THE THIRD REICH 
Agriculture was a central component of National Socialist philosophy 
and formed an essential part of their general economic and political goals. 
Agricultural policy during the Third Reich was formulated mainly by Walter 
Darre, who went on to become Minister of Agriculture in 1933. Darre's ideas 
were expressed in his work "The Yeomanry as the Life Source of the Nordic 
Race", published in 1928. The Nazi slogan 'Blut und Boden' 4 mirrored 
Darre's thoughts. According to Darre, 
The Germanic tribes .... belonged to the settler as opposed to the 
nomadic types and were thus rooted to the soil. Moreover, the 
inheritance of farms and farming traditions from one generation to 
another ensured that the nobility of the blood and moral integrity were 
preserved. (Tracy, 1982: 202) 
Therefore, it ensued that farmers should get special treatment from the 
State; they should not be seen in just economic terms and not be subjected 
. to market forces. Darre's ideas are clear in a speech he delivered on 19 
September 1933, 
We must be quite clear about this: the farmer is not an entrepreneur in 
the usual sense. The production of food cannot be subjected to the free 
play of market forces and exposed to the risks which that entails, for 
agriculture's duty to the nation is immensely important. We need the 
farmer as the blood source of the people; we need him too as the 
source of our food supply. This is not so much a question of ensuring 
that the farmer gets as high a price as possible for his produce ... , as of 
making certain that the farmer is firmly rooted to his land through a 
German law of land tenure and that he gets for his work a fair wage - in 
4 'Blut und- Boden' refers to 'Blood and Soil'. 
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other words, adequate, equitable prices. The farmer must always see 
his activity as towarcts his race and his people, never as a mere 
economic, money-spinning operation. (Darre cited in Tracy, 1982: 202) 
Accordingly, in the 1930s agricultural philosophy focused on two 
objectives: firstly, to enhance the social and racial position of farmers so as 
to act as a bulwark against Socialism and, secondly, to achieve self-
· sufficiency in food. As SchOrmann argues, 
The National Socialist leadership was in no doubt that the battle for 
honour and equality among nations could be won only on the firm basis 
of security in food supplies. So long as the food of the people was not 
assured against all circumstances, the policy of national liberation 
could not attempt any serious trial of strength. Together with the 
construction of a powerful navy and a highly productive industry, it was 
therefore essential to develop food production to the point where every 
individual in the nation could be sure of daily bread. (SchOrmann cited in 
Tracy, 1982: 203) 
Farquharson in his study "The Plough and the Swastika" outlines 
Hitler's opinions on agriculture. According to Farquharson, the peasantry 
was significant for Hitler on practical grounds. Agriculture held back 
Marxism, it produced food, and it supplied men for the military service. 
Having reali~ed the importance of agriculture and the agricultural vote, from 
1929 onwards the Nazis actively attempted to benefit from the 
· discontentment in the countryside. Hence, the National Socialists obtained 
a significant vote in the countryside in the 1930 September election. 
Furthermore, in 1931 the Nazis managed to form an alliance with the 
Prussian Junkers to form the Harzburg Front. The Junkers and the Nazis 
· surprisingly had common views as regards agriculture. Both groups 
believed in increasing domestic food production and an autocratic society. 
Both the Junkers and the Nazis were opposed to Jewish traders and both 
recognised the value of agriculture for military strength. 
By June 1933 Darre had become Minister of Agriculture, and he quickly 
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set about the reorganisation of agriculture. Darre had four main objectives: 
(1) Corporate organisation of agriculture and agricultural markets. First 
of all, a law passed on 15 July 1933 took agriculture out of the competence 
of the Lander and put it into the hands of the Reich. A subsequent law 
passed on 13 September authorised the Minister to establish the 
Reichsnahrstand. The Reichsnahrstand was an extensive organisation 
which included all aspects of food production and distribution. Anyone 
associated with farming was legally compelled to belong to this State Food 
Corporation. 
(2) Import Control and Trade Policy. State Import Boards or 
Reichsstellen were set up to control imports. Boards were established for 
all products, for example dairy products and grain. The Boards exercised 
maximum control over the volume and price of imports. Thus, an importer 
had to submit the product to the relevant Board and then the Board would 
decide whether there was enough demand to justify selling the product on 
the domestic market. The Board would further determine the price for that 
product. Moreover, the Board decided the sources from which imports 
would be admissible. 
(3) Protection of the Family Farm. The 'Blut und Boden' ideology of the 
Nazis guaranteed the protection of the family farm. This ideological concept 
. espoused that workable farms had to be handed down through the 
generations of families of approved German stock. This was outlined in the 
Erbhofgesetz of September 1933. 5 It was laid down that the Bauer 
(yeoman) had to be of Germanic stock and the sole owner of the Erbhof 
. (ancestral estate).-The scheme outlined by the Nazis was attractive to the 
,~ 
fanners and beneficial for them because the State took over the farms' 
debts in exchange for small annual repayments. 
(4) Price and Production Policy. By the time the war broke out, the Nazis 
5 The Erbhofgesetz translates as the Law on inherited fanns. 
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had all the machinery in place to control food supplies and prices. The State 
Food Corporation was reorganised to provide better control so that all vital 
foodstuffs were seized and only sold by the authorities. Rationing was also 
put into place. The main problem which confronted the Germans was that of 
the labour shortage, which was remedied by using foreign workers and 
prisoners-of-war. (Tracy, 1982: 205-209) 
Tracy argues that the National Socialists were the only ones who 
created a coherent agricultural philosophy, which was part of their overall 
aims and put this philosophy into practice. Tracy, "Their [National Socialists] 
agricultural policy was not merely based on a desire to pander to the 
agricultural interest and gain its support. Their policy for agriculture was part 
of their overall aim, that of ensuing, by force, if necessary, the political and 
economic strength of the German nation." (Tracy, 1982: 212 - 213) Tracy 
has maintained that even though the Nazi regime ended, their ideas about 
agriculture have survived their legacy in Germany and elsewhere. 
6.4 POST-WAR AGRICULTURAL POLICY. 
According to Hendriks, 1945 signalled a change with the past, both in 
terms of German history as well as the structure of agriculture. The farming 
area of the FRG had been reduced considerably by the division of Germany. 
Without the rich agricultural regions in the East the FRG's farming units 
. were much smaller (less than 10 hectares); a more industrialised, mainly 
Catholic society emerged. (Hendriks, 1991: 34) 
The new Federal Republic's farming area had been reduced from 
472,000 sq. km of the Reich to 248,000 sq. km. (Hendriks, 1991: 35) Labour 
, was attracted to the urban areas due to the employment opportunities there. 
Ha'!.ing assimilated 12 million refugees, the pressure on food supplies had 
''-11' 
intensified. Consequently, Germany was on the brink of starvation around 
1946/47. Having lost the traditional food supplying areas in Germany, the 
food shortage was a major concern. Food production in the Western zones 
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was half that of the pre-war level. Food rations in 1945-47 amounted to 
, 
approximately 1200 to 1300 calories per head per day. Therefore, 
agricultural interests in the immediate post-war period centred around 
increasing food production. 
Opposing views existed as to the route which agricultural policy in 
Germany should take. The Freiburg School of neo-liberal economists were 
against import quotas and any type of physical intervention by the State. The 
Freiburg School of thought, which was supported by most academics, 
proposed the re-integration of Germany in the world economy. This School 
of thought was opposed to regional groupings, but was willing to agree to 
reasonable import tariffs in order to counterbalance the distortions of 
competition on the world market for foodstuffs. The second view preferred 
import controls and looked to a regional economic grouping in order to re-
integrate Germany into the world economy. 
This second view influenced agricultural policy more. The system 
introduced in 1950/51 was based on control of imports, backed up by 
support buying. In fact, the system set up was similar to the one operated by 
the Nazis.! In 1950/51 Import and Storage Boards (Einfuhr-und 
Vorratsstellen) were established for various agricultural products, for 
instance, cereals, meat. These Import and Storage Boards guaranteed 
prices, controlled imports and held stocks. 
The position of agriculture in Germany stabilised during the early 1950s. 
World market prices had decreased, Germany's industrial exports had 
risen, and home production had improved. Domestic prices were kept 
. 
above the world market prices by utilising the Import and Warehouse 
Ag~'J.cies." The Import and Storage Boards aided domestic prices by limiting 
imports. As a result, farmers in Germany were protected from competition 
from the outside; the Import and Storage Boards managed to manipulate 
prices well above those on the world market. 
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Agriculture in Germany was given a further boost with the enactment of 
the Landwirtschafisgesetz or Agriculture Act in 1955, with the full backing of 
the Deutsche Bauern Verband and all the major political parties. The Act 
reinforced the traditional view of agriculture as a subsidised sector. The 
objectives of the Agriculture Act were: 
To ensure for agriculture a share in the progressive development of 
Germany's national economy and for the population the best possible 
supply of food, agriculture is to be placed in a position to offset, through 
general economic and agrarian measures - particularly commercial, 
taxation, credit and price policies - its natural and economic 
disadvantages vis-a-vis other sections of the economy and to increase 
its productivity. At the same time the social status of persons engaged 
in agriculture is thereby to be adjusted so that it equals that of 
comparable professional groups. (Hallett, 1968: 93) 
The close cooperation between the Deutsche Bauern Verband and the 
Ministry of Agriculture and the agreement on agricultural policy between the 
major parties reasserted the special treatment that agriculture received. It 
ensured the influence of agrarian interests on government policy. Hendriks 
concludes that post-war Germany surfaced with its traditional policies 
unchanged. Nevertheless, "The birth of the Common Agricultural Policy 
necessitated an adaptation of Germany's traditional agricultural objectives 
to European requirements." (Hendriks, 1991: 40) 
6.5 GERMANY AND THE COMMON AGRICULTURAL POLICY. 
The overall aim of the thesis is to investigate how Germany's role will 
change in the European Union. This thesis seeks to examine Germany's 
actions in specific policy areas. Hence, the remainder of this chapter entails 
an analysis of Germany's role in European agricultural policy prior to 
. unification; investigating Germany's motives behind actions in specific 
policy areas. This thesis suggests that domestic political factors can 
explain a member state's actions at the EU level. In his work on Germany's 
role in the CAP, Stefan Tangermann pointed out that one could analyse the 
role of a member state in EU policies by looking at, 
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the way in which the country defines its interests in the Community and 
the manner in which the country exercises an influence on 
developments in the Community, bC?th directly by trying to meet its 
national interests and indirectly by its sovereign national actions. 
(Tangermann, 1979: 241) 
Tangermann adds that when examining the role of a member state in 
the European Union, there is a basic assumption that, " .. countries have kept 
their national identity, perceive their national interests and pursue these 
interests in the Community." (Tangermann, 1979: 241) 
Since Germany has very strong national traditions in agriculture, the 
question to be addressed is whether Germany would give up its domestic 
objectives in agriculture to formulate more European ones. Hendriks 
argues that Germany has not changed its national interests with the 
creation of supranational institutions. Germany has continually tried to 
formulate agricultural policy according to its own needs. According to 
Hendriks, there is, " .. continuity in Germany's farm policies, even when this 
threatens to impede EC endeavour." (Hendriks, 1989a: 75) Germany has 
had a protectionist, pro-German stance on agricultural policy. 
Germany1s attitude to and interests in agricultural policy have changed 
over time. In the 1950s Germany was trying to become an equal member of 
the European Union when certain sectoral interests had to give way to wider 
economic and foreign policy objectives. In the 1970s and 1980s, however, 
national sectoral interests began to reassert themselves. In order to get a 
comprehensive idea about Germany's attitude to agricultural policy, one has 
to go back to the inception of the Common Agricultural Policy. This is 
necessary before one can attempt an examination of the impact of 
unification on agricultural policy and hence an analysis Germany's role in 
the EU. 
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6.51 GERMANY AND THE INSTALLATION OF THE CAP. 
As mentioned earlier, the inception of the CAP meant a re-orientation of 
Germany's agro-political thinking. In the beginning the Germans were 
dubious about the CAP, preferring national co-ordination of agricultural 
markets rather than a supra-national agency. The Germans tried to resist 
the creation of the CAP because the CAP meant that the Germans would 
have to steadily give up national control over trade flows and price levels. 
Tangermann notes that, " .. the establishment of the CAP was regarded by 
German farmers as well as by many officials in German agricultural policy 
as a national catastrophe." (Tangermann, 1979: 248) There is a strong 
tendency in Germany for high prices in farm products. The Ministers and the 
DBV alike were concerned about the downward spiral in agricultural support 
prices. Hendriks asserts that Germany's initial disapproval of the CAP was 
surprising since Germany's national regulations were very similar to those 
of the new CAP. Rather, it seemed as if the "Community's internal 
intervention system and import regime of the CAP were modelled on the 
German experience." (Hendriks, 1989a: 76) 
Finally the concerns of those associated with agriculture in Germany 
gave way to the overall aim of establishing the European Communities. The 
six original members of the Communities could not envisage a programme 
of economic integration which excluded agriculture; because economic 
integration without agriculture stood a limited chance of success. 6 
Ultimately, the Germans signed the Treaty of Rome, thereby establishing 
6 The inclusion of agriculture in the Treaty of Rome can be explained by several factors. Firstly, the 
mere size of the agricultural sector in 1957 goes towards explaining its inclusion. In 195720% of the 
working population or 15 million people were engaged in agriculture. This constituted an important 
section of the population, which was important electorally. Secondly, the Treaty of Rome was a 
delicate balance of national interests. The Treaty offered the West Germans free trade in industrial 
goods and free access to French markets. The French would not have accepted anything less than free 
trade in agriculture, perceiving any other proposal as discriminatory considering the treatment of 
industrial goods. The French had a relatively efficient agricultural sector and stood to gain 
considerably in a free Community agricultural market and benefit from access to German markets. 
(Swann, 1990: 205-206) 
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the European Economic Community and creating with it a common market 
for agriculture, thus sacrificing temporarily sectoral interests for European 
harmony. Hence, a common policy for agriculture was established, but the 
specifics of the policy were to be worked out later. 
Therefore, the farmers were convinced that they had to make certain 
sacrifices as regards the institution of the CAP for the overall good of the 
European integration process. Later, the consumers and taxpayers who 
found out that they would have to bear the costs of the CAP were given the 
same explanation. It was argued that the Community could not have been 
founded without establishing the CAP. However, problems did not arise with 
the signing of the Treaty of Rome since at the beginning only minor 
measures had to be implemented. Problems occurred when the 12 year 
transitional period set for the establishment of a common market was 
drawing to a close. 
6.52 AGRICULTURE IN THE 1960s: ASSERTION OR SUBJUGATION OF GERMAN 
AGRICULTURAL INTERESTS? 
German apprehension about the completion of the CAP became visible 
in the 1960s during the concluding stages of the transitional phase. The 
Germans were eager to delay the adaptation of its agriculture to Community 
rules. In addition, the cereal price issue was a source of conflict. 
In 1960 the Commission put forward proposals to figure out the detailed 
policy content of the CAP and to put them into effect. The Germans were, 
however, hesitant to accept an interpretation of the Treaty of Rome which 
called for comparable achievements in agricultural and industrial trade. The 
. Germans were also not so eager to adapt their agricultural sector to 
Community guidelines too quickly. The CAP jeopardised traditional bilateral 
trading relations because of its policy of 'community preference', where the 
member states were required to open their markets to EU produce in favour 
of old trading relations. The French government, eager to attain new 
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markets for its agricultural surpluses and facing rural unrest, refused to 
move onto the second stage of the transitional phase until progress was 
made towards a common agricultural market. De Gaulle's ultimatum that 
the common market could not continue to develop until the agricultural 
questions were resolved, did not have any effect until the following year. The 
Germans attempted to hold on to the persistence of national prices until the 
end of the transitional phase. Negotiations remained deadlocked until 14 
January 1962, when the basis of the policy and price support system was 
agreed on. 7 Thus, at this point the Germans then realised that they had to 
suppress agricultural sectoral interests for wider considerations. 
The cereal price issue was yet another example of discord between 
Germany and the Community. The cereal price issue exemplified 
Germany's attempt to shape agriculture according to its own needs. By 
January 1962, the general scope of agricultural policy had been determined, 
but specific rules still had to be worked out. A common price level remained 
to be agreed, which Germany wished to delay until the end of the 
transitional phase. 
In November 1963 Mansholt, the Commissioner for Agriculture, put 
forward a plan to harmonise cereal prices in one go for the marketing year 
1964-65. The plans entailed compensatory payments for those countries 
which would incur a reduction in prices, i.e. Germany. Grain production did 
not contribute a significant amount to the farming sector; however, grain 
farmers exerted considerable political influence in the FRG. Under pressure 
from the DBV, the Germans refused all demands for the alignment of the 
. cereal price to the lower Community level. The German Minister of 
Agriculture, Schwarz, managed a price freeze for the year 1964-65, hence 
7 The marathon Council of Ministers meeting resulted in the establishment of the agricultural code. 
The code outlined the common prices for agricultural products and the methods for fmancing the 
arrangement. The European Agricultural Guidance and Guarantee Fund (EAGGF) was established to 
fmance the arrangement. The code also outlined the principle of community preference which was to be 
guaranteed by external protection. 
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forcing the Commission to revise its plans, with the outcome that 
harmonisation was delayed until 1966/67. 
Several interdependent factors finally resolved the issue. The Germans 
saw a clear link between the cereal price issue and the imminent Kennedy 
Round of the GATT. "It is our opinion that the conclusion of the Kennedy 
Round and the realisation of the common Agricultural Policy are connected." 
(Hendriks, 1991: 54). The Kennedy Round was crucial to Germany as the 
greatest exporter of industrial goods in the Community. The French, 
becoming restless with the Germans, cleverly utilised the importance of a 
successful conclusion of the Kennedy Round to Germany, by threatening to 
leave the Community if a cereal price was not agreed. The Germans finally 
conceded, but a trade-off had taken place where the industrial interest was 
met and agriculture sacrificed. The government had to rely on farm votes, 
and both coalition parties COU/CSU and FOP had promised German 
farmers in the face of imminent elections that they would maintain cereal 
prices. However, in the face of a conflict of interests the Germans had 
accepted a lower domestic price for wheat and subjugated agricultural 
interests for the overall interest of European unity. The Agriculture Minister 
Schwarz attempted to intervene to convince Chancellor Erhard to reconsider 
his options. The German farmers were, however, compensated for the 
reduction in price. 
Thus, the policy which had been opposed from all quarters within 
Germany at the outset was implemented in the 1960s. The Germans at this 
point were unsuccessful in shaping the policy according to their needs . 
. Although, the desire to formulate the policy according to German lines was 
there. ,It appeared during this period that German farmers were the losers of 
the common policy, and that their interests had been subjugated for 
economic interests in the Kennedy Round of the GATT and the overall aim 
of European integration. 
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Tangermann argues that if a country wants to push a particular policy in 
its favour, it would be more successful if it has considerable political power 
in the Community. Therefore, according to Tangermann, Germany was 
unable to assert its national interests in agriculture during this period 
because Germany's political weight in the European Communities at the 
time of the inception of the CAP was relatively low. Germany faced a 
dilemma: on the one hand, it wanted progress in European integration, and 
it wanted to become a fully integrated member of the western world. On the 
other hand, it wanted to fulfil its national objectives in agriculture. 
(Tangermann, 1979: 247) Hendriks adds that it was not possible for 
Germany to pursue its national interest in any area without arousing 
mistrust and evoking criticism from its partners. Therefore, Hendriks argues 
that, "Bonn declined to maximise national interest in all sectors; certain 
sectoral interests had to be (temporarily) subjected to wider 
considerations." (Hendriks, 1991: 218) Freisberg adds that German 
agricultural interests were undermined in Brussels due to Germany's 
obstinacy and lack of negotiating skills. (Freisberg, 1965: 48) 
At first glance it may appear as if the Germans lost in the formulation of 
the CAP; it does not detract from the fact that the objectives of the CAP as 
contained in Article 39 of the Treaty of Rome 8 bore a marked resemblance 
to the objectives of the Agriculture Act of 1955. Hence, German objectives for 
agriculture to a degree had been incorporated into European policy. 
Furthermore, although at first the CAP was considered a trade-off between 
German industry and French agriculture, eventually German agriculture 
benefited a great deal from the CAP due to the adoption of high German 
prices. Thus, the eventual outcome of the CAP did not appear to be 
unfavourable to German farmers. The German farmers gained from the 
8 The objectives of the CAP as contained in Article 39 of the Treaty of Rome were to: (a) increase 
agricultural production; (b) ensure a fair standard of living for the agricultural community; (c) stabilise 
markets; (d) provide certainty of supplies; ( e) ensure supplies to consumers at reasonable prices. 
(Swann, 1990: 206-207) 
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abundant financial support which was routed into agriculture via national 
measures of structural, social and tax policies. The German farmers are in 
effect net gainers of the CAP and hence keen defenders of the policy. 
6.53 AGRICULTURE IN THE 1970s: MANIPULATION OF THE AGRIMONETARY 
SYSTEM AND MONETARY COMPENSATORY AMOUNTS. 
The installation of the agrimonetary system in the 1970s provided in 
many ways the principal means by which the Germans were able to pursue 
their interests in agriculture and a highly protectionist policy. Changes in the 
international monetary economy warranted the introduction of agricultural 
technical measures which were to reconcile perceived German interests 
and the CAP. 
In the early 1970s the world was beset by monetary crisis. A world-wide 
recession and monetary instability compounded by the· oil price shocks had 
a profound. effect on the economies of Europe. The Bretton Woods system 
created in 1944 was based on fixed exchange rates. The Community had 
an artificial unit of currency, the Unit of Account (UtA), for intra-EC 
transactions. The UtA was based on the US dollar; agricultural support 
prices were set in the UtA. Target prices and intervention prices were then 
converted into national currencies. The CAP objective of common pricing. 9 
was achieved through this mechanism. However, the system inferred fixed 
national currency rates. But a devaluation of a member state's currency 
against the dollar would result in an increase in farm prices on the 
domestic market. Conversely, a revaluation would lead to lower prices in the 
domestic market. This is indeed what occurred in 1969. 
In August 1969 the French devalued the Franc by 11 % to be followed by 
a revaluation of the German Deutschmark in October. This meant that 
measures had to be put into place which would uphold the principle of 
9 One of the key objectives of the CAP was common pricing; in other words farmers across the EU 
should receive the same level of support regardless of where they farmed. 
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market unity and common prices and would protect the Community's 
intervention system. Germany and France had to alter their 'green' rates of 
exchange to take account of the new value of their currencies. However, if 
this happened there would have been a fall in French farm prices and a fall 
in CAP prices received by German farmers. Neither scenario was 
acceptable to either party. The French were keen to protect French 
consumers from price rises. The Germans were not willing to accept a 
decrease in farmers' incomes 10 from reduced agricultural prices. As a 
result, there was a phased revaluation of the green Deutschmark and a 
phased devaluation of the green Franc. The actions of Germany and France 
led to the implementation of a system of Monetary Compensatory Amounts 
(MCAs); a temporary system of border taxes and subsidises. Thus, export 
levies and import subsidies were put into place for the French, whilst export 
subsidies and import levies were introduced for Germany. MCAs were 
introduced to bridge the gap between the green rate and the real rate of 
exchange. MCAs were supposed to be a temporary measure, implemented 
to uphold the policy of common prices. In reality, however, MCAs implied an 
end to common prices. The struggle over, and indeed the introduction of, 
MCAs shows Germany's determination to maintain control of its farming 
sector. 
As mentioned above, MCAs were supposed to be temporary measures. 
However, MCAs became firmly secured as the world moved from the Bretton 
Woods system of fixed exchange rates to floating ones. Not only did the 
introduction of MCAs result in a difference in the rates of various national 
currencies, but rates also varied for different commodities. In fact, the whole 
'green' money mechanism was flawed and open to abuse. The operation of 
a 'green' money system benefited the Germans greatly. Swinbank argues 
10 The Germans had estimated that farm incomes would diminish by DM 1.7 milliard each year as a 
direct consequence of the revaluation ofthe Deutschmark. 
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that the 'green' currency mechanism was "used by governments to resist 
the effects of exchange rate appreciation and depreciation." (Swinbank, 
1996: 2) Furthermore, the 'green' money system allowed governments a 
free reign over the level of CAP price support which they could apply in their 
countries. Grant adds that the green money system further "became a 
means of pursuing national agricultural and food policies whilst remaining 
within the common market." (Grant, 1996: 17) The Germans were as guilty 
as, or perhaps even more guilty than, other Member States, of utilising the 
green money system for their own ends. 
In fact, German manipulation of the 'green' money system clearly 
demonstrates its attempts to pursue a pro-German agricultural policy, 
aiming to satisfy domestic actors and objectives. MCAs clearly benefited 
high-price countries such as Germany; MCAs gave countries which 
revalued their currencies an artificial advantage. Hence, it is not surprising 
that attempts to dismantle the MCAs have been strongly resisted by the 
Germans. It is argued that, " .. the MCA system has made a decisive 
contribution to the development of farmers' incomes in Germany." 
(Hendriks, 1989a: 81) Furthermore, the MCAs insulated the domestic price 
level from the effects of national currency changes and kept the domestic· 
price level 10% above the common price level. The MCA system also gave 
the Germans greater flexibility in price decisions. 
In the early 1970s the Germans outright rejected the idea of cutting 
MCAs and opposed any fixed time limit to phase them out. Griesau, the 
Secretary of State in the BML, was quoted as saying, " .. reduction in 
agricultural incomes as a result of monetary changes must be avoided by 
special measures." (Cited in Hendriks, 1991: 61) By the mid 1970s, 
however, the Germans had realised that the MCAs had to be broken down 
in principle - but they demanded that the MCAs be offset by annual 
increases in institutional prices. The deadlock continued into the 1980s. 
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Since 1984, MCAs had a decreased role in the EC, but the attitude towards 
the MCAs has not changed. The objective that the dismantling of positive 
MCAs should not lead to lower prices could no longer be adhered to. 11 
Nevertheless, the MCA system was a constant source of discord between 
the Commission and the German Government, with Ertl, the Minister for 
Agriculture, threatening to resign if MCAs were dismantled in 1974. 
The German government did not only clash with the Community 
institutions but also with other member states, particularly France. 
Germany's perennial manipulation of 'green' rates caused continual conflict 
between France and Germany. A particular case to note is France's 
attempts to block the introduction of the European Monetary System in 1979. 
France had put forward proposals which intended to fix the ECU against the 
agricultural UtA at parity. Thus, it was the proposed employment of the new 
ECU in agri-monetary transactions which became the source of discord 
over the introduction of the EMS. The change from the use of the agricultural 
UtA to the ECU, which was based on a basket of currencies, would have 
meant a reduction in real value of common prices. Hill estimates the 
decrease- in agricultural prices in real terms at almost 21 %. This was, of 
i. 
course, unacceptable to the Germans. The Germans were unwilling ~o 
surrender the right to protect their own farmers against the effects of OM 
revaluation and the consequent loss of farm incomes; therefore they 
refused to dismantle MCAs. The French were, however, insistent that the 
EMS could not start as scheduled without a resolution of the MCA issue. 
The dispute was finally solved with the signing of the 'Gentleman's 
. Agreement' in March 1979. The Agreement provided for an elimination of 
any new MCAs within two market years. The Agreement also stipulated that 
any decrease in MCAs should not lead to a reduction in prices in national 
currencies. Germany's manipulation of the 'green' money system, the use 
1\ MCAs were abolished with the introduction of the internal market in January 1993. 
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of positive MCAs, higher support prices in Germany and its refusal to 
dismantle MCAs and the battles with the Commission and France reveals 
Germany's efforts to maintain a grip on agricultural policy and to defend its 
agricultural interests in the Community. Hendriks goes further to argue that, 
The onset of monetary instability provided an excellent cloak for 
Germany to pursue national objectives, while it continued to present an 
outwardly 'committed' European profile. In order to safeguard its 
farmers' incomes, the FRG insisted on the use of positive MCAs to 
offset the impact of revaluation of the Deutschmark on farm incomes. 
(Hendriks, 1991: 218) 
Hendriks argues that Germany's attempts to keep the MCA system in 
order to guarantee its domestic level was a clear sign that the Germans 
were not interested in common actions and legislation but were more eager 
to satisfy sectoral interests. (Hendriks, 1991: 218) 
6.54 AGRICULTURE IN THE 1980s: THE GREEN ECU AND THE SWITCHOVER 
MECHANISM. 
Agrimonetary conflict continued into the 1980s with the French still 
claiming that the agrimonetary system was benefiting the Germans and that 
positive MCAs were supporting German farmers. In attempt to tackle the 
inadequacies of the system, the 1984 Council undertook reform of the 
'green' money system; a switchover mechanism was introduced to deal 
with positive MCAs. A new 'green' ECU was created which was worth 3% 
more than the ECU and was linked to the Union's strongest currency i.e. the 
Deutschmark, rather than to a basket of currencies. A switchover 
mechanism was implemented in 1984 to stop the emergence of positive 
. 
MCAs. Thus, the new system 'switched' positive MCAs into negative MCAs 
through a'corrective factor applied to the ECU. (Grant, 1996: 19) 
However, the changes introduced in 1984 had inherent advantages for 
German farmers. The new system had the effect of increasing CAP support 
prices, a definite objective of the Germans. The system further submitted to 
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German interests, since the 'green' ECU was linked to the OM, as the EU 
fastest appreciating currency. Thus, CAP support prices were more on par 
with German standards. Hence, the introduction of the 'green' ECU, while 
decreasing positive MCAs, did not reduce the domestic price level in strong 
currency countries such as Germany. Grant points out, 
Because of the creation of an effective Deutschmark zone for agriculture, 
common prices were over twenty per cent higher than what they would 
have been by 1994. The switch over mechanism was supposed to allow 
positive MCAs to be dismantled while keeping the CAP budget under 
control, but in practice agricultural incomes were protected by increased 
prices or, in some cases, by other forms of compensation. (Grant, 1996: 
22) 
The agreement in 1984 allowed for compensation for German farmers 
who would make a loss from the gradual eradication of MCAs. The 5% 
reduction in Germany's existing MCAs from January 1985 were to be offset 
by compensatory measures. German farmers were to receive VAT rebates 
and other concessions. However, even these measures proved insufficient 
for the Germans. The Germans rejected the notion that any compensation, 
however it was financed, should be degressive. Furthermore, the Germans 
" disputed the timing and amount of compensation for German farmers for 
the 5% decrease in positive MCAs. The use of the agrimonetary system to 
their advantage cannot be underestimated. The Germans have insistently 
demanded the maintenance of the MCA system, yet the German 
contribution European Agriculture Guidance and Guarantee Fund (EAGGF) 
have risen as a result of its operation. Nevertheless the Germans complain 
about their role as the 'paymaster' of the EU and contributions to the overall 
EU budget. 
Other events during the 1980s demonstrated Germany's efforts to steer 
agricultural policy according to its own needs. It is important to note that by 
this point even the Germans could not deny that the CAP need reforming. 
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Hence, the strategy was to be in a position to control the changes. This is 
clearly shown by the milk quotas issue. Action was necessary to tackle the 
expensive chronic surplus in the diary sector. Kiechle, the Minister of 
Agriculture, backed by the DBV, made it his private mission to secure the 
installation of milk quotas. Kiechle was not in favour of a restrictive price 
policy. The introduction of quotas countered the lowering of the common 
price level. 
Furthermore, Germany invoked its veto for the first time in the history of 
its membership of the Community thereby clearly demonstrating the 
importance of agriculture. In January 1985 the Commission proposed a 
reduction in institutional prices of 0.3%. This was not acceptable to the 
Germans since this involved a reduction in the intervention price for cereals. 
The then Minister of Agriculture, Kiechle, argued that German farmers had 
lost confidence as a consequence of the constant loss of income. Over the 
last ten years their income had largely been reduced due to agri-monetary 
, 
measures. Kiechle argued that in order to restore confidence it was 
necessary to reject a cut in positive MCAs and the intended decrease in 
cereal and oilseed prices. Kiechle stated that, "the most he could accept 
-,-
was a price freeze, since any reduction would conflict with Germany's vital 
national interest. (Hendriks, 1989a: 85) Kiechle was also supported by 
Chancellor Kohl who stated that Germany as one of the most important 
members of the Community should not be put under such pressure. 
Kiechle reiterating the sentiments of the Chancellor, stated that Germany 
would, not assent to a compromise package. Thus, for the first time the 
- Germans invoked the 'Luxembourg Compromise' and vetoed the decision 
to lower institutional prices in the cereals sector. As a result of Germany's 
actions the measures were not adopted. 
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6.5 CONCLUSION. 
Agricultural policy in Germany has been based on traditions which have 
passed down in history. The protective nature of Germany's approach 
towards agriculture dates back to the 19th century, as does the importance 
and the influence of organised agricultural interests on policy. The 
importance of agriculture and the notion that it should receive special 
treatment, finds its roots during the time of National Socialism, when 
agriculture was seen as tool for the preservation of the German people. 
Many of these traditions survived post-war period and find themselves 
embedded in the CAP. 
There is no doubt that the Germans have a pro-German attitude towards 
agricultural policy in the European Union .. Despite the fact that the farming 
Community was opposed the inauguration of the CAP, largely due to the 
fear that agricultural objectives might be diluted or even worse sacrificed for 
the European objective, German farmers have benefited immensely from 
the CAP. From the start German actions have demonstrated their wish to 
formulate policy according to their needs and interests. The 1960s saw the 
. .' 
use of delaying tactics on the part of the Germans in order to retain national 
prices as long as possible. The Germans refused to move away from 
national prices until the end of the 12 year transitional phase. They were 
also reluctant to work out the detailed content of the CAP until as late as 
possible. The 1960s also saw the Germans' conflict with the French over 
the cereals price issue with France refusing to move onto the second stage 
of the integration process. The dispute was finally resolved due to 
Germany's overriding interests in the Kennedy Round of the GATT 
negotiations. Even at this stage the CAP bore the hallmark of German 
interests. The CAP reflected the objectives of the Agricultural Act of 1955, 
and CAP prices were pitched according to the German level. 
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The 1970s represented a clear manipulation of the agrimonetary 
system by the Germans for their own ends. Germany pursued a highly 
protectionist policy and German farmers were further guaranteed high 
prices for their produce. Germany's refusal to dismantle MCAs, because 
this would be detrimental to German farmers, further demonstrated 
Germany's efforts to pursue policy according to its concerns. Changes in 
the agrimonetary system in the 1980s, meant to tackle to problem of MCAs, 
were inherently advantageous for strong currency countries such as 
Germany. 
Thus, Germany has traditionally conducted agricultural policy according 
to its own needs despite its overall 'European' outlook. The Germans have 
been able to guarantee their farmers huge benefits and to achieve domestic 
objectives at the European level. Hence, the Germans have become 
sensitive to any changes in the CAP. Rather, the Germans are ardent 
defenders of the CAP. The CAP has become, " .. a valued and protected 
component of Bonn's EC membership .. II (Hendriks, 1991: 219) 
However, with the coming of unification will Germany's attitude towards 
agriculture change at both the domestic and European level? Will policies 
which have been cultivated over centuries and policies which have been 
pursued in the EU over decades change as a result of unification? These 
are the issues to be addressed in the next chapter. 
CHAPTER SEVEN: AGRICULTURE 
INTRODUCTION 
A central contention of this thesis is that Germany's role in the EU differs 
in contrasting policy sectors. The thesis maintains that the policy sector 
itself shapes Germany's role in the European frameworks in that particular 
policy area. These arguments loosely correspond to the ideas of Loyvi, who 
argues that different policy arenas produce different policy patterns, 
processes and actors. This argument is also put forward by Wallace and 
Bulmer. 1 Thus, policy areas have dynamics of their own which necessitate 
a particular course of action at the European level. The thesis also 
contends that the EU serves as an optimal environment for pursuing certain 
domestic concerns. 2 
Chapter Six has examined the historical background of agriculture in the 
Federal Republic. Chapter Six also reviewed the role of the FRG in the 
formation of the CAP and Germany's stance on agriculture up until the 
unification of Germany. However, before attempting to examine the impact of 
unification on agricultural policy and consequently Germany's role at the 
European level, one has to deal with the fundamental question of why one 
should choose agriculture as a case study. 
Agriculture has acquired special significance in German politics. 
Agriculture has enjoyed a prominent place on the political agenda in 
Germany. This can be traced back to the actions of the Junkers in the late. 
19th Century, through to the importance given to agriculture in the 
preservation of the German people during the years of the Third Reich. Even 
in the post-war period it was acknowledged that agriculture required special 
treatment and protection from the imbalances in market forces. These 
objectives were enshrined in the Agriculture Act of 1955. These traditions 
1 See Chapter Two section on Domestic Politics Approach. 
2 These ideas have been put forward by Milward. See Chapter Two. 
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survived national policy and were translated into the CAP. 3 The agricultural 
tradition of protectionism and the importance of organised agricultural 
interests on decisions regarding agriculture have survived to the present 
day. As a result, relative to its economic weighting 4 agriculture has an 
important political role. Agricultural interests have been able to exert strong 
political influence at the national level. German agricultural interests have 
not been limited to the domestic arena. German farmers have transcended 
their national borders to significantly influence the agricultural agenda at the 
European level. Thus, as an issue agriculture and German farmers are 
significant both domestically and at an EU level. 
Agriculture is the most highly developed form of common action in the 
EU. Having played a central role from the inception of the EEC, the CAP is 
often referred to as the "cornerstone of the Community". The CAP is the 
most integrated of EU policies and also consumes a sUbstantial amount 
(around half) of the EU budget. Thus, the importance of agriculture at the EU 
level cannot be denied. 
The Germans have essentially played an active role in the formation of 
agricultural policy and its changing contours. Despite their commitment to 
the process of European integration and their actions to further it, in the area 
of agriculture the Germans have pursued policies largely driven by their own 
needs and to their benefit. 5 As mentioned above the Germans have 
traditionally maintained a protectionist stance in agriculture and this has 
been able to continue in European policy. The issue to be addressed here 
is whether this would continue after unification considering the problems 
. 
Germany was confronted with. 
Agriculture in the 1990s presents a dilemma for Germany, not only at 
3 Chapter Six contains a detailed and historical analysis of the place of agriculture in the Gennan 
political system. 
Prior to unification agriculture contributed less than 2% of GDP. 
S See Chapter Six for an analysis of Gennany's stance on agricultural policy. 
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the European level but also at the domestic level. Indeed, the challenges 
that confront Germany are intertwined. Firstly, Germany faces the problem 
that the former GDR incorporated a large agricultural area. 6 171 000 
hectares of land was utilised for agricultural purposes. (Commission of the 
European Communities, 1991: 127) Secondly, the number of people 
employed in agriculture amounted to more than 10% of the working 
population. (Commission of the European Communities, 1991: 127) 
Thirdly, and more importantly, the structural differences in agriculture are 
immense. Agriculture in the former GDR was characterised by large 
collectives and state farms whose average size was about 4500 hectares 
for arable farms. (Commission of the European Communities, 1990a: 76) 
In contrast, farms in the old FRG were mostly family farms in the region of 
about 18 hectares. Attempting to combine these two different structures has 
been an enormous task. Fourthly, agriculture in the former GDR and FRG 
were shaped by their respective economic and political systems with 
differing objectives. The FRG was influenced by the CAP and the GDR by a 
policy of collectivisation. Reconciling these conflicting systems will not be 
, 
an easy tas.~. Hence, integrating eastern German agriculture into the CAP 6 
may prove immensely problematic. 
Considering the enormous challenges German agriculture faces after 
unification and bearing in mind Germany's traditional stance on agriculture 
at the European level, it was suggested that the Germans might finally 
change their approach to European agricultural policy. The unification of 
Germany 7 altered Germany's interests in agriculture and its approach to 
CAP transfers and support. 
The argument put forward rests on three characteristics to be found, in 
6 The integration of eastern German agriculture into the CAP commenced with German Economic and 
Monetary Union on 1 July 1990. 
7 The unification of Germany is however, not the sole factor changing Germany's approach to the 
CAP. External factors such as the GAIT negotiations, and calls for reform of the CAP have been 
instrumental in altering Germany's stance. These will be considered in detail further on in this chapter. 
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different forms, in each policy sector. The thesis attempts to develop a 
typology of these three characteristics: the dynamics of the policy sector; 
policy circumstance and policy-making structures. These three 
characteristics influence Germany's role in the EU with regard to agricultural 
policy. The main arguments will be summarised here. 
In the case of agriculture the dynamics of the policy sector refers to the 
structural differences in agriculture in the eastern and western parts of 
Germany. This section examines the differences in farm structure, the 
problems of transition, and how the structure of agriculture has changed the 
German position on agriculture. The dynamics of the policy sector also 
concerns the traditional role of agriculture in German politics and how 
unification has brought about a re-orientation. The dynamics of the policy 
sector also refers to Germany's traditional protectionist attitude towards 
agriculture and examines whether this attitude continues, given the more 
complex nature of domestic agriculture after unification. This section 
essentially deals with domestic issues. 
Policy circumstance looks at the state of agriculture with reference to the 
European level. Whereas in migration the collapse of communism has 
produced a new situation, the problems in agriculture have existed for a 
while. The CAP is the oldest policy in the EU, with an established set of 
policy networks and a whole series of bargains and trade-offs. Agriculture in 
the EU faces a number of serious problems which are not confined to 
Germany. But the Germans have immense difficulty in dealing with 
problems in the CAP. The Germans, along with the other member states, 
face the problem of CAP reform, particularly with regard to budgetary 
contributions and agricultural support. The application of the CAP in the 
former GDR meant a rise in contributions to the CAP. With the costs of 
unification this may prove difficult, especially considering that Germany is 
the highest net contributor to the EU budget. The CAP reform necessitates a 
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change in the German approach towards agriculture. The MacSharry 
reforms advocate significant cuts in agricultural prices. The MacSharry 
reforms also involve the concept of decoupling payments. In other words, 
moving towards separating market policies for agriculture from income 
maintenance policies for farmers. The reforms move away from the system 
of guaranteed prices. 
Linked to the internal reform of the CAP was the external pressure for a 
successful conclusion of the Uruguay Round of the General Agreement on 
Tariffs and Trade. The deadlock in the GATT negotiations threatened vital 
German industrial interests. Furthermore, the problems with France over 
the proposed changes. intimated by the USA also caused problems. 
Previously, questions regarding agriculture have been solved by means of a 
trade-off with the French. The French cannot effect any significant changes 
without German agreement. The Germans encountered significant 
problems in trying to maintain this delicate balance of attempting to satisfy 
two competing interests domestically, namely agriculture and industry, and 
also bearing in mind the Franco-German relationship. 
Policy-~aking structures involves an analysis of the institutional and 
constitutional factors which affect decisions regarding agriculture. The 
structures for European policy-making in Germany ensures that there is a 
great deal of scope for domestic input. Domestic political actors and 
processes are an important component in agricultural policy-making. 
Parties and interest groups in Germany have been able to leverage 
Germany's need for the EU into benefits for themselves. Thus, this section 
considers the role of the various actors in the policy-making process. The 
role of the German Farmers Union is of immense importance. The section 
considers the role of the Ministry for, and the role of the Minister for 
Agriculture. This section includes an examination of the close working 
relationship between the DBV and the BML. It also incorporates an analysis 
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of the role of the Christian Social Union in the governing coalition and its 
policy on agriculture. The section considers the input of the Lander, 
particularly since the eastern and western Lander have contradictory 
objectives in agriculture. Furthermore, the section includes an overall 
analysis of the policy-making process in Germany, incorporating the 
Federal structure, the system of proportional representation, the sectorized 
nature of policy-making in Germany, and the role of the Chancellor. 
The unification of Germany has brought immense challenges for the 
agricultural sector in Germany. Unification has necessitated internal change 
in the agricultural sector, as well as the integration of eastern German 
agriculture into the Common Agricultural Policy. Incorporating the former 
GDR into the CAP was a tricky task for the EU; it will no doubt pose 
problems for the policy which has so painstakingly been developed over the 
life of the European Union. These will now be examined in detail. 
7.1 DYNAMICS OF THE POLICY SECTOR 
7.1.1 THE AGRICULTURAL SECTORS: MILES APART 
This section aims to consider the vital differences in the agricultural 
sectors in the eastern and western parts of Germany. This section will also 
<, 
examine central problems in the transition process on the domestic level, 
as well as the aims and objectives of agricultural policy for the five new 
Lander. The section incorporates an examination of the impact of unification 
on agricultural policy in Germany. 
The introduction of German Economic and Monetary Union on 1 July 
1990 signalled the beginning of the adaptation process 8 of eastern 
8 Specifically, Gennan Economic and Monetary Union provided for the adjustment of prices to 
agricultural producers and the means of production to the level of the FRG. Article 15 (1) of the Treaty 
. between the FRG and the GDR, establishing a Monetary, Economic and Social Union, stated, 
"Because of the crucial importance of the European Community rules for agriculture and food industry, 
the Gennan Democratic Republic shall introduce a price support and external protection scheme in line 
with the EC market regime so that agricultural producer prices in the Gennan Democratic Republic 
become adjusted to those in the Federal Republic of Gennany". (Press and Infonnation Office of the 
Federal Government, 1991c: 18) 
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agriculture to western methods. The adjustment required was immense: 
the two agricultural sectors were poles apart .. The forced collectivisation of 
agriculture in the East for the last years had produced an agricultural 
structure which differed considerably to that of the old FRG. The transition 
from a system based on a closed planned economy to a liberal market 
economy was not going to prove an easy task and was certainly not 
possible without long-term transitional measures. Indeed, it is argued that 
the economic and social problems resulting from the integration of two 
agricultural sectors have been more severe than in the industrial sectors. 
(Schmitt, 1993: 190) 
The differences between the two parts of Germany are manifold and 
explicit. First, and foremost, the agricultural sectors were shaped by their 
respective political and economic structures. This implied a fundamental 
distinction .in their aims and objectives. The system in the former GDR was 
governed by a planned economy and central planning. The agricultural 
means of production were collectivised. The agricultural system in the 
former GDR was characterised by the desire for complete self-sufficiency. It 
implied ma~imisation of production, a comprehensive system of producer 
and consumer subsidies and minimal trade in the agricultural sector. East 
German agriculture was wholly production oriented; its state farms 
produced substantial quantities of poor quality at prices which bore no 
relationship whatever to market mechanisms. The system in the former 
FRG, on the other hand, was influenced by its involvement in the EU and 
subject to the mechanisms of the CAP. 
The two systems differ vastly in terms of their organisational structure. In 
. the former GDR, an agricultural area of 6 171 000 hectares was farmed by 
4751 farms. (Commission of the European Communities, 1990a: 76) 
Agricultural holdings differed significantly in their size and structure. 
Agricultural holdings in the East predominantly came in the form of 
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'agricultural production co-operatives' or (Landwirtschaftliche 
Produktionsgenossenschaften, LPG) and state-owned estates or 
(Volkseigene Gater, VEG). Agricultural production co-operatives covered 
approximately 85% of the agricultural holdings, totalling 3855 holdings. 
State-owned enterprises totalled approximately 15% with 465 farms. 
(Commission, 1990a: 76) Agricultural production co-operatives were 
formed by the merger of the members' property and land. Legally the land 
remained under private ownership, however the right of use was transferred 
to the agricultural production co-operatives. (Jarothe, 1992: 96-97) 
The central element of SED's agricultural policy was the establishment 
of large agricultural units. Hence, the average size of agricultural production 
co-operatives was 4500 hectares (arable farms) and dairy farms averaged 
740 cows. (Commission, 1990a: 76) In contrast, the western part of 
Germany .is dominated by family farms averaging 18 hectares. Although 
farms in the northern regions of Schleswig-Holstein tend to be larger, they 
are by no means the same size as the eastern regions. Approximately half 
of the holdings in the West tend to be farmed part-time. (Schmitt, 1993: 191) 
Most farms..in the East tend to be highly specialised in either animal or crop 
production. It is important to point out that this separation of crop and animal 
production is not regarded as being efficient, neither environmentally nor 
logistically. Schmitt sums up the difference between the structures of the 
two agricultural sectors, 
whereas western Germany is dominated by small family farms that are 
deemed inefficient, and therefore lacking in competitiveness, eastern 
Germany is characterised by huge farms deemed more efficient, and 
hence more competitive, at least in the future. (Schmitt, 1993: 191) 
The proportion of the population active in agriculture in the East is worth 
noting. Approximately 10% of the population, as compared to 5% in the 
former FRG, are engaged in agriculture. The large numbers of people 
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working in the agricultural sector could perhaps be explained by the fact that 
agriculture is considered more important in the former GDR than in other 
industrialised countries of the world. Furthermore, it should be emphasised 
that the agricultural sector incorporates areas of work not directly related to 
agricultural production, such as construction, social and cultural services, 
and repair services. Nevertheless, almost 60% of the agricultural workforce 
was directly involved in agricultural production (an average of 8.2 persons 
per 100 hectares). (Commission, 1990a: 77) The high levels of employment 
in agriculture can be explained by the working conditions; namely, fixed 
working hours, regular holidays and the pay structure. The overmanning of 
enterprises was a central problem for agriculture in the former GDR and in 
part explains the low levels of productivity. However, low levels of productivity 
were also caused by a shortage of appropriate technology and low levels of 
automation, which necessitated more manual labour. Enterprises were 
subject to the problems associated with a higher proportion of manual 
workers; namely absenteeism, lack of motivation and compulsory 
employment. The bad quality of the products can also be blamed on the 
lack of a sophisticated pattern of demand for quality products from the food 
, 
processing industry, which was organised into Kombinate on a product by 
product basis. The food processing industry employed 240 000 workers. 
Agriculture in the two parts of Germany is 'dualistic' in nature in terms of 
the structure of prices. Producer prices in the former GDR are higher than in 
the former FRG. Producer prices in the former GDR have risen since the 
agricultural price reform in 1984. 9 The higher producer prices have to be 
considered in light ·of the fact that the level and structure of prices was 
determined by administrative decisions and not markets. Furthermore, 
9 It is hard to conjecture about prices levels in the former GDR due to the inconvertibility of the East 
German mark. Nevertheless, in 1988 the price for 100kg of wheat was 67.54 East German marks in the 
GDR and 38.60 DM in the former FRG for the same period. Producer prices ratios in the EU and the 
former GDR varied notably. For instance, in the GDR animal production was subject to higher 
protection than in the EU. (Commission, 1990a: 77) 
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prices were guided by two political objectives; firstly, to achieve self-
sufficiency and secondly, to cover the costs of farming. (Schmitt, 1993: 191) 
Consumer prices, on the other hand, for basic foodstuffs remained 
markedly low lO and stable. Low consumer prices were guaranteed by state 
subsidies. State subsidies amounted to 32 billion East German marks in 
1988. The result being that the agricultural holdings in the former GDR were 
on the brink of collapse once they became subject to EC prices. It is argued 
that, "The combination of falling prices and a change in the pattern of 
consumer preferences after unification led to the almost total collapse of the 
GDR's internal agricultural produce market." (Lippert et ai, 1993: 94) 
The differences between the former GDR II and FRG are summarised 
in the following table: 
TABLE 7.1 COMPARISON OF AGRICULTURAL STATISTICS: GDR AND FRG 1988 
Feature GDR FRG 
Total Agricultural Area 6.2 11.9 
1m. hectares) 
Arable Land 4.7 7.3 
(m. hectares) 
Number of Agricultural 4751 7.5 
Holdings 
Average Size of 4,500 16.8 
Holdings (hectares) 
Population 16.7 61.5 
1millions) 
Agricultural Area per 0.37 0.19 
head of Population 
lhectares) 
Persons Employed in 9.7-11.7 6.9 
Agriculture per 100 ha 
Agricultural Area (no.) 
Source: Adapted frbm: European Parliament, (Committee on Agriculture, 
Fisheries and Rural Development), Opinion for the Temporary Committee to 
consider the impact of the process of German reunification on the European 
. Community, 30 May 1990, EN\AD\89541 
10 For instance, the price of 1 kg of potatoes was 0.17 East German mark, whilst the producer received 
0.56 East German marks. (Commission, 1990a: 77) 
II For an in-depth statistical analysis of the agricultural sector in the former GDR see: (Commission, 
1991: 129-134) 
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The differences between the agricultural sectors were huge. The 
differences are summed up, 
dass wir in Ost und West zwei Landwirtschaften hatten, die so 
unterschiedlich waren wie kaum zwei andere auf der Welt...Wir hatten 
drOben in den ehemaligen DDR eine Landwirtschaft, die wesentlich auf 
den Landwirtschaftlichen Produktionsgenossenschaften basierte. Und 
auf der anderen Seite in Westdeutschland haben Sie den sogenannten 
Familienbetrieb. 12 
It has been ascertained that there were major differences between the 
structure of agriculture in the two parts of Germany. Different political and 
economic systems had brought about varying structures and objectives in 
the agricultural sector. Thus, the dynamics of the agricultural sector had an 
impact on the form that agriculture would take after unification, and hence 
on the transition measures and processes as well as the decisions that 
Germany would advocate in Agricultural Council of the EU. 
7.1.2 AIMS OF AGRICULTURAL POLICY FOR THE NEW LANDER 
The integration of the agricultural sector of the former GDR into the 
Federal Republic meant that the main aims of western German agricultural 
I 
policy 13 were also applicable in the new Lander. However, due to the 
historical development of and the diversity of the agricultural sector in the 
East, it was considered necessary to develop a separate set of agricultural 
objectives and measures for the new Lander. 
The overriding objective of the Federal Government is, "to set up, in the 
new Federal states, an agricultural sector of a diversified structure, which is 
12 Interview with official, Bundeskanzleramt, Bonn, 14 September 1993. Author's translation, " .. that 
. we had two completely different agricultural systems in the East and West which were so different than 
two any other sectors on this earth. Over there in the former GDR we had an agricultural sector which 
was fundamentally based on LPGs. On the other side in West Germany we had the so-called family 
. farm." 
13 The main focus of the objectives of agricultural policy in the former FRG arise out of the 
Landwirtschaftsgesetz (Agricultural Act) of 1955, the Treaty of Rome, particularly Article 39 and a 
whole series of statutory regulations. For a summary of the objectives see: (Bundesministerium fUr 
Emillmmg, Landwirtschaft und Forsten, 1993f: 4-6 & 98-99), (Bundesministerium fUr Emahrung, 
Landwirtschaft und Forsten, 1995d: 4-6 & 89-91) 
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efficient, compatible with environmental goals, and competitive in the 
European Single Market." (Bundesministerium fOr Ernahrung, 
Landwirtschaft und Forsten, 1993a: 1) In this context, farming may be 
organised in different legal and management patterns, either full-time or 
part time, as single work units or partnerships. (Auswertungs- und 
Informationsdienst fOr Ernahrung, Landwirtschaft und Forsten, 1993: 6-7) 
The Federal government also emphasises that farming in the new Lander 
should proceed on, "cost-effective production on the basis of ecological 
principles and sustainability, livestock production related to the land 
resource available and the consideration of animal welfare principles." 
(Bundesministerium fOr Ernahrung, Landwirtschaft und Forsten, 1993a: 8) 
The Minister for Agriculture, Borchert, upon taking office in 1993, under the 
motto "Der kOnftige Weg" 14 outlined his main objective for agriculture as, 
"eine leistungs- und wettbewerbsfahige Landwirtschaft" or an efficient and 
competitive agricultural sector. 
To this end the specific objectives for the new Lander were as follows: 
to support the undeniable process of breaking up the large co-operatives 
through legal measures; in the short term to bring agricultural production up 
to the requirements of the market, particularly through measures designed 
to cut the quantity produced and to better the quality of the products; to 
orientate concerns to environmentally- friendly farming methods; to 
contribute to the process of overcoming price differences and problems; to 
facilitate the liquidation of enterprises through aid; and finally to accompany 
the structural adaptation process with social measures. In this process of 
reorganisation, the' Federal government aimed at developing a market 
. orientated and competitive agriculture and at eliminating the impediments 
in the re-establishment of enterprises. (Bundesministerium fOr Ernahrung, 
Landwirtschaft und Forsten, 1993e: 6-7) 
14 Translated as "The Future Way". 
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In summary, the aims of the Federal government as regards agriculture 
in the new Lander revolved around three principal areas. Firstly, the Federal 
government aimed at reducing the agricultural factors of production, land 
and labour, with the goal of restricting and even decreasing the volume of 
production. Secondly, the government had the objective of reorganising the 
production structure with a view to orienting towards the market. 
Furthermore, the government aimed at making the agricultural sector more 
efficient and environmentally friendly. Finally, the Federal government aimed 
at completely overhauling the structure of farms, particularly with regard to 
size. 
7.1.3 THE TRANSITION PROCESS: CHANGES AND PROBLEMS 
The Minister for Agriculture, Jochen Borchert, described the task of 
transforming the agricultural sector in the East as the task of the century. 
Borchert commented, "wir stehen mit der Umstrukturierung vor eine 
Ja h rh u nderta ufg abe." 1 5 (Presse und I nformationsamt der 
Bundesregierung, 1993d: 271) Nevertheless, the transition process in the 
agricultural sector has been steady but substantial. "In only four years, 
radical pO,Htical, economic and social changes have taken place." 
(Bundesministerium fOr Ernahrung, Landwirtschaft und Forsten, 1995a: 1) A 
report commissioned by the DBV in Berlin one year after Economic and 
Monetary Union revealed that, "far-reaching changes have taken place in the 
structure of property ownership and privatisation, in farm structure, and in 
the employment situation of East German agriculture." (Agra Europe, 1991d: 
N/4) However, the process has encountered problems, and despite the 
progress made, it will take a long time before this process is complete. 
Agriculture in the new Lander has undergone significant structural change. 
There is a dichotomy between the structure of farms in the East and the 
15 Auth.?r's translation, "We are facing the task of the century with the restructuring process." 
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West. It is a question of family farms versus co-operatives. 16 Linked to this 
issue of structural change has been the property question. The process of 
privatisation has been slowed down by unsettled property issues and 
problems connected to the distribution of property to withdrawing members. 
The agricultural sector has undergone reduction and changes in 
production. Other problems have been linked to general economic 
problems, for instance the repayment of debt. Undoubtedly the changes that 
have taken place have caused a degree of antagonism between eastern 
and western farmers. 
Unification brought about the task of marrying two completely diverse 
agricultural sectors, particularly with respect to farm structure. The 
differences in the structure have been discussed in depth earlier in this 
chapter. Suffice to say that the structures varied not only in size, but also in 
volume and production methods. The question to be addressed is how the 
former agricultural co-operatives would be structured and what impact that 
they would have on the future direction of agriculture as a whole. 
There is no doubt that unification has intensified the discussion on the 
structure of agriculture in Germany, and the tendency is to utilise this 
opportunity. The BML tends to share this opinion. It was remarked, ",?ie 
Richtung ist die Chance zu nutzen, und es zeigt sich heute bereits, dass die 
ganze Agrarstrukturdiskussion in ganz Deutschland durch die deutsche 
Vereinigung wieder zugenommen hat." 17 
16 Jarothe considers the arguments relating to the relative advantages of the family farm structure over 
the agricultural co-operatives. Jarothe argues that, not only are the family farms the ones supported by 
the EU, but they are indeed more efficient, oriented towards a market economy, organised in interest 
and producer organisations as well as more able to compete. Furthermore, the family farms require less 
manual labour and are more environmentally friendly. Alternatively, Jarothe argues that the size of the 
structures found in the East is the main disadvantage. The farms are not competitive. The size ofthe 
farm and the way in which they were run make decision making difficult. The farms employ too much 
manpower, thereby reducing productivity. Jarothe has perhaps been too critical of the structures in the 
. East and does not acknowledge the inadequacies of the family farms. (Jarothe, 1992: 100-103) 
17 Interview with official, Referat 211, "Grundslitzliche Angelegenheiten der Agrarpolitik, Koordination 
der agrar- und ernlihrungspolitischen Planung", Bundesministerium fUr Ernlihrung, Landwirtschaft und 
Forsten, Bonn, 13 September 1993. Author's translation, "The trend is to utilise this opportunity and 
it is already beginning to emerge that the whole discussion about the structure of agriculture all over 
Germany is increasing again as a result of German unification." 
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There has been a definite change in policy. In a policy document entitled 
"Der kOnfiige Weg", the Minister for Agriculture, Jochen Borchert outlined his 
main aim for agricultural policy as establishing, efficient and competitive 
enterprises or "Ieistungsfahige und wettbewerbsfahige Betriebe". 18 
Borchert's actions bypassed the problems to a certain degree by advocating 
an efficient system rather than any particular structure. Although, the 
Borchert document tends to place emphasis on the structures in the East, 
Borchert points out that Germany has perhaps depended on the relatively 
small structured family farms for too long, and hence has lost touch with the 
EU. The Agrarbericht 19 alludes to the fact that the structure of farms in other 
EU member states are more favourable in terms of production and 
efficiency than in Germany. Borchert has therefore made the task of catching 
up with the rest of the EU, particularly in terms of the structure of 
enterprises, a priority. Hence, it is argued that it is imperative that the 
structure of agriculture in the new Lander be utilised positively. 20 
The different structured agricultural holdings has necessitated a 
development whereby, "sich der Anderungsprozess in beiden Teilen 
beschleunigt." 21 The BML is expecting structural change in both parts of 
Germany. 
Die Agrarpolitik erwartet einen starken Strukturwandel in den alten 
Landern. Es wird also in den alten Landern ein Konzentrationsprozess 
stattfinden, weil mit einem kleinen Betrieb auf Dauer keine effektive 
Produktion gemacht werden kann. In den neuen Uindern wird sich 
kOnfiig ein starker Strukturwandel ergeben, so dass also sicher ein Teil 
dieser Grossbetriebe sich noch verkleinern wird. 22 
18 Interview with official, Referat 211, "Grunds1itzliche Angelegenheiten der Agrarpolitik, Koordination 
der agrar- und em1ihrungspolitischen Planung", Bundesministerium fUr Em1ihrung, Landwirtschaft und 
Forsten, Bonn, 13 September 1993. 
19 The Annual Report of the Agricultural Situation in Germany, produced by the BML. 
20 Interview with official, Referat 211, "Grunds1itzliche Angelegenheiten der Agrarpolitik, Koordination 
. der agrar- und em1ihrungspolitischen Planung", Bundesministerium fUr Em1ihrung, Landwirtschaft und 
Forsten, Bonn, 13 September 1993. 
21 Interview with senior official, Bundesministerium fUr Em1ihrung, Landwirtschaft und Forsten, 
Bonn, 13 September 1993. Author's translation, "the process of change has accelerated in both parts of 
Germany." 
22 Interview with official, Referat 211, "Grunds1itzliche Angelegenheiten der Agrarpolitik, 
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In practice, two sets of agricultural objectives exist; for the East and for 
the West respectively. The goal for the old Lander is to allow the emergence 
of these new structures alongside the previous ones and specifically not to 
hinder the structural change that was taking place. As regards the five new 
Lander, the aim is to continue the transformation of structures. It is 
important to add that there are already structures there which are 
competitive according to EU standards. Consolidation and market 
orientation of the enterprises in the new Lander have been responsible for 
, this competitiveness. Despite the radical transformation in the structure of 
enterprises, the German government does not profess to advocate a 
preference for either structure. Rather it is asserted that the market should 
decide which is the most effective form. "Aber wir sagen hier bei uns im 
Landwirtschaftsministerium, wir wollen nicht die einen oder die anderen in 
ihrer Entwicklung beschneiden; der Markt soli entscheiden, welche Form 
die effektivste ist. " 23 Furthermore, the BML envisages a two way process, 
whereby the structural differences in the East and West influence each 
I 
other. 
The structure of the agricultural production co-operatives in the new 
Lander, have undergone radical change; and this process is to continue. 
Excessively large farms have been reduced to an economically viable size 
and the separation between animal and crop production has been 
reversed. The agricultural production co-operatives have been transformed 
Koordination der agrar- un.d emahrungspolitischen Planung", Bundesministerium fUr Emfihrung, 
Landwirtschaft und Forsten, Bonn, 13 September 1993. Author's translation, "Agricultural policy is 
expecting considerable structural change in the old Lander. A process of concentration will take place 
in the old Lander since in the long run it will not be possible to produce effectively with a small farm. 
Considerable structural change is also going to occur in the new Lander, so that a proportion of these 
. larger farms will become smaller." 
23 Interview with official, Referat 211, "Grundsatzliche Angelegenheiten der Agrarpolitik, Koordination 
der agrar- und emahrungspolitischen Planung", Bundesministerium fUr Emahrung, Landwirtschaft und 
Forsten, Bonn, 13 September 1993. Author's translation, "But here in the Ministry of Agriculture we 
are of the opinion that we do not want limit the development of one or the other; rather the market 
should decide which structure is the most effective." 
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into either "NaWrliche Personen" (Natural Persons) of the vast majority are 
"Einzelunternehmen" (Individual Enterprises) or "Juristische Personen" 
(Juridical Persons). 
TABLE 7.2 STRUCTURE OF ENTERPRISES IN THE NEW LANDER: FEBRUARY 1992 
April 1991 Enterprises % of Agri Average 
Feb. 1992 Area Area 
Feb. 1992 Feb. 1992 
NATURAL 9,238 14,633 24.5% 86 ha 
PERSONS 
THEREOF24 
Individual 8,975 13,707 17.3% 64 ha 
Enterprises 
Partnerships 263 926 7.2% 401 ha 
25 
JURIDICAL 3,375 3,035 75.5% 1,268 ha 
PERSONS 
THEREOF26 
Registered 478 1,475 44.0% 1,522 ha 
Co-operative 
Other 463 1,560 31.5% 1,029 ha 
Corporation 
27 
Production 2,434 
- - -
Co-
operative28 
OTHER 246 
- - -
ENTER-
PRISE 
TOTAL 12,859 17,668 100.0% 289 ha 
Source: Adapted from: Bundesministerium fOr Ernahrung, Landwirtschaft 
und Forsten. Agricultural Economy in the new Federal States - Topical 
Survey, January 1993 
24 Natural Persons were subdivided into individual enterprises and partnerships . 
. 25 Partnerships under the Civil Code are General Partnerships or Limited Partnerships. 
26 Juridical Persons were divided into Registered Co-operatives, Other Corporations and Production 
Co-operatives. 
27 These include Joint Stock Companies and Limited Liability Companies. 
28 These are Agricultural Production Co-operatives and Horticultural Production Co-operatives (GPG) 
and other Production Co-operatives. 
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7.3 STRUCTURE OF ENTERPRISES IN THE NEW LANDER: MAY 1994 
April 1991 Enterprises % of Agri Average 
May 1994 Area Area 
May 1994 May 1994 
NATURAL 9,328 24,884 40.4% 88 ha 
PERSONS 
THEREOF 
Individual 8,975 22,505 19.9% 48 ha 
Enterprise 
Partnership 263 2,379 20.5% 469 ha 
JURIDICAL 3,375 2,821 59.3% 1,143 ha 
PERSONS 
THEREOF 
Registered 478 1,336 35.9% 1,461 ha 
Co-operative 
Joint Stock 
-
1,335 21.7% 882 ha 
Companies 
Limited 
-
64 1.5% 1,276 ha 
Companies 
Other Co- 2,434 86 0.2% 136 ha 
o~erative 
OTHER 246 78 0.3% 191 ha 
ENTER-
PRISE 
TOTAL 12,859 27,783 100.0% 196 ha 
Source: Adapted from: Bundesministerium fOr Ernahrung, Landwirtschaft 
und Forsten, Agricultural Economy in the Federal Lander, January 1995 
The two tables indicate the degree of change which has taken place in 
the transformation of the former agricultural structures of the East. Initially 
the transformation of structures was slow. The reasons for the slow start 
are to be found in problems related to unsettled property issues. However, 
the amendment of the Agricultural Adjustment Act or 
Landwirtschaftsanpassungsgesetz (LAG) solved a great many of these 
problems and thereby accelerated the process of transformation of the 
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production co-operatives into different legal structures. Approximately 75% 
of the former co-operatives in eastern Germany have been converted into 
pa,rtnerships or corporations. As of the 1 January 1992 the legal structure of 
the agricultural production co-operative ceased to exist. The small family 
farm, which is the norm in the old FRG and the rest of the EU, is in the 
minority in the new Lander. Hence, a radical change has occurred in the 
new Lander. 
An important point of differentiation between East and West is the size of 
same type of farm. The newly founded or converted holdings are clearly 
larger than those in the old Lander. For instance, the average area of a 
family farm in the new Lander is 152 hectares, whereas the average area of 
the same type of concern in the old Lander is 30 hectares. 29 Although this 
may be an average there are differences between states. Hence, the 
structure of farms not only differs in the North and South, but an additional 
layer had been added with differences in the East and West. The general 
conclusion is that unification has had a great impact on the structure of 
agricultural holdings. According to an official in the BML, "Die Prozesse sind 
sehr dynamisch in den neuen Landern". 30 The BML is of the view that this 
(, 
opportunity in the new Lander should be utilised. It is important to 
acknowledge this difference because the developments in agriculture in the 
last few years have proceeded differently. 31 
The change over in structure has not been without problems. Set aside 
from the problems encountered during the privatisation process and those 
29 Interview with official, Referat 211, "Grundsatzliche Angelegenheiten der Agrarpolitik, Koordination 
der agrar- und emtihrungspolitischen Planung", Bundesministerium fUr Emtihrung, Landwirtschaft und 
Forsten, Bonn, 13 September 1993. 
30 Interview with official, Referat 211, "Grundsatzliche Angelegenheiten der Agrarpolitik, Koordination 
der agrar- und emtihrungspolitischen Planung", Bundesministerium fUr Emtihrung, Landwirtschaft und 
Forsten, Bonn, 13 September 1993. Author's translation, "The process are very dynamic in the new 
Lander." , 
31 Interview with official, Referat 211, "Grundsatzliche Angelegenheiten der Agrarpolitik, Koordination 
der agrar- und emtihrungspolitischen Planung", Bundesministerium fUr Emtihrung, Landwirtschaft und 
Forsten, Bonn, 13 September 1993. 
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linked to property matters, which will be discussed later, structural changes 
have caused problems between eastern farmers and western farmers. 
There exists a fear among the farmers in the West that the structures being 
erected in the East, will in the long term be more efficient and competitive 
than the family farms in the West. Farmers are worried they will be 
surpassed due to amount of aid 32 being granted to the eastern farmers. 
The rents are cheaper, the farmers in the East have access to 
technologically advanced machinery; with the result that ultimately the 
farmers in the East can produce more cost effectively. Indeed, it is 
beginning to emerge that the structures in the East are more profitable and 
may actually present a threat to western concerns. It was reported in Agra 
Europe that this process is beginning to emerge with reference to the dairy 
sector, "There are already signs that the large scale dairy farms that are 
beginning to emerge in the in the new Lander of eastern Germany will 
eventually challenge some of the more rustic units that have survived in the 
West of the country." (Agra Europe, 1996b: N/2) The politicians have to be 
able to serve the interests of both sets of farmers. 33 It has been argued that 
the larger concerns are not the favoured structure for the DBV. (Jarothe, 
': 
1992: 101) 
A reason cited for the slow pace of conversion of the LPGs into efficient 
profit making businesses has been all the questions related to unsettled 
property issues and problems connected to the distribution of property to 
withdrawing members. The revision of the "property question" is of central 
importance to the reform of agriculture in the East. The Agricultural 
. , 
32 The Federal government made a number of aids available for the promotion of agricultural 
structures. The government granted investment aids in the shape of a lowering of interest of up to 5% 
for a capital market loan of not more than 400.000 DM per enterprise. The term of the loan is 20 years 
for property and 10 years for other investments. Furthermore, farmers are able to get public loans for 
buildings and constructional assets. In addition, farmers are eligible for loans up to a maximum of . 
50,000 DM for grassland-related animal husbandry. In 1992 compensatory payments could be made as 
a compensation for difficult natural conditions of production. 
33 Interview with senior official, Bundesministerium fUr Ernlihrung, Landwirtschaft und Forsten, 
Bonn, 13 September 1993. 
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Adjustment Act is of vital importance. The Agricultural Adjustment Act, the 
LPG Law, along with the law on the transfer of property rights and 
leaseholds of state-owned property and enterprises and members of co-
operatives, were regulations that had been introduced in the last days of the 
GDR regime, which remained in force. The Agricultural Adjustment Act 
outlined, 
the legal basis for restoration and guarantee of private ownership of 
property and the development of a diverse agricultural sector. It also 
regulated the process of breaking up the co-operative cartels, which 
were to be restructured into different legal companies; transferring 
farms to private ownership ..... The LAG was intended to clarify disputed 
property claims and facilitate land reform. (Lippert et ai, 1993: 95) 
The Agricultural Adjustment Act was passed through the Volkskammer 
in the last days of the GDR, 29.06.1990 to be exact. The Act was, however, 
amended about a year later on 03.07.1991. The Act produced the necessary 
legal conditions to accelerate the process of restructuring. Other laws 
relating to agriculture were simply allowed to expire. For instance, the LPG 
law lapsed. The Agricultural Adjustment Act clarified property disputes and 
made the legal position of the landowners clearer. Thus, the amendment of 
the Agricultural Adjustment Act solved a great many of the problems related 
to property issues. Nevertheless there were other problems. 
Clarifying the owners of property which had been expropriated during 
the land reform between 1945 and 1949 and the period after that, were 
some of the most difficult problems to solve. With regard to the land that 
was expropriated during the land reform 34 between 1945 and 1949, it was 
decided that this .property could not be returned. This measure was 
approved by a decision of the Federal Constitutional Court of 23.04.91. This 
means that a farmer who obtained land during the land reform can treat this 
34 In 1946 a Land Reform was carried out in the former GDR, whereby land was expropriated from war 
criminals and active Nazis. Land was also expropriated from all concerns over 100 hectares and then 
distributed to smaller concerns. 
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land like old property. This land cannot be encroached upon. Hence, victims 
of expropriations between 1945 and 1949 were entitled to financial 
compensation according to the Compensation Act. 
However, land and property withdrawn after 1949 could be reclaimed. 
This was a major problem. Many westerners put in claims for their land in 
the East, thereby causing difficulty and uncertainty for the present occupiers 
of the land. According to the Compensation Act, victims of expropriations 
after 1949 who cannot either receive their land or choose compensation, 
have a claim to financial compensation. 
The privatisation of land has thrown up many unforeseen problems. 
Privatisation of land has proved particularly difficult because the exact 
recording of land parcels has been hindered by deficient local land surveys, 
inadequate information in the Land Register, as well as missing boundary 
lines. Furthermore, privatisation was complicated by the whole issue of 
unsettled property and land. Land which had to be returned to its rightful 
owners could not be privatised. Hence, privatisation is liable to take a long 
time. Therefore, land is predominantly being leased. 3S 
The Federal Agency for Unification-Related Special Tasks 
.' (Bundesanstalt fOr vereinigungsbedingte Sonderaufgaben) (BVS) holds 
approximately 1.3 million ha of agricultural land and 0.77 million ha of forest 
land in trust. This is land which had been expropriated in the socialist land 
reform. The BVS succeeded the Treuhand Anstalt, which was the agency 
responsible for privatising former state-owned enterprises in the GDR, this 
included privatising 512 state-owned farms and other state enterprises, 
totalling 330,000 hectares. 
After unification, agriculture has undergone a drastic structural change 
3S The Bodenverwertungs- und Verwaltungs GmbH was set up in the middle of 1992 to lease and sell 
agricultural land. This company was also given the task of privati sing state farms. Up to now, 881, 
000 ha of land has been leased for long term (12 years) and 215,000 for the short term. Land is 
generally leased for 12 years. Local residents who want to establish a new farm and farmers wanting to 
rent land they are presently farming are given priority. 
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in terms of production. "Es hat sich im Produktionsbereich ein ganz 
radikaler Wandel vollzogen." 36 Agriculture in the former GDR was 
completely geared towards maximum production. Production had to be cut 
in the five new Lander so as not to aggravate EU surpluses. As Schilling 
notes, 
The path towards agriculture in the five new Lander which is 
economically profitable and whose existence is assured in'the long 
term cannot.. consist in repeating all those intensification processes 
undergone by the agriculture of Western Europe in the course of the last 
three decades. (Schilling, 1991: 254) 
In the new Lander the structure in the area of "Pflanzenproduktion" or 
crop production has changed dramatically; it has adapted to the structures 
of the whole of Germany. For example there has been a decrease of potato 
growing by two thirds and extensive areas have been set aside. There has 
also been a decrease in the production capacities, above all in the livestock 
sector. For instance, there has been a reduction of 49% in cattle stocks and 
67% in pig stocks. (Bundesministerium fOr Ernahrung, Landwirtschaft und 
Forsten, 1995a: 3) This reduction in production has facilitated a 
comprehe~sive adjustment to the market. The decrease in livestock 
numbers has also led to an enormous decrease of milk and slaughter 
cattle production. The producer price levels are gradually approximating 
those of the old Lander. Furthermore, the workforce has been cut drastically. 
In April 1994, 164,000 of the former 848,000 workers continued to be 
employed in agriculture. (Bundesministerium fOr Ernahrung, Landwirtschaft 
, und Forsten, 1995a: 3) 
Other problems in the transition process are connected to general 
economic problems. The Treaty establishing a Monetary, Economic and 
36 Interview with official, Referat 211, "Grundslltzliche Angelegenheiten der Agrarpolitik, Koordination 
der agrar- und ern1lhrungspolitischen Planung", Bundesministerium rur Ernllhrung, Landwirtschaft und 
Forsten, Bonn, 13 September 1993. Author's translation, "A radical change has occurred in the field of 
production. " 
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Social Union or the Staatsvertrag effected a currency union. According to 
Article 10 (5), 
Wages, salaries, grants pensions and leases as well as other recurring 
payments shall be converted at a rate of one to one. All other claims and 
liabilities .... shall be converted to Deutsche Mark at the rate of two to one. 
(Press and Information Office of the Federal Government, 1991 c: 16) 
Thus, citizens of the GDR were able to exchange East Marks at a rate of 
1: 1 up to a limit; 37 the rest was converted at a rate of 2: 1. Debts of firms 
were also converted at a rate of 2: 1. The debts of firms were partially 
deleted, so that concerns could stabilise themselves. However, the Minister 
for Agriculture acknowledged in an interview with Agra Europe that "farms in 
eastern Germany were still encountering substantial problems with debt." 
(Agra Europe, 1994b: N/3) Borchert pointed out that the agricultural 
production co-operatives had different types and volumes of debt at the time 
of unification. It is estimated that on the date of Economic and Monetary 
Union between the GDR and FRG total debt amounted to DM 7.6 bn. (Agra 
Europe, 1994b: N/3) Debts relating to property were not deleted but were 
merely passed on to the successor organisations of the agricultural 
production co-operatives. Other debts outstanding by the earlier LPGs were 
frozen until the end of 1993. Hence, the debts were once again in place as 
of the 1 January 1994. In order to relieve the financial burden on the farms, 
Bonn has struck a deal with German Banks to reschedule the loans. 
Therefore, the farms can take out new loans to aid development, even 
though this means higher interest payments in the longer run. 
The overall .aim of a competitive agricultural sector or a 
-
"wettbewerbsfahige Landwirtschaft" can be interpreted in several ways. One 
37 Certain limits were set for savings for GDR citizens at a rate of 1: 1; children aged up to fourteen 
were allowed up to DM 2000, adults aged between fifteen and sixty were entitled to convert up to DM 
4000 and elderly people, namely those over sixty, were able to convert up to DM 6000. Remaining 
money in circulation and savings were converted at a rate of2: 1. Non-residents of the GDR were 
allowed to convert East Marks, which had been issued after 31 December 1989, at a rate of 3: 1. 
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of the most important objectives is to build a "moderne 
Ernahrungswirtschaft" or a modern food economy. Both EU and the new 
Lander themselves have made financial aid available in order to achieve 
this objective. With the result, according to the BML that, "in den neuen 
Landern gegenwartig die modernste Ernahrungswirtschaft in der ganzen 
EG entsteht." 38 The relative advantages which the East can offer in terms of 
technological developments has meant that western German concerns are 
now relocating to the East. There is a certain trend amongst the food 
processing industry to take advantage of the situation in the East and build 
up highly modern concerns there. The Federal' government is supporting 
this trend with the view that such modern concerns in the food processing 
industry will encourage the development of highly effective agricultural 
enterprises. 39 
Despite the problems encountered along the path to restructuring, the 
BML is of the opinion that, 
the most difficult stretch of the road for restructuring agriculture in the 
new Federal Lander has been covered. The enterprises now meet 
important conditions to survive competition which is growing 
increasingly intense. The reform of the Common Agricultural Policy and 
the GATT resolutions present new challenges to the agricultural 
enterprises of the new Federal Lander. (Bundesministerium fOr 
Ernahrung, Landwirtschaft und Forsten, 1995a: 9) 
In summary, the transition problems in agriculture are being 
surmounted. Structural change has taken place in the East. Jochen 
Borchert, the Minister for Agriculture, has noted that agriculture in eastern 
Germany has adapted to the requirements of the market by reducing output 
and improving product quality. Furthermore, the break up of large holdings 
38 Interview with official, Referat 211, "Grundsiitzliche Angelegenheiten der Agrarpolitik, Koordination 
der agrar- und emiihrungspolitischen Planung", Bundesministerium fUr Emiihrung, Landwirtschaft und 
Forsten, Bonn, 13 September 1993. Author's translation, "At present the most progressive food 
economy in the whole ofthe EU is emerging in the new' Lander." 
39 Interview with official, Referat 211, "Grundsiitzliche Angelegenheiten der Agrarpolitik, Koordination 
der agrar- und emiihrungspolitischen Planung", Bundesministerium fUr Emiihrung, Landwirtschaft und 
Forsten, Bonn, 13 September 1993. 
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is almost complete. Borchert's views are confirmed by a recent report by the 
DBV which points out that, "new investments and rationalisation measures 
in East Germany had produced satisfactory results." (Agra Europe, 1996a: 
N/1) The Federal government has invested significant amounts in the 
reconstruction of the agricultural sector. Since 1990 approximately 16 
million DM have been invested in the East from the agricultural budget. 
(Bundesministerium fOr Ernahrung, Landwirtschaft und Forsten, 1994f: 3) 
Of course, the agricultural sector in the new Lander will continue to be 
supported, but to a lesser extent. (Bundesministerium fOr Ernahrung, 
Landwirtschaft und Forsten, 1994f: 3) Borchert points out that not all of the 
current problems of restructuring the agricultural sector in the East can be 
solved by the financial aid provided by the Lander, the Federal government 
and the EU. Borchert argues that it is impossible to obliterate the practices 
of 40 years overnight. According to Borchert, "Es gilt Kompromisse zu 
schliessen ...... und eine flexible Anpassung der Betriebe." 40 (Presse und 
Informationsamt der Bundesregierung, 1993d: 272) 
7.1.4 A CONTINUANCE OF A PROTECTIONIST ATTITUDE TOWARDS 
AGRICULTURE? 
( 
The previous section has analysed the fundamental differences in the 
agricultural sectors in the two parts of Germany. The section has 
endeavoured to examine the process of transformation in the agricultural 
sector after unification and to ascertain the principal problems in that 
process. The agricultural sector in the East has adapted and taken on 
. board western regulations and methods. The result of unification has been 
a diversely structured agricultural sector, leading to changes in agricultural 
policy .. 
Thus there has been a definite shift in the balance of agriculture 
40 Author's translation "It is necessary to make comprises and take a flexible approach to the 
adjustment of farms." 
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following unification. However, despite these changes Germany's overall 
attitude towards agricultural policy remains protectionist. Agricultural 
interests remain important in Germany; with the notion that German farmers 
need to be 'protected'. Old structures remain firmly at helm of agricultural 
policy-making, continuing to exert influence on policy decisions. Chancellor 
Kohl had the option of appointing an Agricultural Minister from the East, 
bearing in mind the shift in the balance of agricultural interests. However, 
Ignaz Kiechle, the CSU politician, continued as Minister for Agriculture after 
the first all German election, hence virtually guaranteeing the maintenance 
of Bavarian influence over agricultural decisions. The old structures 
governing agricultural policy-making have continued to exert influence over 
policy decisions and the traditional protectionist stance propounded by 
these structures has continued after unification. The -advent of a new CDU 
Agricultural Minister, Jochen Borchert, has not altered that path either. The 
. 
tradition that farmers have a special position in society and need to be 
aided and protected is one which has transcended many turbulent changes 
in agriculture; unification has not upset that tradition. 
Rather the prediction is this protectionist stance is likely to extend 
" 
eastwards. The larger structures in the East, certainly in the long term, have 
the potential for increased and probably more efficient production. 
Nevertheless, Germany is likely to remain as protective of agriculture as it 
was before December 1989. "Indeed, it is likely that the massive 
enlargement of its farmed areas and the potential for increased production 
,will strengthen German tendency to protect agriculture and to operate 
dirigiste policies." (Agra Europe, 1992a: Et8) 
The Germans have always granted their farmers extensive financial 
assistance. Financial aid has been one manifestation of Germany's 
protectionist stance towards agriculture. The Germans continue to maintain 
a protectionist stance towards their farmers. The section on the transition 
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process revealed the kind of aid being granted to the eastern farmers in 
order to improve their structures, productivity and efficiency. In addition, in 
April 1995 the Federal government and the Lander announced a new 
agricultural aid programme, which would also benefit the western farmers 
from 1995. Of course, the eastern Lander are also beneficiaries of this aid 
package until the end of 1996. The amount allocated for investment by the 
" 
Federal government has been raised from OM 470 million to OM 570 
million. Added to the Lander contributions, aid to agriculture totals OM 950 
million. Aid will be available to any farming family whose income falls below 
OM 150 000. The money will be invested in buildings; livestock farmers will 
be the principal beneficiaries. The main objectives of the programme are to 
boost aid to the dairy farmers, improve environmental protection and raise 
aid available for non agricultural investments. (Agra Europe 1995a: N/3) The 
amount of investment in agriculture post-unification reinforces Germany's 
protectionist attitude towards the sector. 
An official from the BML confirmed Germany's protectionist tradition by 
stating, "Wir sind sicherlich im Landwirtschaftsbereich noch 
protektionistischer als Grossbritannien .... Oas sind wir nach wie vor." 41 He 
~ , 
pointed out that the Germans avoided a "revolution" in eastern German 
agriculture by maintaining a protectionist stance. 42 
The agrimonetary system has been the mechanism through which the 
Germans have been able to maintain protectionist policies. 43 The Germans 
have in the past, and continue to, protect their farmers by manipulating the 
. 'green' money system. As Swinbank notes, ''The green money system is 
manipulated to. provide an additional element of protection for farmers 
41 Author's translation, "In the agricultural sector we are defmitely more protectionist than the British. 
We still are now." , 
42 Interview with senior official, Ministerialdirigent, Bundesministerium fur Emlihrung, Landwirtschaft 
und Forsten, Bonn, 19 April 1995. 
43 Chapter six contains a detailed account of how Germany has been able to utilise the agrimonetary 
system to its benefit up until unification. 
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against exchange rate appreciation." (Swinbank, 1996: 1) 
Swinbank argues that the onset of the Single Market on 1 January 1993, 
should have guaranteed that, "the lunacies of the green money system 
could, and should, have been swept away. But the Commission and the 
Member States, largely on German insistence, botched the job." (Swinbank, 
1996: 1) The Single Market created in 1992 ensured the freedom of 
movement for goods, persons, services and capital. Clearly MCAs' 44 were a 
deviation from that objective and measures had be installed to dismantle 
them. MCAs were abolished with the establishment of Single Market. Not 
only the Single Market Programme but also the establishment of the 
Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM) and the moves towards Economic and 
Monetary Union called for dismantling green money system. Green 
currencies would become redundant with a single currency in the EU. 
However, some of the asymmetries of the green money system were 
preserved. For instance, the Switchover mechanism remained in force until 
August 1993. Furthermore, the new agrimonetary system provided for 
generous compensation terms for farmers facing revaluations. 45 
The virtual collapse of the ERM in August 1993 demonstrated 
L 
Germany's protectionist attitude towards agriculture. German farmers were 
confronted by a cut in prices. The emergence of French and Danish 
products on the German market, due to the decrease in value of the Krona 
and French Franc, had the effect of reducing prices. German farmers called 
for emergency action by the Commission. Max Zurex, chief economist of the 
. DBV, commented in August 1993, 
Any further price changes are going to hit us very hard because we've 
44 Monetary Compensatory Amounts lie at the heart of the EU's agrimonetary system. They date back 
to 1969, when in the wake of revaluation of the DM and a devaluation of the French Franc, the EC 
allowed France and Germany to continue to calculate national farm prices on the previous exchange 
rates. 'Positive' MCAs were in operation for revaluing currencies and 'negative' ones for devaluing 
currencies. 
45 Article 8 of Council Regulation 3813/92 stated L1.at fmancial compensation could be paid to farmers 
Who endure a loss of revenue due to a green rate revaluation. 
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already seen lower prices from reform of the CAP while we're paying 
more for our raw materials since our inflation rate is the highest in the 
EC. (Hargreaves, 1993: 24) 
German farmers, along with their European counterparts, have been 
protected from any real drop in farm prices ensuing from currency changes 
through the 'switchover' mechanism which was set up at German 
insistence in 1984. German prices have been kept stable through this 
mechanism. The Commission attempted to do away with the system at the 
beginning of 1993 with the introduction of the Single Market, but the German 
farm lobby ensured that it remained in place. Since the switchover was 
triggered by a revaluation within the narrow band of the ERM - a political 
decision in the semi-fixed exchange rate system - it is now defunct as 
currencies are permitted to fluctuate widely. The Germans, nevertheless, 
wanted it applied again to floating currencies. But, meeting German 
demands would have had the consequence of raising the costs of the CAP. 
The Commission, having to placate the Germans, froze green currency 
rates until December 1993. The Germans claimed that core currency 
countries had to carry on trading in narrow bands, thereby disadvantaging 
farmers in those countries. The Germans highlighted the case of the 
Bavarian diary farmers, who were perceived as being disadvantaged as 
compared to exports to Italy. (Grant, 1996: 25) 
The discarding of the narrow band within the ERM meant that the 
switchover mechanism could no longer protect farmers in strong currency 
. countries against future revaluation. Thus, the German government 
launched an attempt at restoring the system in order to protect its farmers 
from losing income when the Deutschmark is revalued. An official from the 
BML, speaking at an Agra Europe conference in November 1993, argued 
that the events of August 1993 could not modify the decision taken in 
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December 1992 to keep the switchover until December the following year. 
He declared, "Such a compromise, balanced only after long and most 
controversial negotiations, is integral and cannot be changed by accidental 
effects of decisions taken on other contexts. If those effects have an impact 
on legal rules, these rules have to be adapted. " (Schwinne, 1993: 2) In 
spite of the decision taken in December 1993 not to expand the switchover 
-' 
to floating currencies, Borchert clearly saw a possibility of resurrecting the 
system. In an interview with Agra Europe in January 1994, Borchert not only 
asserted that the Council would reconsider the switchover, but that the 
debate on agrimonetary rules applicable from 1995, "will probably see a 
continuation of the current system." (Agra Europe, 1994a: P/7) He signalled 
that Germans would consider matters connected to the agrimonetary 
system in the German Presidency. 
The switchover mechanism was eliminated in December 1994. 
However, the Germans were still concerned about protecting the income of 
their farmers. Nevertheless, the Germans were less concerned with the 
means to guarantee farmers incomes. The answer came in the form of a 
"mini-switchover" which the Germans were successfully able to maintain. 
/'< 
The "mini-switchover" guarantees against agrimonetary-related cuts in 
arable and livestock aids. 
However, Germany was set for a battle with the Commission over the 
proposed scrapping of the "mini-switchover" and the Commission's 
proposal to set national financial ceilings on the compensatory payments 
. made by revaluing countries. Germany's furious reaction to these proposals 
reflects the belief that German farmers must be protected against price cuts 
virtually at all costs. Borchert argued that guaranteed protection of German 
farmers was "an essential German concern". (Grant, 1996: 30) German 
attacks on the Commission have focused on proposals which deal with 
compensation to producers who incur losses on their CAP payments. 
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Borchert accused Fischler, the Agriculture Commissioner, of violating an 
undertaking between the Council and the Commission that compensation 
payments would not be decreased under levels concluded as part of the 
1992 CAP reforms. Minister Borchert warned, "Germany does not need to 
apologise for its strong currency, and its farmers do not have to suffer 
because other countries are unable to meet the convergence criteria." 
(Southey, 1995b: 2) The Germans argue that countries with weaker 
currencies are at a competitive advantage; they are overcompensated. A 
German official succinctly summarised German concerns, "What matters is 
that what Germans get paid in D-Marks must be guaranteed." (Southey, 
1995b: 2) The Germans argued that the Commission would have to change 
its proposals. 
Fischler has argued that the system can no longer be sustained, since 
it is undermining efforts to decrease agricultural production. Furthermore, 
the EU can no longer afford to finance the system. In order to deal with 
German attacks, the Commission came up with the proposal that, 
the Commission will ensure that there is sufficient funding available to 
cover an amount which corresponds to the loss of income in each 
revaluing country resulting from cuts in CAP reform arable and livestock 
payments. This contribution would be guaranteed and 100% EU-
funded. (Agra Europe, 1995b: P/3) 
German resistance was eventually overcome by a French inspired 
scheme, which would allow for a dual currency system - one for direct aid 
payments and another for price support payments. The idea is to be able to 
. protect farmers' incomes whilst eroding the excessive costs of the old 
system. The new system nullifies the old one introduced in January 1995, 
under which a revaluation in one member state could trigger compensation 
in all member states. They new system means freezing rates for reform aid 
payments to producers until January 1999 in countries where appreciable 
revaluations take place between the end of June 1995 and June 1996. The 
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direct effect will be to decouple direct aid payments from revaluations by 
fixing them in national currency terms. The system also includes a 
compensation system for farmers who suffer income losses from the 
impact of revaluations on intervention prices. The compensation payments 
will be restricted to three year period and the payments will degressive in 
the second and third years. The payments will be co-financed by the EU and 
the member state. The new system means that rules governing direct 
income support payments to farmers will depend on national economies of 
the countries concerned. A two tier system will be in operation for direct 
support payments to farmers with fixed conversion rates for strong currency 
countries, such as Germany, and variable rates linked to the ECU for 
weaker currency countries. The Germans welcomed the deal for securing 
farmers incomes in Germany until the end of the century. Thus, German 
obstinacy paid off in achieving a deal favourable to them. 
Officials at the BML insist that a currency unit for agriculture is 
imperative, "Farming, more than any other industry, is integrated into Europe 
and while we have common prices and no common currency, we will have 
to take care of currency divergences." (Harding, 1995a: 4) Thereby the 
.' 
maintenance of the agrimonetary system is justified until the EU achieves a 
single currency. 
In summary, the Germans have used the agrimonetary system to 
protect their farmers' incomes; the'system has worked to the advantage of 
German farmers by supporting high cost German agriculture. The Germans 
. have vigorouslyresisted any changes in the agrimonetary system, thereby 
indicating their . continuous protectionist stance towards agriculture after 
unification. In 1993, Erhard Schwinne from the Currency Affairs Division of 
the BML commented, "Neither Germany, nor any other country, whose 
currency is or may come under pressure of revaluation, will accept any 
system which results in abrupt reductions of institutional prices and 
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amounts." (Schwinne, 1993: 4) Thus, Germany's position on the utilisation 
of the agrimonetary system has not altered as a result of unification and the 
incorporation of the five new Lander into the CAP. Grant notes, 
The underlying dynamic has been to satisfy the interests of German 
farmers. Their interests are allowed to be placed at the centre of the 
CAP as a whole because of the determination and skill of Germany in 
relation to agricultural questions and its role as a major net budget 
contributor. (Grant, 1996: 33) 
7.1.5 THE IMPACT OF UNIFICATION ON GERMAN AGRICULTURAL POLICY 
Unification has had an impact on agriculture, both at the domestic and 
European level. 46 It is important, however, to point out that unification alone 
is not the sole factor affecting the debate on agriculture in Germany, and 
indeed in the EU, in the 1990s. The reform of the CAP, and its implications 
for agriculture in Germany, and a successful conclusion of the GATT 
negotiations, have been fundamental in bringing about a change. 
Although it has not fundamentally changed domestic agricultural policy 
itself, unification has brought about a shift in emphasis. 47 Unification has 
changed the orientation of the discussion on agriculture in the FRG. The 
debate about the structure of agriculture in Germany has intensified and 
, 
changed. In terms of structure, the family farm is, as a result of unification, 
not the only viable form. The larger structures in eastern Germany are 
perceived as perfectly feasible, competitive, and perhaps even more 
efficient. It was remarked, 
After four years one can say that these larger farms which exist in 
eastern Germany in different legal forms, have contributed to the notion 
that in western Germany it is now feasible to think about whether a 
diverse agricultural structure is more meaningful than just a family 
farm.48 
46 The impact of unification on European agriculture and the CAP will be discussed under the section 
entitled policy circumstance. 
47 Interview with official, Referat 211, "Grundsiltzliche Angelegenheiten der Agrarpolitik, Koordination 
der agrar- und emilhrungspolitischen Planung", Bundesministerium filr Emilhrung, Landwirtschaft und 
Forsten, Bonn, 14 September 1994. 
48 Interview with official, Referat 211, "Grundsiltzliche Angelegenheiten der Agrarpolitik, Koordination 
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Thus, the pressure for structural change has intensified in the West. In 
addition, farmers from the West have migrated to the East where the profit 
margin, certainly in the long term, is higher. This has no doubt led to 
problems between eastern and western farmers. "1m Moment halt ein 
bisschen eine schwierige Situation, weil man beobachtet, dass die 
0' 
Stimmung zwischen Ost und West eigentlich nicht besser, sondern 
schlechter geworden ist." 49 ' 
The impact of unification on agricultural policy and the shift in attitude is 
illustrated simply by the change in policy discussions. For instance in the 
1980s the discussion about the upper limit for the number of cattle per 
holding concentrated on approximately 80. The motto in the 1980s in 
Germany was that enterprises with more than 80 cattle were not feasible. 
However,_ the developments in the new Lander have completely surpassed 
these discussions and the policy has been overhauled. "Es gibt keine 
Ansatzpunkte mehr, von solchen Diskussionen zu reden. Weil, das ist durch 
die Realitat praktisch ad absurdum gefOhrt worden." 50 There are 
enterprises in the East with 1000 or 2000 cows. Unification, without a doubt, 
{ 
has influenced this debate. 
According to an official in the Chancellery, the Minister for Agriculture 
has been careful but noticeable in changing gear by simply referring to an 
efficient and competitive agricultural sector. In this way the Minister of 
Agriculture has been skilful in detracting from a particular farm structure. 
The representative from the Chancellery attributed the opening of the East 0 
-
der agrar- und emtihrungspolitischen Planung", Bundesministerium fUr Emtihrung, Landwirtschaft und 
Forsten, Bonn, 14 September 1994. 
49 Interview with official, Leiter des Referates Emtihrung, Landwirtschaft und Forsten, 
Bundeskanzleramt, Bonn, 14 September 1993. Author's translation, "At the moment we have a 
slightly difficult situation, as we have noticed that the atmosphere between East and West has 
worsened rather than improved." 
so Interview with official, Leiter des Referates Emtihrung, Landwirtschaft und Forsten, 
Bundeskanzleramt, Bonn, 14 September 1993. Author's translation, "There are no more starting points 
for those kind of discussions. Reality has practically proven this ad absurdum." 
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as definitely contributing to this discussion. Furthermore he added that this 
is not a stance which has come about voluntarily but that the issue has 
been forced. 51 
There has been a change in the balance of German agriculture 
following unification. Whereas five years ago a farm over 18 hectares was 
unimaginable in the most of Germany 52 and the whole thrust of agricultural 
,-
policy was geared towards sustaining this structure, unification has meant 
a complete overhaul of this policy. Unification has on the whole had a 
positive effect on agriculture and agricultural policy. It can, however, not be 
denied that unification has led to problems, particularly in the interests and 
insecurities of the farmers across the whole of Germany. Initially, unification 
resulted in a combination of numerous small inefficient farms and some of 
the largest inefficient farms in the western world. However, now the 
efficiency, of farms is beginning to balance out, with a shift in certain aspects 
of the policy at the domestic level and the respective changes at the 
European level in order to accommodate the interests of farmers in both 
parts of Germany. 
7.2 POLICY CIRCUMSTANCE 
Policy circumstance centres around an analysis of three factors which 
are vital for agricultural policy in the 1990s: German unification and the 
incorporation of eastern agriculture into the mechanisms of the CAP; the 
reform of the CAP, and the GATT negotiations and the possible 
consequences it has for German agriculture. These three processes are of 
decisive importance for German agriculture over the next ten years. Although 
the reform of the CAP and the GATT negotiations may appear peripheral to 
unification and eastern German agriculture at first glance, the two events 
51 Interview with official, Leiter des Referates Ernahrung, Landwirtschaft und Forsten, 
Bundeskanzleramt, Bonn, 14 September 1993. 
52 Of course the size of farms in the northern state of Schleswig-Holstein have always been greater. 
Farms there averaged at about 40 ha. 
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are of immense importance regarding the overall framework of German 
agricultural policy and the objectives it pursues at the European level. The 
reform of the CAP and the GATT negotiations have contributed to the 
changing environment within which agriculture in the new Lander has had 
to operate. The discussions surrounding the reform of the CAP and the 
GATT agreement have certainly complicated any adaptation measures and 
introduced new challenges for eastern German agriculture. "The reform of 
the Common Agricultural Policy and the GATT resolutions present new 
challenges to the agricultural enterprises of the new Federal Lander." 
(Bundesministerium fOr Ernahrung, Landwirtschaft und Forsten, 1995a: 9) 
7.2.1 THE EU AND AGRICULTURE IN THE NEW LANDER 
THE INTEGRATION OF EASTERN AGRICULTURE INTO THE CAP 
It is important at this point to consider the incorporation of eastern 
agriculture into the mechanisms of the CAP. Economic and Monetary Union 
on 1 July 1990 signalled the formal integration of the agricultural sector of 
the East into the mechanisms of the CAP. This included the CAP price 
support mechanism, quotas and structural funds, and EU export subsidies 
as well as the refund and levy systems relating to external trade. The former 
".: 
GDR was also required to adapt its production and environmental 
measures to the CAP including the set-aside of land and afforestation. 
Germany was granted a number of derogations 53 for the agricultural territory 
of the East, which were valid in the first instance for three years and later 
extended until the end of 1996. Germany was also permitted to provide 
. sUbstantial national subsidies for agriculture in that region. Article 4 of the 
Regulation of Transitional measures states, 
53 Article 1 of the Regulation on the Transitional Measures stated that, "To ensure the hannonious 
integration offanning in the territory of the fonner Gennan Democratic Republic into the common 
agricultural policy, this Regulation lays down transitional measures and adjustments required to the 
common agricultural rules." (Council of the European Communities, 1990: 10) 
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the Commission may authorise Germany to introduce in the territory of 
the former German Democratic, a system of aid to compensate for 
agricultural income losses in that territory as a result of the changeover 
to the common agricultural policy. (Council of European Communities, 
1990: 11) 
The transitional measures applied to all agricultural products. 
Production of cereals and oilseed were not included in the Maximum 
Guaranteed Quantities (MGQs). Nor was the region's production to be 
counted towards the MGQs for sheep and tobacco. Separate milk and sugar 
quotas were established for the former GDR. The milk quota was set at 
6.59 million tonnes. The sugar quota was set at 847 000 tonnes. (Agra 
Europe, 1990: E/2) The set-aside programme was to remove marginal 
areas from agricultural production. The Commission allowed for a series of 
national aids in order to bring the infrastructure of East German agricultural 
production up to EU standards. The Commission also exempted the former 
GDR from EU veterinary and plant health legislation until the end of 1992. 
The unification of Germany meant that the former FRG had to not only 
integrate eastern agriculture into the social market economy but also into 
the CAP. The Committee on Agriculture, Fisheries and Rural Development 
perceived it to be a "positive move, but it will call for considerable vigilance 
and continuing strict standards on the part of the Community authorities." 
(European Parliament, 1990: 7) The EC was concerned that if production 
levels did not drop in the eastern part of Germany, the EC could face more 
agricultural surpluses. Furthermore, the EC was concerned about the costs 
. of integrating eas!ern agriculture into the CAP. Some estimates put the 
-
increase of costs from 1000 to 3000 million ECU per annum. Lippert 
summarises the difficulties for the EC, 
The entry of the GDR into the CAP meant a worsening of agricultural 
market difficulties in the EC, especially in terms of potential increases in 
surplus production and also increased exports as subsidies were 
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removed. This demanded extra structural payments, export subsidies, 
and the added budgetary burden of intervention purchases. (Lippert et 
ai, 1993: 100) 
Lippert points out that it is the impact of eastern agriculture's integration 
into the CAP which has made the German government more forceful in its 
resistance to the DBV and less prepared to contribute to the EC farm price 
and income support system. 
The adaptation of eastern agriculture to the CAP and the internal market 
is all but complete. There are,' however, still some special provisions in 
place for eastern agriculture. Firstly, help for investment 
(lnvestitionsforderung) is valid in the new Lander until the end of 1996. 
Secondly, regulation of the milk market will continue until 1.4.98. The 
Agriculture Council recognised that, in comparison to other regions in the 
EU, agriculture in the eastern Lander was in a particular situation. Hence, 
the Commission and the Agriculture Council finally endorsed Kiechle's 
demands by deeming special provisions necessary for the five new Lander 
as part of the CAP reform package. 
The special provisions concern the following areas: Firstly, the special 
(, 
provisions pertained to the ceiling on the number of male fattening cattle, 
(mannliche Mastrinder), breeding cows (MutterkOhe), and ewes 
(Mutterschafe) entitled to a premium payment. The Commission and the 
Agriculture Council resolved that rather than setting the restrictions on the 
number of animals for separate reference years, the following numbers of 
animals would be entitled to premium payments in order to facilitate the 
necessary structural change. Hence, the numbers were 1 000 000 ewes, 
180 000 breeding cows and 780 000 fattening cattle. Furthermore, the 
provisions allowed for the possibility of exchanging 15% of the ceiling for 
beef and cows. Secondly, it was decided that a general base area of circa 
3,56 million hectares would be established for the new Lander. Thirdly, the 
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level of yield to calculate the compensation payments for price cuts and the 
premiums for set-aside would be aligned. Hence, irrespective of the 
average yields for cereals and rape laid down between 1986-1990, the new 
Lander would be granted the same level of compensation and premium for 
set-aside as the old Lander (55,6 dtlha for cereals and 31,1 dtlha for rape). 
Fourthly, the special provisions determined that the upper limit of 90 
animals per enterprise per calendar year would not apply for the premium 
on male fattening cattle for the new Lander. 
Other general decisions in the CAP reform are also of relevance for the 
new Lander. The premium for set-aside will be paid irrespective of the size 
of the concern. The BML concluded that the special provisions negotiated 
for the new Lander within the context of the CAP reform constituted a fair 
contribution by the EU towards restructuring in agriculture in the East. 
(Bundesminister fOr Ernahrung, Landwirtschaft und Forsten, 1992b: 1-3) 
European agricultural policy is very closely linked to national policy. 
Thus does a shift in agricultural policy at the domestic level as a result of 
unification imply an indirect effect on policy at the European level? An official 
from the BML commented, "in der Europaischen Gemeinschaft hat die 
I' 
Wiedervereinigung nicht zu einer nachhaltigen Anderung der EG Agrarpolitik 
gefOhrt." 54 It would be a mistake to come to the conclusion that unification 
had led to a significant change in the CAP. The agricultural sector of the new 
Lander contributes approximately between 5% and 8% to EU agriculture. 
Eastern German agriculture does not hold enough weight to effect a change 
in the whole policy. Hence, the direction of CAP has not changed as a result 
of unification. Neither has unification changed Germany's general role in EU 
agricultural policy. However, Germany has attempted to pursue policies at 
the European level which are agreeable to eastern farmers. "Die deutsche 
54 Interview with senior official, Bundesministerium fUr Emiihrung, Landwirtschaft und Forsten, 
Bonn, 13 September 1993. Author's translation, "Unification has not led lasting change in EU 
agricultural policy." 
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Politik in der EG hat darauf hingewirkt oder hat versucht, Regelungen zu 
finden, mit denen die Landwirtschaft im Osten leben kann." 55 
German unification may not have had a direct effect on European policy. 
But it has had an effect on Germany's position and specific German 
interests in EU agricultural policy. It has been suggested that the 
importance of German agriculture has increased in the EU as a result of 
unification. An official at the BML remarked, "Deutschland hat ein grosseres 
Gewicht in der EG gewonnen." 56 Germany's importance has grown with 
respect to its increased agricultural area and the increase in the volume of 
production. Germany is now the main producer in certain agricultural 
products such as potatoes. Unification has brought about a new direction 
and new thoughts on agricultural policy at the domestic level which in part 
have resulted in a change at the European level. An official at the BML 
commented, "vielleicht hat sich in den letzten fOnfzehn Jahren nicht so viel 
verandert wie in den letzten drei Jahren. Weil die deutschen Position 
einfach zum Oberdenken anders geht." 57 
The change in specific German interests has perhaps been most 
notable at the European level with issues related to structural change in the 
!, 
size of enterprises. In terms of the representation of interests, a change has 
occurred in Brussels. The national interests of German agricultural policy 
revolved largely around guaranteeing the incomes of small farmers. It was 
commented, "Der Akzent hat sich verschoben." 58 Before unification 
55 Interview with official, Bundeskanzleramt, Bonn, 14 September 1993. Author's translation, "In the 
EC German politicians have attempted to work towards regulations which are acceptable for Eastern 
farmers." 
. 56 Interview with official, Referat 211, "Grunds1itzliche Angelegenheiten der Agrarpolitik, Koordination 
der agrar- und ern1ihrungspolitischen Planung", Bundesministerium fUr Ern1ihrung, Landwirtschaft und 
Forsten, Bonn, 13 September 1993. Author's translation, "Germany's weight has increased in the 
EC." 
57 Interview with official, Referat 211, "Grunds1itzliche Angelegenheiten der Agrarpolitik, Koordination 
der agrar- und ern1ihrungspolitischen Planung", Bundesministerium fUr Ern1ihrung, Landwirtschaft und 
Forsten, Bonn, 13 September 1993. Author's translation, "Perhaps there has been more change in the 
last three years than in the previous fifteen. This is because the German's way of thinking has 
changed." 
58 Interview with senior official, Ministerialdirigent, Bundesministerium fUr Ern1ihrung, Landwirtschaft 
und Forsten, Bonn, 19 April 1995. Author's translation, "The emphasis has shifted." 
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Germany always promoted the interests of the family farm. Now the family 
farm is not the only viable model: upon unification Germany acquired much 
larger farms in the East. The interests of farmers differ between North and 
South and East and West. The government has to find a balance and 
compromise between the various Lander. Change at the domestic level has 
been accompanied by change at the European level. It was commented, "In 
.-
BrOssel hat das die Auswirkung, dass wir uns starker fOr Regelungen 
interessieren, die auch den grossen Betrieben nOtzlich sind." 59 
The changed policy is already leading to problems. The BML 
emphasises both structures at the European level. The smaller family 
farmers in the South are complaining about the degree of benefits and 
premiums being provided for eastern farmers. From their perspective 
benefits should once again be concentrated on them. 60 A manifestation of 
Germany's changed interests and the way in which the German government 
is pursuing the interests of the eastern farmers was the controversy which 
ensued between the Federal government and the Commission over the 
amount of land which could be sown with cereals in the new Lander. The 
Federal government argued that the area had been underestimated by 10% 
I 
due to the unreliability of the data from the East. Hence, the Federal 
government asked for an increase of 347,000 hectares in the base area. 
The question was how would the EU deal with this problem? Would the EU 
put sanctions into effect? According to the rules, the new Lander should 
have been punished. However, the BML argued that this situation could not 
have been foreseen and therefore a compromise should be found. A 
compromise was found to take account of the statistical inaccuracy. The 
German base area could be increased by 181,000 hectares. 
59 Interview with senior official, Ministerialdirigent, Bundesministerium fUr Emlihrung, Landwirtschaft 
und Forsten, Bonn, 19 April 1995. Author's translation, "The effect in Brussels being that we are 
more interested in regulations which will be useful to the larger farms as well." 
60 Interview with senior official, Ministerialdirigent, Bundesministerium fUr Emahrung, Landwirtschaft 
und Forsten, Bonn, 19 April 1995. 
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The DBV would argue that the unification of Germany has not had a 
sUbstantive effect on EU agricultural policy. What occurred was a de facto 
enlargement. Hence the integrating country had to adapt its structures. The 
EU did institute a set of special measures for a transitional period. The DBV 
is of the view that the EU is watching the developments in the eastern 
German agricultural sector with interest, bearing in mind the potential 
.. 
eastern enlargement. The transition that took place from a communist 
structured sector to a capitalist sector may in the future serve as a model for 
adaptations in other Central and East European states.61 The Germans are 
now experienced in this adaptation process. 
The transition period in agricultural policy was shorter than for other 
enlargements. It was assumed that Germany had the resources to solve 
the problems quicker in this area. It has been very difficult for people in 
eastern Germany to comprehend this rapid transformation process. The 
public at large in the East has had problems adapting to the principles of 
the market economy and the production methods. Eastern Germans 
engaged in agriculture have additionally found it difficult to come to terms 
with the consequences of rapid transformation in the agricultural sector 
~ 
such as the massive unemployment. Eastern farmers have criticised 
European decisions relating to agriculture in the East, namely the question 
over the base area. Furthermore, they complain that the CAP is too 
bureaucratic. 
Nevertheless, the farmers realise that transformation could not have 
taken place without the EU and the transitional measures. The transitional 
measures have facilitated the construction of a competitive and efficient 
agricultural structure in the East. Germany's partners in the EU are 
concerned that the structures which are being developed in the East could 
eventually be more efficient than the ones which exist in their countries. 
61 Interview with senior official, Deutscher Bauernverband, 19 April 1995. 
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Hence there is also dissent about certain measures being made available 
for the new Lander. 62 
7.2.2 GERMAN UNIFICATION AND THE CAP REFORM 
Before embarking on an analysis of Germany's attitude towards the 
CAP and the CAP reform after unification it is important to understand the 
contents of the reform proposal. By the 1970s it was clear that the CAP was 
" 
in urgent need of reform. Technological advances and the maintenance of 
high producer prices had led to a situation where production had escalated 
to a level where surpluses were mounting within the Community. The cost 
of support had increased dramatically and in response to the budgetary 
problems the Community commenced attempts at reform of the CAP. 
Hence, "the build-up and destruction of surplus food, the direct and indirect 
costs of the high price policy, the budgetary implications of the MCA system" 
(Hendriks,1994a: 155) all necessitated reform of the CAP. Since the mid 
1970s the EC had been engaged in a process of reform which moved away 
from open-ended guarantees towards more market oriented solutions. 63 
. By the early 1990s reform of the CAP was unavoidable. The internal 
pressure of rising costs, coupled with the external impetus to conclude the 
I' 
GATT negotiations, culminated in a process of reform which was finally 
achieved in May 1992 to be fully operational by 1996. The deadlock over a 
reduction in agricultural support in the GATT negotiations are inextricably 
linked to the reform of the CAP. 64 The MacSharry proposals 65 for the reform 
of the CAP comprised two main elements: a price cut and a direct subsidy 
aimed at small and poorer producers. MacSharry's reform proposals 
62 Interview with offi~ial, Referat 211, "Grundsatzliche Angelegenheiten der Agrarpolitik, Koordination 
der agrar- und emahrungspolitischeri Planung", Bundesministerium fUr Emahrung, Landwirtschaft und 
Forsten, Bonn, 13 September 1993. ' 
63 For an overview of the operation of the CAP and the principal problems and attempts at reform see: 
~Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food, 1993: 1-11) 
The significance of the GATT negotiations in the German position on agriculture is examined in the 
next section. 
65 The MacSharry proposals are named after the EC Commissioner for Agriculture. An agreement on 
the proposals was arrived at on 22 May 1992, six months after the initial proposals were submitted. 
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centred around change in the arable sector. The fundamental components 
of the reform consisted of: firstly, a significant cut in the level of price support 
for cereals, the aim being to bring prices to the level of the world market 
price. The Commission had proposed a cut in cereal prices of 35% over 3 
years. A cut of 29% was eventually agreed. Secondly, the proposal 
advocated a system of acreage payments to compensate farmers for the 
anticipated loss of revenue. 
However, it was suggested that compensation payments be 
'modulated', in other words linked to the size of the farm. This concept of 
modulation was contested by several member states, including the British 
and the Germans. The scheme advocated that 'smaller' farmers be 
remunerated in full, whilst 'larger' farms or farms beyond a designated size 
only be compensated partially. The British had argued that this proposal 
unjustly discriminated against them. The German Minister of Agriculture, 
Ignaz Kiechle, was happy to align himself with the British since the 
emerging structures in the East were much larger. Hence, marking a 
change in the German approach towards agricultural policy. Finally, the 
compensation payments should be connected to a set-aside scheme. 
{ 
(Swinbank, 1993a: 359-364) The Commission intended to reduce the area 
under cultivation by 2m ha. (Rollo, 1992: 6) The Commission was also 
seeking a reduction in the milk quota of 3%, which the Council rejected. 
Furthermore, the Commission was looking for a reduction of 15% in Beef 
prices. 66 
Generally speaking, unification has not altered Germany's stance 
towards the CAP and the process of reforming it. Although, certain elements 
within the reform proposals which would have previously yielded German 
support, are now the source of discord. The MacSharry reform proposed 
66 For a detailed analysis of the MacSharry proposals see: (Swinbank, 1993a: 359-372) and 
(Commission of European Communities, 1992: 5-22) 
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that compensation be modulated according to the size of an agricultural 
holding. The Commission had suggested that there be an upper limit on 
compensatory payments based on the size of the farm. Prior to unification, 
the Germans would have agreed that there be an upper ceiling for size, 
since German farms were not so large. However, after unification and the 
acquisition of these larger farms in the East, the Germans insist that there 
.-
must under no circumstance be an upper limit according to the size of a 
holding. 67 Despite the progress achieved, the large eastern farmers still 
need support, clearly much more than the part-time farmers in the western 
part of Germany. Yet, according to the MacSharry proposals, these eastern 
farms would be categorised as large rich farmers and their support would 
be cut. Kiechle objected to this arbitrary assumption that, "small farms were 
good and large farms bad." (Agra Europe, 1991 b: P/5) Kiechle was further 
quoted as saying, "The proposals to leave the large farms without 
help ..... cannot be accepted in view of the farms in excess of 100 hectares in 
the new eastern states." (Campbell, 1991: 34) The DBV and the German 
farmers themselves were vehement in their opposition towards this aspect 
of the MacSharry reform. The DBV favoured the option of a redirection 
" 
towards supply management, which preserved the same price structures 
but reduced quantities sharply. Thus, the MacSharry reform proposals 
complicated the situation for eastern farmers. 
A significant change in the German position was that Kiechle had 
agreed to drastic price cuts, which he had originally opposed. Kiechle was 
quoted as saying, "FOr falsch halte ich, dass sie vor allem auf 
Preissenkungen bis auf Weltmarktniveau gesetzt hat." 68 (Presse und 
Informationsamt der Bundesregierung, 1992h: 765) Furthermore, on this 
occasion Kiechle resisted the DBV in not utilising his veto, as he had done 
67 Interview with senior official, Ministerialdirigent, Bundesministerium fUr Em1ihrung, Landwirtschaft 
und Forsten, Bonn, 19 April 1995. 
68 Author's translation, "I consider it wrong that price cuts have been set up to world market levels." 
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in 1985. Nevertheless, Kiechle was able to negotiate a satisfactory 
compensation package. He negotiated set-aside compensation for all 
farmers and the extension of the milk quota system until 2000. Kiechle also 
insisted that compensation payments for cuts in cereal prices should 
continue indefinitely. Thus the Minister of Agriculture continued to achieve as 
good a deal as possible for German farmers. 
The Chancellor was of fundamental importance in shaping the German 
package for CAP reform. Kohl directed Kiechle to come up with a 
compromise package for the CAP, as the reform as it stood was not entirely 
satisfactory to the German government. Bonn advocated that any price cuts 
had to be matched by a 'package of measures' such as income 
compensation and set-aside quotas. The government reached a 
compromise in October 1991 which included the following measures: 
Firstly, reductions in support prices were only acceptable if accompanied by 
income compensation. Furthermore, producers should expect positive 
developments in market prices. Secondly, income compensation had to be 
continuous and guaranteed and not limited to any particular size of holding. 
Finally, compensatory payments could not form part of the negotiating 
i, 
package in the GATT. (Hendriks, 1994a: 158) 
Nevertheless, Tangermann argues that unification is unlikely to change 
Germany's overall attitude towards the development of the CAP. He pointed 
out that Germany is likely to maintain its protective stance in agriculture. 
Tangermann argues that essentially unification upset the balance of 
. German agricultural policy, in the respect that the larger farms in the East 
would eventually become more efficient and productive. Thus, policy would 
no longer revolve solely around the small family farm. (Agra Europe, 1992a: 
Et8-9) This is indeed the case and is a worry shared by farmers in the West. 
Tangermann estimates that with this change in German policy, the 
Germans are likely to push for even higher levels of support in the EU 
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despite the potential for increased productivity in eastern German 
agriculture following unification. Tangermann argues that the economic 
distress in the agricultural sector, the bankruptcies and increased 
unemployment made the eastern Germans as concerned about protection 
as their western colleagues. 
The incomes of the inefficient part-time farmers in the toy farms of the 
west and of the under-employed workers in the socialised farms of the 
east cannot be brought to the levels they desire through any feasible 
subsidies to output. The only hope is direct income support. (Financial 
Times, 22 October 1990: 14) 
Therefore, Tangermann contends that at least in the short to medium 
term Germany is unlikely to change its attitude towards agricultural policy. 
The Germans "continue to insist on levels of agricultural protection which 
will perpetuate its peasant-style agricultural economy and place further 
burdens on the rest of the country." (Agra Europe, 1993: P/6) 
Indeed, there has been no radical change in Germany's approach to 
CAP reform as a result of unification. The Germans agree on the prinCiple 
that the CAP needed to be reformed. The CAP reform is regarded as a 
reasonabl,e compromise. The Germans believe that the EU had no other 
alternative. (CDU-Bundesgeschaftsstelle, 1994d: 4) The DBV was originally 
against the reform package. Nevertheless, the DBV would concede that 
reform of the CAP is necessary and that the CAP has the capacity to be 
adapted. An official from the DBV cited the integration of eastern German 
agriculture into the CAP as an example of the CAP's adaptive capacity. He 
. pointed out that there were problems regarding Germany's entry and that 
the CAP was flexible enough to accommodate the changes. A set of 
transitional measures were agreed to facilitate eastern Germany's 
accession to the CAP. 69 
69 Interview with senior official, Deutscher Bauemverband, 19 April 1995. 
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Thus, the Germans concede that the reform was unavoidable for a 
variety of reasons: the system does not function effectively anymore and the 
system could no longer be financed. However, the general direction of 
Germany's approach to CAP reform remained the same. The Germans 
have never been in favour of sharp decreases in price, always preferring 
higher prices and the control of production through other measures, either 
by set-aside or quotas. 70 The general approach towards CAP reform 
remains protective and high income oriented. However, unification has 
marked a shift in approach to certain elements of the reform debate; 
namely the discord over compensation to larger farms. 
Germany's stance towards the CAP remained the same to the extent 
that Borchert continued to pursue pOlicies which would add to the overall EU 
budget. Indeed, the BML clashed with the Bundesbank over this issue. The' 
German CAP demands conflicted with tile Bundesbank's concerns over 
Germany's contributions to the EU budget. The Bundesbank suggested in a 
report in 1993 that Germany's contributions to the EU budget be reduced. In 
1993 Germany paid 29% of the total EU budget but only benefited from 12% 
of EU expenditure. (Agra Europe" 1993: P/5) The Bundesbank suggested 
.' that the rise in German contributions was no longer appropriate bearing in 
mind the drop in Germany's purchasing power since unification. The 
Bundesbank's suggestions contradicted Borchert's demands from the 
Commission for a policy which would add the burden on the EAGGF budget. 
The German approach to the CAP reform debate followed the traditional 
line of satisfying the German farmers in exchange for reform. The German 
farmers were recompensed for the reform of the policy by both national and 
EU measures. 
Unification may have only effected a small change in the German 
70 Interview with senior official, Millisterialdirigent, Bundesministerium fUr Ernahrung, Landwirtschaft 
und Forsten, Bonn, 19 April 1995. 
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approach, but the external impetus to CAP reform, namely from the 
deadlock in the GATT negotiations, did mark a shift in the German priorities 
between protecting agriculture and concluding the GATT negotiations so as 
not to disadvantage industry. 
7.2.3 GERMAN AGRICULTURE AND THE GATT NEGOTIATIONS 
The GATT negotiations contributed to a change in the German position 
on agriculture. Hendriks argues that the conflict which the CAP caused in 
international relations made the Germans reassess their position on 
agriculture. Germany as a significant exporting country had an 
overwhelming interest in the successful conclusion of the GATT 
negotiations. Hendriks contends that the deadlock over the Uruguay Round 
meant that, "German policy-makers were made to realise not only the 
economic but also the political costs of pursuing a highly-protectionist 
policy." (Hendriks, 1994b: 64) Hendriks goes further to argue that the conflict 
between the EU and the United States over agricultural matters lead to a, 
"turning-point when Germany had to undertake a stock-taking of its position 
on the CAP and to re-assess its method of agricultural support." (Hendriks, 
1994b: 64) 
" 
The Germans faced problems in determining their position on· the 
agricultural dimension of the GATT negotiations domestically. However, the 
deadlock between the Community and the United States revolved around 
calls for the abandonment of the EU's regulated market system, especially 
export subsidies. The US and the "Cairns Group" of agricultural exporting 
countries called for cuts in EU farm subsidies of between 75% and 90%. 71 
The Germans were obviously opposed to these proposals. 
Germany faced a dilemma in the GATT negotiations due to its dual 
interests of upholding the principle of free trade on the one hand, being the 
world's second largest exporting nation, and the aim of protecting a 
71 For details of the measures in the GATT Agreement see: (Swinbank, 1993a: 364-366) 
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vulnerable and an electorally important section of the economy on the other 
hand. The agricultural sector remained vital since Germany was facing a 
Federal election at the time. 
The Germans faced problems with a conflict of interests both at the 
governmental and non-governmental level. Prior to the actions of Chancellor 
Kohl, the sectorisation on the German policy-making process allowed the 
agricultural and trade ministries to contradict each other on Germany's 
stance in the GATT negotiations. What has occurred is a souring of 
relations between the Finance Ministry and the SML. The Finance Ministry 
was quite willing to accept concessions on agriculture as long as it did not 
affect their vital interests. However, when discord over agricultural issues in 
the GATT negotiations threatened their collapse, the Finance Ministry 
adopted a firmer stance. 
Now, as the Frankfurt power-brokers become ever more concerned 
about the impact of unification on the German economy, it is the finance 
ministry which looks set to take a position entirely incompatible with that 
of their agricultural colleagues. (Agra Europe, 1993: P/6) 
The government faced problems at the non-governmental level with the 
respective interest groups. The government faced resistance to its 
agricultural policy from industrial and economic circles. The Federation of 
Germany Industry (Sundesverband der Oeutschen Industrie) (SOl) broke 
their traditional alliance on agricultural policy to influence the Chancellor 
directly for a successful conclusion of the GATT negotiations. The SOl wrote 
to the Chancellor applying pressure on him, urging him to utilise his power 
. and authority. The. SOl had the support of the FOP led Economics Ministry, 
which pointed out that the failure of the GATT would be catastrophic for 
Germany. Kohl on this occasion supported industry. Kohl highlighted the 
importance of free trade, 
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for Germany as the world's leading exporting nation, it is of great 
importance ... to dismantle trade barriers. We know from our past that 
economic well-being and progress can only be achieved in an open 
economy. (Hendriks, 1994b: 66) . 
The DBV was against the Blair House deal. The DBV were aware that 
trade and industrial interests had been put first in the GATT negotiations. 
The DBV felt that agriculture had been made a scapegoat in the 
negotiations. "Die Landwirtschaft wurde zu Unrecht zum SOndenbock 
abgestempelt." 72 (Deutscher Bauernverband, 1993: 12) Aware of the 
importance of the GATT agreement, Kohl seems to have invoked his 
Richtlinienkompetenz 73 in instructing his cabinet that the GATT Round must 
not end in failure. Thus, the reform of the CAP and the conclusion of the 
GATT agreement are closely linked. 
However, once the German position in the GATT negotiations had been 
worked out, problems emerged with France. France had resisted US 
demands on quantitative cuts in the GATT negotiations. There was no 
longer a need to support the French in the GATT once the German 
problems had been resolved. France had become the world's second 
largest food exporter due to EU subsidies and the US demands meant that 
France would have to commit itself to sacrifice some of its share of the 
world's cereal market. The French threatened to veto the whole Blair House 
deal. The French argued that the concessions agreed by the Commission 
were too generous. President Clinton attempted to use Germany to apply 
pressure on the French to stick with the common commercial policy. 
Chancellor Kohl found himself in a precarious position, having to satisfy 
domestic interests, facing an election, needing a conclusion of the GATT, 
'and having to convince the French not to break ranks. However, the 
72 Author's translation, "Agriculture was unjustly made the scapegoat." 
73 This refers to the competence of the Chancellor to set guidelines for policy. 
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Germans although sympathetic to the French cause, would not have gone 
so far as supporting the French if it entailed a renegotiation of the farm deal 
of November 1991. 
Other internal and external pressures apart from unification have 
resulted in a shift in German position in the reform of agriculture. Some 
have argued that this shift has entailed a "break-down in consensus on 
agricultural issues" and that Germany "forced to examine its position on 
agricultural protectionism and undermined the previously powerful position 
of the agricultural sector in Germany's social and political set up." 
(Hendriks, 1994b: 72) This position is exaggerated, the Germans have 
effected a shift in policy, but the old agricultural structures remain important 
in Germany and are able to influence policy. The DBV and the BML continue 
to work closely together, although there have been disagreements between 
the interest group and the Ministry in the past. The Germans have been able 
to extract a good deal for their farmers, despite technically giving priority to 
industry and trade. The Germans remain protectionist towards their 
farmers. The Germans were able to win important concessions for their 
farmers at the national and European level. Furthermore, the package of 
measures agreed for CAP reform bore the hallmark of measures agreed by 
'the German government in October 1991. The Germans continue to protect 
their farmers. The German government confirmed this in a statement in the 
annual Agrarbericht of 1993, "the Federal government pushes for a speedy 
conclusion of the GATT Round, in which she emphatically represents the 
interests of the German agricultural sector." (Hendriks, 1994b: 69) 
7.3 POLICy-MAKING STRUCTURES 
The institutional and constitutional dynamics of agricultural policy-
making both at the domestic and European level are of immense 
importance. The sectorisation of policy-making has a direct effect on policy. 
Institutional pluralism ensures that a number of actors are involved in the 
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policy-making process. The DBV, the CDU, the CSU and the BML are all 
guaranteed an input in the policy process. The constitutional principles of 
Richlinienkompetenz ensures that the Chancellor plays an important role in 
policy-making. The Ressortprinzip (Departmental principle) assures a 
great deal of ministerial autonomy in decisions regarding agriculture. The 
German system of proportional representation and the consequent need for 
coalition-formation also elevates the position of agriculture. Hence, 
domestic political actors and processes are an important component in 
agricultural policy-making. Therefore, this section examines the importance 
of policy-making structures 74 in German decisions in agriculture both at the 
domestic and European level. However, before one can embark on an 
analysis of the relevance of these structures for agricultural policy-making 
and how they affect decisions, it is important to briefly review the policy-
making process in Germany. 
7.3.1 THE POLIcy-MAKING PROCESS IN GERMANY: A BRIEF REVIEW 
The Federal Republic of Germany has a Federal structure of 
government in which power is decentralised and shared amongst various 
actors. Due to the decentralised system of government in Germany, 
individual ministries, the various political parties, interest groups,. the state 
governments (Landesregierungen) and the Bundesbank play an important 
role in the formulation of policy. Hence, the Federal government is not the 
sole actor in decision-making. The institutional position of the other actors 
in the policy-making process is endorsed constitutionally. The German 
. constitution, the Basic Law, provides for the legal autonomy of the 
Bundesbank, the need to take into account the views of the Lander 
governments, and the extent of the authority of individual ministries. 
Furthermore, constitutional principles back up the power of the Chancellor 
74 Bulmer and Paterson have highlighted the importance of internal policy-making factors. They argue 
that int«rnal policy-making factors limited Germany's ability to playa leading role in the ED. 
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and the autonomy of individual ministers. The system of proportional 
representation and coalition-formation is also important. 
Individual ministers acquire a great deal of autonomy to formulate policy 
by virtue of the constitutionally guaranteed Ressortprinzip. The concept of 
ministerial autonomy is compounded by the sectorisation of policy. The 
sectorisation of policy places existing policy and its protagonists in the 
ministry in a strong position. The operation of the principle of ministerial 
autonomy can have negative consequences. It leads to the evolution of 
'house policies', where individual ministries focus rather narrowly and 
subjectively on their policy area, sometimes to the detriment and coherence 
of overall European policy concerns. Bulmer and Paterson point to an 
increase in the sectorisation of European policy in the 1970s and 1980s. 75 
The sectorisation of policy and the operation of 'house policies' has 
been particularly prevalent in the BML. The contradictions from the operation 
of these policies have spilled over to the European level. For instance, 
Helmut Schmidt's attempts to reform the CAP conflicted with the BML's 
efforts to increase CAP expenditure. It is clear that the attitudes and 
interests of those formulating agricultural policy and those drafting the EU 
budget at the national level differ considerably. Another example is .the 
contradiction of interests between German industry and agriculture in the 
GATT negotiations. When the negotiations were deadlocked, German 
industry began to exert pressure on the Federal government for a 
successful conclusion. It is argued that the Chancellor utilised his 
. Richtlinienkompetenz and instructed his Cabinet that the negotiations must 
not fail. 
The' above example indicates how the Kanzlerprinzip can be used in 
problem solving. According to Article 65 of the Basic Law, the Chancellor 
7S The concept of ministerial autonomy in relation to European policy has been discussed in Chapter 
Three. 
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principle identifies the Chancellor's Richtlinienkompetenz i.e. his 
responsibility for setting the guidelines of government policy. This 
competence also extends to European policy. 
The Federal structure in Germany ensures that the Lander governments 
playa fundamental role in the policy-making process. 76 The Constitution 
guarantees that competencies be divided between the Federal 
government and the Lander government. Hence, the Federal government 
does not hold exclusive competence for all the policy areas addressed by 
the EU. The Lander governments have to be consulted on certain issues. 
This process has been complicated by unification by the simple increase in 
the number of Lander governments, adding to the lack of coherence 
deriving from the Federal structure of the state. Furthermore, the diversity of 
the interests of the eastern and western Lander, not just in the area of 
agriculture, are bound to complicate matters. Thus, complications in the 
Bund - Lander relationship can affect decisions not only at the domestic 
level but also at the European level.77 
The institution of a system of proportional representation 78 and the 
necessity!, of coalition-formation also has an important role in the policy-
76 The L1inder are constitutionally guaranteed power via Article 30 of the Basic Law which reserves 
powers for them. The L1inder have exclusive competence in cultural affairs, education, health service 
and policing. The L1inder also enjoy participation in framework and concurrent laws. Smith notes, 
"With framework laws, the federation lays down the basic conditions, leaving the Under to legislate 
the particular requirements and detail for their own needs. For areas covered by concurrent legislation, 
the L1inder may pass laws to the extent that the federation has not done so." (Smith et aI, 1992: 41) 
Framework laws include higher education, hunting and conservation, the press and film industry, and 
land distribution and regional planning. Concurrent laws comprise civil and criminal law and 
sentencing, registration of births, deaths and marriages, residence and establishment of aliens and the 
production and use of nuclear energy. (Smith et aI, 1992: 41) Furthermore, the L1inder are guaranteed 
f.ower through direct representation in the Bundesrat. 
7 The L1inder were able to guarantee more influence in European policy decisions during the 
ratification of the Single European Act. According to the L1inder the SEA was transferring powers to 
the EU which were under their competence, without securing any L1inder involvement in the policy-
makirig. The L1inder were able to secure a consultation procedure on all issues concerning the EU. This 
procedure would undoubtedly slow down European policy-making in Germany. (Bulmer & Paterson, 
1988: 249-250) 
78 The electoral system in Germany is a mixed system which combines the simple majority plurality 
system with party lists. Thus, the electoral system in Germany is one in "which half the 
representatives are elected on the simple majority plurality principle but the other half are selected on 
the basi~ of party lists so that the overall system is proportional." (Paterson & Southern, 1994: 181) 
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making process. The system of proportional representation facilitates the 
representation of minorities and allows the smaller parties such as the FOP 
and CSU to gain parliamentary representation. In order to obtain a majority 
in the Bundestag, governments need form coalitions. The tradition of 
coalition governments further enhances the power of the smaller parties. 
Thus, the policies of the smaller parties such as the CSU, who have 
particular ideas regarding agriculture, are crucial in policy-making. The 
coalition system of government means that minority parties in the coalition 
also have key ministerial positions. Hence, an agricultural minister in the 
present coalition may derive either from the COU, CSU or the FOP. 79 The 
party that a minister belongs to will indeed affect his position on certain 
policy decisions. The system of coalition-government can therefore ease 
policy-making, but it can also complicate it. 
Therefore "institutional pluralism" in Germany affords interest groups a 
great deal of influence over policy. Furthermore, individual ministries and 
the corresponding interest group tend to work closely together. Personnel 
tend to develop a high degree of speCialisation and personnel are often 
recruited from the corresponding interest group. For instance Ignaz Kiechle, 
the former Minister for Agriculture, was a prominent member of the OBV 
prior to becoming Minister for Agriculture. Furthermore, the electoral system 
means that interest groups are able to nominate their representatives 
through the political parties onto various Committees of the Bundestag. 
7.3.2 POLIcy-MAKING STRUCTURES AND AGRICULTURE 
The German political system enhances the pOSition of German farmers 
and provides them with an opportunity to control the national position in 
European agricultural policy. This is not a new practice. As Chapter Six 
79 10sefErti served as Agricultural Minister from 1969 until he resigned when FDP shifted support to 
the CDU/CSU coalition. Ertl derived from the FDP. Ertl was to be followed by a CSU Minister for 
Agriculture, Ignaz Kiechle, who remained in office until 1993. In 1993 lochen Borchert took office as . 
a CDU ~inister of Agriculture. 
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indicates, German farmers were actively supported since after World War 
Two. 80 So that by the time the CAP was created, as Phillips argues, 
"farmers were well entrenched in German politics, with privileged access 
and significant influence over policy." (Phillips, 1990: 107) The farmers are 
able to control the national agricultural agenda through a powerful lobby. 
The DBV has a strong role in the formation of agricultural policy., The DBV 
has been able to maintain this supreme position due to the fact that it is the 
only powerful lobby in the farming sector. The DBV has a loyal membership 
and provides virtually the only access to government for farmers. The DBV 
has 750, 000 members and represents over 90% of those who are involved 
in agriculture full time. (Paterson & Southern, 1994: 235) The DBV is aided 
in its position by favourable mass and elite opinion. This approval has 
been passed down after the war and based on the philosophy that farmers 
execute an indispensable service to the economy and contribute to the 
maintenance of the countryside. 
The DBV maintains its position and influence on agricultural policy by 
working within the policy-making structures. Firstly, the DBV has a close 
working relationship with the BML. Secondly, the DBV secures influence 
through the Bundestag via the Bundestag Agricultural Committee. Paterson 
and Southern note that in the period between 1980-1982 16 of 26 members 
of the Committee were directly connected to agriculture. They point out that· 
the opinions of this committee tended to coincide with that of the DBV. 
(Paterson & Southern, 1994: 236) Paterson and Southern argue, "the 
. Bundestag is .. unlikely to act as a countervailing power to the Ministry of 
.. 
Agriculture since it delegates powers to the Agriculture Committee which is 
securely dominated by the agricultural interest." (Paterson & Southern, 
1994: 236) Finally, the DBV maintains its strong hold over agricultural policy 
by instituting supporters in key positions in the government. Ignaz Kiechle, 
80 See Chapter Six for historical background. 
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for instance, was a prominent member of the DBV, who also belonged to 
the CSU. Chancellor Kohl's preferred choice for the Minister of Agriculture 
would have been the present President of the DBV, Heeremann, who was a 
member of parliament for the CDU as well. However, Kohl had to opt for 
Kiechle in order to maintain the balance in the governing coalition. 
(Paterson & Southern, 1994: 236) 
The proportional representation system in Germany strengthens the 
power of the farm vote. The tradition of coalition-government in Germany 
means that coalitions need to attract the farm vote directly or through 
smaller parties. Individual farmers and the DBV generally tend to support 
the Christian Social Union in Bavaria and the Christian Democratic Union in 
the rest of Germany. The Free Democratic Party (FOP) gradually came to 
realise the value of the. farm vote in the 1980s to ensure that the party was 
able to get over the 5% minimum vote in order to achieve parliamentary 
representation. The FOP exerted influence over agricultural matters through 
Josef Ertl, an FOP minister, who served as agricultural minister for 14 years 
in the SPD/FDP coalition. Ertl resigned after the cabinet re-schuffle following 
the federal election in 1983. He was succeeded by Ignaz Kiechle who was a 
CSU member and a strong farm supporter. Jochen Borchert, who 
succeeded Kiechle in 1993, is however a member of the CDU. 
In addition, the Federal system of government in Germany strengthens 
the farm lobby. Phillips points out that, "The federal Cabinet often has little 
opportunity to influence farm policy because the compromises and options 
have been finessed in negotiations among the department and minister for 
agriculture, the DBV, the Bundestag and the Lander." (Phillips, 1990: 109) 
The· sectorization of policy-making in the Federal government emphasises 
existing policy and the Minister's position. The DBV also maximises its 
impact in the system by working closely with the BML. Many ministry officials 
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tend to originate from the DBV, hence there is a common view on issues. 
Phillips argues that, "the resulting set of interlocking bargains inside 
Germany ensures that farm interests dominate and determine the German 
national position in European farm debates." (Phillips, 1990: 110) 
Furthermore, since 1981 the farm lobby has been firmly supported by 
Chancellor Kohl and the Cabinet. For instance, Kiechle was given 
permission to utilise the veto in the Agriculture Council in 1985. 
In summary, policy-making structures are crucial for decisions on 
agriculture. The DBV has been a fundamental actor in the policy-making 
process and has been exerting considerable influence on German 
agricultural policy- making. The DBV has been able to achieve this 
optimum position due to, 
the continuing absence of any effective countervailing lobby and the 
distinctive electoral and governance systems in Germany. Because the 
farm minister represents both his government and the special interests 
of the farm sector in the EC Farm Council. (Phillips, 1990: 111) 
The German political system as a whole enhances the position of German 
farmers. The Federal structure, the system of proportional representation, 
!" 
and the way in which it facilitates the representation of smaller political 
parties who have particular agricultural interests, further elevates the stance 
of German farmers. 
7.3.3 CONTINUITY OR CHANGE: THE POLIcy-MAKING STRUCTURES AND THE 
POSITION OF AGRICULTURE AFTER UNIFICATION. 
It has been argued by some that unification has upset the consensus 
that had prevailed in German agriculture. Farmers in the former GDR have 
different interests to those in the former FRG. In the East, farmers are 
concerned about the drop in commodity prices that resulted from unification. 
Traditional policies aimed at small family farms, structural policies that 
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discriminate against emerging farm organisations in the East, and finally 
EU pOlicies such as set-asides that relatively disadvantage the East, are not 
relevant any longer. Not only have diverse interests made agricultural policy 
formation within Germany and the EU more difficult, but also as argued by 
some, reduced the power of traditional farm groups in the former FRG? 
It has also been contended that the power and influence of those who 
have traditionally been dominant in agricultural policy-making will diminish. 
The CSU has a regional concentration of power in Bavaria, and it has been 
argued that given the changing balance of agricultural interest in the East, 
the CSU's role may diminish in a unified Germany. If regional influence 
diminishes, does that for instance, entail an increase in the power of the 
FOP, which has nation-wide representation, attracting support from larger 
farms in the North? 
The role of the political parties and their policy positions are 
fundamental in agricultural policy-making. Previously, the COU/CSU's 
position on agriculture was very much geared towards the maintenance of 
the small family farms. As a result of reunification, Germany has acquired 
much larger structures in the new Lander. To a degree this has meant a 
change in policy in terms of the desired form of structures for farms. Like" the 
BML, the COU is emphasising the need for farms which are competitive and 
productive, regardless of size and structure. The COU is according to 
statements attempting to achieve equality and not discriminate against the 
larger structures which have been established in the East since unification. 
The main aim of CDU agricultural policy is outlined as, 
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Vorrangiges agrarpolitisches Ziel der CDU fOr die neuen Bundeslander 
ist der Aufbau einer leistungsfahigen, eigenverantwortlich gefOhrten, 
vielseitig strukturierten, umweltfreundlichen Landwirtschaft. Dabei 
wollen wir keine Betriebsformen, die sich nach der Wende gebildet 
haben, diskriminieren. Wir wollen Chancengleichheit fOr aile Landwirte 
in den neuen Bundeslandern. 81 
Hence, the CDU has acknowledged the changes which have taken 
place in the structure of agricultural holdings and no longer considers the 
family farm as the only ideal model. However, the structural changes have 
been difficult to accept for the CDU's coalition partner, the CSU. There have 
been differences of opinion on policy matters between the two parties. The 
CDU and the CSU had difficulties in formulating a common text for their 
1994 election manifesto. 82 The CSU is very much in favour of the classical 
Bavarian family farm, and the Bavarian Minister of Agriculture was keen to 
have solely the term "family farm" in the text. Of course the CSU Minister 
was trying to protect his farmers' interests. He would perhaps have been 
able to use some leverage had the Federal Minister of Agriculture been a 
member of the CSU. However, the wording in the text incorporated all farm 
structures rather than just the family farm. 
Unser Leitbild ist dabei der unternehmerisch handelnde Landwirt, der 
eigenverantwortlich im Familienbetrieb oder in anderen Betriebs- und 
Rechtsformen tatig und an bauerlichen Wirtschaftsweisenausgerichtet 
ist. (CDU-Bundesgeschaftsstelle, 1994b:29) 83 
The above incident was not the only occasion where the Bavarian CSU 
81 Interview with official, Referent rur Agrarfragen, CDU, 19 April 1995. Author's translation, "The 
CDU's primary aim in agricultural policy for the new L!inder is to establish an agriculture which is 
competitive, autonomously run, versatile in its structure, and environmentally friendly. At the same 
time we do not want to discriminate against those structures which have been established after the 
changes. What we want is equality of opportunity for all farmers in the new L!inder." 
82 Interview with official, Referent rur Agrarfragen, CDU, 19 April 1995. 
83 This acknowledgement of the acceptability of diverse farm structures was also noted in other CDU 
documents. See: (CDU-Bundesgeschaftsstelle, 1994a: 59) Author's translation, "Our model is an 
entrepreneurial farmer, working on his own authority in either a family farm or in any other legal farm 
structur~, orientating himself to rural economic ways." 
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Minister of Agriculture and the COU Federal Minister of Agriculture differed 
on their views regarding the future course of agricultural policy. The 
Bavarian Minister of Agriculture, Bocklet, clearly demonstrated the difference 
in the priorities and conceptions of agricultural policy between the eastern 
and western Lander. Reinhold Bocklet opened a discussion with Federal 
Minister Borchert about the "renationalisation of farm income policy." In a 
statement to the Bavarian Parliament Bocklet pointed out that "It makes no 
sense to transfer money to Brussels for it only to be transferred back to 
national governments for distribution." (Agra Europe, 1996a: E/4) Bocklet 
argued that Brussels' authority over structural and income policy should be 
revoked and returned to the member states, especially to national and 
regional governments. He further called for the return of authority to include 
the responsibility for direct payments connected to compensation for cuts in 
support prices made as part of the 1992 CAP reform, payments made 
under the agrimonetary system, and structural programmes. He maintained 
that payments should not be connected to the production of individual 
commodities but rather they should mirror the economic achievement of 
each region. Bocklet pointed out that the restoration of control over 
payments to the regional level, would enable incentives for environmental 
objectives to be included into the payments. He contended that the system 
would be simplified if all the different payments were merged into one 
single payment. 
More importantly, as regards Brussels' role in the formation of 
. agricultural policy, Bocklet argued that, "Brussels' role in determining EU 
agricultural policy should be reduced to setting the framework within which 
national governments would operate." (Agra Europe, 1996a: E/4) Federal 
Minister Borchert accepted the need for a review of Germany's contributions 
to the EU in 1999. Bocklet had pointed out that Germany paid OM 20 billion 
into t~e agricultural budget annually but only received half of that back, with 
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Bavaria receiving OM 1.4 billion every year. Borchert, however, accused 
Bocklet of resorting to "populist" slogans to make his point. (Agra Europe, 
1996a: E/4) 
The Bavarian Minister of Agriculture highlighted the difference in the 
priorities of the eastern and western farmers. He saw the CAP reform as his 
primary focus. The CSU in general has found the adaptation process in the 
German agricultural sector and the consequent implications for EU policy 
difficult. Bocklet continued to emphasise the classical Bavarian farm 
structure in the COU/CSU Grundsatzprogramm. Furthermore, the former 
CSU Minister for Agriculture Kiechle initially attempted to install small 
Bavarian style farms in the East, until this proved not to be feasible. 
The COU may have altered its position as regards the structure of farms 
as a consequence of unification. Nevertheless, the COU still considers the 
agricultural sector as important as industry and trade. Other traditional 
objectives have also survived the turbulence in the merger of the agricultural 
sector. The COU continues to emphasise both the economic and the social 
role which agriculture plays. (COU-Bundesgeschaftsstelle, 1994d: 22) The 
COU and CSU have always had the aim of securing farmers' incomes and 
utilising all means to prevent any drop in incomes. What has resulted has 
been a highly protectionist policy, maintained by high prices and 
supplemented by compensatory payments to German farmers for any 
changes in the CAP. Hence, the COU and CSU still retain the aim of 
guaranteeing farmers sufficient income. In addition, the governing coalition 
. continues to point out that German farmers will be protected from any abrupt 
drop in prices. Furthermore, the Federal government has even pledged to 
comperisate German farmers directly for cuts in prices and cuts in quantity 
which are tabled as part of the CAP reform. The prices for agricultural 
products in the EU are rated in ECUs and this could mean a drop in prices 
when converted into OM. A complicated set of agrimonetary regulations 
260 
protects German farmers from sudden drops in prices. 84 The protection 
has continued despite unification. The coalition manifesto stated, "Solange 
es keine einheitliche Wahrung in der EU gibt, muss die deutsche 
Landwirtschaft vor abrupten wahrungsbedingten Preissenkungen geschOtzt 
werden." 85 (CDU-Bundesgeschaftsstelle, 1994c: 41) 
The role of the Chancellor and the attitude of the political_ elite are 
fundamental in agricultural policy-making as with other policy issues. It was 
hoped that Germany's attitude towards agriculture would change after 
unification. Chancellor Kohl continued to back the German farm lobby at the 
time of the first all German election in 1990, thereby highlighting the 
importance of the DBV. The Chancellor's actions could be explained in 
terms of the pending election, since German farmers constitute an 
important source of electoral support. It was hoped that with the changing 
nature of agriculture in Germany following unification there would be, 
a more commercial attitude into German agriculture as a whole. The 
large numbers, and thus political power, of the west German hobby 
farmers would be so diluted that the Federal government might become 
more sympathetic to CAP reform. (Agra Europe, 1990j: P/2) 
However, at that point in time no change was detectable. Thus, the 
German farm lobby remains powerful and the hope that it would reduce its 
influence in the policy-making process upon unification was unfounded. 
Furthermore, Germany's unwillingness to compromise over the MacSharry 
proposals for the Uruguay Round negotiations shattered the illusion that 
Germany might adopt a different stance towards agriculture. Chancellor 
84 The Germans to a degree have been responsible for the major flaws of the CAP, according to 
Tangermahn. The coalition's main objectives for the 13th legislative period tend to perpetuate these 
flaws; The Germans have utilised the agrimonetary system to their benefit. The agrimonetary system 
had the effect of keeping German prices above other EU prices and particularly above world prices. The 
Germans have been responsible for maintaining EU nominal prices at consistently high levels. They 
have also been responsible for the establishment of the quota/market regulation mentality in EU 
rolicy-making. 
5 Author's translation, "As long as the EU lacks currency union, German agriculture has to be 
protect~d from abrupt, currency-related price cuts." 
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Kohl reiterated the stance that German farmers ought to be compensated 
for a loss in income; moreover he argued that policy should be formulated 
to ensure a competitive and efficient agricultural sector in Germany. "Die 
Politik in Europa und auf nationaler Ebene wird so gestaltet, dass die 
WeUbewerbs- und Leistungsfahigkeit der deutschen Landwirtschaft 
gesichert bleibt." 86 (Presse und Informationsamt der Bundesregierung, 
1992f: 568) Kohl further praised the Agricultural Minister Kiechle for his 
actions in the formulation of policy. This was a clear indication that 
Germany's agricultural aims at the European level had not altered a 
significant amount post unification. 
On the contrary, the DBV and agriculture in general has been able to 
sustain its position in a time when agricultural policy has undergone 
substantial change at the European level. The importance of the farm lobby 
did not flounder at the 1994 Federal elections. The Federal government was 
in a position where it had to appease its farm voters, as the farm lobby 
remains an important source of votes for the governing coalition, particularly 
the CSU and the CDU. 87 The Chancellor Helmut Kohl highlighted the 
importance of the agricultural sector in the domestic environment at the 
headquarters of the DBV in February 1995. Chancellor Kohl argued that 
farmers needed to be supported. He declared, "Es besteht fUr mich 
Oberhaupt kein Zweifel, dass unsere Bauerinnen und Bauern in der 
schwierigen Anpassungssituation auf Unterstotzung angewiesen sind." 88 
(Presse und Informationsamt der Bundesregierung, 1995b: 107) Kohl 
. pointed out that the German government had proved its commitment to 
. 
German farmers in representing their interests both at the national and 
86 Author's translation, "European and national policy will be designed in a way which will continue 
to assure the competitiveness and productivity of German agriculture." 
87 The population in Bavaria and Baden-WUrttemberg is particularly sensitive towards agricultural 
issues. Politicians in the CSU and also the CDU have been careful to formulate palatable agricultural 
aims in order to retain this support. 
88 Author's translation, "For me there is no doubt at all that our farmers (male and female) are 
depend~nt on support in this difficult phase of adjustment." 
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European level. It had aided the farmers at the European level with 
reorganisation of the agrimonetary system and at the national level with a 
variety of aids and measures. (Presse und Informationsamt der 
Bundesregierung, 1995b: 107-108) Kohl understood the concerns of the 
farmers as regards the reform of the CAP and the integration of the Central 
and East European countries into the EU. Although Kohl's words could be 
interpreted as rhetoric, it does not detract from the fact that Kohl's 
government continues to support farmers not only through domestic 
measures but also through actions at the European level. 
Nevertheless, Kohl emphasised the necessity of reform and argued that 
the reform of the CAP and the conclusion of the GATT negotiations had 
brought more reliable conditions into existence for agriculture. (Presse und 
Informationsamt der Bundesregierung, 1995b: 108) He confirmed his 
pledge of supporting farmers and compensating them financially as 
outlined in the Koalitionsvereinbarungen or (Coalition Agreement). 
Moreover, he virtually guaranteed this support constitutionally. (Presse und 
Informationsamt der Bundesregierung, 1995b: 107) 
The President of the DBV also voiced his concerns about the state of 
agriculture in Germany on this occasion. He stressed the difficult situation 
in which many enterprises found themselves in, particularly after the 
serious changes which had taken place in agriculture as a result of the CAP 
reform and GATT. He argued that German farmers want the government to 
show signs of encouragement. "Die Bauern und ihre Familien erwarteten 
. jedoch, dass die Bundesregierung Zeichen der Ermutigung setze." 89 
(Presse und Informationsamt der Bundesregierung, 1995b: 107) 
Heeremann underlined the necessity of "verlasslichen agrarpolitischen 
Rahmenbedingungen auch in Agrarwahrungsfragen." 90 (Presse und 
69 Author's translation, "However, the farmers and their families were expecting the Federal 
~overnment to give some sign of encouragement." 
o Author's translation, "reliable agripolitical framework conditions in agrimonetary issues too." 
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Informationsamt der Bundesregierung, 1995b: 107) He pointed out that a 
renewed debate on the principles of CAP reform should not be allowed. He 
also voiced his concerns about market and production conditions in the 
new Lander. He argued, "Wenn der Rahmen stimmt, dann konnen u~sere 
MitbOrger weiterhin auf einen verlasslichen Partner Landwirtschaft setzen, 
der im Obrigen zur Zeit die Hauptlast der Inflationsbekampfung in unserem 
Land tragt." 91 (Presse und Informationsamt der Bundesregierung, 1995b: 
107) 
The transition process and subsequent changes in agricultural policy 
have been noted earlier in this chapter. Accordingly, the BML has had to 
alter its policy. A senior official in the BML commented, 
Wenn das Umfeld anders ist, andert sich zwangslaufig die 
Agrarpolitik ... man muss die ganze Zielrichtung der Agrarpolitik 
verschieben. Man muss also auch diese Interessen der grosseren 
Betriebe anders berOcksichtigen. 92 
The BML had to formulate a policy which attempted to deal with the interests 
of both eastern and western farmers. 93 The diversity of interests constituted 
one of the fundamental problems of a unified agricultural policy. The BML 
has accommodated its policy according to its clientele both at the domestic 
and European level. The relationship between the BML, the Minister and the 
DBV have become strained as a result of these dual interests. The DBV 
agrees that there has been a subtle change in the position of the BML and 
accordingly a subtle shift in governmental policy. A senior official at the DBV 
. 91 Author's translation, "If the framework is right, then our fellow citizens will be able to carry on 
counting on this reliable partner agriculture, which by the way, is currently carrying the burden in the 
battle against inflation in this country." 
92 Interview with senior official, Ministerialdirigent, Bundesministerium fUr Emiihrung, Landwirtschaft 
und Forsten, Bonn, 19 April 1995. Author's translation, "When the associated area is different, then 
agricultural policy will inevitably change .... the whole direction of agricultural policy has to be altered. 
Accordingly, the interests oflarger farmers also have to be taken into account." 
93 The point was made that, "Wir mUssen eine einheitliche Agrarpolitik machen, aber wir haben sehr 
unterschiedliche Klientel im Westen und Osten." Author's translation, "We have to formulate a unified 
agricultural policy, but we have a completely different clientele in the East and West." Interview with 
senior official, Ministerialdirigent, Bundesministerium fUr Emiihrung, Landwirtschaft und Forsten, 
Bonn, ~9 April 1995. 
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remarked, "Die Position der Bundesregierung ist natorlich nuancierter". 94 
The DBV retained its position as the primary representative for 
agricultural interests after unification. The reorganisation of agriculture in 
the East resulted in the establishment of five Lander level interest groups 
(Landesverbande), which are organised under the framework of the DBV. In 
this respect, the Landesverbande are organisationally bound to ~he DBV in 
Bonn. 
Mit der Umstrukturierung der landwirtschaftlichen Betriebe haben sich 
die Kreis- und Landesbauernverbande in den neuen Bundeslandern 
als Interessenvertretung aller Betriebs- und Rechtsformen 
herausgebildet und unter dem Dach des Deutschen Bauernverbandes 
ihre Heimat gefunden. 95 (DBV, 1994: 3) 
The five new regional interest groups utilise the DBV to represent their 
interests both nationally and at the European level. "Ober diesen Verband 
[DBV] transportieren die Verbande in den fOnf Neuen Landern ihre 
Forderungen an die Bundesregierung oder nach BrOssel." 96 Hence, the 
interests of eastern farmers are represented through the mechanisms of 
the DBV. Despite the fact that the DBV professes to represent the interests 
,. 
of all farmers, there are problems brewing as a result of the difference in the 
interests of the two farming communities and the diversity of the farming 
structures. 97 A senior official at the DBV commented, 
94 Interview with senior official, Deutscher Bauernverband, Bonn, 19 April 1995. Author's translation, 
"Naturally there is a subtle difference in the position of the Federal government." 
95 Author's translation, "With the restructuring of agricultural enterprises, the communal and state 
level agricultural interest groups in the new Lander have developed into the representatives of the 
interests of all kinds of legal forms of enterprises, but they have found their home under the roof of the 
DBV." 
96 Interview with senior official, Deutscher Bauernverband, 19 April 1995. Author's translation, "The 
groups in the five new Llinder pass their demands for the Federal government or Brussels via the 
DBV." 
97 Inte.rview with official, Referent fUr Agrarfragen, CDU, 19 April 1995. 
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Sicher gibt es den Konflikt 'gross' und 'klein' ... Wir machen den Versuch 
hier, als Bauernverband, ein einheitliches System in Deutschland zu 
bekommen .... Und da gibt es Schwierigkeiten. Ich glaube nicht, dass 
das langfristig Arger .machen wird.98 
The DBV admits that there are problems between the larger and smaller 
producers. The DBV is attempting to build a unified system. However, the 
representative of the DBV did not believe that these differences would cause 
problems in the long term. From this perspective, it is then understandable 
that the DBV is continuing to attempt to increase the efficiency of these 
Landesverbande in order to increase their influence on policy. (DBV, 1994: 
12) However, the DBV may be underestimating the scale of the problems 
which may occur between East and West and the role it could play in the 
solution. of those problems. 
Of course, the DBV perceives its role in the transformation of agriculture 
in the East as a positive one. The DBV believes that it has played a major 
role in the composition of agricultural policy for the East. Naturally, the DBV 
was committed to the successful integration of the new Lander into the CAP 
and believes that it has been essential in its transformation. Furthermore, 
according to the DBV,. they were fundamental in the extension of the special 
conditions in particular areas until 1996. "Es gab dann Schwierigkeiten in 
der EU mit spezifischen Dingen in den fUnf neuen Landern. Wir haben uns 
dafUr eingesetzt, dass die Schwierigkeiten geregelt wurden." 99 
The unification of Germany and the consequent changes in the 
agricultural sector have had an effect on the substantive policy of the DBV. 
98 Interview with senior official, Deutscher Bauemverband, 19 April 1995. Author's translation, "Of 
course there is this conflict 'big' and 'small' ..... As the Farmers Union, we are attempting to develop a 
uniform system in Germany .... And there are difficulties. I do not think that this will cause trouble in 
the long run." 
99 Interview with senior official, Deutscher Bauemverband, 19 April 1995. Author's translation, "There 
were difficulties in the EU with specific issues in the five new Under. We have lent our support to 
resolve these difficulties." 
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The representative of the DBV pointed out that unification "has substantially 
changed the view of the western organisational structure." 100 He suggested 
that DBV's policy had shifted in relation to credit programmes. He argued 
that the DBV had actively pursued a policy where these should be available 
for all farm structures and should not be limited to an agricultural holding of 
a particular size. He added that this had had a positive effect on agriculture 
in the East and had indeed, been a step forward in the direction of 
agriculture in the new Lander. The channelling of aid to eastern farmers 
has, however, caused problems for other German farmers. Nevertheless, 
the representative from the DBV believed that, "as long as it is handled 
rationally, there is no danger" in the long term. He pointed out there was 
more danger of conflicts erupting between the northern and southern 
farmers in SChleswig-Holstein and Bavaria than between East and West. 
The representative from the DBV did, however, cite the question on what 
would constitute Germany's ideal farm structure of the future as the source 
of conflict. 101 
The DBV has adapted itself according to the changing circumstances in 
agricultu~e and changing realities. The DBV is not solely run by the 
traditional interests of the southern German farmers. The DBV has proved 
itself to be "adaptive" in the process of change in the agricultural sector; 
inspite of the fact that the redirection of certain aims has lead to conflict 
between the different sets of farmers. 
Generally speaking, the DBV's view about the process of change in the 
eastern agriculture tends to concur with that of the BML. 102 The DBV's 
perception is thai there are still problems in the agricultural sector in the 
East, but nevertheless the agricultural sector on the whole has adapted 
100 Interview with senior official, Deutscher Bauemverband, 19 April 1995. 
101 Interview with senior official, Deutscher Bauemverband, 19 April 1995. 
102 Of course, there have been differences of opinion between the regional agricultural interest groups 
and the BML regarding certain agricultural policy aims. 
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much faster and much better than other sectors of the economy. In all, the 
DBV has a positive view about the restructuring of agriculture in the East. 
The DBV agrees that the restructuring of farms into effective and viable 
holdings has been successful, but does point out the problems that 
unemployment in the agricultural sector has caused. 103 
The DBV retains an important and influential role in agricultural policy-
making after unification. Thus, German agricultural interests and the DBV 
remain influential in the balance of power. The DBV representative 
remarked, "We have a lot of influence, we can change a IOt.,,104 However, the 
representative from the DBV did point out that the overall importance of 
agriculture at the national, the European and even the global level has 
diminished. He argued that 25 years ago the agricultural directorate in 
Brussels was of immense importance and exerted considerable influence 
over Community affairs and that this was no longer the case. He countered 
this point by suggesting that, "this does not mean that governments are not 
interested, and that active farm organisations cannot overcompensate for 
this decline." 105 Thus, active farm lobbies still have an important role to play 
despite t~is overall decline in the significance of agriculture. The DBV official 
tended to exaggerate the decline of agriculture at the European level.. The 
EU continues to spend 50% of its budget on agriculture. The official was 
perhaps referring to the domestic dissatisfaction with the outcome of the 
GAIT agreement for agriculture. 
Certainly it has to be acknowledged that the acquisition of a diverse 
agricultural sector in the East has not resulted in a dilution of the DBV's 
aims at the national level. The DBV remains resilient in achieving the 
maximum benefits for German farmers and in lobbying the BML. Prior to 
unification the DBV had to reconcile contradictory aims between North and 
103 Interview with senior official, Deutscher Bauemverband, 19 April 1995. 
104 Interview with senior official, Deutscher Bauemverband, 19 April 1995. 
105 Interview with senior official, Deutscher Bauemverband, 19 April 1995. 
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South. In the post unification period an additional layer of interests has 
been added to the DBV's agenda. The DBV perceives its role after 
unification as a continuation of the process prior to unification, but having to 
reconcile a more complex system and complex set of interests. There is no 
doubt that the task the DBV faces is difficult and complicated. But as the 
sole effective representative of farming interests in Germany, the DBV has 
no other alternative. The DBV views itself as the representative organisation 
for eastern farmers. However, as time passes and the if interests of the 
eastern farmers are not being met, there may be a possibility that the 
eastern farmers may seek alternative sources of representation. This 
source of representation may in the future derive from the Party of 
Democratic Socialism (PDS) which has considerable influence over policy 
at the Lander level, where agriculture is the main source of employment; 
namely, in Mecklenburg-Vorpommern and in Brandenburg. 106 
The DBV has been able to exert influence on government policy by 
working closely with the BML. The tradition of exerting influence through the 
Minister has continued after unification. There continues to be common 
ground between the DBV and the CDU led ministry. The representative from 
the DBV commented, "We have a basic understanding with the Ministe(. 107 
However, that does not detract from the fact that the membership of the DBV 
, forces the DBV to put pressure on the Minister of Agriculture. Despite this 
basic understanding, "it is not our role to make his life easy. On the contrary, 
we have had hard conflicts with him." 108 
However, there was a notable exception to this rule. Minister of 
Agriculture Kiechle clashed with the DBV over farm reform in 1992. The DBV 
was against the MacSharry proposals for the reform of the CAP. The DBV 
demanded that Kiechle fight the proposed changes vehemently and even 
106 Interview with senior official, Deutscher Bauemverband, Aussenstelle Berlin, 21 April 1995. 
107 Interview with senior official, Deutscher Bauemverband, 19 April 1995. 
108 Interview with senior official, Deutscher Bauemverband, 19 April 1995. 
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use his veto if necessary. The President of the DBV, Heeremann, was 
quoted as saying, "We are in favour of reform, but not the one Kiechle is 
accepting ... They get a 5 per cent plus wage rise in the public sector, and we 
get 35 per cent minus for cereal farmers: it is unacceptable." (Peel, 1992: 4) 
The DBV argued that two months prior to the final judgement it still had the 
support of the Minister. However, at the final hurdle, according to the DBV, 
the Minister "switched sides". The DBV made the point that the government 
did not have agriculture at the top of its list of priorities. On this occasion, 
unlike 1985, Ignaz Kiechle did not seem willing to use his veto. Despite his 
obvious Bavarian connection, Kiechle described the DBV as, "day-dreamers 
who have no idea of agricultural political necessities." (Peel, 1992: 4) This 
was a clear change in his position. 
Two important ingredients account for Germany's relaxed stance 
towards. the CAP to its normal defence of the CAP. Firstly, Germany's desire 
to reach a successful conclusion of the GATT negotiations and secondly, 
the change in German policy priorities due to the advent of the huge East 
German farms. The Minister of Agriculture faced a dilemma in attempting to 
defend traditional West German interests and newly acquired eastern 
German ones. Kiechle wanted a cereal price cut of 15-20% maximum. In 
this respect, Kiechle was seeking to defend western Germany's relatively 
small and high cost farmers. The Minister was forced to accept a cut of 
29%. However, he came away with the concession that he would be able to 
give substantial compensation to German farmers. Furthermore, in 
attempting to serve the interests of the larger eastern farmers, Kiechle was 
happy to adopt the same stance as Britain in calling for compensation to be 
paid to larger farmers as well as to smaller ones. Compensation to 
German farmers was paid in two ways: Firstly, Kiechle was able to retain 
the right to pay income support measures in 1992 to replace the 3% VAT 
rebate which expired in 1992. The second form of compensation was 
270 
payable to all EU farmers in exchange for a 15 % reduction in their arable 
land. Kiechle was determined that these payments should be permitted for 
an indefinite period. (Peel, 1992: 4) It is important to point out that the first 
set of compensatory payments were a significant concession, as these 
compensatory payments were a German national measure and a clear 
distortion of the agricultural common market. It is clear that Kiechle adjusted 
his policy aims at the European level according to the changed 
circumstances arising from unification. Kiechle defended the interests of 
the larger farms in seeking compensation for them. 
Subtle changes may have occurred in policy, but Germany retained its 
highly protectionist stance in agriculture to incorporate protection of eastern 
agriculture. In that sense, individual aims may have been added, but the 
overall stance and policy objectives remain very much the same. What has 
resulted has been a complication of the whole agricultural debate in 
Germany. 
The role of the Minister of Agriculture is clearly important in the policy-
process. The sectorization of policy-making and the Ressortprinzip in 
Germany has meant that Agricultural Ministers in the past have had the 
autonomy to formulate policy. According to the OBV, the Minister of 
Agriculture, as the main actor negotiating process, continues to represent 
the interests of the German farmers at the European level. "As long as it is 
just Brussels and agricultural policy .... 1 think our minister, who is a member 
of the German government, is doing his utmost to get good bargains for 
German farmers." 109 However, the Minister of Agriculture's freedom of 
manoeuvre was constrained during the GATT negotiations with industry 
applying pressure on the government for a speedy conclusion of the 
Agreement. It is in this instance that Chancellor Kohl utilised his 
Richtlinienkompetenz to ensure that GATT negotiations did not fail. The OBV 
109 Interview with senior official, Deutscher Bauemverband, 19 April 1995. 
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acknowledges that German agricultural interests were not sufficiently 
represented during the GATT negotiations. 
It has been argued that the overall thrust of German agricultural policy 
has not changed at the domestic and European level as a result of 
unification. However, the policy has been adapted in specific areas to 
accommodate the agricultural sector of the East. What has resulted from 
unification has been a subtle shift in emphasis in agricultural policy. The 
role of the Minister of Agriculture has been crucial in actualising this shift. 
The Ministers have individual aims and priorities which they seek to 
achieve. 
In 1993, the long serving CSU Minister for Agriculture, Ignaz Kiechle, 
was replaced by the CDU politician Jochen Borchert. Kiechle was assertive 
and forthright in defending the interests of German farmers, particularly the 
Bavarians. Kiechle's use of the national veto over cereal prices in 1985 
bears testimony to that fact. Furthermore, Kiechle defended German 
interests emphatically in the CAP reform debate and was ardent in 
obtaining the best deal for German farmers from the CAP reform, thereby 
minimising the side-effects for the German farmers. Kiechle, backed by the 
Chancellor Helmut Kohl, was able to obtain the most favourable deal 
possible for German farmers. The Chancellor praised Kiechle's record and 
commented at the end of the negotiations of the reform of the CAP, 
Ich mochte an dieser Stelle Herrn Bundesminister Kiechle fUr seine 
VerhandlungsfUhrung ausdrucklich danken. Er hat mit grossem 
Nachdruck und personlichem Engagement die Verhandlungen gefUhrt 
und dabei die Interessen der deutschen Landwirtschaft vertreten. Er 
hatte dabei meine volle Unterstotzung. IlO (Presse und Informationsamt 
der Bundesregierung, 1992f: 568) 
As a CSU politician, Kiechle was influenced by 'Bavarian style' 
110 Author's translation, "On this occasion, I would particularly like to thank Federal Minister Kiechle 
for his handling of the negotiations. He has led the negotiations with great vigour and personal 
comIllitment, and thereby representing the interests of German agriculture. He has my full support." 
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agriculture. The CSU in general experienced difficulty in accepting the 
diverse nature of the agricultural sector in the new Lander. Kiechle initially 
had hopes of building a Bavarian style agricultural sector in the East. 
Obviously, these hopes were not realised as agricultural holdings in the 
East were far too distinct in terms of their size and structure. 
However, Borchert is a CDU politician from North Rhine-Westfalia. It 
cannot be denied that the political party and the Land that a politician 
emanates from can make a difference to the policy aims that he brings onto 
the agenda and the policy outcome. Although there is a basic line of policy 
which does not change, there is room for interpretation. The DBV official 
remarked, "I see .... a difference between the parties." 111 
Indeed, Borchert utilised this room for manoeuvre. Borchert stressed 
growth and the development of structures far more than his predecessor. 
More importantly, Borchert's perception of farm structures differs from his 
predecessor. His conception of farm structure is influenced by his 
Wesfalian background. Farms in North-Rhine Westfalia and Lower Saxony 
tend to be larger than those predominant in the South of Germany. Thus, 
Borchert. is in favour of larger farm structures. There has been a shift in 
priorities of the Minister, since his predecessor Kiechle concentrated on the 
small and middle class farms in the South. 112 The shift in policy could, of 
course, be attributed to the changed circumstances in the East. But Borchert 
readily accepts the need for diverse structures, whereas his predecessor 
Kiechle had a "Bavarian" vision of eastern German agriculture with the 
establishment of small style family farms. 
The whole policy-making process has become more complex after 
unification. Germany has a Federal structure, which means that power is 
distributed between the Federal government and the Lander. The mere fact 
III Interview with senior official, Deutscher Bauemverband, 19 April 1995. 
112 Interview with senior official, Deutscher Bauemverband, 19 April 1995. 
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that unification entailed the establishment of five new Lander complicated 
the policy-making process. Each Land has a different coalition with its 
different set of interests in power. For instance, a Social Democrat 
\ 
government in Brandenburg has a different view about the future of larger 
farms than a Christian Democrat government in Mecklenberg-Vorpommern. 
It would be a mistake to confine these regional and Lander diversities to the 
East-West dimension. With regard to agricultural policy there are 
differences emerging between North and South and East and West. The 
government faces the task of reconciling these diverse interests and of 
trying to formulate a national strategy. "Our government has growing 
difficulties in getting all these states under one roof." 113 
Indeed, the eastern Lander have their own interests which they are 
attempting to pursue through the various policy-making mechanisms. For 
instance, the five new Lander considered the extension of the special 
conditions until 1997 as vital for eastern German agriculture. The Lander 
governments clearly positioned themselves in favour of that decision and 
intended to actively pursue it via the Bundesrat. "Die Landesregierungen der 
fOnf Lander haben sich schon deutlich positioniert, dass ein Abbau der jetzt 
bestehenden Forderungen katastrophale Folgen hatte." 114 
Broadly speaking, the eastern Lander tend to agree with the 
government's basic approach towards agricultural policy in the East. 
However, there are differences of opinion on specific issues. "Aber in 
Einzelfragen, in Detailfragen haben wir durchaus unterschiedliche 
Auffassungen." 115 For instance, the government considered the 
Altschuldenregelung (Regulation on old debts) to be adequate, whereas the 
113 Interview with senior official, Deutscher Bauemverband, 19 April 1995. 
114 Interview with senior official, Deutscher Bauemverband, Aussenstelle Berlin, 21 April 1995. 
Author's translation, "The state governments of the five new Lander have clearly expressed that a 
reduction in the current support level would have disastrous consequences." 
115 Interview with senior official, Deutscher Bauemverband, Aussenstelle Berlin, 21 April 1995. 
Auth?r's translation, "In single issues and questions of detail, we do indeed have different opinions." 
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eastern Lander perceived it not to be. 
Indeed, differences of opinion extend beyond the governmental level. 
General policy aims of the DBV in Bonn and the Aussenstelle in Berlin tend 
to concur. It is, at the regional level in the Landesbauernverbande where the 
scope for conflict arises. Discord has arisen between the regional 
agricultural interest groups in the new Lander and the old Lander. A 
representative from the Aussenstelle (branch) of the DBV in Berlin cited the 
example of the Bavarian Bauernverband's demands to bring the special 
conditions for eastern German agriculture to an end by 1996. The Bavarians 
feel that they are being unfairly disadvantaged by the imposition of these 
regulations; the worry is that the relatively small Bavarian farms will not 
remain competitive!16 The representative from the Aussenstelle hinted that 
it would be potentially disastrous for the DBV if each of the regions 
attempted to pursue their different demands. Like the BML, essentially, the 
main task facing the DBV is to formulate a coherent policy which 
incorporates the varying interests of farmers in Germany and to prevent the 
escalation of a situation where the DBV cannot meet these divergent 
interests~ He believes that it would be ample ammunition for the Federal 
government to undermine the DBV. 117 
It can be argued that the traditional aims of the southern German 
farmers no longer solely run the DBV; the balance of power has shifted 
within the DBV itself. There is a cohesive element in the DBV where the 
views of eastern and western farmers tend to concur. Conversely, there are 
issues which only concern eastern or western farmers. Nevertheless, 
despite this picture of cohesion the fact remains that the specific problems 
regarding eastern agriculture dominate the work of the DBV at the 
moment. 118 For an interest group that was specifically geared towards the 
116 Interview with senior official, Deutscher Bauemverband, Aussenstelle Berlin, 21 April 1995. 
117 Interview with senior official, Deutscher Bauemverband, Aussenstelle Berlin, 21 April 1995. 
118 In!erview with senior official, Deutscher Bauemverband, Aussenstelle Berlin, 21 April 1995. 
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small western farmers, this is indeed a change. 
The tradition of close alignment between agriculture and conservative 
parties seems to have continued after unification. "Von der Tendenz ist 
natorlich eine Hinwendung des Berufsstandes zu den konservativen 
Parteien eindeutig." 119 However, not all the Presidents of the regional 
interest groups are members of the CDU. 
The Federal structure and the system of proportional representation 
continues to aid interest groups and smaller parties. Germany is not a 
country in which power is won outright. There is a need for coalition 
building. These structures ensure that interests such as agriculture remain 
important. Thus, agriculture remained an important concern at the 1994 
Federal election. 
7.4 CONCLUSION 
Unification brought immense challenges for the agricultural sector in 
. Germany. Not only did the Germans face the task of integrating the diversely 
structured agricultural sector of the former GDR into the western part, but 
agriculture in the East also had to incorporated into the mechanisms of the 
CAP. 
A principal contention of the thesis is that Germany's role in the EU 
varies in contrasting policy areas and that the policy sector itself determines 
Germany's role. Germany's approach towards agriculture has been, and 
continues to be, determined domestically, with a highly national and 
protectionist response to the CAP. Despite the overall 'European' rhetoric 
towards matters concerning the EU, German policy in agriculture has been 
driven by its own needs. The CAP has served the interests and needs of 
German farmers, which the German government has been keen to placate. 
Thus, the EU has served as an optimal environment for solving domestic 
119 Interview with senior official, Deutscher Bauemverband, Aussenstelle Berlin, 21 April 1995. 
Auth~r's translation, "Naturally, this professional group tends to tum towards conservative parties." 
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concerns. This overall stance has not altered as a consequence of 
unification. 
What impact has unification had on agricultural policy and Germany's 
role in the EU? This chapter examined three characteristics in relation to 
agricultural policy: the dynamics of the policy sector, policy circumstance 
and policy making structures. 
The dynamics of the policy sector analysed the very nature of agriculture 
in Germany. Unification has resulted in a radical transformation of 
agriculture, particularly in the East, although not without problems. The 
initial attempt to imprint a 'western German' style agriculture in the East 
failed. On the contrary, agriculture in the East has influenced the West. 
Germany's position on agriculture at the domestic level has changed as a 
consequence of unification. Unification has necessitated internal change 
which has led to a definite shift in the balance of agricultural policy in 
Germany. Unification has renewed the discussion about the future shape of 
agriculture policy. The debate on the structure of agricultural holdings has 
intensified and has brought about a re-orientation. The discussion 
surrounding agriculture in Germany has caused problems between eastern 
and western farmers, with western farmers increasingly concerned ~bout 
the level of aid being transferred to the eastern agricultural sector. 
Although emphasis may have shifted in certain areas of agricultural 
policy, Germany's overall attitude towards agriculture, particularly at the 
European level, remains protectionist. Agricultural interests remain 
important in German politics. The notion that unification would dilute 
Germany's attitude towards the CAP does not hold true. There remains the 
belief that German farmers have a special position in German society and 
that they need to be protected. Rather than Germany letting down its 
protectionist barriers, the protectionist attitude has been extended 
eastwards. The Germans continue to grant farmers substantial financial 
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assistance, a clear manifestation of their protectionist attitude. Furthermore, 
Germany continues to defend and strive for benefits for German farmers 
with a manipulation of the agrimonetary system. The vigour with which the 
Germans strove to hinder changes in the agrimonetary rules clearly 
indicated that Germany's protectionist attitude had not altered in the post 
unification period. The Germans were still engaged in battles with the 
Commission over agrimonetary issues after unification. 
Policy circumstance considered the incorporation of the eastern Lander 
into the mechanisms of the CAP as well as implications of the CAP reform 
and GATT Agreement for agriculture in the eastern Lander. The CAP reform 
and the GATT Agreement may on the surface appear irrelevant to the 
discussion surrounding agriculture and Germany's role in the EU. However, 
unification is not the sole factor affecting agricultural policy and Germany's 
position on agriculture; the two factors have been vital in shaping overall 
policy aims. More importantly, the two events have contributed to the 
changed framework within which eastern German agriculture has to 
operate. 
Unifi~ation has not resulted in a change in Germany's overall attitude 
towards agriculture at the European level. Nor has it altered the 
fundamental contents of the CAP. Eastern German agriculture is 
insignificant in terms of its contribution to EU agriculture to bring about a 
radical transformation. Eastern agriculture has been successfully 
incorporated into the mechanisms of the CAP, with the help of a number of 
derogations. German interests have naturally shifted and the Germans have 
modified their representation of interests. Both Kiechle and Borchert have 
been' ardent in achieving significant concessions for eastern German 
farmers. The special provisions in the CAP reform package are but one 
example. 
As far as the CAP reform debate is concerned, the overall disdain for 
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CAP reform is still prevalent in Germany. The Germans' dislike of change in 
the agricultural sector was clearly illustrated by the views of the DBV and the 
BML. CAP reform, in particular, presented certain difficulties for eastern 
German farmers which Kiechle strove to overcome. Kiechle won a 
significant victory over the Commission over compensation payments to 
larger farms, marking a change in policy. 
Germany's approach towards agricultural matters in the GATT 
negotiations were again unaffected by unification, although the negotiations 
themselves had a fundamental impact on Germany's overall position on 
agriculture. The Germans faced the dilemma of having to satisfy a number 
of domestic interests, with the Chancellor ultimately invoking his authority to 
set the guidelines of policy in favour of industrial interests. 
The structures for European policy-making in the German political 
system. ensure domestic input, so that domestic political actors and 
processes are important components in the policy making process. 
Unification has undoubtedly complicated the overall policy-making process. 
The German political system has always enhanced the position of German 
farmers. It had been argued that unification might upset the balance of 
L, 
power within agricultural policy-making. However, despite the gravity ~f the 
change in the agricultural sector, the general consensus amongst main 
actors in agricultural policy-making remains. Of course, the diverse set of 
agricultural interests has made policy-formulation difficult. Nevertheless, 
many of the actors involved in agricultural policy-making have adapted their 
policies. 
The CDU, BML and the DBV have adjusted their poliCies. Overall CDU 
policies continue to back German farmers with the notion that they need to 
be protected. The process of adaptation has perhaps been easier for the 
CDU than for its coalition partner the CSU. Having a fundamentally different 
conception of agriculture in Germany, the CSU has experienced difficulty in 
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reconciling it with new realities in the East. These differences have 
manifested themselves in the concerns of the Bavarian Minister of 
Agriculture. 
It has been argued by some that traditional agricultural interests groups 
would lose their monopoly in interest representation. However, the DBV has 
maintained its influential position in agricultural policy formulation. 
Furthermore, the DBV has been able to install itself in the East as the main 
agricultural representative for eastern farmers through the establishment of 
regional agricultural organisations. Without a doubt, the DBV faces 
difficulties in reconciling the variety of interests, but the DBV perceives its 
role as an extension of the one prior to unification. Previously, the DBV had 
the responsibility of reconciling northern and southern interests. Clearly, 
after unification the DBV is no longer solely concerned with traditional 
southern German agricultural issues. Despite the complex nature of the 
task facing the DBV, the aims of the DBV have not been diluted at the 
national or even the European level. 
The DBV clearly continue to work with the BML. This does not imply that 
the relationship with the BML and the Minister of Agriculture is always 
harmonious. In summary there exists considerable continuity in Germany's 
approach towards agriculture and Germany's role in EU agricultural policy. 
CHAPTER EIGHT: CONCLUSIONS 
The unification of Germany produced an abundance of academic 
literature on its future direction in the EU. This thesis has provided a 
somewhat different contribution to the dominant literature on this growing 
debate. The argument presented in this thesis departs from the two 
opposing camps which characterise Germany as either a'- 'dominant 
hegemon' or a 'benign actor' in the EU. The core objective of this thesis was 
to attempt to analyse the nature of Germany's role in the EU in the post 
unification period. The impact of unification itself on Germany's role 
represented a subsidiary aim of that analysis. Having been emancipated 
from the ties of the post-war settlement and regained its sovereignty, the 
primary issue at stake appeared to be Germany's approach to co-operation 
in multilateral frameworks. Germany's role towards the furtherance of 
European integration and its commitment to that objective was a central 
theme. 
An analysis of Germany's role in the EU encompasses a plethora of 
issues and subject areas; a task which is beyond the scope of anyone 
piece of analysis. The thesis has followed a two tier approach, first 
analysing Germany's relationship with the EU in the broader context in light 
of the objectives cited above, and then using a sectoral approach to 
Germany's role in the EU, focusing on two key policy areas: migration and 
agriculture. 
8.1 GERMANY'S ROLE IN THE EU: THE BROADER PERSPECTIVE 
This thesis reaches the conclusion that Germany remains committed to 
the EU and the process of European integration. In essence the unification 
process has not altered Germany's pro-integration stance. Indeed, one can 
witness a degree of continuity in Germany's approach to the EU. Despite 
the emergence of anti-European tendencies in the political and public 
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domain, the actions of the political elite, particularly Chancellor Kohl, in 
steering the EU further down the road towards deeper integration and 
enlargement, provide ample evidence for this assertion. Economic and 
Monetary Union and Eastern Enlargement feature highly on Chancellor 
Kohl's list of priorities. It has to be acknowledged that objections in the 
domestic arena to the further transfer of powers to the EU will have to be 
skilfully managed by Chancellor Kohl so as not frustrate his objectives. 
Multilateralism has become a German hallmark; the Germans are 
unlikely to turn away from multilateral forms of co-operation. The Germans 
have fundamentally benefited from collective action within the EU; achieving 
major aims and solving domestic problems within its frameworks from the 
outset. Since unification it has become apparent that the Germans are 
increasingly prepared to refer to the existence of a set of domestic priorities 
which could be pursued better at the European level. It is, however, 
important to acknowledge that the inclination to realise objectives through 
joint action in the EU does not contradict Germany's pro-integration 
position. 
Ger'Tlany's role in the EU featured at the core of the debate in this 
thesis. The thesis concludes that Germany's standing in the EU, and the 
role which its partners expect it to play, has undoubtedly altered as a result 
of unification. Germany's partners had a schizophrenic reaction to the 
nature of Germany's role, on the one hand expecting greater leadership, 
and on the other fearing dominance. The force of events has endowed 
Germany with a 'stronger' role in the EU. The Germans themselves 
perceive this 'leading' role in terms of new responsibilities and obligations 
rather than the acquisition and exercise of hegemomic power. The thesis 
rejects the hegemonic notions of a Germany dominating the EU. The EU 
can expect Germany to playa greater role in the shaping of the EU into the 
next millennium. The thesis deduces that Germany's role in the EU has 
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been policy specific; thus it has taken a pro-active and leading role in 
particular policy areas of interest. Thus far, reference has been made to the 
legacies of unification for Germany's role in the EU. The Germans have 
inherited a whole host of domestic challenges due to unification. Inevitably 
the Germans have had to focus on problems at the domestic level, but not 
to the detriment of its role at the European level. The two policy sectors 
considered exemplify the nature of the challenges confronting Germany in 
those policy arenas. 
8.2 THE SECTORAL ApPROACH: THE CASE STUDIES 
A central theme of the thesis is that an analysis of Germany's role in the 
EU has to be sensitive to sectoral variations. The thesis attempted to 
develop a taxonomic model of characteristics to illustrate the sectoral 
character of Germany's role in the EU. In brief, the model comprised three 
key characteristics: the dynamics of the policy sector, policy circumstance 
and policy-making structures. The model helped to test some of the main 
hypotheses of the thesis. The thesis concluded that Germany's role in the 
EU differed in different policy sectors. It, therefore, deduced that Germany's 
role in t~e EU has been policy specific, with the two case studies providing 
a contrast of Germany's approach to the EU. Furthermore, it is concluded 
that Germany's role in the EU in any given policy area is shaped by the 
nature of the policy sector itself. Thus, policy sectors have dynamics of their 
own which necessitate particular courses of action. It could be argued in 
part that Germany's role in the EU, at least on a day to day basis, is issue 
driven. This thesis concluded that in certain policy sectors, actors are able 
to deviate from' general European objectives, using the EU to solve 
domestic problem problems or pursue sectoral aims. 
The taxonomic model presented in the thesis is rooted in a range of 
theoretical approaches. Essentially, the model draws on the ideas of Lowi 
and the work of Bulmer and Katzenstein. The ideas of Lowi are particularly 
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relevant for the dynamics of the policy sector. Lowi links the nature of the 
policy issue, to the pattern of politics associated with it, and policy 
outcomes. Hence, he asserts that different policy arenas produce different 
policy patterns, processes and actors. Katzenstein and Bulmer stress the 
importance of institutions in shaping policy. They demonstrate the diversity 
of the policy process, by illustrating the varying influence, and role of, a core 
set of institutions in different policy sectors. Bulmer elaborates on the 
concepts of institutional pluralism and the sectorisation of policy, 
elucidating their impact on the making of policy in Germany. These 
approaches are instructive for the section on policy making structures. 1 
The next section goes on to draw some conclusions from a comparative 
analysis of the two case studies based on the taxonomic model. 
8.3 A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS 
8.3.1 DYNAMICS OF THE POLICY SECTOR 
The thesis concluded the dynamics of the policy sector or 
characteristics intrinsic to the policy area under analysis shaped Germany's 
role in the EU in any given policy scenario. The case studies illustrated that 
agricultu~e and migration produce different results at the European level. 
Germany's approach towards migration policy has been conditioned by the 
very nature of the issue itself. The definition of the issue as a "politically 
sensitive" subject, ensuing partially from Germany's Nazi legacy, has 
dictated the course of action in that policy arena both at the domestic and 
European level. Germany's idiosyncratic approach to migration questions 
resulted in an inconsistent and contradictory policy. The dynamics of the 
migration issue initially characterised the issue. as domestically 
unmanageable, thwarting policy reform. The domestic policy process was 
marked by inaction elevating the issue up to the European agenda. The 
increasing interpretation of the migration issue as a transnational 
1 All these theoretical arguments are considered in greater depth in theoretical review in Chapter Two. 
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phenomenon, particularly by 'the Germans and in light of developments 
within Europe to lift internal borders, intensified the search for solutions 
within European frameworks. Thus, the dynamics of the policy sector 
produced a scenario where the Germans actively sought to Europeanise 
policy with joint action being perceived as the logical course of action for 
Germany's increasing asylum problems. 
Whereas the dynamics of the migration issue generated conflict and 
deadlock in the domestic arena in the post unification period, 
characteristics within agriculture gravitate towards consensus oriented 
policy-making in the domestic arena. The traditional importance of 
agriculture, and the elevated position of the agricultural community drive 
policy in the domestic arena. The approach towards agricultural policy-
making is governed by the idea that German farmers hold a special position 
in German society and need to be 'protected'. These traditions have 
withstood unification and have been coupled with the inherent differences in 
the two agricultural sectors to generate consistent policies but bearing a 
'German' hallmark. Characteristics of the German agricultural agenda 
dominate European agricultural policy. 
, 
8.3.2 POLICY CIRCUMSTANCE 
Policy circumstance analysed the impact of unification, and other factors 
which at first seem marginal on policy decisions within these two sectors. In 
one sense the unification of Germany and migration are fundamentally 
linked: migration constituted a impelling catalyst for the rapid unification 
process. The unification of Germany, coupled with the collapse of 
communism in the East and disintegration of the Soviet Union, were directly 
responsible for the new and complex set of problems in migration. 
Unification had indirectly facilitated the conditions for mass migration, 
thereby exacerbating the so-called 'crisis' and pressure for policy 
reappraisal. The relaxation of freedom of movement in the former 
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communist bloc and the Soviet Union added to the migration pressure to 
Germany, compounding the calls for reform. The unification of Germany 
fostered the emergence of anti-foreigner tendencies, which manifested 
themselves in rise in the support of the extreme right and an increase in 
attacks on foreigners. Although, unification may not have had a substantive 
effect on policy; it certainly contributed to a changing perception of migration 
issue in the domestic context. 
Agriculture is inherently a complicated issue both within Germany and 
the EU, with an entrenched set of problems existing prior to unification. 
Unlike migration, the unification of Germany affected the agricultural sector 
more directly, by effecting a subtle shift in domestic policy and by instigating 
the incorporation of eastern agriculture into the mechanisms of the CAP. 
Unification did not execute a fundamental transformation of Germany's 
general approach to , or role in the CAP. It did, however, alter Germany's 
position and specific interests in the CAP, ones which were acceptable to 
eastern farmers. Two vital components shaping Germany's agricultural 
policy, the CAP reform and GATT Agreement, have also been important for 
the overall framework within which eastern agriculture has to operate. 
l.· 
Generally speaking, Germany's dislike of CAP reform has persisted, with 
reform being pursued reluctantly. Nevertheless, the Germans have skilfully 
managed to extract a satisfactory set of concessions for eastern German 
farmers as part of the reform package. The German position in the GATT 
negotiations, largely unaffected by unification, has had an impact on 
Germany's overall agricultural policy position. In the main the Germans 
persevere with protectionist and high income oriented policies. 
8.3.3 POLiCy-MAKING STRUCTURES 
The policy-making structures in the two policy sectors have been 
imperative in determining the success or failure of policy initiatives at the 
domestic and European level. The 'institutional pluralism' in the policy 
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process ensures the involvement of a range of domestic actors in the 
formulation of policy. The integration of domestic and European policy-
making at the domestic level is crucial in shaping the course of action the 
Germans take in EU structures. 
In the case of migration the 'institutional pluralism' complicated the 
policy-making environment. The policy-making structures were 
characterised by a lack of consensus, inaction and political and 
constitutional deadlock. The CDU/CSU's proposed amendment of Article 16 
evoked contradictory policy positions, with inter- and intra party splits 
dominating the policy process. The protracted political debate, compounded 
by the need to achieve a two thirds majority in both the Bundestag and 
Bundesrat, resulted in a temporary paralysis of the policy process. The 
federal structure and the nature of policy-making in Germany, which 
disperses power between different levels of government also added to 
complications. The eastern Lander experienced particular difficulties in the 
maintenance of asylum seekers. The Chancellor attempted to grasp the 
initiative by utilising his Richtlinienkompetenz, only to fail. The inability of 
policy-making structures to deal with the 'politically' sensitive issue of 
\' 
migration benefited only the extreme right, who were able to manipulate the 
issue, further heightening concern and need for reform. 
The domestic political and constitutional stalemate elevated the search 
for a solution to the European arena. The integration of domestic and 
European policy-making aided the Germans in their attempt to solve the 
domestic 'crisis'. A policy decision reached within European frameworks 
would automatically be applicable domestically. The belief that the 
migration issue was better dealt with at the transnational level underpinned 
Germany's calls for harmonisation of policy. Chancellor Kohl made a 
concerted effort to Europeanise policy. Chancellor Kohl utilising his 
Richtlinienkompetenz actively tried to bring migration into community 
287 
competence as part of Article 8a of SEA, which was governed by majority 
voting. He also put forward proposals for a European-wide policy at the 
Luxembourg Council in 1991 and at the Maastricht Summit. 
The fundamental difference between the agricultural and migration 
policy-making at the European level is that migration remains within the 
intergovernmental framework. The institutional constraints of the 
intergovernmental framework worked against the efforts of Chancellor Kohl. 
The requirement of unanimity, the primacy of nation-states which identify 
migration as a national competence linked to national sovereignty and the 
lack of consensus hindered progress at this level. The failure to achieve a 
solution within this framework aided the domestic policy structures to 
overcome the obstructions to the constitutional amendment. However, the 
revision of the asylum law has not eradicated the desire of the Germans to 
regulate migration within EU umbrella, hence Chancellor Kohl's continuous 
endeavours to Europeanise policy and bring migration under Community 
competence. 
The integration of domestic and European policy-making at the 
domestic means that the DBV is not only able to control the domestic 
~" 
agenda but also the European. The domestic policy-making structures in 
the agricultural sector are generally characterised by consensus and co-
operation. An established set of structures and traditions govern agricultural 
policy-making. The institutional pluralism prevalent in German policy-
making permits the full participation of a range of domestic actors. The 
, 
German political system has always enhanced the position of farmers, with 
the DBV holding an influential role in the formulation of policy. The 
sectorisation of policy at the domestic level leads to the operation of 'house 
policies' which are carried up to the European level. The Ressortprizip 
ensures that the Minister of Agriculture generally has a great deal of 
autonomy, resulting German agricultural interests being translated in the 
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European arena. The close co-operation between the Minister of Agriculture, 
the BML and the DBV perpetuates the farmers' ability to dictate a German 
agenda in European structures. Unification has complicated the policy-
making in agriculture, but not altered it a great deal. The same structures 
retain importance in the formulation of policy in Germany and the EU. 
The case studies illustrated that policy differs in terms of Germany's 
actions in the EU. Different policy areas are positioned towards different 
ends of this 'assertive' and 'compliant' spectrum. Germany's role in the EU 
is policy specific, consequently certain policy sectors gravitate towards the 
'compliant' end of the spectrum and in other policy areas towards the 
'assertive' end. The thesis concluded that in policy areas of interest the 
Germans adopt a pro-active position and a progressive role to pursue policy 
solutions beneficial to them. The Germans have the capacity to set the 
policy agenda in their favour and if necessary they are willing to pursue an 
independent path. In both agriculture and migration, the Germans have 
attempted to utilise the European frameworks to pursue policy outcomes 
favourable to them. In the case of migration, the Germans attempted to 
Europea~ise policy to solve the domestic asylum crisis, but the desire was 
a policy with 'European' overtones. The utilisation of European frameworks 
in agriculture has been driven by their own policy needs, primarily to derive 
benefit for, and satisfy an important domestic constituency. The Germans 
actions within agricultural policy-making has distinct 'German' 
characteristics, maintaining a high price and protectionist policy. Thus, the 
Germans have utilised arena in both policy sectors but with different 
outcomes. 
Germany's role in the EU in agricultural policy has been 'assertive' in 
attempting to secure policy solutions beneficial to them. Despite the overall 
'European' rhetoric, Germany's approach to agriculture, has been and 
continues to, determined domestically, with a highly national and 
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protectionist response to the CAP. Countless examples provide evidence 
for that assertion. The Germans continued manipulation of, and insistence 
on the maintenance of an agrimonetary system is but one example. 
Unification has not altered this practice. The continued disdain for CAP 
reform and the assertiveness with which the Germans procure 
concessions for their farmers is another example. In agricultural policy the 
Germans have been successful in achieving German oriented outcomes. 
Unification has not executed a fundamental reorientation of Germany's 
attitude towards agriculture, and its role in agricultural policy-making at the 
European level. Eastern agriculture was simply incorporated into the 
mechanisms of the CAP, with the aid of a number of derogations. One can 
witness a great degree of continuity at the European level after unification. 
Germany's role in the EU in migration policy has been pro-active 
advocating policy harmonisation and common solutions to a common 
problem. Whereas the outcome has been satisfactory for the Germans in 
agricultural policy in terms of benefits for their farmers, in migration policy 
German attempts to Europeanise policy have initially failed, partially due to 
the natu~e of the policy issue and partially due to the institutional structures 
which works against the Germans. The Germans have certainly taken the 
lead and attempted to set the agenda. But the agenda has dictated 
European solutions in migration and German ones in agriculture. 
Unification has had an indirect but equally important impact on migration 
policy in intensifying the need for policy harmonisation at the European 
level. Thus, the European framework can be a useful tool in some cases 
and not in others.' 
Despite Germany's overall 'European' approach; signified by its 
continued commitment to the EU, and its strengthened role in the EU after 
unification, its role has largely been policy specific. The nature of the policy 
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issue and the domestic and European policy-making structures influence 
the course of action in given policy sectors. 
8.4 GERMANY'S ROLE IN THE EU AND THE CASE STUDIES: SOME CONCLUSIONS 
The thesis proposed a two tier investigation of Germany's role in the EU: 
a broader examination of Germany's role in the EU, followed by a sectoral 
analysis of two key policy areas. What do the case studies demonstrate 
about Germany's broader role in the EU? 
What sort of an actor is Germany in the EU? The thesis concluded that 
Germany cannot be identified as a 'hegemonic power' in the realist 
conception of the term. There is, certainly no 'grand strategy', on the part of 
the Germans, to exercise 'purposive hegemony', nor is there an identifiable 
willingness to dominate the EU. Hegemony is, by nature, a difficult concept 
to define. Any suspicion by the other member states that such a policy was 
held, would meet strong resistance. However, Bulmer attempted to sum up 
German power in the "new" Europe, by identifying key power resources. 
These included Germany's economic power, its political significance, the 
role Germany plays in security and defence issues, perceptions of German 
influence and its, "political and institutional capacity to project its interests in 
\ 
the European arena". (Bulmer, 1995b: 3) Bulmer noted that it is simply not 
enough to just possess the requisite power resources. In order to -be 
defined as a hegemonic power the Germans have to be "willing and able to 
use them". (Bulmer, 1995b: 3) In essence, the willingness of Germans to 
utilise these power resources forms the heart of the debate in the post 
unification period. Taking a cursory look at Bulmer's interpretation, it would 
be plausible to conclude that Germany cannot be conceptualised as a 
'hegemon'. Briefly, Bulmer refers to Germany's economic strength, from 
which it derives a considerable source of power. However, Germany's 
economic status is by no means a new phenomenon, predating unification. 
Although, Germany's economic power weakened in the post unification 
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period, in terms of its ability to make side payments. Bulmer then considers 
Germany's political importance. There is no doubt that Germany's political 
strength has grown. Yet, the Germans seem unwilling to adopt a 'leading' 
role, reaffirming their commitment to the EU, deeper integration and 
multilateral co-operation. The German government also continues to 
demonstrate a preference for launching policy initiatives under the Franco-
German banner. Finally, Germany cannot be considered a 'hegemon' in 
security terms, being previously constrained by its external environment, the 
Germans still prefer to embrace international institutions as opposed to 
unilateral action. 2 (Bulmer, 1995b: 3-11) 
The notion that Germany does not have the ability to assert its interests 
in the EU on institutional and political grounds is pertinent for this study. The 
thesis explained Germany's role in the EU in terms of a sectoral analysis, 
based on a taxonomic model which combined an institutional analysis of 
the policy process with an examination of the nature of the policy issue. The 
institutional sectorisation of policy making forms a countervailing argument 
against the characterisation of Germany as a hegemonic actor. The political 
structur~s in Germany were constructed precisely to prevent the 
accumulation of German power in the traditional sense. 
What are the implications of institutional pluralism and the sectorisation 
of policy making for Germany's role in the EU. Katzenstein's seminal 
analysis of the Federal Republic, related the concept of semisovereignty to 
the internal dynamics of German policy making, arguing that it had a 
constraining effect on the exercise of German power. The sectorisation of 
policy making bOred an interdependent approach to policy making, with 
institutional constraints being placed on the capacity of the German state, 
thereby reducing the scope for the exercise of power. Katzenstein, therefore, 
asserted that German power has been 'tamed' by the institutional 
2 For a fuller discussion see: (Bulmer, 1995b:3-11) and (Bulmer and Paterson, 1996) 
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structures. Similarly, Bulmer stressed the importance of the concepts of 
institutional pluralism and the sectorisation of policy making. He cited 
sectorisation and fragmentation of policy structures as reducing the capacity 
for exercising 'purposive hegemony' in the EU. The new post-Maastricht 
institutional co.nstraints, according to Bulmer, reduce the capacity of 
Germany to pursue national interests even further. 3 The institutional 
pluralism inherent in the policy making process means the government 
cannot act as a coherent, monolithic national actor, since power is 
dispersed both vertically and horizontally. Some scholars even question the 
existence of a set of German national interests. In short, institutional 
pluralism and sectorisation militate against hegemony in the German case. 
Bulmer noted enhanced institutional constraints and pluralism in the post-
unity period, deducing that it was difficult to see how Germany could behave 
like a hegemon. 
Issue areas have largely been ignored in the examination of German 
European policy. Scholars tend concentrate their analysis more broadly on 
German European policy objectives, focusing on integration rhetoric and 
declarat~ry policy. It could perhaps, be argued that they have been drawing 
over optimistic conclusions about the nature of Germany's role in the EU. 
The study used a sectoral approach to analyse Germany's role in the EU via 
a set of case studies. The method' chosen has proved valuable in 
elucidating more broader conclusions about Germany's relationship with 
the EU. The analysis centres on two well chosen areas; agriculture and 
migration. Agriculture constitutes an original issue of great significance to 
EU politics and migration an area of increasing concern. It is implicit that 
3 Bulmer cites five developments which have strengthened the fragmentation of European policy and 
above all offset the scope for a more purposive role, over and above the normal horizontal constraints. 
He notes the increased ambivalence of public opinion about European issues. Added to this are the 
gains of the Lander in achieving greater participation in European policy-making. The establishment of 
the new European Union Affairs Committee in the Bundestag, coupled with the Federal Constitutional 
Court's judgement also act as constraining factors. Finally, Bulmer refers to the role of the 
Bundesbank in the integration process, particularly EMU. (Bulmer, 1995b: 13) . 
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this study cannot provide a complete picture or design a typical position. 
Such an exercise would require further analysis of a broader range of policy 
areas. Nevertheless the case studies provide a fruitful insight into 
Germany's role in the EU. 
The two case studies provide a better explanation of the sectoral 
dynamics of Germany's role in the EU. The policy sectors illustrated how 
Germany policy is driven by sectoral interests in individual policy areas, 
giving the appearance of an instrumental commitment to Europe. German 
agricultural policy in the EU, for instance, has been driven by the need to 
achieve domestic policy objectives, primarily to gain benefit for, and satisfy 
an important domestic constituency. Conversely, the German government 
looked to the European framework to Europeanise migration policy in order 
to solve a domestic crisis. 
The. case studies note the effect of the sectorisation of policy making 
and the institutional pluralism for Germany's role in the EU in the individual 
policy sectors. Although, not a conscious strategy, the structures which were 
designed to constrain Germany in the EU, can in some specific cases or 
policy s~ctors empower them on a sectoral level. Bulmer and Paterson 
note that, "Sectorized policy making may not be simply a matter of 
dissipating the efforts of German European policy. It may prove to be a 
policy resource". (Bulmer and Paterson, 1996: 12) The institutional 
pluralism in the German policy process allows a number of policy actors to 
participate in policy making, and consequently permits a diversity of 
interests to pursue sectoral objectives within the EU. Thus, the 
fragmentation of policy making structures and the sectorisation of policy can 
empower actors on a sectoral level. The policy process is so fragmented 
that individual ministers are able to take their own agendas up to the 
European level. The pluralistic and sectorized nature of policy making, 
coupled with the principle of ministerial autonomy and the integration of 
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domestic and European policy making at the national level facilitates this 
process. However, the institutional pluralism and the sectorisation of policy 
provide only a partial explanation of the process. The thesis concludes that 
the nature of the policy issue evokes certain responses and actions in the 
EU. The migration case study is a classic example, fostering European co-
operation. The pursuit of these sectoral agendas can either help or hinder 
Germany's overall European policy objectives. 
The pursuit of sectoral goals not only gives the appearance of 
instrumental commitment to the EU, it may be perceived as an act of 
German power. Of course, as Bulmer and Paterson argue, this largely 
dependent on the definition of power. They note, 
Power and influence do not derive only from their explicit use in a 
purposive manner through governmental diplomacy: they may also 
derive from Germany's policy credentials ... and from unintentional 
consequences of other actions. (Bulmer and Paterson, 1996: 21) 
The pursuit of sectoral goals could be perceived in terms of the exercise 
of unintentional power. Bulmer and Paterson observe that the Germans can 
exercise soft power through institutions. Hence, the coining of the phrase 
'gentle giant'. (Bulmer and Paterson, 1996: 23) Bulmer concludes that, 
"German power will be asserted in a relatively uncoordinated way, ... or in 
. discrete policy areas .... : a soft kind of hegemony". (Bulmer, 1995b: 17) 
Bulmer's argument could be applicable to the pursuit of sectoral goals in 
both migration and agriculture. 
However, the pursuit of sectoral interests does not indicate a move 
away from integrated actions within the EU or multilateral forms of co-
operation. The 'German government has essentially benefited form 
collective action within the EU, being able to achieve major aims and solve 
domestic problems. The case studies demonstrate that Germany is still 
committed to multilateral means of co-operation. The German government 
has utilised multilateral frameworks, working within them to derive benefits. 
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The case studies illustrate this point, that although differing in form, 
objectives and outcomes, German policy actors have worked within the EU 
to Europeanise policy in migration and to achieve German-oriented 
solutions in agricultural policy. The Germans certainly have the ability to set 
a policy agenda which is favourable to them in these multilateral 
frameworks. But all this is not part of a hegemonic strategy to dominate the 
EU. 
The case studies also demonstrated that Germany's role in the EU is 
stronger. The Germans are increasingly prepared to set the policy agenda 
in their favour. The case studies provided examples of two domestically 
important issues, where policy actors attempted to resolve problems in the 
EU. The Germans took a proactive stance in migration policy in continually 
attempting to put in on the European agenda. For instance, Chancellor's 
repeated attempts for policy communitization. The German attempt to set 
the agricultural agenda pre-dates unification, and is well documented trait of 
that issue. 
However, when interest driven policy making threatens to precipitate a 
crisis, s~ctoral dynamics are overridden, and Germany's fundamental 
commitment to Europe takes over. This can be a two way process. In the 
case of migration where sectoral dynamics of the migration issue 
threatened to precipitate a crisis in the domestic arena, the Germans 
looked to the European fora for a solution, voicing European reasons for 
that course of action. The Chancellor in particular utilised his 
Richlinienkompetenz to put the migration issue on the European agenda. 
The reverse is the case in agriculture. The Chancellor has intervened on 
several occasions to constrain a whole series of Agricultural Ministers. One 
such occasion was during the GATT negotiations. The Chancellor's role is 
of particular significance. Not only does the Chancellor perform the role of 
co-ordinator, backed by the Chancellor Office but the Chancellor is also 
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endowed with the constitutional right to set policy guidelines. Paterson cites 
Gaddum in illustrating the co-ordinating function. He observes, 
Within the government the primacy of the integration policy of the actors 
Kohl/Genscher turned out as the most powerful interest of German 
European policy. It functioned as a kind of filter (Schleuse) between 
sectorally oriented interests and positions which could be realised in 
the Community. Whenever sectoral interests hampered the interests of 
policy of the axis, Chancellor/Foreign Minister, they came under their 
influence and amenable to compromise. (Paterson, 1996: 178) 
The process of sectorisation has important consequences for 
Germany's role in the EU. Of course, sectorisation means that it is difficult to 
formulate a coherent European policy line. A recent example of sectoral 
politics illustrates its possible impact for Germany's role in the EU and 
Chancellor Kohl's European project. In a bid to rejuvenate the IGC, the Irish 
Presidency asked member governments to fill out a questionnaire stating 
which policy areas should continue to be decided by unanimity and which 
ones should be subject to majority voting. The German government refused 
to fill out the questionnaire. Furthermore, casting a blow to Chancellor 
Kohl's attempt to quicken the pace of political integration, several German 
(, 
ministers have rejected a move towards majority voting in key policy areas. 
One official was cited as saying that a move towards majority voting would 
make issues easier to challenge. This example illustrates the impact of 
sectoral politics on European integration and the role that Germany plays in 
the EU. An interesting point to note is that, both the Minister of Agriculture, 
Jochen Borchert and Interior Minister Kanther feature amongst Ministers 
who are opposed to majority voting. But this by no means precludes the 
prospect of a common European vision, which mitigates against hegemony 
and a later chancellorial intervention. 
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8.5 IMPLICATIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
The taxonomic model suggested in this thesis can be applied to other 
policy sectors. A synthesis of these three characteristics could be utilised to 
explain Germany's actions in other policy areas. An interesting question 
would be in which type of policy sectors Germany pursues a 'German' or 
'European' approach and where the typical position is on this spectrum of 
'assertive' or 'compliant'. Such a investigation would require a more 
extensive series of case studies. 
8.5.1 EASTERN ENLARGEMENT 
Enlargement of the EU to the East represents a possible candidate for 
analysis. Apart from EMU, eastern enlargement represents one of the chief 
and potentially divisive challenges for the EU into the next millennium, in 
which Germany's role is of fundamental importance. 
Central to the question of Germany's role in Europe in the post 
unification period has been its relations with the countries of Central and 
Eastern Europe (CEE) with respect to the potential enlargement of the EU to 
the east: Eastern enlargement is an important domestic issue for the 
Germans. Germany, with its geographical proximity to the East and its 
historical and cultural ties with this region has vital economic, political and 
strategic interests in this area. The Germans stand to gain economically 
from the expansion of the single market to the East. However, regional 
proximity also means that instability in this region could have negative 
consequences for Germany. It is therefore, not surprising that the Germans 
have been at the' forefront in negotiations between the EU and Central and 
Eastern Europe regarding the expansion of the EU eastwards. Germany 
has been pressing its partners in the EU to promise the Czech Republic, 
Hungary and Poland that they will be in the first wave of the next round of 
countries joining the EU around the year 2000. Chancellor Kohl is also 
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adamant that the EU's first priority must be to stabilise Germany's eastern 
border, notably with Poland. Germany's desire to incorporate CEE into the 
EU is driven by important strategic concerns. However, the debate about 
eastern enlargement in the domestic and European context may prove to be 
more complex, where Germany's strategic aims may conflict with other vital 
sectoral aims connected to enlargement. 
8.5.2 SUB ISSUES: MIGRATION AND AGRICULTURE 
The enlargement debate encompasses a broader range of issues. The 
two policy sectors considered in this thesis, migration and agriculture, are 
particularly relevant issues, which are likely to complicate the negotiation 
process both in the domestic and European arena. Justice and Home 
Affairs may prove to be a stumbling block. The question of high levels of 
migration from the eastern regions remains an important area of concern 
for the .Germans. So much so that the Germans have already concluded 
agreements with the countries bordering it. Furthermore, the Germans have 
identified justice and home affairs as an important area for co-operation. 
The pre-accession strategy agreed at the Essen Council in December 1994 
concluding the German Presidency called for, "increasing co-operation in 
t" 
the fields of justice and home affairs, so as to create an increasingly unified 
area". (Gower, 1995) The issue to be addressed is how much will the 
dynamics of the migration issue contribute to, and the German desire for 
solution in this policy area affect its role in the pursuit of Eastern 
enlargement? 
Some of the countries of Central and Eastern Europe have large 
agricultural sectors. Out of the primary candidates for accession Poland and 
Hungary present challenges to the CAP. Eastern enlargement represents a 
contentious issue in the domestic arena; German farmers have already 
indicated their concern about a premature accession and its likely impact 
on the German agricultural sector. These views are shared by the Minister 
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of Agriculture, Borchert who does not share the elite consensus in support 
of enlargement. Borchert has argued that CEE, "should not be allowed to 
join the EU until they can compete on an equal footing which he interprets 
as meaning large-scale reductions in the labour of the kind that occurred in 
East Germany". (Grant, 1996: 12) Any eastern enlargement would 
necessitate reform of the Common Agricultural Policy. The German dislike 
of CAP reform is self evident. Any reform of the CAP would run the risk of 
being vetoed by EU member states with particularly powerful farming 
lobbies such as the DBV. The dynamics of the agriculture sector are likely to 
feature at the top of the agenda and influence the German position on 
eastern enlargement, thereby potentially executing a change in its overall 
pro-eastern enlargement position. The Mediterranean states have also 
voiced their opposition, being particularly concerned about the diversion of 
structural funds to the eastern regions and the budgetary implications of 
eastern enlargement. If the CAP and structural funds are maintained in their 
present form, eastern enlargement would impose a heavy burden on the 
EU budget. The CEEs are likely to be net beneficiaries from the budget. 
Member .~tates are unlikely to agree to higher budget contributions. 
The dynamics of these two policy sectors may influence or frustrate 
Germany's overall view on eastern enlargement and create conflict between 
its strategic objective of achieving eastern enlargement as soon as is 
feasibly possible and individual sectoral concerns. These issues will no 
doubt affect Germany's role in the EU as regards the accession of CEE. 
A vital component in the whole debate about eastern enlargement is 
developments in CEE. The Central and East Europeans hold great 
expectations for enlargement, particularly in aiding and sustaining the 
political and economic transformation process. The intricacies of the 
German/CEE relationship, in general and individual sectors, become 
relevant in Germany's approach to eastern enlargement in the EU. At 
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present these countries look to Germany to advance their cause in the EU. 
Any analysis would have to consider the input of the Central and East 
Europeans. How much will Eastern input' aid the process of eastern 
enlargement? Would the East Europeans attempt to mobilise pressure on 
the Germans? However, if the Germans were unable to keep promises 
already made, what impact would this have on co-operation in this region? 
The domestic policy process has an impact on European policy 
decisions. It would appear on the surface that there is an overall consensus 
in the policy-making arena regarding Germany's Ostpolitik; but the internal 
policy debate on eastern enlargement is far more complex. Although, official 
rhetoric may advance the cause of eastern enlargement, the process in 
practice may prove to be problematic, with contradictions emerging in the 
official discourse. An analysis of the role of different actors in the policy 
. process and their impact on decisions regarding Eastern enlargement is 
imperative. As argued previously the policy-making process and the nature 
of the political system in Germany means that responsibility for policy 
formation in a given policy area is divided, with the result that the 
governm~nt is not a monolithic, autonomous and coherent actor. Therefore, 
any analysis of eastern enlargement in general and the sub issues would 
require an examination of the input of the Ministries, the Lander, parties, 
interest groups and even public opinion in the formation of policy. 
Accordingly, the research would analyse the role and priorities of the new 
Lander, particularly their concerns regarding agricultural and structural 
funds. The research would examine the role of individual ministries and the 
pressure they. are able to place on the general policy regarding Eastern 
enlargement. The role of public opinion and affected interest groups such 
as the DBV would also be considered. 
The policy-making arena becomes relevant at the subnational, national 
and European level. The role of the Germans gains fundamental 
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importance at the European level in reconciling the divergent views of the 
other member states. Eastern enlargement impinges on the direct interests 
of some member states. What will be the role of other member states in the 
negotiation process? How far are the interests and concerns of these 
member states likely to affect the route that Eastern enlargement takes. 
It would be possible to build upon the research carried out in this thesis 
using eastern enlargement as a case study. The taxonomic model could be 
utilised to explain Germany's actions in the EU with regard to eastern 
enlargement and individual sectoral issues within that debate. The model 
could be a useful tool to decipher which end of the spectrum eastern 
enlargement falls in 'assertive' or 'compliant'. The analysis of the policy 
sectors in this thesis could be carried further to consider whether the 
dynamics of the migration and agriculture sectors will complicate 
Germany's approach to eastern enlargement within the EU. Will it possible 
for the Germans to surmount these areas of concern for its overall strategic 
interests in eastern enlargement. What role is Germany, a key actor in the 
process, likely to play in the negotiations: will the Germans create or 
frustrate the framework for Eastern enlargement? 
\' 
The novelty of the arguments presented in this thesis is in the synthesis 
of the three characteristics contained in the model enlightening Germany's 
role in the EU within those policy sectors. The thesis also contributes to the 
body of knowledge of the impact of unification on agriculture and migration 
in the English language. The contribution is the analysis of the sectoral 
nature of Germany's role in the EU where overriding European aims are 
either undermined or furthered by the issue in question. The value added is 
in the' comparison of these two key policy areas which present challenges, 
although differing in nature, for Germany in the post-unification period. 
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